Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation et al v. Chervon North America Inc

Filing 40

ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 4/27/15: denying 23 Snap-on's Motion to Disqualify; and denying as moot 22 Snap-on's Motion to Intervene. (cc: all counsel) (nm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MILWAUKEE ELECTRIC TOOL
CORPORATION, METCO BATTERY
TECHNOLOGIES LLC, AC (MACAO
COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED, and
TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES CO. LTD.,
v.

Case No. 14-CV-1288-JPS

Plaintiffs,

HILTI, INC.,
Defendant.

MILWAUKEE ELECTRIC TOOL
CORPORATION, METCO BATTERY
TECHNOLOGIES LLC, AC (MACAO
COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED, and
TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES CO. LTD.,
v.

Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . No..14-CV-1289-JPS

Plaintiffs,

CHERVON NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant.
MILWAUKEE ELECTRIC TOOL
CORPORATION, METCO BATTERY
TECHNOLOGIES LLC, AC (MACAO
COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED, and
TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES CO. LTD.,
v.

Plaintiffs,

SUNRISE GLOBAL MARKETING, LLC,
Defendant.

Case No. 14-CV-1290-JPS

MILWAUKEE ELECTRIC TOOL
CORPORATION, METCO BATTERY
TECHNOLOGIES LLC, AC (MACAO
COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED, and
TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES CO. LTD.,

Case No. 14-CV-1294-JPS

Plaintiffs,

v.

TOOLTECHNIC SYSTEMS LLC,
Defendant.

MILWAUKEE ELECTRIC TOOL
CORPORATION, METCO BATTERY
TECHNOLOGIES LLC, AC (MACAO
COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED, and
TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES CO. LTD.,

Case No. 14-CV-1295-JPS

Plaintiffs,

v.

POSITEC TOOL CORPORATION and
POSITEC USA, INC.,
Defendants.

ORDER

In the above-captioned cases, Snap-on Incorporated (“Snap-on”) filed
identical motions to intervene and motions to disqualify the law firm DLA
Piper LLP from representing the plaintiffs.1 The motions are now fully
briefed and ready for disposition. After careful consideration, the Court
denies without prejudice Snap-on’s motions to disqualify DLA Piper and
denies the motions to intervene as moot.

1

It may be very confusing to cite to the docket sheets in each of the separate
cases. As such, the Court will do so sparingly and only where absolutely necessary.

Page 2 of 16

1.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
The plaintiffs filed eight separate cases in this Court on October 14,

2014, alleging patent infringement against several defendants, including:
Richpower Industries Inc., Hilti, Inc., Chervon North America, Inc., Sunrise
Global Marketing, LLC, Max USA Corp., Tooltechnic Systems LLC, Positec
Tool Corporation and Positec USA, Inc., and Snap-on Incorporated. (Case
Nos. 14-CV-1286, 14-CV-1288, 14-CV-1289, 14-CV-1290, 14-CV-1292, 14-CV1294, 14-CV-1295, 14-CV-1296 respectively.).3 The plaintiffs allege that the
defendants infringed the ‘290 patent, the ‘173 patent, and the ‘510 patent. The
plaintiffs allege infringement of two additional patents, the ‘257 patent and
‘167 patent, in their cases against defendants Chervon and Positec. All of the
patents-in-suit relate to alleged inventions in the area of Lithium-ion
(“Li-Ion”) powered handheld cordless power tools and related technologies
for controlling and charging battery packs for such tools. The same lawyers
appeared for the plaintiffs in seven of the eight cases (the “DLA Piper
Cases”)4 from Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren, s.c.; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
LLP; and DLA Piper. DLA Piper did not appear in the case against Snap-on,
Case No. 14-CV-1296.
Snap-on is a current client of DLA Piper and has been a client for
approximately twenty years. (Docket #16-1, Declaration of Irwin M.

2

The parties do not appear to dispute the underlying facts.

3

After the filing of the present motions, defendants Richpower Industries
Inc. and Max USA Corp. filed joint stipulations with the plaintiffs to dismiss the
cases against them. (14-CV-1286, Docket #26; 14-CV-1292, Docket #32). As such,
these defendants are no longer relevant to the motions to disqualify.
4

For clarity, the Court notes that the “DLA Piper Cases” now refers to five
of the six remaining cases as a result of the aforementioned voluntary dismissals.

Page 3 of 16

Shur (“Shur Decl.”) ¶ 2). DLA Piper has represented Snap-on in hundreds
of matters primarily relating to obtaining, enforcing, and defending
Snap-on's U.S. and international trademarks. (Shur Decl. ¶ 2). DLA Piper’s
representation of the plaintiffs in the other cases was not immediately
apparent to Snap-on because DLA Piper did not appear as counsel for the
plaintiffs in the complaint against Snap-on. (Shur Decl. ¶ 6). In early
November 2014, Snap-on called its DLA Piper relationship partner, Gina
Durham, to raise its concerns about the conflict.
In 2013, Milwaukee Tool approached DLA Piper about enforcing its
patents. (Declaration of Sean C. Cunningham (“Cunningham Decl.”) ¶ 2.). A
preliminary conflicts check revealed that one of the potential adverse parties,
Snap-on, was a current client of DLA Piper. (Cunningham Decl.¶ 3). The
DLA Piper lawyers who represent Milwaukee Tool in the DLA Piper Cases
have never performed work for Snap-on. (Cunningham Decl.¶ 3; see also
Declaration of Erin Gibson (“Gibson Decl.”) ¶ 2). Additionally, DLA Piper
has not represented Snap-on in any matter involving Milwaukee Tool or its
patents. (Cunningham Decl. ¶ 3). DLA Piper maintains that its attorneys
representing Milwaukee Tool took appropriate measures in 2013 to ensure
they were screened from anything related to Snap-on. (Cunningham Decl. ¶
9). However, the DLA Piper attorneys who represent Snap-on were not
informed of the situation until after different counsel filed the Snap-on Case
on behalf of Milwaukee Tool. Snap-on’s relationship partner did not know
about DLA Piper’s representation of Milwaukee Tool until November 2014.
(Cunningham Decl. ¶ 9).
Snap-on alleges that numerous common issues of fact and law exist
that make DLA Piper directly adverse to Snap-on. On December 13, 2014, the

Page 4 of 16

plaintiffs proposed a stipulation to consolidate the cases because they
“involve the same or similar patents [and] common questions of law and fact
are pervasive.” (Shur Decl., Ex. C). Additionally, Snap-on identifies other
common issues , including: (1) a stay of the proceedings pending Inter Partes
Review;5 (2) damages related to a reasonable royalty; and (3) a permanent
injunction under 35 U.S.C. § 283. Snap-on maintains that DLA Piper’s
disqualification is necessary because the plaintiffs’ positions in all cases create
direct adversity.
2.

DISCUSSION
2.1

Legal Standard

Attorneys practicing before this Court are subject to the Wisconsin
Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, which are adopted by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. General L.R. 83(d)(1); see also Weber v. McDorman,
No. 00-CV-0381, 2000 WL 43237498, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 11, 2000) (“It is
common practice in federal courts to apply state rules of professional
conduct.”).
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule (“SCR”) 20:1:7 prohibits an attorney
from representing a client if that representation is directly adverse to another
client:

5

Since the filing of the present motion, the Court has denied the defendants’
motions to stay. On February 10, 2015, the defendants filed a petition for writ of
mandamus requesting that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit vacate this Court’s order denying Defendants’ motions to stay. On February
19, 2015, the Federal Circuit, issued an order denying Petitioners' petition for a writ
of mandamus and denying the motion. As such, the motions to stay are no longer
a common issue among the related cases.

Page 5 of 16

(a)

Except as provided in par. (b) [involving written conflict
waivers], a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.
A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1)

the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client; or

(2)

there is a significant risk that the representation
of one or more clients will be materially limited
by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client,
a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer.

Under SCR 20:1.7(b), each affected client may waive the conflict
provided the client gives informed consent, confirmed in a signed writing.
As an initial matter, the Court notes it is unable to locate any specific
guidance within this circuit discussing disqualification of counsel as a result
of direct adversity.6 In general, however, the Seventh Circuit has made clear
that disqualification of counsel is a “drastic measure which courts should
hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.” Freeman v. Chicago
Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982) (declining to
disqualify a law firm representing a party where an associate of the firm was
at one time an associate member for the firm representing the adverse party).
In Freeman, the court noted that motions to disqualify should be resolved
with extreme caution because they may be used abusively as a litigation
tactic. Id at 722. Disqualification, while protecting the “sacrosanct privacy of
the attorney client relationship,” at the same time “destroy[s] a relationship
by depriving a party of representation of their own choosing.” Id. As such,
“‘the moving [party] bears the heavy burden of proving facts required for

6

Likewise, the parties’ briefs on this issue discuss mainly unpublished
district court cases analyzing similar professional rules from other states.

Page 6 of 16

disqualification.’” E2Interactive, Inc. v. Blackhawk Networks, Inc., No.
09-CV-629, 2010 WL 1981640, at *4 (W.D. Wis. May 17, 2010) (quoting Evans
v. Artek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 794 (2d Cir. 1983)); see also Commonwealth Ins.
Co. v. Stone Container Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 938, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
2.2

Analysis

Snap-on argues that DLA Piper must be disqualified from
representing the plaintiffs in this litigation. The parties do not dispute that
Snap-on is a current client of DLA Piper. And, Snap-on recognizes that DLA
Piper is not representing the plaintiffs in the Snap-on Case, No. 14-CV-1296.
Nevertheless, Snap-on argues that DLA Piper’s representation of the
plaintiffs in the related cases creates direct adversity between DLA Piper and
Snap-on, which requires disqualification. Thus, the issue before the Court is
whether there exists direct adversity between Snap-on and the plaintiffs’
positions in the related cases. As discussed in detail below, although this is
a close question, the Court finds no direct adversity and, thus, will deny the
motions for disqualification.
The parties each rely on various, non-binding cases—with Snap-on
analogizing the present facts to cases finding direct adversity and the
plaintiffs to cases finding no direct adversity. As such, the Court finds it
helpful to briefly summarize these cases, noting similarities and differences
to the present case where appropriate.
Snap-on cites to Arrowpac Inc. v. Sea Star Line, LLC, Nos. 3:12-CV-1180,
et al., 2013 WL 5460027 at *10 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2013) as a “leading” case
where direct adversity and disqualification occurred. The court in Arrowpac
disqualified Baker & Hostetler as counsel for Sea Star, a defendant in four
co-pending cases. Id. at *2. Although Baker did not represent Sea Star in the
case in which its other clients, Nestle and YRCW, were plaintiffs, it was
disqualified from representing Sea Star in the related cases because Baker
Page 7 of 16

was “impermissively acting directly adverse to the interests of Nestle and
YRCW.” Id. The court’s ruling relied on the history of the cases (with certain
issues already arising) and the representations of Sea Star of what was to
come. Id. at *10. Notably, the court pointed out that Sea Star had already
indicated on multiple occasions that its next move in the litigation was filing
a motion to dismiss the claims of all plaintiffs in all cases (all of which would
rely in part on the same filed-rate doctrine). Id. Additionally, a Baker attorney
already had signed a motion to dismiss Nestlé’s case. Id. Although the court
recognized that disqualification is a drastic measure, it held that the “unique
factual situation” presented necessitated disqualification. Id.
Snap-on also cites Rembrandt Techs., LP v. Comcast Corp., No.
2:05-CV-443, 2000 WL 470631, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2007), in support of
finding direct adversity. Fish and Richardson (“F&R”) originally appeared
for plaintiff Rembrandt Technologies, LP, in two cases but not in the third,
where Rembrandt sued Time Warner, an F&R client. Id. at *1. F&R withdrew
from one of the two cases in which it had appeared, but refused to withdraw
from both. Id. Time Warner moved to intervene and to disqualify F&R in
the case in which it continued to appear for Rembrandt. Id. The court
recognized that “the mere possibility of overlapping Markman proceedings
is insufficient to show direct diversity, particularly when the trials of how
the constructions will apply to accused products or conduct varies from
defendant to defendant.” Id. at *4. In the end, however, the court granted the
motion to intervene and the motion to disqualify F&R and concluded that
F&R did not need to appear in the case against Time Warner for it to be
“directly adverse” to its client. Id. The court found significant the fact that a
finding of infringement and an injunction issued by the court against any
cable company that followed industry standards “would have a significant
practical effect” on F&R’s other client, Time Warner. Id.
Page 8 of 16

Finally, Snap-on cites to Celgard, LLC v. LG Chem, LTD, Nos.
2014-1675, -1733, -1806, 2014 WL 7691765, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 10, 2014)
(non-precedential order). In Celgard, Jones Day had appeared for Celgard to
enforce a preliminary injunction Celgard had obtained against suppliers of
lithium batteries. Id. at *1. The complaint had named only the battery
supplier and its affiliated companies, not Apple, a long-time client of Jones
Day. Id. The court granted Apple’s motions to intervene and to disqualify,
finding direct adversity because:
Apple faces not only the possibility of finding a new battery
supplier, but also additional targeting by Celgard in an attempt
to use the injunction issue as leverage in negotiating a business
relationship. Thus, in every relevant sense, Jones Day’s
representation of Celgard is adverse to Apple’s interests.
Id. at *2.
In contrast, the plaintiffs analogize the present situation to three
cases where courts have found no direct adversity and denied the motions
to disqualify. In Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc. (“MPT”), No.
10-CV-2618, 2011 WL 1636928, at *1, the Quinn Emmanuel (“Quinn”) law
firm represented MPT in a patent case against several defendants. Id. Using
different counsel, MPT filed a separate case in the same court against several
other defendants, including DirecTV, a then-current Quinn client. Id. DirecTV
intervened in MPT and moved to disqualify Quinn, arguing that the
positions Quinn would have to advance on behalf of MPT with regard to
claim construction, infringement, invalidity, licensing, damages and patent
exhaustion could be adverse to DirecTV’s interests in its lawsuit with MPT.
Id. at *2. The court recognized that DirecTV’s litigation would likely proceed
before the allegedly conflicted counsel would take adverse positions in the
second case due to the separate briefing schedule. Id. at *4. Additionally, the
court recognized that the accused products were not the same and therefore
Page 9 of 16

that Quinn could “not take any position in [the] litigation that would
necessarily be adverse to DirecTV.” Id. at *3. The court held that any potential
conflict was “speculative” and there was no direct adversity requiring
disqualification. Id. at *4.
In Sumitomo Corp. v. J. P. Morgan & Co., No. 99 CIV. 4004, 2000 WL
145747, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000), Sumitomo engaged the law firm of
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (“Paul Weiss”) to represent it in
a lawsuit against J.P. Morgan involving an alleged copper trading scheme.
Sumitomo, 2000 WL 145747, at *1. Sumitomo hired another law firm to
represent it against Paul Weiss client Chase Manhattan Bank (“Chase”) in a
separate lawsuit involving the same trading scheme. Id. at *2. After the Court
consolidated the Chase and J.P. Morgan cases, Chase moved to disqualify
Paul Weiss from representing Sumito. Id. at *5. The court denied the motion
to disqualify, stating:
There is no danger that Paul Weiss’[s] participation in this case
will adversely impact its representation of Chase in the other
matters. The issues involved in this action are totally unrelated
to the issues in the matters in which Paul Weiss represents
Chase. While one can understand that Chase’s in-house
counsel might be unhappy that a law firm which represents it
in some matters was taking a position in litigation involving
another client that, if adopted, would prejudice an argument
that Chase was advancing in a separate case, that does not
mean that the law firm is violating a confidence of its client or
engaging in unethical conduct.
Id. at *4.
Finally, the plaintiffs analogize this case to Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera
Corp., 468 F. Supp. 2d 359, 367 (D. Conn. 2007), where the court denied a
motion to disqualify. In Enzo, the law firm of Hunton & Williams (“Hunton”)
represented Enzo Biochem as the plaintiff in a patent case against Applera.

Page 10 of 16

Id. at 361. Enzo also sued a different defendant, Amersham, in a separate case
using different counsel. Id. Amersham later was acquired by a long-standing
Hunton client GE. Id. GE intervened to disqualify Hunton and argued that
the duty of loyalty prevented Hunton from representing Enzo because there
was “significant overlap” between the two patent cases, and because Hunton
and Greenberg Traurig lawyers regularly discussed “important issues such
as claim construction.” Id. at 360, 363. The court noted that:
[W]hile the construction of Enzo’s patents applicable to the
infringement claims brought against two separate accused
infringers, Amersham and Applera, implicates pretrial
Markman overlap, the trials of how those constructions apply
to the respective accused products or conduct are wholly
separate.
Id. at 367. The court ultimately found no direct adversity and denied the
motion for disqualification. Id.
Here, after careful consideration of the balance between the duty of
loyalty against the right to choose one’s own counsel, the Court finds no
direct adversity in this case and, thus, disqualification is not warranted. The
Court notes, however, that the result in this instance is far from crystal clear.
The parties’ briefs each cleverly highlight the factual similarities of favorable
cases and shy away from any distinctions. Admittedly, there are several
factual similarities between Snap-on’s cited cases and the issue at hand, and
the Court recognizes the various distinctions with plaintiffs’ cited cases.
However, the Court nonetheless finds that, after consideration of all factors,
this is not a “unique factual situation” that necessitates the drastic measure
of disqualification. See, e.g, Arrowpac, 2013 WL 5460027, at *10.

Page 11 of 16

Neither the historical nor future implications that the Court took
issue with in Arrowpac, Snap-on’s “leading” case, are present here. Unlike
Arrowpac, there is no evidence here that DLA Piper has participated in any
motion brought by Milwaukee Tool against Snap-on or opposed any motion
brought by Snap-on against Milwaukee Tool. Additionally, unlike Arrowpac,
the Court here would need a “crystal ball to predict [the plaintiffs’] very next
moves in this litigation.” Id. at *10. Indeed, two of the seven DLA Piper cases
have been dismissed voluntarily since the filing of the motions to disqualify
and a third has notified the Court by a letter that it intends to settle the case.
And finally, although Snap-on takes great issue with the logistical issues of
future depositions—suggesting that DLA Piper would be responsible for
participating and objecting on behalf of plaintiffs’ witnesses for seven-eighths
of the questioning while another law firm handled one-eighth (Reply, at 7)
—the Court finds this concern to be speculative at best. In Arrowpac, there
was direct evidence presented that Baker intended to participate in
depositions in such a manner. Id. at *11. (noting that during a hearing, the
Court inquired as to how Baker would handle a deposition of a CEO from
Sea Star). There is no such evidence here, and the Court will not speculate as
to how the parties will conduct discovery.7 See MPT, 2011 WL 1636928, at *4.
Snap-on argues that Enzo and Sumitomo are not persuasive here
because they were burdened by the Second Circuit’s high disqualification
standard. (Reply at 3-4). The Court disagrees. The Court recognizes that the

7

Moreover, the Court also notes that it is unaware of the parties’ discovery
schedule in this matter. The cases were filed on October 14, 2014, and the
scheduling conference held on January 30, 2015. Given the timing of this case and
the impending dispositive motion deadlines, the Court can only presume that at
least a portion of the discovery process has begun.

Page 12 of 16

Second Circuit requires disqualification “only if there is a significant risk that
an attorney’s conduct will taint the trial.” Sumitomo, 2000 WL 145747, at *3.
However, in addressing the overarching question of whether disqualification
was warranted, the courts in Sumitomo and Enzo both analyzed the same
issue presented here—namely, whether direct adversity existed.8 As such, the
Court finds no reason to exclude the persuasive reasoning of Sumitomo and
Enzo in its direct adversity analysis under the Seventh Circuit disqualification
standard.9 Additionally, Snap-on argues that the plaintiffs’ cases are
unpersuasive because the unique timing in this case—the filing of eight
lawsuits, on the same day in the same court, and on the same
patents—creates direct adversity. (See Reply at 2-3). The Court readily
recognizes this distinction and agrees that these factors present a much closer
call than previous cases. However, the Court declines to find that the

8

Specifically, Sumitomo analyzed New York’s Code of Professional
Responsibility Rule 5-105 which “forbids a lawyer from representing a client if that
representation will adversely affect the interests of another current client.”
Sumitomo, 2000 WL 145747, at *3 (quoting N.Y.Code DR 5-105(A)-(B)). Enzo
analyzed Rule 1.7 of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct which provides
that a concurrent conflict of interest exists if “the representation of one client will
be directly adverse to another client.” Enzo, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 364-65 (quoting
Conn. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.7 cmt.).
9

Of course, while the Seventh Circuit standard for disqualification may not
be as high as that of the Second Circuit, this does not negate the fact that the bar for
disqualification remains extremely high. See Freeman, 689 F.2d at 721 (finding that
disqualification of counsel is a “drastic measure which courts should hesitate to
impose except when absolutely necessary”).

Page 13 of 16

coordination of these cases, even on these facts, is dispositive in a finding of
direct adversity.10
Here, as in Sumitomo, DLA Piper “is not involved in attempting to
establish wrongdoing by [Snap-on] or seeking a judgment that will directly
impact [Snap-on].” Sumitomo, 2000 WL 145747, at *5. Snap-on’s products are
not at issue in the related DLA Piper cases and the plaintiffs do not allege
that the defendants’ products infringe because they comply with a technical
industry standard. (Pl’s Opp. at 9) (noting the distinction with Rembrandt).
Moreover, there is no evidence that DLA Piper has performed any
substantive legal work for Snap-on with respect to the patents at issue in this
case. (See Cunningham Decl. ¶ 3). The Court agrees that, here, “the mere
possibility of overlapping Markman proceedings is insufficient to show direct
diversity, particularly when the trials of how the constructions will apply to
accused products or conduct varies from defendant to defendant.”
Rembrandt, 2007 WL 470631, at *4. The Court recognizes Snap-on’s concern
that DLA Piper will be making arguments on behalf of the plaintiffs with
respect to patent validity that are contrary to the views of Snap-on, however,
this issue is one relating to the circumstances of the plaintiffs’ patents and
independent of the specific circumstances of Snap-on. See Enzo, 468 F. Supp.
2d at 367.

10

The Milwaukee Tool cases have not been consolidated; rather, they have
been coordinated for only pretrial purposes and not for trial. Notably, the Sumimoto
court found that even consolidation of the actions for pretrial purposes did not
create a conflict. Sumitomo, 2000 WL 145747, at *5 (“Upon consolidation, no conflict
arises because consolidation does not merge separate lawsuits into a single action
and does not make parties in one lawsuit parties in another.”)

Page 14 of 16

Finally, the Court declines to disqualify DLA Piper in part due to its
sincere concern that disqualification motions may be used as an “abusive
litigation tactic.” See Freeman, 689 F.2d at 722. The defendants in this case
have requested a stay in this case twice already, including a petition for writ
of mandamus requesting that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit vacate this Court’s order denying the motions to stay, none
of which were successful. Moreover, Snap-on became aware of the alleged
conflict in early November 2014 (Decl. Irwin ¶ 7), however, the motions to
disqualify were not filed until late January 2015, nearly three months later,
and not fully briefed until March 2015, going well into the discovery period.
And, although the Court recognizes that the plaintiffs are sophisticated
corporate entities with in-house legal counsel and have additional
representation through Reinhart, there is nonetheless a concern that DLA
Piper’s disqualification may prejudice the plaintiffs with the July 31, 2015
deadline for dispositive motions quickly approaching. As the parties are now
well aware, this Court takes very seriously its obligation to comply with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 requiring the rules to be construed and
administered “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.” Thus, after considering all factors, the Court
finds that Snap-on has not met its “heavy burden” of showing the necessity
of disqualifying DLA Piper; thus, the balance in this case tips toward denial
of the disqualification motions.
3.

CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the Court finds that the drastic measure of

disqualification i2 not warranted in this instance. As such, Snap-on’s Motions

Page 15 of 16

to Disqualify will be denied. As a result, the Court is obliged to deny the
Motions to Intervene as moot.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Snap-on’s Motions to Disqualify (14-CV-1288,
Docket #14; 14-CV-1289 Docket #23; 14-CV-1290, Docket #22; 14-CV-1294,
Docket #22; 14-CV-1295, Docket #21)be and the same are hereby DENIED;
and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Snap-on’s Motions to Intervene (14CV-1288, Docket #13; 14-CV-1289, Docket #22; 14-CV-1290, Docket #21; 14CV-1294, Docket #21; 14-CV-1295, Docket #20) be and the same are hereby
DENIED as moot.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 27th day of April, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

Page 16 of 16