Vazquez Vargas v. Chief Executive of Kenosha County Detention Center

Filing 18

ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 6/17/15 that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk of court shall enter final judgment. Further ordering that the separate petition filed in Case No. 15-C-0494 is DISMISSED as unnecessary. (cc: all counsel, via USPS to petitioner)(dm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

QUIRINO VAZQUEZ VARGAS,
Petitioner,
v.

Case Nos. 15-C-0455
15-C-0494

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF KENOSHA
COUNTY DETENTION CENTER,
Respondent.

ORDER
On April 16, 2015, this court received a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 from Quirino Vazquez Vargas.1 The petition indicates that Vazquez
Vargas has been ordered removed from the United States and is being detained at the
Kenosha County Detention Center. He alleges that there is no significant likelihood of his
being removed in the reasonably foreseeable future and that he must be released in
accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
The authority to detain aliens after the issuance of a final removal order is in
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Under this provision, the Attorney General is afforded a ninety-day
period to accomplish the alien’s removal from the United States following an entry of a final
order of deportation or removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)-(B). During this period,
Congress has mandated the detention of the alien ordered removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).
Upon the conclusion of the removal period, the statute allows for either continued detention

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On April 27, 2015, Vazquez Vargas filed a substantially similar habeas petition,
which has been docketed as Case No. 15-C-494. It is not clear why he filed this second
petition, but it will be dismissed as unnecessary.

or release under supervision. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).

Although the statute gives

Immigration and Customs Enforcement the discretion to continue detaining an alien in this
situation, this detention is subject to the limits of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-92 (2001).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 1231(a)(6), the provision that
allows for detention beyond the removal period, to limit post-removal-period detention to
a period “reasonably necessary to bring about the alien’s removal from the United States.”
Id. at 698.

The Court held that post-removal-order detention for six months is

“presumptively reasonable.” Id. at 701. Beyond six months, if removal is no longer
reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is not authorized by statute. Id. at 699.
In the present case, the petitioner’s order of removal was issued on April 9, 2015.
See Ex. A to Resp. to Pet; ECF No. 14-1. The order could not have become final before
that date, and thus the six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention has not yet
expired. The petition is premature and will be dismissed for that reason.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
DENIED. The clerk of court shall enter final judgment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the separate petition filed in Case No. 15-C-0494
is DISMISSED as unnecessary.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 17th day of June, 2015.

s/ Lynn Adelman
__________________________________
LYNN ADELMAN
District Judge

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