Easterling v. Thurmer et al
Filing
126
ORDER signed by Judge Pamela Pepper on 2/22/2017 GRANTING 71 Defendants' motion for summary judgment; GRANTING 119 Plaintiff's motion to refile his response to defendants' proposed findings of fact; GRANTING 121 Plaintiff's motion to seal Exhibit 747 and to file a redacted copy; and DISMISSING Complaint. (cc: all counsel; by US Mail to plaintiff) (pwm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________________
CLARENCE M. EASTERLING,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 14-cv-1392-pp
v.
DEBRA ADAMS, TIM HAINES,
and CINDY O’DONNELL,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 71), GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO REFILE HIS RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT (DKT. NO. 119), AND GRANTING HIS MOTION TO
SEAL EXHIBIT 747 AND TO FILE A REDACTED COPY (DKT. NO. 121)
______________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiff Clarence M. Easterling, who is representing himself, is
incarcerated at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility (WSPF). On June 15,
2015, Judge Rudolph Randa (the judge assigned to the case at that time)
screened the plaintiff’s amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. §1915A, and
permitted him to proceed on claims that eight of the nineteen defendants
named in the complaint had violated his constitutional rights when they
refused to allow him visits with his minor daughter. Dkt. No. 20.
On December 28, 2015, this court (signing on behalf of Judge Randa,
who had written the order but was not in the office to sign it due to medical
issues) granted in part defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt.
No. 61. Judge Randa dismissed five of the eight defendants—Michael Thurmer,
1
Richard Raemisch, Pamela Fuller, Philip Kingston, and Jane Doe—because he
found that the plaintiff’s claims against them were barred by the statute of
limitations. See id. at 3-6.
In his complaint, the plaintiff sought several kinds of relief. He asked the
court to issue an injunction ordering “all defendants who have authority to do
so” to allow him visitation with his daughter. Dkt. No. 1 at 15. He asked for a
declaratory judgment, declaring that he had a right to visitation with his
daughter. Id. And he asked for “presumed,” compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. at 15-17. In its December 28, 2015 order, the court dismissed the
plaintiff’s claims against Cindy O’Donnell in her personal capacity, and
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for money damages against her. Dkt. No. 61 at 9.
Defendant O’Donnell remained in the case only in her official capacity, with
relation to the plaintiff’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief.
On February 19, 2016, the remaining defendants (Debra Adams, Tim
Haines, and O’Donnell) filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 71.
That motion was fully briefed on June 29, 2016.1 On July 7, 2016, Judge
Randa referred the case to Magistrate Judge Patricia Gorence for mediation.
Dkt. No. 109. On August 2, 2016, the case was reassigned to this court. On
October 18, 2016, Judge Gorence advised the court that mediation was
unsuccessful, and she returned the case to the court.
1
Shortly after filing his response materials, the plaintiff filed two motions. The
first requested that the court allow him to refile his responses to the
defendants’ proposed findings of fact in order to reproduce the defendants’
original proposed facts. Dkt. No. 119. The second requested the court to allow
him to seal Exhibit 741, and file a redacted version of the exhibit for the public
docket. Dkt. No. 121. The court will grant both motions.
2
For the reasons explained in this decision, the court grants the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and dismisses this case.
I.
RELEVANT FACTS2
A.
The 2004 Visitation Request and Denial at Waupun
In 2004, while incarcerated at Waupun Correctional Institution, the
plaintiff asked, in accordance with the relevant policies, that institution
officials allow him to have visits with his three-year old daughter. Dkt. No. 106
¶37. Pamela Fuller (who is no longer a defendant), acting as the warden’s
designee, completed a form denying that request. Dkt. No. 105 at 4. In the
form, Fuller explained,
[Warden Kingston] has reasonable grounds to believe
that the inmate’s offense history indicates there may
be a problem with the proposed visitation [309.08(4)(f);
[and]
[Warden Kingston] has reasonable grounds to believe
that [the proposed visitor] may be subjected to
victimization. [309.08(4)(g)].
Dkt. No. 106 at ¶39.
The plaintiff appealed the denial through the inmate complaint review
system. Id. at ¶40. Inmate Complaint Examiner (ICE) James Muenchow (who is
no longer a defendant) found that the denial complied with Wis. Admin. Code §
DOC 309.08(4)(f) and (4)(g). Id. at ¶41. He explained that warden’s decision
refusing to approve a proposed visitor is both discretionary and unconditional,
The court takes the facts from the “Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to
Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact” (dkt. no. 106) and the “Response to
Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Additional Fact and Conclusions of Law in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment” (dkt. no. 105).
2
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and that an ICE would not challenge or second-guess the warden’s discretion.
Id. He then recommended that the offender complaint be dismissed. Id.
Michael Thumer (who no longer is a defendant) was a deputy warden at
Waupun at this time; he agreed with Muenchow’s recommendation and
dismissed the offender complaint, finding no reason to overrule the visitation
decision. Id. at ¶7, 42.
The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Corrections Complaint
Examiner’s (CCE) office, which recommended that the appeal be dismissed. Id.
at ¶43. The Office of the Secretary accepted the CCE’s recommendation, and
dismissed the appeal. Id. at ¶44. The plaintiff also appealed the denial to Philip
Kingston (who no longer is a defendant), the warden at Waupun at that time.
Id. at ¶45. Kingston responded to the appeal with the following:
I am in receipt of your correspondence of 12/21/04
appealing the denial of your daughter to your approved
visiting list. I note you have appealed this denial
through the Inmate Complaint Review System and
have since received a decision from the Secretary of
the Department of Corrections. The reason for denial is
clearly stated in the complaint decision.
You ask if you will ever be allowed to visit with your
daughter while you are incarcerated. You have the
ability to influence that decision through your
participation
and
successful
completion
of
recommended treatment programming.
Id.
The plaintiff’s recommended programming included Cognitive Group
Intervention Program, Vocational Education, Sex Offender Treatment, and
Anger Management. Id. at ¶46.
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B.
Policies for Requesting Visitors at WSPF
Pursuant to DAI Policy #309.06.01 and WSPF Procedure #900.302.01,
the current process for obtaining approval for a visitor at WSPF is as follows:
(a) The inmate is responsible for mailing a Visitor
Questionnaire form (DOC-21AA) to proposed
visitors.
(b) Each proposed visitor, including minors, shall
complete a DOC-21AA form and send the completed
form directly to the facility where the inmate is
currently placed.
(c) Once the DOC-21AA form is returned, it is screened
for completeness, legibility, appropriate signatures,
conformance to the allowable number of visitors on
the Visitor List, and the elapsed time since any
previous denials or removals of a proposed visitor
from the inmate’s visitor list.
(d) Upon return of the DOC-21AA form, a background
check of the proposed visitor is conducted including
his or her relationship to or activities with the
inmate.
(e) Input from an agent may be requested under
special circumstances. Any agent recommendations
for denial shall be accompanied by designation on a
DOC-2429 form, of which administrative code
would apply to the denial, and a narrative
explanation of why the agent believes the code
applies.
(f) When considering visitors for inmates with
sexually-related offenses, a completed Sex Offender
Assessment Report (DOC-1577 or DOC-1577A)
must be in the inmate’s file and have been reviewed
prior to approval.
(g) Consultation from Psychological Services staff
should be requested when there is a possibility of
victimization and staff cannot arrive at a clear
decision regarding visitation.
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(h) If the proposed visitor is denied, a Denial letter
(DOC-161) is completed stating the reasons for the
denial based on criteria identified under Wis.
Admin. Code §DOC 309.08(4), such as the Warden
has reasonable grounds to believe that the inmate’s
offense history indicates there may be a problem
with the proposed visitation or the proposed visitor
may be subjected to victimization.
(i) All visitor denials shall be staffed with a supervisor
prior to finalization of the denial.
(j) The proposed visitor may appeal the denial of
visitation in writing to the Warden/designee of the
facility where the inmate is located. An inmate may
appeal this decision through the inmate complaint
review system (ICRS).
(k) If a proposed visitor has been denied from the
visitor list, they may not resubmit a new Visitor
Questionnaire (DOC-21AA) for reconsideration for a
minimum of six months after denial.
Id. at ¶105.
In addition, Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 309.08(1)(f) permits inmates who
have been denied visits with a particular visitor to resubmit a proposed visitor’s
name for reconsideration after six months. Id. at ¶49.
C.
The Plaintiff’s 2013 Inquiries Regarding the 2004 Visitation Denial
The plaintiff was transferred to WSPF on April 11, 2013. Id. at ¶68.
Defendant Timothy Haines was the warden at WSPF at that time. Id. at ¶4.
Defendant Debra Adams was, and is, a probation and parole agent. Id. at ¶5.
Defendant Cindy O’Donnell manages special projects for the office of the
secretary. Id. at ¶6.
On May 13, 2013, the plaintiff sent an information request to defendant
Haines. Id. at ¶78. In the request, the plaintiff stated:
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Almost nine years have lapsed since my original
request to have my daughter placed on my visiting list
was submitted. She will be 12 in July of [2013] and I
have 25 years in prison. Will [WDOC] allow me to see
my daughter before she turns 18? Will DOC ever allow
me to receive a visit from daughter? It states on my
visitor list that the reason is under review; can my
daughter be placed on my approved visitor list? Please
provide me with a reason for your denial of the
request.
Id. at ¶87.
Haines states that he does not recall reading the plaintiff’s information
request at that time. Id. at ¶78, 89. Haines’s assistant, Stephanie Brown (who
is not a defendant), handled the plaintiff’s request by telling him to contact
Client Services. Id. at ¶78.
On May 15, 2013, defendant Adams received an email from Client
Services Assistant Mary Lee (who is not a defendant), asking for input into the
plaintiff’s request about whether he would be allowed visits with his daughter.
Id. at ¶79. Lee informed Adams that the plaintiff’s daughter had been denied
visitation on December 2, 2004, because the then-warden at Waupun had
reasonable grounds to believe that the inmate’s offense history indicated there
might be a problem with the proposed visitation, and that the proposed visitor
may be subject to victimization. Id. Lee also informed Adams that the plaintiff
was incarcerated in connection with convictions for armed robbery, disorderly
conduct, and second-degree sexual assault, which had been amended to
fourth-degree sexual assault. Id. at ¶80.
That same day, Lee sent a follow-up email to Adams, in which she
described correspondence from the then-warden written in 2005, which stated
7
that the plaintiff was to complete the recommended treatment program. Id. at
¶81. Lee noted that the plaintiff had been on the waiting list for the Sex
Offender Treatment (SOT) program since April 29, 2002, but that WSPF did not
offer SOT. Id.
Adams responded to Lee’s email shortly after she received it, and stated
that she agreed with Kingston’s decision that the plaintiff needed to complete
programming. Id. at ¶83. Lee responded to the plaintiff: “I did hear back from
your agent. She stated you do need to complete the programming.” Id.
Adams clarifies that her email to Lee was not a formal denial of a
visitation, because there was no outstanding visitation request to deny;
instead, her response provided only her opinion based on the limited and
general inquiry from Lee. Id. at ¶85. Had there been a formal visitation request,
Adams says, she would have expected there to be a completed Visitor
Questionnaire (DOC-21AA) or Visitor Questionnaire Assessment and
Evaluation (DOC-21HH) form, and she would have expected the prison to
request a formal investigation. Id.
When the prison requests a formal investigation, it asks the agent (here,
Adams) to conduct an investigation and then fill out a form in WICS (the
Wisconsin Integrated Corrections System, which helps the DOC track and
maintain information on an inmate) outlining his/her recommendation on the
proposed visitor. Id. at ¶86. Adams states that, given the wording of Lee’s
email, the absence of a completed visitor form, and the fact that no one asked
8
her to complete a WICS form, she did not interpret Lee’s email to be a formal
request for an investigation. Id.
On November 19, 2013, the plaintiff sent another information request to
Haines, stating that he wanted to have visits from his daughter but that he was
told he needed to complete SOT first. Id. at ¶87. He asked who was in charge of
SOT so that he could be put on the list. Id. The plaintiff did not clarify in his
request that the visitation “denial” had occurred nearly a decade earlier. Id.
Haines responded to the plaintiff on December 9, 2013, and informed
him that, if he was unhappy with the results of his daughter’s application for
visitation, he could file an inmate complaint in accordance with Wis. Admin.
Code DOC § 310, and/or his daughter could send a written appeal to Haines.
Id. at ¶90. Haines states that, when he wrote this response, he did not know
that the “denial” the plaintiff was referring to had occurred ten years earlier. Id.
at ¶91. He also explains that he did not believe the plaintiff’s
interview/information request slip was a formal visitation request, because the
plaintiff did not complete the visitation form or otherwise comply with the
policy. Id. at ¶89.
On January 1, 2014, the plaintiff filed an offender complaint asserting
that the denial of his visitation with his daughter was unreasonable and that
he wanted visits with his daughter. Id. at ¶92. The ICE, Ellen Ray (who is not a
defendant), recommended that the offender complaint be dismissed. Id. at ¶9394. On January 28, 2014, Haines, who reviewed the complaint to confirm that
staff had responded appropriately, dismissed the complaint. Id. at ¶95, 99. The
9
plaintiff appealed Haines’s decision to the CCE’s office; defendant Cindy
O’Donnell dismissed the appeal on February 27, 2014. Id. at ¶96, 98.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Summary Judgment Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
324 (1986); Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 629 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir.
2011). “Material facts” are those under the applicable substantive law that
“might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute
over “material fact” is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
A party asserting that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed
must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion
only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do
not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a
motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be
10
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to
testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
B.
The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
The alleged violation about which the plaintiff complains is the denial of
his request to have visits with his daughter. “Parents have a liberty interest,
protected by the Constitution, in having a reasonable opportunity to develop
close relations with their children.” Harris v. Donahue, 175 Fed. App’x 746,
747 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 483 (1990)).
In the prison context, however, “’the very object of imprisonment is
confinement,’ and ‘many of the liberties and privileges enjoyed by other citizens
must be surrendered by the prisoner.’” Id. at 748 (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta,
539 U.S. 126 (2003)). “When a prison policy . . . impinges on a prisoner’s
constitutional rights, courts assess whether it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.” Id. A court looks at four factors in making this
assessment:
(1) whether a rational connection exists between the
prison policy regulation and a legitimate governmental
interest advanced as its justification; (2) whether
alternative means of exercising the right are available
notwithstanding the policy or regulation; what effect
accommodating the exercise of the right would have on
guards, other prisoners, and prison resources
generally; and (4) whether ready, easy-to-implement
alternatives exist that would accommodate the
prisoner’s rights.
Id. (citing Overton at 132).
To prevail on a §1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate, in part, that
the defendants intentionally caused the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff’s
11
constitutional rights. See Donald v. Polk Cnty., 836 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir.
1988). In other words, the defendants must have personally caused or
participated in the alleged violation. Hildebrandt v. Illinois Dept. of Natural
Resources, 347 F.3d 1014, 1039 (7th Cir. 2003). Defendants Haines and
Adams argue, in part, that they were not personally involved in denying the
plaintiff’s request for visitations with his daughter. They explain that Kingston
made the one and only denial, in 2004. Any input Haines and Adams had in
2013 was limited to responding to the plaintiff’s general inquiries about
Kingston’s 2004 denial. The defendants emphasize that, following the 2004
denial, neither the plaintiff nor the mother of the plaintiff’s daughter ever
formally resubmitted his daughter’s name in an effort to have her added to the
plaintiff’s visitor list. Dkt. No. 106 at ¶50, 76.
Even if the institution’s denial of the plaintiff’s request to add his
daughter to his visitation list violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights (and
the court does not make a finding on that question one way or the other), the
court could not find Haines and Adams liable for that violation unless they
personally made or participated in the decision to deny the plaintiff’s request.
They did not. The undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff made only one
formal request for visitation with his daughter under the relevant policies. He
made that request in 2004, and neither Haines nor Adams had any
involvement in the decision to deny that request.
The plaintiff first argues that Haines and Adams should have known that
he intended his information requests to serve as formal requests for visitation.
12
This argument fails, however, because §1983 requires intentional action; in
other words, courts hold defendants liable only for what they actually knew,
not for what they should have known. Holding a defendant liable for what he or
she should have known would allow plaintiffs to bring §1983 suits based on
negligent conduct. The law is well settled that negligence is not actionable
under §1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 333-34 (1986); Davidson
v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986); Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788-89
(7th Cir. 2005).
Here, both Haines and Adams state that they did not view the plaintiff’s
information requests as formal requests for visitation, because the relevant
policies don’t allow inmates to make visitation requests in that way. Instead,
Haines and Adams viewed the information requests as just that: requests for
information, and they responded accordingly—quickly and without
investigation. The plaintiff has not provided evidence to rebut Haines’ and
Adams’ sworn explanations; he has not, for example, pointed to other
situations where these defendants handled similar informal requests for
information as formal visitation requests pursuant to policy, or shown that
either defendant went through the steps or investigations that normally would
occur after an inmate made a formal request. There is no evidence in the record
to support a conclusion that either Haines or Adams viewed the plaintiff’s
inquiries as formal requests. If the plaintiff did not make formal requests to
Haines or Adams, they cannot be held liable for denying such requests.
13
Second, the plaintiff argues that, if his informal inquiries were
insufficient to serve as formal requests, Haines or Adams should have advised
him to comply with the relevant policies for making a visitation request. This
argument also fails. The defendants have stated that they did not believe that
the plaintiff’s information requests were formal requests for visitation. If they
had viewed the information requests as an effort to ask that the plaintiff’s
daughter be added to his visitor list, it is possible that they might have
instructed him to comply with the relevant policies for making a formal
request. But even if they believed that the plaintiff was trying to make a formal
request and yet didn’t direct him to those policies, their failure to do so
wouldn’t have violated the Constitution. The alleged act of denying the plaintiff
his ability to visit with his daughter is what is actionable under the
Constitution, not the defendants’ alleged failure to inform the plaintiff of
relevant institutional policies.
Third, the plaintiff argues that he was prohibited from resubmitting a
formal request (as permitted by the relevant policies) because in 2004,
Kingston told him that he would not be permitted to visit with his daughter
until he completed SOT. The plaintiff overstates Kingston’s 2004
communications with him. The record evidence does not indicate that Kingston
ever told the plaintiff that he could not resubmit a request to visit with his
daughter. Rather, the record shows that when the plaintiff asked Kingston if he
would ever be allowed a visit from his daughter, Kingston stated, “You have the
ability to influence that decision through your participation and successful
14
completion of recommended treatment programming.” Dkt. No. 106 at ¶45
(emphasis added). Kingston’s response implies that if the plaintiff completed
the recommended treatment programming, it might help him with regard to the
decision on any future visitation request he might make. Further, Kingston did
not say that the plaintiff could not receive a visit from his daughter until he
completed the required programming, as the plaintiff argues; Kingston stated
only that completion of the programming could influence any future decision
about whether the plaintiff could have a visit from his daughter.
Kingston, the court also notes, was the warden at Waupun. Haines and
Adams worked at WSPF. The policies are clear that each warden has discretion
regarding who may visit inmates at that warden’s institution. Even if Kingston
had prohibited the plaintiff from submitting additional visitation requests
(which he did not) asking that his daughter be allowed to visit him at Waupun,
the plaintiff offers no evidence that a decision by Kingston would be binding on
the warden of WSPF.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that the court should construe Haines’
dismissal of the plaintiff’s inmate complaint as a formal denial of his request
for visitation with his daughter. The court declines to adopt this view.
Reviewing grievances typically does not expose prison officials to liability under
§1983, because ruling on grievances “does not cause or contribute to the
violation.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). It is undisputed
that the plaintiff did not follow the relevant policies for making a formal request
for visitation, so the institution never initiated a formal process for approving
15
the plaintiff’s daughter as a visitor. The process by which Haines reviewed the
inmate grievance differs greatly from the process by which Haines would have
reviewed a formal visitation request. If the court were to consider Haines’
decision in the grievance procedure as a decision on a visitation request, it
would essentially gut the requirement that inmates comply with the relevant
visitation policies. The court declines to substitute the grievance procedures for
an inmate’s obligation to comply with the relevant visitation policies.
In short, the court will dismiss the plaintiff’s claims against defendants
Haines and Adams, because they are not liable for Kingston’s decision to deny
the plaintiff’s visitation request.3 The court presumes, based on the relevant
policies, that the plaintiff’s daughter may resubmit a completed visitor form to
start the formal review process to determine whether she may be added to her
father’s visitor list. The court will not offer an advisory opinion as to how
Haines or Adams should evaluate such a request.
Finally, the court will also dismiss O’Donnell. The plaintiff asked that she
remain in the case because “a state official can be sued for injunctive relief.”
Dkt. No. 61 at 8. But the “injunctive relief” the plaintiff requested was an order
requiring the institution to allow the plaintiff to have visitation with his
daughter; because, to the court’s knowledge, no one at WSPF ever has denied a
formal, procedurally-correct request from the plaintiff to add his daughter to
his visitation list, such injunctive relief is not appropriate (and the plaintiff has
3
Because the court concludes that Haines and Adams were not personally
involved in denying the plaintiff’s visitation request, it is unnecessary for the
court to address whether any such denial was reasonable or whether the
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
16
not met the standard for injunctive relief). Because there is no basis for the
court to grant injunctive relief, it will dismiss O’Donnell in her official capacity.
III.
CONCLUSION
The court GRANTS the plaintiff’s motion for leave to refile his response to
defendants’ proposed findings of fact. Dkt. No. 119.
The court GRANTS the plaintiff’s motion to seal Exhibit 747, and for
leave to file a redacted copy of the exhibit. Dkt. No. 121.
The court GRANTS the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (dkt.
no. 71), and DISMISSES the plaintiff’s complaint. The clerk of court will enter
judgment accordingly.
This order and the judgment to follow are final. A dissatisfied party may
appeal this court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by
filing in this court a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of judgment.
See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, 4. This court may extend this
deadline if a party timely requests an extension and shows good cause or
excusable neglect for not being able to meet the 30-day deadline. See Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A).
Under certain circumstances, a party may ask this court to alter or
amend its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or ask for relief
from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Any motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) must be filed within 28 days of the entry
of judgment. The court cannot extend this deadline. See Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 6(b)(2). Any motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) must
17
be filed within a reasonable time, generally no more than one year after the
entry of the judgment. The court cannot extend this deadline. See Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2).
The court expects parties to closely review all applicable rules and
determine, what, if any, further action is appropriate in a case.
Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 22nd day of February, 2017.
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