Earl v. Foster et al

Filing 9

ORDER signed by Judge Rudolph T. Randa on 5/21/2015 DENYING 8 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Daryise Earl at Green Bay Correctional Institution) (cb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
DARYISE L. EARL,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 15-CV-282

BRIAN FOSTER, et al.,
Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, a Wisconsin state prisoner, filed a pro se complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. On
May 7, 2015, the Court screened the complaint and dismissed the plaintiff’s
claims of class-of-one discrimination and deliberate indifference to a
hazardous condition of confinement.

The Court allowed the plaintiff to

proceed on his retaliation claim, but on a different basis than the one the
plaintiff articulated in that portion of his complaint. On May 18, 2015, the
plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s screening order.
Because the plaintiff seeks to revisit a non-final order that decided
fewer than all of the claims in this action, the Court will construe the
plaintiff’s request as a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(b). A motion for reconsideration serves a very limited
purpose in federal civil litigation; it should be used only “to correct

manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”
Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 561 F.Supp. 656, 665-66 (N.D.
Ill. 1982), aff'd, 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984)). A “manifest error” is a
“wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling
precedent.” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted). Motions for reconsideration are generally not vehicles to
introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could or should have
been presented to the district court prior to judgment. Moro v. Shell Oil
Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996); Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal &
Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987).
Retaliation
The Court has allowed the plaintiff to proceed on his claim that
defendant Brooks retaliated against the plaintiff based on the plaintiff’s
allegations that, had he not complained, his position in the kitchen would
have remained open and the plaintiff would have continued to be
compensated while recovering from his injury.

The Court clarified,

however, that the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that he had been
“fired” in retaliation for his complaints because the plaintiff stated that
Lieutenant Faltyski (a prior named defendant who is now dismissed) had
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informed him that he was “not fired” and that once the plaintiff was
cleared, he would “have the chance to work again.” (Compl. ¶ 28, Docket
#1.) The plaintiff did not plead facts in his complaint demonstrating
Lieutenant Faltyski’s statements were false.
The plaintiff states that the Court “erroneously assessed the facts of
this claim” and that “[t]o preserve the right to fully litigate this argument
throughout the proceedings of this case, Earl will elaborate his contentions
to erase any misgivings the Court may have in regards to this claim.”
(ECF No. 8 at 1.) In support, the plaintiff sets forth a series of events
dating from November 2014 through the end of February 2015. None of
these events are alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint even though they all
occurred prior to the time the plaintiff filed his complaint.
The Court screened the plaintiff’s complaint based on the allegations
the plaintiff stated therein.

The plaintiff has not set forth “newly

discovered evidence” as all of the events currently presented to the Court
concluded not only prior to the Court’s order but even prior to the plaintiff’s
filing of his complaint. The plaintiff is now seeking to remedy a pleading
deficiency identified by the Court; however, a motion for reconsideration is
not the proper vehicle for that. In any event, the Court has already held

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that the plaintiff has successfully stated a claim of retaliation against
defendant Brooks, and the plaintiff may continue to proceed on that claim.
Class-of-One Discrimination
The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s class-of-one claim because the
plaintiff did not sufficiently allege that the defendants’ actions were
undertaken for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.
On the contrary, Lieutenant Faltyski explained that operational and
institutional needs required that the kitchen position be filled while the
plaintiff recovered from his injury. The Court held that “the need for a
fully staffed kitchen provides a rational basis for temporarily filling the
plaintiff’s position.” (ECF No. 7 at 7.)
The plaintiff argues that the Court has “misinterpret[ed] the facts of
this case” because the plaintiff’s “claim is that he was fired from his work
position for vindictive reasons . . . .” (ECF No. 8 at 2.) The plaintiff also
argues that by allowing the plaintiff to proceed on his retaliation claim but
then

dismissing

his

class-of-one

claim,

the

Court

is

“contradicting/undermining itself by indicating the defendants acted
irrational under the retaliation claim, but rational under the same set of
facts under the class of one claim.” (Id. at 3.)

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The Court correctly interpreted the plaintiff’s claim; however, the
plaintiff misinterprets the law upon which the Court’s holding was based.
With regard to a class-of-one claim, a plaintiff “must plead and prove that
he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. The rationalbasis requirement sets the legal bar low and simply requires a rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate
governmental purpose.” D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681, 68687 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Importantly,
a plaintiff alleging an improper motive does not necessarily overcome the
presumption of rationality. Id. at 687. “To the contrary, ‘a given action can
have a rational basis and be a perfectly logical action for a government
entity to take even if there are facts casting it as one taken out of
animosity.’” Id. (citing Flying J Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549 F.3d 538,
547 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added)).
Thus, the question considered by the Court was: Did the complaint
reveal a rational basis for treating the plaintiff differently notwithstanding
the defendants’ retaliatory motive?

It clearly did, based on Lieutenant

Faltyski’s statements regarding the institution’s needs for a fully staffed
kitchen. Of course, the defendants’ desire to retaliate against the plaintiff
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may also plausibly explain why the plaintiff was removed from his kitchen
position, but the test for rationality does not ask whether the benign
justification was the actual justification; it need only be a conceivable basis
for treating the plaintiff differently. See D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 725
F.3d at 686.

The Court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s class-of-one

claim.
Deliberate Indifference to a Hazardous Condition
In order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate
indifference to a hazardous condition of confinement, a plaintiff is required
to allege that defendants deliberately ignored a prison condition that
presented an objectively, sufficiently serious risk of harm. Pyles v. Fahim,
771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014).

The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s

claim, holding that the “issuance of ‘worn out boots to kitchen workers who
work in extremely slippery areas’ is not a sufficiently dangerous condition.”
(ECF No. 7 at 8.) The Court based its holding on Watkins v. Lancor, which
held that held ‘neither wet floors nor failure to provide protective overshoes
for the wet floor support a claim of deliberate indifference. 558 Fed.Appx.
662, 665 (7th Cir. 2014).
The plaintiff argues that “the Court misapplied an inaccurate
standard of review to the facts of this.”
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(ECF No. 8 at 4.)

While the

plaintiff agrees with the Court’s assessment of Watkins, he argues that
Watkins does not apply because he had previously notified defendants
about the danger of wearing worn-out work boots on slippery kitchen
floors.
The plaintiff is not correct that by complaining to defendants he
successfully transformed worn-out boots and slippery floors into objective,
serious risks of harm. At most, by providing notice to the defendants, the
plaintiff stated a claim for negligence against the defendants, “but
negligence, or even gross negligence, will not support a claim of deliberate
indifference.”

The Court’s application of Watkins was not erroneous, and

the Court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.
NOW, THEREFORE, BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT the plaintiff’s “Motion for Reconsideration of
Screening Order” (ECF No. 8) is DENIED.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 21st day of May, 2015.

BY THE COURT:

__________________________
HON. RUDOLPH T. RANDA
U.S. District Judge

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