Peace v. Unknown et al

Filing 25

DECISION AND ORDER signed by Judge Pamela Pepper on 9/15/2015 DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 3 Motion to Appoint Counsel ; GRANTING 8 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; GRANTING 9 Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint; DENYING AS MOOT 16 Motion for Use of Prison Release Account to Pay Partial Filing Fee; DENYING 23 Motion in Limine; and SCREENING Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (cc: all counsel; by US Mail to Plaintiff and Warden at Waupun CI) (pwm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________________
DANIEL ANTHONY PEACE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 14-cv-1416-pp

WARDEN PAUL KEMPER, LISA AVILA,
CAPTAIN DIEBOLD, K. ENGEL,
CO JONES, CO II LAMKE,
LT. ZIEM, CO II JOHN DOE 1, and
CO II JOHN DOE 2,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (DKT. NO. 8), DENYING WITHOUT
PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
(DKT. NO. 3), GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND/CORRECT
COMPLAINT (DKT. NO. 9), DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
USE OF PRISON RELEASE ACCOUNT TO PAY PARTIAL FILING FEE (DKT.
NO. 16), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE (DKT. NO. 23), AND
SCREENING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT
______________________________________________________________________________
The plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§1983, alleging that the defendants violated his civil rights while he was
incarcerated at the Sturtevant Transitional Facility. This order resolves the
plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the plaintiff’s motion
for appointment of counsel, the plaintiff’s motion to amend/correct the
complaint, the plaintiff’s motion for use of his prison release account to pay the
initial partial filing fee, and the plaintiff’s motion in limine, and as well as
screening of the plaintiff’s amended complaint.

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I.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
(DKT. NO. 8)
The Prison Litigation Reform Act applies to this case because the plaintiff

was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. 28 U.S.C. §1915. That law allows
a court to give an incarcerated plaintiff the ability to proceed with his lawsuit
without pre-paying the civil case-filing fee, as long as he meets certain
conditions. One of those conditions is a requirement that the plaintiff pay an
initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b). Once the plaintiff pays the initial
partial filing fee, the court may allow the plaintiff to pay the balance of the
$350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id.
On March 3, 2015, the court issued an order requiring the plaintiff to
pay an initial partial filing fee of $7.79. Dkt. No. 15. The plaintiff filed a motion
asking to use his prison release account to pay the partial filing fee, but the
court received the initial partial filing fee before it resolved that motion. The
court will deny the plaintiff’s motion to use his prison release account to pay
the initial partial filing fee as moot. Dkt. No. 16. The court will grant the
plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. No. 8), and will
allow the plaintiff to pay the balance of the $350.00 filing fee over time from his
prisoner account, as described at the end of this order.
II.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT (DKT. NO. 9)
On November 20, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend/correct

complaint. Dkt. No. 9. He supported his motion with an affidavit and attached
a proposed amended complaint and a number of exhibits.

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In his motion, the plaintiff asserts that he has identified a defendant who
was originally sued as a John Doe and also that he would like to add a request
for punitive damages. This motion complies with Civil Local Rule 15, and “the
court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
The court will grant the motion, and will screen plaintiff’s amended complaint.
III.

SCREENING OF PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT
(DKT. NO. 9-1)
A.

Standard for Screening Complaints

The law requires the court to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss part or all of
a complaint if the plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,”
that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§1915A(b).
A claim is legally frivolous when “it lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895,
900 (7th Cir. 1997). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous
where it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or where the
“factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
“Malicious,” although sometimes treated as a synonym for “frivolous,” “is more
usefully construed as intended to harass.” Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d
1107, 1109-10 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
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To state a claim under the federal notice pleading system, the plaintiff
must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is
entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff does not need to plead
specific facts, and his statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)). However, a complaint that offers “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To state a claim,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, “that is
plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint allegations “must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
In considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts follow the
principles set forth in Twombly. First, they must “identify[] pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A plaintiff must support legal conclusions
with factual allegations. Id. Second, if there are well-pleaded factual

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allegations, courts must “assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege
that the defendants: 1) deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States; and 2) acted under color of state law. Buchanan-Moore v.
Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Vill. of
North Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The court is obliged to give the plaintiff’s pro
se allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal construction. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)).
B.

Facts Alleged in the Amended Complaint

On March 27, 2014, while the plaintiff was on temporary lock up (TLU)
status at Sturtevant Transitional Facility (STF), another inmate was moved into
the plaintiff’s cell. Dkt No. 9-1 at 4. The next night, the plaintiff was asleep on
his stomach. Id. He was awakened by his cell mate pulling down his pants and
trying to put his penis in the plaintiff’s anus. Id. Later that night, the plaintiff
got the attention of correctional officers by faking an asthma attack. Id. The
plaintiff reported to Lt. Jones that he had been raped. Id.
Early in the morning on March 29, 2014, two sergeants escorted the
plaintiff to Wheaton Franciscan Healthcare, where a rape kit was taken and the
plaintiff was interviewed by the Racine County Sheriff’s Department. Id.

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A few days later, an inmate unit worker told the plaintiff that a first shift
correctional officer II (John Doe 1) said the plaintiff had been raped, but it
wasn’t really rape because the other guy said the plaintiff wanted him to do it.
Id. A day after that, someone put a poem about liking to have sex with men
under the plaintiff’s door. Id. Over the next few weeks, other detainees looked
at the plaintiff’s cell, pointed, and called the plaintiff gay. Id.
Three weeks after the rape, the plaintiff explained to Security Director
Lisa Avila and PREA investigator Diebold how he had been sexually assaulted.
Id. When the plaintiff was done telling his story, Avila had the plaintiff moved
to another cell. Id. at 4-5.
Two inmates who came from another housing unit told the plaintiff he
was being talked about. Id. at 5. One inmate who came to do repairs said that
CO II John Doe 2 stood in front of the officers’ station telling inmates that the
plaintiff had been raped. Id. The second inmate, who is friends with an inmate
that worked in the RCI garage with defendant CO II Lamke, told the plaintiff
that everyone was saying he had been raped. Id.
Two to three weeks later, Avila and Diebold questioned the plaintiff about
the sexual assault. Id. Avila also asked the plaintiff what he was in prison for,
why he was sent back to prison, and about his pending charges. Id. The
plaintiff answered all these questions, but Avila said she did not believe the
plaintiff. Id. Diebold was also part of this conversation, and said, “they did say
there was anal intercourse. We got that.” Id. The plaintiff told Diebold that

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Psychological Services said it was the plaintiff’s decision whether to press
charges. Id. at 5-6. The plaintiff did not want to press charges because he felt
sorry for the other inmate’s kid. Id. at 6.
On April 29, 2014, defendant K. Engel came to the plaintiff’s door to give
the plaintiff a conduct report. Id. Defendant Jones was standing with Engel at
the plaintiff’s door, and Jones asked Engel if she could read the conduct report.
Id. As Jones started to read the conduct report, she asked Engel if this was a
“major.” Id. Engel said yes. Id. The conduct report was for a violation of Wis.
Admin. Code DOC §303.15, sexual conduct. Id. The plaintiff asked if he could
read the conduct report, but Engel said no. Id.
Engel said, “if you take it the long way, you would sit in front of a group
of people, and you can bring witnesses and evidence. If you take it the short
way, you would sit in front of a captain and you would be able to bring
witnesses and evidence.” Id. The plaintiff told her he wanted to take it the short
way. Id. Engel told the plaintiff to sign the top of the form, and Engel had him
check three boxes. Id. The plaintiff asked about checking a box regarding
whether he was guilty or not guilty, and Engel told the plaintiff not to worry
about that until the hearing. Id. Then Engel and Jones left. Id.
On April 30, 2014, Jones gave the plaintiff a copy of the conduct report.
Id. She said, “you forgot to sign the bottom of this form.” Id. After the plaintiff
signed the due process form, Jones walked away from the plaintiff’s door. Id.
She came back seven minutes later and asked the plaintiff if he wanted to call

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any witnesses. Id. at 6-7. The plaintiff said, “Who am I going to call as a
witness,” and she left again. Id. at 7.
About a week later, the plaintiff had a conduct report hearing with Lt.
Ziem. Id. The plaintiff explained what happened to him, and Lt. Ziem had a
correctional officer take the plaintiff back to his cell until count time was over.
Id. As the plaintiff was in intake, waiting to go to Racine Correctional
Institution (“RCI”), Lt. Ziem came with the paperwork from the hearing. Id. The
plaintiff asked Lt. Ziem if she had found him guilty. Id. She said that he had a
chance for a due process hearing, but he waived it. The plaintiff tried to
explain, but Lt. Ziem said, “that doesn’t matter. Put it down on your appeal.
You’re going to RCI anyway.” Id.
The plaintiff was at recreation in segregation at RCI, and another inmate
told the plaintiff that he heard he had been raped by someone who worked in
the garage. Id.
The plaintiff filed an appeal form to Warden Paul Kemper on May 5,
2014. Id. The warden affirmed the hearing officer’s decision on July 13, 2014,
without investigating the claims in the plaintiff’s appeal. Id.
When the plaintiff was transferred to Waupun Correctional Institution,
he was not able to obtain employment due to his poor conduct report history
because of this major conduct report. Id.
The plaintiff alleges that he was humiliated by staff telling other inmates
about the plaintiff being sexually assaulted. Id. at 8. He also suggests that staff
members retaliated against the plaintiff by writing a conduct report falsely
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alleging sexual conduct, then found the plaintiff guilty, and did not investigate
the plaintiff’s appeal. Id.
The plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as
injunctive relief. Id. at 9-11. The plaintiff also included in his complaint a
request for a no-contact order with any of the defendants, but he did not file a
separate motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 11.
C.

Legal Analysis of Alleged Facts

The plaintiff indicates that “[a]t the time [his] Civil Rights were violated,
the defendants also violated my 8th amendment right for free of mental
anguish, physical or emotional wanton infliction of pain, or emotional distress.”
Id. at 8. It appears, then, that the plaintiff is asserting a violation of his Eighth
Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment.
To the extent the plaintiff considers the officers telling others about his
rape to be harassment, “[s]tanding alone, simple verbal harassment does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment, deprive a prisoner of a protected
liberty interest or deny a prisoner equal protection of the laws.” DeWalt v.
Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000)(“The use of derogatory language,
while unprofessional and deplorable, does not violate the Constitution.”).
Similarly, the plaintiff has made no allegations regarding threats to the
plaintiff’s safety, nor has he presented any facts that would give rise to a failure
to protect claim. See Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Once
prison officials know about a serious risk of harm, they have an obligation to

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take reasonable measure to abate it.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
The plaintiff does not suggest that anyone knew about the risk of the sexual
assault before it occurred.
The plaintiff complains about some of the defendants telling other prison
employees and inmates that the plaintiff was raped. At best, prisoners have
“very limited privacy rights.” Franklin v. McCaughtry, 110 Fed.Appx. 715, 719
(7th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1995)).
The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to information
privacy. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). It remains an open
question whether prisoners “enjoy a constitutional right to privacy in their
medical information.” Franklin, 110 Fed.Appx. at 719 (citations omitted). In
Franklin, the court cited Carroll v. DeTella, 255 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2001),
for the principle that “[p]risoners cannot enjoy greater privacy protection than
individuals in free society.” Franklin, 110 Fed.Appx. at 719. The court likened
the plaintiff’s concern about being forced to discuss his medical information
(regarding a cancerous finger sore, diabetes, and the need for eyeglasses) in the
presence of other inmates and prison staff members to a “general indiscretion,”
and noted that “the interest in the privacy of medical information will vary with
the condition.” Id. (citing Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1999)).
The court concluded that the plaintiff’s being forced to discuss “pedestrian
maladies” did not “transgress the constitutional right to privacy insofar as that
right might extend to prisoners” and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
the claim. Franklin, 110 Fed.Appx. at 719.
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The plaintiff’s alleged sexual assault was not necessarily a medical
condition, but he was taken to the hospital for examination and the
administration of a rape kit. Additionally, unlike the pedestrian maladies
referenced in Franklin, sexual assault is a very sensitive topic. Although
prisoners are not entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment, they are
not “without a remedy for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs.”
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1084). At this early stage, the court will
allow the plaintiff to proceed on his claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments regarding the dissemination of information about the plaintiff’s
alleged sexual assault. There was no prison need for that information to be
shared openly with staff and other inmates.
This claim may proceed against defendants CO II John Doe 1, CO II John
Doe 2, CO II Lamke, CO II K. Engel, CO II Jones, Lt. Ziem, Security Director
Lisa Avila, and PREA investigator Diebold. These are the defendants who had
knowledge of the sexual assault prior to the plaintiff’s transfer to RCI. There is
no allegation that Warden Paul Kemper had the information at that time or
participated in spreading the information to officers and inmates, and thus the
court will not allow the plaintiff to proceed on his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims against defendant Kemper.
The plaintiff’s allegations also are enough to state a First Amendment
retaliation claim against those defendants involved in issuing his conduct
report. To state a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must allege that “(1) he engaged

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in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that
would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First
Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the [d]efendants’
decision to take the retaliatory action.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546
(7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).
The plaintiff’s report of his rape constitutes protected First Amendment
activity. According to the plaintiff, the defendants filed a conduct report against
him in retaliation for making those rape allegations. The court can infer at this
stage, for the purpose of stating a claim, that the plaintiff’s report of the rape
was at least a motivating factor in the conduct report that was brought against
him. Each defendant who reviewed that conduct report, and reviewed or ruled
on any appeal or grievance from the report, is subject to the plaintiff’s
retaliation claim. At this time, the court will allow the plaintiff to proceed on his
First Amendment retaliation claim against all of the named defendants
(identified and unidentified).
In some cases, if a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor would effectively
overturn the prison disciplinary board’s finding, the plaintiff may not proceed
on such a claim. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). These decisions may foreclose a civil rights
suit if a judgment in favor of the inmate necessarily would imply that he was
wrongly disciplined with a loss of good-time credits. See Dixon v. Tolley, 502
Fed.Appx. 605, 606 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Edwards, 520 U.S. at 647-48. “[B]ut

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the bar imposed by Edwards and Heck does not apply to an inmate who was
punished only with segregation.” Dixon, 502 Fed.Appx. at 606 (citing
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004); Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d
303, 307 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Because Heck and Edwards concern the allocation
between collateral review and damages actions as a
matter of federal law, they have no application where
collateral review is unavailable – either because the
plaintiff’s custody has expired or because he was never
“in custody” as a result of the defendants’ contested
actions. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 75455 (2004); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir.
2000). Neither disciplinary segregation nor a reduction
in the amount of recreation is a form of “custody”
under federal law; Heck and Edwards thus are beside
the point.
Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff has not
alleged that his time in segregation affected his good time credits. As a result,
his claims are not barred by Heck or Edwards.
As a final note, the court recognized that the plaintiff is proceeding on
claims against CO II John Doe 1 and CO II John Doe 2. Once the defendants
have filed an answer to the complaint, the court will issue a scheduling order
setting deadlines for the identification of the Doe defendants, as well as for the
completion of discovery and filing dispositive motions. The plaintiff will need to
use the discovery process to discover the identities of the Doe defendants. He
should then ask the court to substitute those individuals for the parties
currently identified CO II John Doe 1 and CO II John Doe 2.

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IV.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
(DKT. NO. 3)
In a civil case, the court has discretion to decide whether to recruit a

lawyer for someone who cannot afford one. Navejar v. Iyola, 718 F.3d 692, 696
(7th Cir. 2013); 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(1); Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 706
F.3d 864, 866-67 (7th Cir. 2013). First, however, the person has to make a
reasonable effort to hire private counsel on his own. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d
647, 653 (7th Cir. 2007). After the plaintiff makes that reasonable attempt to
hire counsel, the court then must decide “whether the difficulty of the case –
factually and legally – exceeds the particular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson
to coherently present it.” Navejar, 718 F.3d at 696 (citing Pruitt, 503 F.3d at
655). To decide that, the court looks, not only at the plaintiff’s ability to try his
case, but also at his ability to perform other “tasks that normally attend
litigation,” such as “evidence gathering” and “preparing and responding to
motions.” Id.
In his November 10, 2014 motion, the plaintiff did not include any
information about his attempts to hire a lawyer on his own. Dkt. No. 3. On July
29, 2015, however, the court received a declaration in support of the plaintiff’s
motion to appoint counsel. Dkt. No. 22. In that declaration, the plaintiff
documented his attempts to secure counsel on his own. The court concludes
that this declaration satisfies the first Pruitt factors, leaving the court to decide
whether, given the difficulty of the case, the plaintiff is competent to represent
himself.

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The plaintiff very clearly and competently has presented his claims to the
court. His claims are fact-based, and relate to what he and the defendants said
and did, not to some complex legal argument. At this stage, the court
concludes that the plaintiff’s case is not so complicated that he can’t
adequately represent himself. See Navejar, 718 F.3d at 696 (citing Pruitt, 503
F.3d at 655).
V.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE (DKT. NO. 23)
The plaintiff filed a motion in limine on July 29, 2015. Dkt. No. 23. The

motion asks the court to suppress allegations of sexual misconduct after
May 5, 2014. It is unclear exactly what allegations of sexual misconduct the
plaintiff references. In any event, it is too early for the court to make decisions
about what evidence it might or might not admit at any future trial. After the
court enters this order, and after the defendants have been served with and
responded to the complaint, the parties will embark on discovery, which means
that each side will turn over to the other side any information relevant to the
allegations in the complaint. After that, the parties may, if they wish, file
motions for summary judgment, where the court will decide whether the
evidence shows that there are any material facts in dispute. Only if the court
does not grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants will the court
schedule a trial, and only then will the court begin to determine what evidence
may or may not be admissible at that trial. The court will deny this motion.

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VI.

CONCLUSION
The court GRANTS the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis (Dkt. No. 8). The court ORDERS the Secretary of the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections or his designee to collect from the plaintiff's prison
trust account the $342.21 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly
payments from the plaintiff's prison trust account in an amount equal to 20%
of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's trust account and
forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the
account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Secretary
shall clearly identify the payments by the case name and number.
The court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the plaintiff’s motion to
appoint counsel (Dkt. No. 3). The court GRANTS the plaintiff’s motion to
amend/correct complaint (Dkt. No. 9); the clerk of court shall docket the
proposed amended complaint (Dkt. No. 9-1) and its exhibits as the amended
complaint and exhibits. The court DENIES AS MOOT the plaintiff’s motion for
use of his prison release account to pay his initial partial filing fee (Dkt. No.
16). The court DENIES the plaintiff’s motion in limine (Dkt. No. 23).
The court ORDERS that the plaintiff may proceed on Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment privacy claims and First Amendment retaliation claims
against the defendants, as provided above.
The court ORDERS that pursuant to an informal service agreement
between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, copies of
plaintiff’s amended complaint and this order are being electronically sent today
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to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for service on the following state
defendants: Warden Paul Kemper, Security Director Lisa Avila, PREA Diebold,
CO II K. Engel, CO II Jones, CO II Lamke, and Lt. Ziem.
The court further ORDERS that, pursuant to the informal service
agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, the
defendants who are served with the amended complaint shall file a responsive
pleading to the complaint within sixty days of receiving electronic notice of this
order.
The court ORDERS that the plaintiff shall submit all correspondence and
legal material to:
Office of the Clerk
United States District Court
Eastern District of Wisconsin
362 United States Courthouse
517 E. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
PLEASE DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT’S
CHAMBERS. It will only delay the processing of the matter. As each filing will
be electronically scanned and entered on the docket upon receipt by the clerk,
the plaintiff need not mail copies to the defendants. All defendants will be
served electronically through the court’s electronic case filing system. The
plaintiff should also retain a personal copy of each document filed with the
court.
The court further advises plaintiff that if he does not timely file
documents, the court may dismiss his case for failure to prosecute.

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In addition, the parties must notify the clerk of court of any change of
address. Failure to do so could result in orders or other information not being
timely delivered, thus affecting the legal rights of the parties.
The court will send copies of this order to the warden of the institution
where the inmate is confined.
Dated at Milwaukee this 15th day of September, 2015.

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