Williams v. Nygen et al
Filing
103
ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 2/26/16: denying 54 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 66 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; DISMISSING this action on the merits; denying 96 Plaintiff's Motion to pursue a criminal claim; and, denying 101 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See Order. (cc: all counsel) (nm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
ANTHONY H. WILLIAMS.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 15-CV-317-JPS
SUE NYGREN, KRISTIN VASQUEZ,
MICHAEL HOWARD, PAUL KEMPER,
RONALD MALONE, and
NURSE JANE/JOHN DOE,
ORDER
Defendants.
Plaintiff, Anthony Williams (“Williams”) brought this action under 18
U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the defendants violated his civil rights. (Docket
#1). Specifically, Williams alleges that Sue Nygren (“Nygren”) and Kristin
Vasquez (“Vasquez”)1 violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to ensure
that he received proper medical care following a knee injury that Williams
sustained while playing basketball. (Docket #1). Williams also claims that
Paul Kemper (“Kemper), Michael Howard (“Howard”), and Ronald Malone
(“Malone”) acted negligently by failing to maintain the basketball court in a
safe condition. (Docket #1).
Both Williams and the defendants have moved for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Docket #54, #66). As
described more fully herein, the Court concludes that: (1) Nygren and
1
In his motion for summary judgment, Williams also claims that the other
three defendants, Paul Kemper, Ronald Malone and Michael Howard, violated the
Eighth Amendment. (Docket #55 at 1-2). However, the Court explicitly dismissed
these defendants from Williams’ initial Eighth Amendment claim in its screening
order. (Docket #10 at 6). Thus, the Court will not consider their liability under the
Eighth Amendment.
Vasquez are not liable for violating Williams’ Eighth Amendment rights; and
(2) Kemper, Howard and Malone are entitled to governmental and
recreational immunity. Thus, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
will be granted (Docket #66), and Williams’ motion for summary judgment
will be denied (Docket #54).
1.
BACKGROUND2
1.1
The Parties
Racine Correctional Institution (“RCI”) is a state-owned medium
security institution located in Sturtevant, Wisconsin. (Docket #68 ¶ 1).
Williams is an inmate at RCI. (Docket #68 ¶ 22). The impetus of this
complaint was an injury that Williams sustained on June 30, 2014, while
playing basketball on the court adjacent to the prison’s Milwaukee Unit,
where he lived. (Docket #68 ¶ 22).
The defendants are either current or former employees at RCI. (Docket
#68 ¶¶ 3-15).
More specifically, at all times relevant, Nygren was the Health
Services Unit (“HSU”) Manager and Vasquez was the HSU Assistant
Manager at RCI. (Docket #68 ¶¶ 11, 14). Both of the defendants’ positions
required them to work with the primary care physicians, dentists,
psychiatrists, and specialists serving as consultants to the Bureau of Health
Services (BHS) in a collaborative manner to provide quality health care at
RCI in an efficient and effective manner. (Docket #69 ¶ 4; Docket #70 ¶ 4). In
addition, each assisted in providing the overall administrative support and
2
The facts will generally be taken from the parties’ proposed findings of fact
(Docket #56, #68) and the parties’ responses thereto (Docket #74, #92), unless
otherwise indicated. Any disputes of fact will be noted accordingly.
Page 2 of 28
direction of HSU. (Docket #69 ¶ 4; Docket #70 ¶ 4). Though Williams disputes
the nature of supervisory roles within the HSU, neither Nygren nor Vasquez
directed Williams’ treatment or care plans for his knee injury.3 (Docket #68
¶ 47).
In addition, at all times relevant, Kemper was the Warden, Malone
was the Deputy Warden, and Howard was the Unit Manager for the
Milwaukee Unit at RCI. (Docket #29 ¶¶ 3, 5, 9). Matters involving
maintenance of buildings and grounds were routinely addressed by staff
members of the Building and Grounds Department. (Docket #68 ¶ 29).
Kemper generally holds monthly meetings with the Buildings and Grounds
Superintendent to discuss on-going maintenance issues and to prioritize and
plan for future projects. (Docket #68 ¶¶ 30-31). During the relevant time
period, those regularly in attendance at these meetings were Kemper,
Malone, the supervisor of maintenance (Stan Potratz), and the correctional
management services director. (Docket #68 ¶¶ 29-30). Since the 2013-2014
time period, the Building and Grounds Superintendent has discussed the
3
More to the point, Williams disputes what “direct patient care”
means. (Docket #92 ¶ 47). He suggests that because Nygren and Vasquez had
custody of Williams’ medical records, oversaw HSU staff, and reviewed inmate
interview/HSU requests, they provided “direct patient care” to him and were,
therefore, his “primary care providers.” (Docket #92 ¶¶ 47, 50). Williams does not
contest, however, that Nygren and Vasquez were indeed supervisors. (Docket #92
¶ 48). For their part, the defendants clarify that Williams’ “primary advance care
providers” were Nurse Practitioner Lora Blasius (“Blasius”) and Dr. Enrique Luy
(“Dr. Luy”); these two providers were the medical professionals at RCI that
determined what course of treatment to pursue in relation to Williams’ injuries.
(Docket #68 ¶ 48). The defendants further assert that Nygren and Vasquez did not
have the authority to: (1) overturn decisions made by Williams’ advance care
providers; or (2) to prescribe medications. (Docket #68 ¶¶ 49, 51). Though Williams
disputes the scope of the supervisors’ authority, he provides no basis for his
assertions. (Docket #92 ¶ 49).
Page 3 of 28
possibility of resurfacing4 the seven courts in the prison, subject to budget
constraints. (Docket #56 ¶¶ 23-25; Docket #68 ¶¶ 32, 36). So far, only the
Dane Unit courtyard has been resurfaced, because none of the courts were
considered to be in such disrepair as to constitute a hazard to the inmates
playing on them. (Docket #68 ¶¶ 34, 35).
1.2
The Basketball Injury
Williams injured his knee on June 30, 2014, while he was playing
basketball on the court adjacent to the Milwaukee Unit. (Docket #68 ¶ 22).
The defendants assert that at no time prior to Williams’ injury: (1) was
Kemper, Malone or Howard informed that there was an unsafe condition on
the Milwaukee Unit basketball court; (2) was Kemper or Malone aware of
any issues with the condition of the Milwaukee Unit’s court; or (3) was
Kemper made aware of any repeated injury-related problems attributable to
the condition of the basketball courts.5 (Docket #68 ¶¶ 23-25). Kemper,
4
The maintenance staff also regularly maintains the concrete surfaces
around the courts by searching for and shaving down trip hazards. (Docket #68
¶ 37). This is generally done seasonally due to heaving of surfaces after the winter
season is over. (Docket #68 ¶ 37).
5
It is undisputed that Williams submitted two interview requests—one
directed to Howard and one directed to Kemper—regarding the basketball court’s
re-surfacing. (Docket #71, Ex. 1; Docket #73, Ex. 1). Each of these requests states
“[l]ast year a level surface to play basketball was requested. Dane Unit received
theirs, but other units such as Milwaukee are unsafe….” (Docket #71, Ex. 1; Docket
#73, Ex. 1). Though neither of the interview request forms are dated, both Howard
and Kemper state in their declarations that Williams’ requests were made after his
injury. (Docket #71 ¶ 7; Docket #73 ¶ 13). Williams disputes these assertions
without providing any specific date of contact. (Docket #92 ¶¶ 23-25). Nor does
Williams provide any evidence that: (1) other injuries occurred on the Milwaukee
Unit basketball court; or (2) any injuries on the Milwaukee Unit court had been
reported to Kemper, Malone or Howard. (Docket #56 ¶ 15).
Page 4 of 28
Malone and Howard regularly walked the grounds of the prison and
personally observed the surfaces of the basketball areas, including the
Milwaukee Unit court. (Docket #68 ¶ 40). Though Kemper and Malone
“knew” that the basketball court had “cracks,” neither Kemper, Malone nor
Howard had perceived the condition of the court to constitute a safety
hazard. (Docket #56 ¶¶ 16-17, 19-20; Docket #68 ¶ 40). There was no warning
on the exterior of the courtyard or in the inmate handbook regarding the
risks of playing in that area. (Docket #56 ¶¶ 15, 18).
Nonetheless, while engaging in a recreational game of basketball on
the Milwaukee Unit court, Williams heard his knee “pop.” (Docket #68 ¶ 61).
Immediately following the injury, Williams was taken to the HSU6 (Docket
#67 ¶ 61) and thereafter to the Wheaton Franciscan Hospital emergency room
(Docket #68 ¶ 62). Williams had x-rays completed of his left knee and was
given a knee immobilizer along with crutches and instructions. (Docket #68
¶ 63; Docket #56 ¶ 9). The parties do not dispute that the emergency room
6
Williams alleges that Vasquez was, in fact, working on June 30, 2014, in the
HSU and that she knew of his injury because she was present that day. (Docket #56
¶ 6). The defendants do not dispute the content of Ms. Vasquez’s interrogatory
response, which indicates that she was working in HSU the day that Williams was
injured and “saw” that he was injured. (Docket #74 ¶ 6; Docket #85, Ex. 1 at 18). The
defendants maintain, however, that she did not provide Williams direct patient
care at that time. (Docket #74 ¶ 6).
Page 5 of 28
doctor’s discharge note states that Williams should follow up with an
orthopedic (“ortho”) specialist within 3-5 days.7 (Docket #92 ¶ 63).
That same day, Williams was discharged from the emergency room
and returned to RCI with discharge instructions for treatment and home care.
(Docket #68 ¶ 65). A medication order for Vicodin was also approved by the
on-call doctor. (Docket #68 ¶ 66).
Over the course of the next two weeks, Williams was seen three times
by various nurses (Paige Mueller, Debra Nutting, Tamia Chapple) and Dr.
Luy in the HSU. (See Docket #69 ¶¶ 22-25) (describing Williams’ HSU visits
on July 1, July 3, and July 13, 2014). Though Williams does not describe any
conversations that he had in the HSU at this time, he does allege that “HSU
staff knew” about his required follow up appointment with an ortho
specialist and nonetheless failed to schedule it. (Docket #56 ¶ 3). Rather, on
July 14, 2014, Blasius scheduled Williams’ initial appointment at Wheaton
Franciscan ortho clinic for July 28, 2014. (Docket #56 ¶ 4; Docket #69 ¶ 25).
The two-week delay between scheduling and the actual appointment was
allegedly due to the ortho physician’s availability. (Docket #56 ¶ 8; Docket
#85, Ex. 1 at 20).
7
However, when this initial ortho appointment was actually scheduled by
RCI staff is disputed. (Docket #92, Ex. 1 ¶ 63). The defendants’ proposed findings
of fact suggests that the initial ortho appointment was made on June 30, 2014.
(Docket #67 ¶ 63). In support, they cite to Nygren’s declaration. (Docket #68 ¶ 63).
However, Nygren’s declaration states that Blasius ordered a follow-up with
Wheaton Franciscan Hospital’s ortho clinic on July 14, 2014. (Docket #69 ¶ 25).
Williams appears to agree that the initial ortho appointment was scheduled by
Blasius on July 14, 2014. (Docket #92 ¶ 25). In either case, and as discussed more
fully below, to the extent a dispute of fact exists on this date, it is not material.
Page 6 of 28
In light of the purported delay in scheduling the ortho appointment,
Williams submitted multiple Health Services Requests (“HSR”).8 (Docket #1,
Ex. 3). Williams’ second HSR asked how his initial ortho appointment could
have been “forgotten.” (Docket #1, Ex. 3). On July 26, 2014, Nygren
responded to Williams’ second HSR by explaining that the HSU had to
ensure the physician’s availability before scheduling an outside appointment.
(Docket #1, Ex. 3). She also stated that Williams “had an appointment [with
HSU] earlier this week.”9 (Docket #1, Ex. 3).
Williams was indeed seen by an ortho specialist on July 28, 2014.
(Docket #69 ¶ 27). Dr. Goran Jankovic (“Dr. Jankovic”), the treating physician
at Wheaton Franciscan, ordered an MRI of Williams’ left knee and a follow
up appointment after the completion of the MRI. (Docket #69 ¶ 28). Blasius
ordered that MRI on August 1, 2014. (Docket #69 ¶ 29).
Upon returning to RCI, Williams submitted another HSR request to
follow up on: (1) the delay between his emergency room visit and initial
ortho appointment; and (2) the status of his MRI.10 (Docket #69, Ex. 1 at 122).
8
Williams does not state on which day he sent this HSR. On the one hand,
in his complaint he states that he began the HSR process on July 12, 2014. (Docket
#1 at 2; Docket #1, Ex. 3) (labeling the HSR that Nygren responded to as Williams’
“second” request). On the other hand, Williams does not dispute the defendants’
proposed findings of fact that HSR’s are triaged daily at 6:00 a.m. and responded
to based on their priority within seven calendar days. (Docket #99 ¶¶ 54-55). Thus,
the HSR was likely received some time between July 19, 2014, and July 26, 2014.
9
Though Nygren’s note was not explicit as to what appointment she was
referring to, it is undisputed that Williams had an appointment with Blasius on
July 14, 2014—8 days prior to Nygren’s HSR response.
10
Nygren alleges that Williams submitted this HSR on August 8, 2014.
(Docket #69 ¶ 68). Williams does not dispute this. (Docket #92 ¶ 68).
Page 7 of 28
Nygren responded to this HSR on August 8, 2014. (Docket #69, Ex. 1 at 122).
Nygren explained that: (1) outside orders are only recommendations for HSU
staff; (2) all outside medical orders must be initiated by RCI’s medical
providers; (3) Williams’ initial diagnosis was that of a knee sprain; and (4) an
MRI for his left knee had been scheduled. (Docket #69, Ex. 1 at 122).
On August 4, 2014, Blasius completed a review summary for Williams’
visit to the Wheaton Franciscan ortho specialist. (Docket #69 ¶ 30).
Approximately two weeks later, she noted that Williams had a patellar
tendon rupture and that Williams would be referred to an orthopedic
surgeon.11 (Docket #69 ¶ 32). That same day, August 20, 2014, Vasquez
received a call from Williams’ mother to check on the status of his care.
(Docket #68 ¶ 70). Vasquez entered a note in Williams’ medical record
detailing this call. (Docket #68 ¶ 70).
Williams was seen by Wheaton Franciscan Hospital’s radiology
department on August 26, 2014. (Docket #69 ¶ 33). At this time, Dr. Jankovic
completed an MRI of Williams’ left knee. (Docket #69 ¶ 34). Dr. Jankovic also
ordered future labs and procedures. (Docket #69 ¶ 36).
Two days later, Williams filed an inmate complaint and continued to
prepare for surgery. (Docket #69 ¶ 37; Docket #79 at 6-7). First, Williams’
inmate complaint reiterated his objection to the delay in his initial ortho
appointment. (Docket #79 at 6-7). In addition, he completed a surgery
consultation at Wheaton Franciscan Hospital. (Docket #79 at 6-7). Williams’
surgery was scheduled the next day for September 12, 2014. (Docket #68
¶ 72). In light of this surgery, Vasquez placed a medical hold on Williams’
11
The parties do not explain how Blasius received this diagnosis. (Docket #69
¶ 28; Docket #69 ¶¶ 33-34).
Page 8 of 28
record to prevent him from being transferred to another institution. (Docket
#68 ¶ 74).
About two weeks later, Michelle Bones, Inmate Complaint Reviewer,
dismissed Williams’ inmate complaint. (Docket #79 at 6-7). When reviewing
the allegations, the decision indicates that Ms. Bones primarily relied on the
treatment summary provided to her by Vasquez. (Docket #79 at 6-7). Ms.
Bones specifically noted that Blasius was Williams’ primary care provider
and concluded that the HSU staff indeed had not “forgotten” about Williams,
as evidenced by the four appointments he had received prior to seeing the
orthopedic specialist on July 28, 2014. (Docket #79 at 6-7). In addition, Ms.
Bones noted that Williams had received an MRI on August 26, 2014, and was
scheduled for surgery on September 12, 2014. (Docket #79 at 6-7). Because
there were no facts to suggest that Williams’ care was deficient, Ms. Bones
dismissed the complaint. (Docket #79 at 6-7).
Two later days, on September 12, 2014, Williams underwent knee
surgery. (Docket #67 ¶ 73).
Following the procedure, Williams was seen in the HSU on four
different occasions between September 12, 2014, and September 18, 2014.
Page 9 of 28
(Docket #68 ¶ 75). Williams’s final appointment at the Wheaton Franciscan
Hospital Ortho Clinic was on September 22, 2014.12 (Docket #68 ¶ 77).
Less than a week after the surgery, however, an ultra-sound
completed at Wheaton Franciscan Hospital revealed that Williams appeared
to be positive for a Deep Vein Thrombosis (“DVT”). (Docket #68 ¶ 76).
Shortly thereafter, Williams was diagnosed with a DVT and was prescribed
Endxaparin (also known as Lovenox) and Warfarin. (Docket #68 ¶ 78).
Discharge instructions from Wheaton Franciscan outlined the causes,
symptoms, and prevention methods for DVTs. (Docket #69 ¶ 52).
12
Williams disputes that he attended this appointment. (Docket #92 ¶ 77).
However, Williams’ medical records reveal that he did have a scheduled
appointment on September 22, 2014. (Docket #69 at 2). Williams provides no
evidence that he did not attend this appointment. Thus, the Court must adopt the
defendants’ proposed fact that Williams did indeed attend his appointment. See
Burton v. Downey, No. 14-3591, slip op. at 10 (7th Cir. Oct. 8, 2015) (citing Scott v.
Harris, 500 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“[W]hen opposing parties tell two difference stories,
one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the fact for purposes of
ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”). Moreover, regardless of this dispute,
it is undisputed that neither Nygren nor Vasquez were aware of any alleged need
and/or delay of a post-surgery or a follow up ortho appointment. The defendants
present no proposed facts in this regard, presumably because Williams did not
present this theory of liability until his opposition to the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. (See Docket #1).
Page 10 of 28
In light of his DVT diagnosis, Williams began taking Endxaparin and
Warfarin.13 (Docket #68 ¶ 78). Though Williams was prescribed to take
Endxaparin for seven (7) days, Blasius allegedly discontinued the Endxaparin
prescription after only a five (5) day regimen. (Docket #1, Ex. 6 at 3).
Williams’ medical notes do not explain why Blasius made the decision to
discontinue that prescription. (Docket #69, Ex. 1 at 16).
Williams, noting this discrepancy, filed an HSR. (Docket #1, Ex. 6 at 3).
Vasquez replied to this HSR on October 1, 2014, stating that, “the Lovenox
[Endxaparin] was discontinued 9-26-14. You have a current order for
Cumadin (warfarin), please take as directed.” (Docket #1, Ex. 6 at 3).
Williams subsequently filed an inmate complaint related to his
Endxaparin prescription on October 7, 2014. (Docket #79 at 22). That
complaint was dismissed, however, on October 27, 2014. (Docket #79 at 22).
The Inmate Complaint Reviewer that processed Williams’ complaint, Steven
Linn, noted that Blasius: (1) had a laboratory draw completed on the day that
Williams discontinued the Endxaparin; (2) continued to follow-up with
Williams after discontinuing the Endxaparin; and (3) treated Williams
according to his condition. (Docket #79 at 22). Both Vasquez and Nygren
13
Williams’ medical records state that he was ordered to begin taking the
Endxaparin and Warfarin on either September 19, 2014, or September 18, 2014.
(Docket #1, Ex. 6 at 1; #69, Ex. 1 at 40). Thereafter, it is not clear when Williams
actually began taking his medication. On the one hand, the defendants proposed
findings of fact suggest that Williams began taking Endxaparin and Warfarin on
September 24, 2014. (Docket #68 ¶ 78). On the other hand, Williams’ Inmate
Complaint decision, processed by Steven Linn, states that Williams began taking
these medications on September 20, 2014. (Docket #79 at 22). As discussed below,
however, these exact dates are immaterial.
Page 11 of 28
appear to have been carbon copied on this complaint decision on October 27,
2014. (Docket #79 at 22).
2.
LEGAL STANDARD
When a party files a motion for summary judgment, it is their
“contention that the material facts are undisputed and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Nat. Ret. Fund,
778 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “Material facts”
are those facts which “might affect the outcome of the suit,” and “summary
judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is,
if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Thus, to have a genuine dispute about a material fact, a party opposing
summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 474 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); namely, the party in opposition
“must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
“Where…the movant is seeking summary judgment on a claim as to
which it bears the burden of proof, it must lay out the elements of the claim,
cite the facts it believes satisfies these elements, and demonstrate why the
record is so one-sided as to rule out the prospect of a finding in favor of the
non-movant on the claims.” Hotel 71 Mezz, 778 F.3d at 601. In analyzing
whether summary judgment should be granted, a court must draw all
reasonable inferences from the materials before it in favor of the non-moving
party. Id. When a court denies a motion for summary judgment, it “reflects
the court’s judgment that one or more material facts are disputed or that the
Page 12 of 28
facts relied on by the motion do not entitle the movant to judgment as a
matter of law.” Id. at 602.
3.
ANALYSIS
3.1
Eighth Amendment Claim
Williams’ Eighth Amendment claim is asserted against RCI’s HSU
supervisor, Nygren, and HSU assistant supervisor, Vasquez. (See generally
Docket #1). Specifically, Williams raises four specific complaints: (1) that his
initial follow up ortho appointment was not made in a timely manner; (2)
that his MRI was not scheduled in a timely manner; (3) that his bloodthinning medication, Endxaparin, was not administered properly; and (4)
that he was never taken to his final post-surgery ortho appointment.14
(Docket #91 at 7).
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from a state actor’s
“deliberate indifference to his basic needs.” Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616,
620 (7th Cir. 2003). In order to prove a state actor's failure to provide
adequate medical treatment, a prisoner must show that: (1) he/she had a
serious medical need; and (2) the defendant(s) was deliberately indifferent
to it. Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001). An objectively
14
Williams did not allege this last theory in his complaint. (See Docket #1).
Rather, in his opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and in
“response” to Nygren’s declaration, he adds the argument related to his postsurgery appointments. (Docket #91 at 7; Docket #92 at 3-7). The Court did not
initially screen this theory of liability (Docket #10) and, thus, Williams cannot argue
it here. See Abuelyaman v. Ill. State Univ., 667 F.3d 800, 814 (7th Cir. 2011) (“It is well
settled that a plaintiff may not advance a new argument in response to a summary
judgment motion.”). However, as described below, even if these facts had been
properly alleged in the complaint, they do not make out a showing of deliberate
indifference against Nygren or Vasquez.
Page 13 of 28
serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Zentmyer v. Kendall
County, Illinois, 220 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
Moreover, deliberate indifference entails more than “mere negligence,”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994), and requires the prisoner to show
that the prison official was subjectively aware of the prisoner’s serious
medical needs and disregarded an excessive risk that a lack of treatment
posed to the prisoner’s health or safety. Id. at 837.
In this regard, “[l]iability under § 1983 arises only when the plaintiff
can show that the defendant was personally responsible for a deprivation of a
constitutional right.” Zentmeyer, 220 F.2d at 811 (emphasis added); see also
Perkins v. Lawson, 312 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Under § 1983, there is no
respondeat superior liability.”). Moreover, in order to be liable for a failure
to intervene, “there must be some causal connection or affirmative link
between the action complained about and the official sued….” Harper v.
Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005). In other words, “supervisors
cannot be ‘vicariously liable’ for the conduct of their subordinates.” Watts v.
Westfield, No. 10-CV-550-WMC, 2014 WL 3447080, at *4 (W.D. Wis. July 11,
2014) (citing Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013)). A supervisory official only “satisfies the
personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 if the conduct causing the
constitutional deprivation occurs at his direction or with his knowledge and
consent. That is, he must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve
it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 757 (7th
Cir. 2011); Backes v. Vill. of Peoria Heights, Ill., 662 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2011)
Page 14 of 28
(“They must…act either
knowingly or with deliberate, reckless
indifference.”) (internal citations omitted).
The undisputed facts show that neither Nygren nor Vasquez
demonstrated deliberate indifference with respect to Williams’ medical
treatment.15 The Court will address each of Williams’ arguments in turn.
First, Williams claims that Nygren and Vasquez acted deliberately
indifferent because they failed to schedule his initial ortho follow-up
appointment in a timely manner. (Docket #55 at 3). The parties do not dispute
that the emergency room doctor’s recommendation for follow-up ortho care
was made on June 30, 2014 (Docket #92, Ex. 1 ¶ 65), and Williams’
appointment for that visit was made by Blasius two weeks later, on June 14,
2014. (Docket #92 ¶ 25). Between these dates, various nurses, Blasius, and Dr.
Luy treated Williams in the HSU. (Docket #92 ¶¶ 76-68).
There are no facts suggesting that either Nygren or Vasquez had
knowledge of and facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to
the scheduling of Williams’ initial ortho appointment. See Arnett, 658 F.3d at
757. On the one hand, there is no evidence that Vasquez even knew of
Williams’ injury until over three weeks after16 Williams saw the ortho
15
The parties agree that Williams’ knee injury was objectively serious for the
purpose of his Eighth Amendment claim. (Docket #74 ¶ 5). Thus, the Court will
devote this portion of the Order to discussing the issue in dispute—whether
Nygren and/or Vasquez acted with deliberate indifference to Williams’ knee injury.
16
Even if Vasquez knew about Williams’ injury and the basketball accident
because she was on duty in the HSU on June 30, 2014, there is no evidence she
knew of the emergency room doctor’s order to follow up with an ortho specialist
within 3-5 days.
Page 15 of 28
specialist.17 (Docket #68 ¶ 70) (explaining the call that Vasquez took from
Williams’ mother on August 20, 2014). On the other hand, the only evidence
regarding Nygren’s involvement with the initial ortho follow up
appointment stems from two HSR’s that Nygren responded to on: (1) June
26, 2014—after Williams’ appointment had been scheduled; and (2) August
8, 2014—after Williams’ appointment had occurred. (Docket #1, Ex. 3; Docket
#68 ¶ 57). Even if Nygren had learned of Williams situation seven days prior
to the HSR that she responded to on June 26, 2014,18 Williams’ appointment
had already been scheduled by that date. (See Docket #92 ¶ 25). Moreover,
Nygren was not Williams’ primary advance care provider and, therefore, did
not direct Williams’ medical care. (Docket #69 ¶ 9). This meant that Nygren:
(1) was not actively treating Williams; (2) did not have the authority to
determine what course of treatment to pursue in relation to Williams’ injury;
and (3) did not have the ability to overturn the care decisions that were being
made by the HSU nurses, Blasius and Dr. Luy. (Docket #69 ¶ 9).
17
Likewise, the fact that Vasquez: (1) placed a medical hold on Williams to
prevent him from being moved to another institution; and (2) was carbon copied
on October 27, 2014, with an email resolving Williams’ inmate complaint, does not
further Williams’ theory that Vasquez participated in delaying his initial
appointment. (Docket #68 ¶¶ 70, 74; Docket #79 at 22).
18
Seven days prior to June 26, 2014, would be June 19, 2014. (Docket #92
¶ 25).
Page 16 of 28
In short, there are no facts to suggest that: (1) Vasquez or Nygren knew
that Williams needed a follow up appointment prior to it being scheduled
on June 14, 2014; or (2) acted with deliberate, reckless indifference during
the period of time in which Williams’ ortho appointment had not yet
been scheduled.19 To the extent there was any delay in the initial ortho
appointment’s scheduling, the substandard medical care that Williams
allegedly received was not committed by, nor can be found attributable to,
Nygren and Vasquez. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. at 699 n.58
(no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983).
Second, Williams argues that Vasquez and Nygren acted with
deliberate indifference by delaying his MRI appointment. (Docket #55 at 3).
Contrary to Williams’ assertion, the MRI was not ordered by the emergency
room physician. (See Docket #1, Ex. 1 at 3). Rather, Williams’ MRI was
ordered by Dr. Jankovic at Williams’ initial ortho appointment on July 28,
2014. (Docket #69 ¶ 28). Blasius scheduled the MRI on the same day of
Williams’ initial appointment for August 26, 2014. (Docket #69 ¶¶ 29, 33-34;
Docket #69 Ex. 1 at 24). There is no evidence to suggest Vasquez and Nygren
had any involvement in scheduling or delaying that MRI appointment.
Third, Williams claims that Vasquez and Nygren were deliberately
indifferent by failing to intervene with the administration of his Endxaparin
prescription. (Docket #1 at 4). On the one hand, Vasquez became aware of
19
Nor can these defendants be liable for the fact that it took from June 14,
2014, until June 28, 2014, for the appointment to occur. As Nygren explained in her
response to Williams’ HSR on July 26, 2014, the HSU staff can only schedule outside
appointments when the outside doctors have availability. (Docket #99 ¶¶ 59, 47,
63). There is no evidence to suggest that either of the defendants played any role
in delaying the appointment during this timeframe.
Page 17 of 28
this situation sometime between September 26, 2014 (the day that Blasius
discontinued Williams’ Endxaparin prescription) and October 1, 2014 (the
day when Vasquez responded to Williams’ HSR). (Docket #1, Ex. 1, Ex. 6 at
2-3). On the other hand, Nygren only became aware of this situation when
she was carbon copied on the resolution of Williams’ inmate complaint on
October 27, 2014. (Docket #79 at 22).
Importantly, however, on September 26, 2014, Williams’ medical
records indicate that Blasius, one of Williams’ advance primary care
providers, had changed Williams’ seven-day Endxaparin prescription to a
five-day regimen. (Docket #69, Ex. 16 at 16, 39). As the HSU supervisor and
assistant supervisor, it is undisputed that after the medical professional
prescribing his treatment changed Williams’ medication, neither Nygren nor
Vasquez had the authority to alter Blasius’ decision to alter Williams’
prescription. (Docket #69 ¶ at 10; Docket #70 at 9). At best, therefore,
Williams’ allegations—namely that he was dissatisfied with his prescription
regimen and treatment plan—sound in medical malpractice, which cannot
be remedied with an action under Section 1983. Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d
675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Deliberate indifference is not medical malpractice;
the Eighth Amendment does not codify common law torts.”); Johnson v.
Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that plaintiff’s
dissatisfaction or disagreement with course of treatment is not evidence of
deliberate indifference).
Page 18 of 28
Finally, Williams asserts that the defendants’ failure to ensure that he
attended his final ortho appointment violated his Eighth Amendment
rights.20 (Docket #91 at 7). Beyond the fact that this argument was not raised
in the screened complaint and, therefore, cannot be raised at summary
judgment, the argument also has no factual support. (See Docket #1);
Abuelyaman, 667 F.3d at 814. Williams’ medical records indicate that he
indeed attended a final orthopedic appointment on September 22, 2014.
(Docket #69, Ex. 1 at 2); see also Burton v. Downey, No. 14-3591, slip op. at 10
(7th Cir. Oct. 8, 2015) (citing Scott v. Harris, 500 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“[W]hen
opposing parties tell two difference stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court
should not adopt that version of the fact for purposes of ruling on a motion
for summary judgment.”)). Moreover, because Nygren and Vasquez were
not involved in Williams’ direct patient care before, during, or after the
basketball accident, Williams fails to explain when, how, or if the defendants
were made aware of his final follow up appointment needs. (Docket #69 ¶ 10;
Docket #70 ¶ 9). Because there is no evidence that the defendants knew that
the follow-up appointments were needed and/or delayed, the Court cannot
conclude that either of the defendants acted with a sufficient degree of
culpability so as to hold them liable under the Eighth Amendment.
In sum, there is simply no evidence from which to infer that Nygren
or Vasquez acted with deliberate indifference towards Williams’ medical
20
Williams alleges that his final ortho appointments were scheduled for
September 22, 2014, and October 23, 2014. (Docket #91 at 7).
Page 19 of 28
needs.21 The Court will grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
with respect to Williams’ Eighth Amendment claim (Docket #66) and
correspondingly deny Williams’ motion for summary judgment on this
claim. (Docket #54).
3.2
State Law Negligence Claim
Williams claims that Kemper, Malone and Howard acted negligently
by failing to maintain the safety of the Milwaukee Unit basketball court
and/or failing to warn inmates of the dangerous condition of that court.
(Docket #55 at 2). However, this claim must fail because each of these
defendants—as state employees—are entitled to governmental immunity
and recreational immunity.
On the one hand, “[t]he rule of governmental immunity provides that
state officers and employees are immune from personal liability for injuries
resulting from acts performed within the scope of their official duties.” Pries
v. McMillon, 2010 WI 63, ¶ 17, 326 Wis. 2d 37, 50, 784 N.W. 2d 648, 654. The
“general rule for state employees is immunity and an exception must be
demonstrated in order for this rule not to apply.” Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d
1, 10 n.6, 18-19, 546 N.W. 2d 151, 159 (1996) (“The general rule of immunity
for state public officers stands in contrast to that for municipalities where,
‘the rule is liability—the exception is immunity.’”) (citing Holytz v. City of
21
Because the Court finds that the Nygren and Vasquez are entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law on the Eighth Amendment claim, the Court
need not address the defendants’ remaining arguments. See Estate of Phillips v. City
of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 597 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that when a court determines
in a § 1983 case that no constitutional violation occurred, it is unnecessary to
consider whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity).
Page 20 of 28
Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 39, 115 N.W. 2d 618 (1962)). Governmental
immunity is a question of law. Pries, 2010 WI at ¶ 17.
Two exceptions to the rule of governmental immunity for state
employees are relevant in this case: the ministerial duty exception and the
known danger exception. Id. With regard to the ministerial duty exception,
“a public officer or employee is not shielded from liability for the negligent
performance of a purely ministerial duty.” Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 10. “The test
for determining whether a duty is discretionary (and therefore within the
scope of immunity) or ministerial (and not so protected) is that the latter is
found only when [the duty] is absolute, certain and imperative, involving
merely the performance of a specific task when the law imposes, prescribes
and defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with such
certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion.” Id. (internal
citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Second, the known
danger exception operates in situations where an obviously hazardous
situation exists and ‘the nature of the danger is compelling and known to the
officer and is of such force that the public officer has no discretion not to
act.’” Pries, 2010 WI 63, ¶ 23 (citing C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 422
N.W. 2d 614, 619 (1988)). “This exception is a very limited one, having rarely
been asserted successfully.” Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d
81, 95, 596 N.W. 2d 417, 424 (1999). “The two exceptions overlap to an extent,
inasmuch as they both require the identification of a ministerial duty.” Pries,
2010 WI 63, ¶ 23.
The Court concludes that Kemper, Malone and Howard are entitled
to governmental immunity because: (1) maintenance of the basketball courts
was a not a ministerial duty assigned to any of the defendants; and (2) no
Page 21 of 28
reasonable jury could find that the Milwaukee Unit’s court was “so obviously
hazardous” so as to justify the known danger exception.
With regard to the duty to maintain the basketball courts at RCI, at all
times relevant, matters involving maintenance of the buildings and grounds
were routinely addressed by staff members of the Building and Grounds
Department. (Docket #68 ¶ 29). The Supervisor of Maintenance has, at all
times relevant, been Mr. Potratz. (Docket #68 ¶ 29). Although Kemper and
Malone regularly attended meetings with Mr. Potratz, the Buildings and
Grounds Superintendent, and the correctional management services director,
these meetings were generally dedicated to discussing on-going maintenance
issues. (Docket #68 ¶ 31). Nothing about these meetings, or the job
descriptions of Kemper, Malone and/or Howard, impose upon the
defendants the “specific task” or duty of repairing the basketball courts; nor
was this duty “absolute, certain and imperative.” Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 10.
Similarly, there is no suggestion that any RCI policy prescribed “the time,
mode and occasion for” basketball court maintenance. Id.
Rather, maintenance of the courts, like the overall maintenance of the
building and grounds at RCI, was handled according to a careful
prioritization of need and budget constraints. (Docket #68 ¶ 31). It is true, as
Williams suggests, that in 2013-2014 the Building and Grounds Department
discussed re-surfacing the courts. (Docket #68 ¶ 32). However, this resurfacing was contemplated to be part of the overall goal of maintenance of
the prison grounds. (Docket #68 ¶ 34). This is because none of the defendants
had become aware of hazardous conditions on the courts and/or repeated
injuries associated with the courts. (Docket #68 ¶¶ 25, 34). Because there was
not a prescription of the “time, place, or manner” for the completion of this
Page 22 of 28
overall goal, any duty flowing from the 2013-2014 re-surfacing meeting was
discretionary and non-ministerial in nature. Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 10.
Moreover, there are no facts in the record from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that the basketball courts presented an obvious hazard.
Pries, 2010 WI 63, ¶ 23; cf. Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis.2d 525, 532, 259 N.W.2d
672 (1977) (concluding that a park trail’s obvious drop-offs and location near
the edge of a high bluff were sufficiently dangerous to give rise to the park
manager’s “absolute, certain, and imperative duty” to close the trail, place
warning signs, notify his superiors, or otherwise ensure adequate protection
of the public who had been invited to use the park). Despite the fact that the
Milwaukee Unit’s court had some “cracks,” none of defendants considered
the court to be in such a state of disrepair as to constitute a hazard to the
inmates playing on it. (Docket #74 ¶¶ 16-17, 20, 27; see also Figures 1-2).
Williams likewise presented no evidence of other injuries sustained as a
result of the court’s condition.
Page 23 of 28
Figure 1: Milwaukee Unit Basketball Court (Docket #58, Ex. 2
Figure 2: Milwaukee Unit Basketball Hoop Close-Up (Docket #58, Ex. 2)
Page 24 of 28
What is more, Kemper, Malone and Howard are likewise entitled to
recreational immunity pursuant to Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.52. That statute
provides that “no owner and no officer, employee or agent of an owner owes
to any person who enters the owner’s property to engage in a recreational
activity: (1) [a] duty to keep the property safe for recreational activities; (2)
[a] duty to inspect the property…; [or] (3) [a] duty to give warning of an
unsafe condition, use or activity on the property.” Wis. Stat. Ann.
§895.52(2)(a). In addition, “no owner and no officer, employee or agent of an
owner is liable for…injury caused by a person engaging in a recreational
activity on the owner’s property….” Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.52(2)(b). The
statute defines: (1) “injury” to mean “an injury to a person or to property”;
(2) an “owner” to mean “[a] person, including a governmental body or
nonprofit organization, that owns, leases or occupies property”; (3)
“property” to mean “real property and buildings, structures and
improvements thereon, and the waters of the state”; and (4) “recreational
activity” to mean “any outdoor activity undertaken for the purpose of
exercise, relaxation or pleasure.…” Wis. Stat. Ann. §895.52(1) (b), (d), (f), (g).
When interpreting this statute, Wisconsin courts have instructed:
for immunity to apply, certain conditions must exist. First, as
here, the claimant's injuries must have been sustained during
recreational activity. Next, the allegedly negligent party must
be an owner of the property where the injury occurred. There
are some circumstances under which immunity will not apply,
but courts are to liberally construe the statute in favor of
property owners.
Page 25 of 28
Held v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc., 2007 WI App 43, ¶ 8, 300 Wis. 2d 498,
503, 730 N.W. 2d 428, 430-31 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
As stated by Held, there is no dispute that: (1) Williams’ knee injury
was sustained during a game of basketball; and (2) Kemper, Malone and
Howard were employees of a governmental body—the State of
Wisconsin—that owned the basketball court where the incident occurred.
(Docket #68 ¶ 22). Thus, under the plain terms of the statute and the case law
interpreting it, Kemper, Howard and Malone are entitled to recreational
immunity in this case.
To conclude, there is no evidence to suggest that the defendants’
duties to maintain the basketball courts at RCI were anything other than
discretionary and non-ministerial. See Pries, 2010 WI 63, ¶ 23. Moreover, no
reasonable jury could conclude that the condition of the Milwaukee Unit
basketball court presented an obvious danger, the nature of which was
compelling and known to the defendants. Id. Therefore, Kemper, Malone and
Howard are entitled to governmental immunity on Williams’ state law
negligence claim. In addition, Kemper, Malone and Howard are likewise
entitled to recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.52. The
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim (Docket #66) will
be granted, and Williams’ motion for summary judgement on this claim
(Docket #54) will be denied.
4.
CONCLUSION
Williams’ claims cannot proceed beyond summary judgment. The
undisputed facts demonstrate that neither Vasquez nor Nygren, in their
supervisory capacities, violated Williams’ Eighth Amendment rights. In
Page 26 of 28
addition, Kemper, Malone and Howard are entitled to both governmental
and recreational immunity, and thus cannot be held liable for a negligence
claim arising from Williams’ knee injury on the basketball court. Thus, the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket #66) will be granted, and
Williams’ motion for summary judgment (Docket #54) will be denied.
In addition, the Court will deny Williams’ request to bring a criminal
action against the defendants for perjury. (Docket #96). Criminal actions must
be initiated by the government.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Williams’ motion for summary judgment
(Docket #54) be and the same is hereby DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (Docket #66) be and the same is hereby GRANTED, as
more fully described in detail above, and that this action be and the same is
hereby DISMISSED on the merits;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Williams’ motion to pursue a
criminal claim (Docket #96) be and the same is hereby DENIED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Williams’ motion for a preliminary
injunction (Docket #101) be and the same is hereby DENIED.22
22
Williams filed this motion for a “preliminary” injunction on February 25,
2016. (Docket #101). However, this injunction relates to his theory that the
defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to take him to his
final ortho follow-up appointments. (Docket #101). The Court has addressed this
argument above and concluded that: (1) the theory was not properly raised in
Williams’ complaint; and (2) the argument has no merit because neither Nygren nor
Vasquez acted with deliberate indifference with respect to Williams’ purported
appointments. (See supra, Part 3.1). In light of the Court’s conclusion, a preliminary
injunction flowing from this alleged conduct is inappropriate and Williams’ motion
will therefore be denied.
Page 27 of 28
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 26th day of February, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge
Page 28 of 28
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?