Siddique v. Laliberte et al

Filing 95

ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 4/10/2019: GRANTING 70 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; GRANTING 78 Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time; GRANTING 79 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Summary Judgment Responses Instanter; DENYING as moot 92 Defendants' Motion to Stay Trial-Related Deadlines; and DISMISSING CASE with prejudice. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Mohammad Samir Siddique) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MOHAMMAD SAMIR SIDDIQUE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 15-CV-1-JPS

v.
DR. MICHAEL LALIBERTE, DAVID
STOCKTON, and RICHARD R.
THOMAS,

ORDER

Defendants.
This action arises from a contested student government election at
the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (“UWM”). On July 2, 2018, Plaintiff
submitted a fourth amended complaint alleging that his civil rights were
violated when Dr. Michael Laliberte, (“Laliberte”), David Stockton
(“Stockton”),

and

Richard

R.

Thomas

(“Thomas”)

(collectively,

“Defendants”) excluded him from student government in retaliation for his
protected speech regarding students’ rights to self-governance. (Docket
#55).1 On January 15, 2019, Defendants moved for summary judgment.
(Docket #70). The motion is now fully briefed. For the reasons explained
below, the Court finds in favor of the Defendants and will grant their
motion for summary judgment.2

Plaintiff also alleged due process violations, which Defendants
successfully moved to dismiss. (Docket #60).
1

Plaintiff’s unopposed motions for an extension of time and for leave to file
summary judgment responses instanter (Docket #78 and #79) will be granted.
2

1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the Court “shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir.
2016). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit” under
the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A dispute of fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The
Court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-movant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 815 F.3d
356, 360 (7th Cir. 2016). The Court must not weigh the evidence presented
or determine credibility of witnesses; the Seventh Circuit instructs that “we
leave those tasks to factfinders.” Berry v. Chi. Transit Auth., 618 F.3d 688, 691
(7th Cir. 2010). The party opposing summary judgment “need not match
the movant witness for witness, nor persuade the [C]ourt that [his] case is
convincing, [he] need only come forward with appropriate evidence
demonstrating that there is a pending dispute of material fact.” Waldridge
v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1994).
2.

RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiff was a student at UWM from fall 2011 to spring 2016, during

which time he was very active in student government. All three defendants
worked for UWM’s administration during that time. Laliberte worked in
the Student Affairs department; Stockton worked as a “Student
Government Relations Coordinator” or a “Student Service Coordinator;”
and Thomas served as the Director of the Student Union. Stockton, who
reported to several people in the administration including Laliberte, was
Page 2 of 16

employed to provide advice and services to the Student Association (“SA”),
a student government body.3 Plaintiff was a well-known member of the SA,
and an outspoken opponent of the university’s leadership. He was a tireless
advocate for students’ rights to self-govern, and promoted student
government autonomy from UWM’s administration. Plaintiff helped wage
a successful university legislative campaign to defund Stockton’s position.
He also helped pass student legislation that withdrew support for
construction for a new student union. In the 2012-2013 school year, he
worked with a group of students in the SA to elect more agents of change
into leadership positions. The campaign was successful, and in spring 2013,
victors aligned with Plaintiff’s causes were elected to student government
offices. These activities, and Plaintiff in particular, caused great chagrin to
Thomas, Laliberte, and Stockton, who desired a student government that
was more collaborative with and deferential to the administration.
Following UWM’s student government election, UWM’s Chancellor
commissioned a review of the election results by two University of
Wisconsin-Whitewater (UWW) staff members and one UWW student.
As stated in prior orders, the university of Wisconsin’s student
government system derives from Wis. Stat. § 36.09, which reads, in pertinent part:
3

The students of each institution or campus subject to the
responsibilities and powers of the board, the president, the
chancellor, and the faculty shall have primary responsibility for
advising the chancellor regarding the formulation and review of
policies concerning student life, services, and interests. Students in
consultation with the chancellor and subject to the final
confirmation of the board shall have the responsibility for the
disposition of those student fees which constitute substantial
support for campus student activities. The students of each
institution or campus shall have the right to organize themselves in
a manner they determine and to select their representatives to
participate in institutional governance. Id. § 36.09(5).

Page 3 of 16

Based on this investigation, the Chancellor concluded that the election
results were invalid. Plaintiff took issue with the integrity of the review and
the conclusion. He provides evidence that Stockton was at least minorly
involved in the investigation. (Docket #80-1 at 3).
On May 29, 2013, the UWM Student Court enjoined the supposed
victors from taking office, and mandated a new election be held in October
2013. In the interim, the Student Court determined that a student Board of
Trustees would govern in lieu of the SA. The Student Court established a
process by which students could apply for positions as representatives to
the Board of Trustees. Shortly thereafter, an online application for Board of
Trustee representative positions was made available. The Student Court’s
orders were issued in consultation with the administration, in which
Defendants played an active role. The application form for the Board of
Trustees positions enumerated qualifications that applicants would need to
meet in order to be appointed as representatives, but did not explicitly
include a minimum enrollment requirement. (Docket #89 at 7).
The Board of Trustees representative contract contained additional
requirements

of

student

representatives.

It

required

student

representatives to maintain a minimum GPA of 2.0, be in good standing
with the school, and read and sign the contract. There is an issue of fact as
to whether this contract, with these requirements, actually accompanied the
earliest iteration of the application. This is not material. It is undisputed that
the contract did not indicate that the office would check for enrollment.
(Docket #89 at 8).
Stockton screened applicants for their eligibility as Board of Trustee
representatives, and forwarded all eligible applications to the Student
Court. Stockton acknowledges that he was active in the eligibility
Page 4 of 16

assessment process, in which he checked for GPA, enrollment, and
disciplinary standing, then created an Excel sheet of all eligible and
ineligible applicants . (Docket #80-1 at 5–6). He also helped draft the
contract and a code of conduct, and worked very long hours throughout
the process. (Docket #80-1 at 15).
Plaintiff completed the online application form and submitted it
through UWM’s online portal for student groups. Plaintiff was enrolled
during the spring 2013 semester, which ended on May 19, 2013. As of June
2013, he had not enrolled in any summer 2013 or fall 2013 semester courses.
Plaintiff did not enroll for the fall 2013 semester until August 19, 2013.
Plaintiff admits that he was not enrolled at UWM in June 2013, but he was
nevertheless registered as a student (i.e., he had paid the registration fee to
reserve his place at the university). Ostensibly because Plaintiff was not, at
the time of his application, currently enrolled as a student, he did not meet
the criteria for a Board of Trustees representative position. Plaintiff received
notice of his application’s rejection by email on June 23, 2013. The rejection
letter listed possible reasons for the rejection, one of which was insufficient
enrollment. Immediately after Plaintiff received notice of his application’s
rejection, he began to suspect that it was in retaliation for his critical speech
about the administration.
Throughout the university system, there is a policy requiring
students to meet enrollment criteria before they can be involved in certain
extra-curricular activities. The policy in effect at the time of these events,
(the “F50 policy”), required “all leadership position in the organizations be
held by students enrolled on a fee-paying basis at least half-time. . .‘halftime’ status means enrollment for a minimum of six credits as an
undergraduate student. . .” (Docket #80-6 at 22). The UWM Student Status
Page 5 of 16

Determination Policy states that a half-time student in the spring or fall
must be enrolled in 6-11 credits, while a half-time student in the summer
only needs to be enrolled in 3-5 credits. (Docket #80-7 at 15). (By contrast, a
full-time student in the fall or spring requires a minimum of 12 credits, but
only 6 credits in the summer.) Id. The Status Determination Policy also
states that “[i]n order to be fully enrolled for a term, a student must be
enrolled as of the day after the add deadline in that term; prior to that date, a
student is considered registered but not fully enrolled.” Id. at 16 (emphasis
added). Thus, in order for either a full-time or a half-time student to be
considered “fully enrolled,” they must be enrolled as of the day after the
add deadline in that term.
The deadline for adding/dropping courses for fall semester was
September 16, 2013. (Docket #80-8 at 8, 11). Throughout that summer, it
seems there were a series of add/drop deadlines based on the particular
summer session in which a person was enrolled. Id. at 4. Plaintiff has
provided some evidence that the F50 policy requiring students in
organizations to be enrolled in at least 6 credits was inconsistently applied
to continuing students over summer sessions. Specifically, former student
government members attested that they were not aware of the school
actively checking a student’s enrollment status, or permitting or revoking
permission to participate in a student group on that basis. (Docket #86 at 2,
Docket #84 at 1–2). One affiant attested that, to his best recollection, he was
not “fully enrolled” when he was selected to serve on the Board of Trustees,
because he was a new student who had not been at UWM the previous
semester. (Docket #85 at 2–3). He remembers that he, like Plaintiff, had paid
the registration fee, but did not select classes until later in the summer. Id.

Page 6 of 16

When the newly formed Board of Trustees convened, Stockton and
Laliberte cautioned new representatives against listening to “old SA”
members, who were characterized as being disruptive and intimidating.
(Docket 80-1 at 17–18). Plaintiff was referred to by name at least once, and
was called “The Enforcer” of the “old SA” by Laliberte. Id. at 18. Stockton
and Laliberte also spoke about the nefarious activities of the “old SA,” and
mentioned incidents such as sexual harassment, embezzlement, and
hazing, without historically contextualizing these more egregious activities
as events from the distant past. (Docket #80-1 at 17).4
In 2014, Thomas sent an email to the Student Union referencing an
unnamed “group of students involved in the previous SA leadership” who
were attempting to put forth an alternate system of government because
they had “chosen not to participate in the current process of reform,” which
was difficult for them to “manipulate.” Plaintiff claims that as a result of
Defendants’ actions, his speech has been chilled. For example, he felt
reluctant to recruit allies, because he knew they risked becoming targets if
they associate with him. (Docket #86 at 3).
3.

ANALYSIS
To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must

show that “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2)
he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity
in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was ‘at least a
motivating factor’ in the defendant’s decision to take the retaliatory action.”
Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Woodruff v. Mason,

Plaintiff alleges that the statements were about racism and attempted
murder, but has not provided any evidence in support.
4

Page 7 of 16

542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711,
716 (7th Cir. 2006)). In assessing a deprivation’s deterrent effect, courts
consider whether “a person of ordinary firmness” would feel able to
continue First Amendment activity. Bridges, 557 F.3d at 552, 555. “Whether
retaliatory conduct is sufficiently severe as to be actionable is a question of
fact, unless it is so trivial that it would not deter a person of ordinary
firmness from the exercise of the right.” Black v. Clarke, 285 F. Supp. 3d 1070,
1083–84 (E.D. Wis. 2018) (citing Wallace v. Benware, 67 F.3d 655, 663 n.9 (7th
Cir. 1995); Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982)).
Plaintiff’s speech, which criticized UWM’s student government and
administration, is presumed to be protected, and Defendants have not
advanced any arguments to the contrary. The issues on summary judgment
are whether the following actions qualify as retaliation that would deter a
person of ordinary firmness from speaking: (1) Plaintiff’s rejected
application to the Board of Trustees as a student representative, and (2)
Defendants’ speech about Plaintiff to the school community.
3.1

Retaliation
3.1.1

Rejected Application

In this Circuit, “retaliation need not be monstrous to be actionable
under the First Amendment.” Deguiseppe v. Vill. of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187, 192
(7th Cir. 1995). “It is well established that an act in retaliation for the exercise
of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under Section 1983 even if
the act, when taken for different reasons, would have been proper.”
Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting Buise v.
Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 229 (7th Cir. 1978)). To overcome a motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiff must provide evidence that Stockton and
Laliberte rejected his application in retaliation for his political speech, and
Page 8 of 16

that this rejection would have deterred a person of ordinary firmness (if not
Plaintiff himself) from continuing this speech.5
There are sufficient disputes of fact as to whether Plaintiff’s rejected
application was retaliatory. Stockton and Laliberte characterized Plaintiff
and his party as disruptive, aggressive, and intimidating. Stockton, one of
Laliberte’s supervisees, was the subject of one of Plaintiff’s legislative
efforts, and Stockton’s job was jeopardized as a result of Plaintiff’s actions.
Stockton was also tasked with screening applicants for eligibility for the
Board of Trustees, which was intended to replace Plaintiff’s vigilante SA. A
reasonable jury could find that Stockton and Laliberte had a motive to
prevent Plaintiff from serving on the Board of Trustees, and Stockton’s
function as a gatekeeper facilitated that objective.
Additionally, Plaintiff has provided some evidence from people
familiar with the student government processes who attest that the
enrollment requirement was not typically enforced for summertime
student government participants. Of course, it is not necessarily illegal for
an organization to apply a policy that affects all individuals uniformly. See

The parties agree that Thomas’s liability extends only to the retaliatory
speech. (Docket #80 at 3). Laliberte’s connection to the retaliatory rejection is more
attenuated, but Plaintiff has provided a recording of Laliberte discussing the new
student government and opining about the types of students who should be
included and excluded, which is evidence that he “direct[ed] or consent[ed] to the
challenged conduct.” Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir.
2002); see also “Chancellor Meeting 5-6-13 (Full),” https://vimeo.com/77028693.
Defendants argue that this evidence is unauthenticated and therefore
inadmissible, but the standard for evidence on summary judgment is whether the
evidence could be presented in an admissible form. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Wragg
v. Vill. of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 466 (7th Cir. 2010). If the recording could be
authenticated—and Defendants have suggested no reason why it could not be—
then Laliberte’s statements would be admissible as an opposing party statement.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).
5

Page 9 of 16

e.g., Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 1295
(7th Cir. 1996) (observing that “retaliation case law demonstrates that
retaliation causes of action are challenges to the application of governmental
rules, not to the rules themselves.”). Defendants claim that they applied the
enrollment criteria equally to all applicants. However, one affiant who was
appointed to the Board of Trustees believes that he may not have been
enrolled when his application was accepted because he was a new student
and did not enroll for classes until later in the summer. Additionally, a
review of UWM’s registration and enrollment dates supports the
conclusion that some continuing students would have been involved in
activities over the summer without technically meeting the enrollment
criteria, strengthening the inference that this rule was speciously applied to
Plaintiff. Defendants, on the other hand, have provided evidence that they
appointed former SA members to the Board of Trustees, including several
people who were supporters of Plaintiff’s policies, which weakens the
inference that Plaintiff’s critical speech was the motivating factor behind his
rejection. The evidence at summary judgment must be construed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the evidence
presented—however debatable a jury may find it—is not so feeble that the
Court can dismiss Plaintiff’s rejection as a bureaucratic oddity. C.f. Kidwell
v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 969 (7th Cir. 2012); Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield Ass’n, 224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000). A reasonable jury could find
that Defendants arbitrarily employed this policy against Plaintiff and
rejected his application as a result of his critical speech, and that a
reasonable person would feel deterred from further engaging in such
critical speech.

Page 10 of 16

3.1.2

Retaliatory Speech

Typically, retaliatory speech is actionable in situations where there
is “‘threat, coercion, or intimidation that punishment, sanction, or adverse
regulatory action would immediately follow.’” Hutchins v. Clarke, 661 F.3d
947, 956–57 (7th Cir. 2011). Isolated instances of public ridicule will not
amount to actionable retaliatory harassment unless they are egregious
enough to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his right to
speak. Id. “In certain cases, a public official may also face liability where he
retaliated by subjecting an individual to ‘embarrassment, humiliation, and
emotional distress.’” Novoselsky v. Brown, 822 F.3d 342, 356 (7th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678–80 (6th Cir. 1998)); Hutchins, 661
F.3d at 957. This “high bar” is “usually limited to the release of ‘highly
personal and extremely humiliating details’ to the public.” Novoselsky, 822
F.3d at 356 (citing Hutchins, 661 F.3d at 957). In other words,
“[u]nconstitutional retaliation by a public official requires more than
criticism or even condemnation.” Novoselsky, 822 F.3d at 356.
Here, Plaintiff provides evidence that Defendants characterized him
as intimidating and disruptive. This does not constitute retaliatory speech
that violates the First Amendment. Defendants’ tales of former SA members
being involved in embezzlement, sexual harassment, and hazing also do
not rise to the level of retaliatory speech. Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim that
these statements were intended to humiliate him is conclusory and
unsupported by evidence. Plaintiff was not identified in those statements,
and the events that Defendants spoke about had, in fact, happened in recent
years. The Court infers that this comment was made in the context of a
discussion regarding the SA to which Plaintiff belonged, which is why
Plaintiff took umbrage. Perhaps Defendants saw Plaintiff’s SA’s political
Page 11 of 16

activities in the same negative light that they saw Plaintiff’s predecessors’
more disreputable activities. This may be unfair, but it does not give rise to
a constitutional violation. Finally, there is no embarrassment or humiliation
to be found in Thomas’s email regarding an unnamed group of students
who attempted to “manipulate” the student government. Not only does the
email fail to reference Plaintiff, but the substance of the email is not
embarrassing, humiliating, or emotionally distressing, and it strains
credulity that such statements would deter a person of ordinary firmness
from continuing their protected speech. Even in aggregate, these statements
do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Novoselsky, 822 F.3d at
356–57 (“However impolitic [the public official’s] statements may have
been, they did not rise to the level of threat, coercion, intimidation, or
profound humiliation.”).
3.2

Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “Put simply,” says
the Supreme Court, “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Mullenix v. Luna,
136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
To surmount the defense, Plaintiff must show: (1) that the facts as alleged
amount to a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) the right at issue was
clearly established at the time of Defendants’ misconduct. Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d 455, 461 (7th Cir.
2005). Once the defense is raised, the plaintiff bears the burden to defeat it.
Weinmann v. McClone, 787 F.3d 444, 450 (7th Cir. 2015).
Page 12 of 16

To overcome an assertion of qualified immunity, Plaintiff must
proffer facts which, if believed, amount to an actual violation of his
constitutional rights. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). A reasonable
jury could find, based on the evidence, that Defendants acted in retaliation
when they rejected Plaintiff’s application to the Board of Trustees. Next,
Plaintiff must show that the violation of his constitutional rights was
“clearly established under applicable law at the time and under the
circumstances that the defendant official acted.” Easterling v. Pollard, 528
Fed. App’x 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). A right
is clearly established if “a reasonable official would understand that what
he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987). In other words, a right is clearly established if it would be obvious
to a reasonable state actor that “what they are doing violates the
Constitution, or if a closely analogous case establishes that the conduct is
unconstitutional.” Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2001).
Factually identical precedent is not necessary; the guiding question is
whether the official would have had “fair warning” that the conduct was
unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). “In determining
whether a defendant’s alleged actions violated a clearly established right,
courts may properly take into account any information the defendant ought
reasonably to have obtained.” Jones, 425 F.3d at 461.
Wis. Stat. § 36.09(5) delineates students’ rights to actively participate
in student government processes. The statute allows students to organize
themselves in “a manner they determine” and “to select their
representatives to participate in institutional governance.” Id. However, the
students’ participation in governance is “subject to” the responsibilities and
powers of the board, the president, the chancellor and the faculty. The
Page 13 of 16

statute makes clear that “subject to” means “subordinate to.” Id. §
36.09(3m).
Few cases interpret the scope of the statute. In Student Ass’n of Univ.
of Wis.-Milwaukee v. Baum, 246 N.W.2d 622 (Wis. 1976), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court considered whether a student association had statutory
authority to appoint members to three different committees, or whether the
chancellor retained authority to make such appointments. The court held
that the student association had the exclusive right to appoint various
committee members. In so holding, the court acknowledged that the right
to organize and the right to select representatives are integrally related—to
hold otherwise would mean that the administration could “thwart the
authority of the organization and deal with other students more to its
liking.” Id. at 295. The court determined that the legislature’s intent in
drafting this statute was to ensure that these rights were “free of
administrative interference.” Id. at 296. Similarly, in Oshkosh Student Ass’n
v. Bd. of Reg. of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 279 N.W.2d 740, 742 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979),
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed that students had the right to
appoint their own representatives to a committee formed to make
recommendations for the university’s next chancellor. These cases reinforce
the right of the student association to select their own representatives for
various committees, but do little to shed light on the issue at hand.
The propriety of the invalidated elections and the creation of the
Board of Trustees is not before the Court. Rather, the Court must determine
whether, under those circumstances (i.e., an invalidated election and the
creation of a temporary governing body), the Defendants should have
known that they could not prevent a student from participating in that
temporary governing body. It is a close call—on the one hand, it is wellPage 14 of 16

established that the state cannot act in retaliation against a person who
speaks critically of it. On the other hand, while students have the power to
appoint their own representatives to various committees, the extent of an
administrator’s power under Wis. Stat. § 36.09(5) to curb a student’s
involvement in government is not clear. While Plaintiff’s right to engage in
criticism of his university is well-established, his right to participate in
student government under all circumstances is not. Given the Supreme
Court’s instruction that qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” and in light of the
lack of evidence that the Defendants knowingly violated the law, the Court
is constrained to find that qualified immunity applies. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct.
at 308 (citations and quotations omitted).
4.

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Consequentially,
Defendants’ motion to stay trial and pretrial deadlines (Docket #92) will be
denied as moot.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(Docket #70) be and the same is here by GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for extension of
time (Docket #78) be and the same is hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file
summary judgment responses instanter (Docket #79) be and the same is
hereby GRANTED;

Page 15 of 16

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to stay trial
and pretrial deadlines (Docket #92) be and the same is hereby DENIED as
moot; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same is
hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 10th day of April, 2019.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

Page 16 of 16