Brown v. Milwaukee County Jail et al

Filing 21

DECISION AND ORDER signed by Judge Pamela Pepper on 1/12/2016 GRANTING 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; DENYING 9 Motion to Appoint Counsel; DENYING 14 plaintiff's Petition for John Doe; DENYING 18 plaintiff's Pet ition to Leave Proceeds of Suit to Family Upon Death; and SCREENING Complaint. The court ORDERS that on or before 2/19/2016, plaintiff may file an amended complaint complying with the requirements the court set out above. (cc: all counsel; by US Mail to plaintiff and Warden at Waupun CI) (pwm) (Complete document added on 1/12/2016) (vkb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________________
ENNIS LEE BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 15-cv-509-pp

MILWAUKEE COUNTY JAIL,
ATTORNEY J. HICKS,
SARA B. LEWIS,
JOHN BARRETT,
JEREMY PERRI,
OFFICE OF LAWYER REGULATION,
and JANE AND JOHN DOES,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (DKT. NO. 2), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL (DKT. NO. 9), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
PETITION FOR JOHN DOE (DKT. NO. 14), DENYING THE PLAINTIFF’S
PETITION TO LEAVE PROCEEDS OF SUIT TO FAMILY UPON DEATH (DKT.
NO. 18), AND SCREENING COMPLAINT
______________________________________________________________________________
The pro se plaintiff is a prisoner at Waupun Correctional Institution. He
filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, Dkt. No. 1, along with a petition to
proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. No. 2. He has also asked the court to appoint
him counsel, Dkt. No. 9, and has made other requests. This order resolves
those requests and motions, and screens the plaintiff’s complaint.
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
On May 21, 2015, the court issued an order requiring the plaintiff to pay
an initial partial filing fee of $14.13. Dkt. No. 8. The court received that initial
partial filing fee from the plaintiff on June 1, 2015. Accordingly, the court will
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grant the plaintiff’s petition to proceed in forma pauperis because he lacks
funds to prepay the full filing fee, see 28 U.S.C. §1915(b), and will allow him to
pay the remainder of the $350 filing fee in installments as described at the end
of this order.
Motion for Appointment of Counsel
In his motion to appoint counsel, the plaintiff states that his
imprisonment will greatly limit his ability to litigate this complex case and that
he has limited knowledge to the law library. Dkt. No. 9 at 1. The plaintiff also
alleges that he has a “severe mental disability,” and that other inmates have
assisted him with this case. Id. at 2. He states that he has “made repeated
efforts” to find an attorney on his own, and attaches five letters from lawyers
(all dated in late April or early May 2015) indicating that they cannot represent
him. Id. at 2; Dkt. No. 9-1.
In a civil case, the court has discretion to decide whether to recruit a
lawyer for someone who cannot afford one. Navejar v. Iyola, 718 F.3d 692, 696
(7th Cir. 2013); 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(1); Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 706
F.3d 864, 866-67 (7th Cir. 2013). First, however, the person has to make a
reasonable effort to hire private counsel on their own. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d
647, 653 (7th Cir. 2007). After the plaintiff makes that reasonable attempt to
hire counsel, the court then must decide “whether the difficulty of the case –
factually and legally – exceeds the particular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson
to coherently present it.” Navejar, 718 F.3d at 696 (citing Pruitt, 503 F.3d at
655). To decide that, the court looks, not only at the plaintiff’s ability to try his
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case, but also at his ability to perform other “tasks that normally attend
litigation,” such as “evidence gathering” and “preparing and responding to
motions.” Id.
The plaintiff has met the first prong of the Pruitt test—he has
demonstrated to the court that he made efforts to find counsel on his own, and
was unable to do so.
With regard to the second prong of the Pruitt test, however, the court
concludes that, at this point, the plaintiff’s case is not so complex that he
cannot handle it himself. Indeed, as the court discusses below, the complaint
raises arguments that the plaintiff has raised in two other cases in this court.
He has made these arguments before—he clearly states them in this case. He
hints at other arguments that he has not made in previous cases, and as
stated below, the court is going to give him the opportunity to amend his
complaint to flesh out those arguments. But they, too, are factual arguments—
all he will need to do in an amended complaint is explain who did what to him,
and when. The court is confident that at this stage of the proceedings, the
plaintiff is capable of competently representing himself. If things become more
complicated later in the case, the plaintiff can renew his request that the court
appoint a lawyer to assist him.
Petition for a Civil Rights Investigation/John Doe Investigation
On July 22, 2015, the plaintiff filed a document entitled “Petition for Civil
Right Investigation per 18 U.S.C. 241 & 42 U.S.C. 1414 Petition for John Doe
Per: Wis. Stat. 968.26.” Dkt. No. 14. The heading of the document names both
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the court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court. The plaintiff addresses the pleading to Judge Pepper (the judge in this
federal case), Chief Justice Patience Roggensack (who is the chief justice of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court), and Attorney General Loretta Lynch. Id. at 1. But
in the body of the pleading, the plaintiff asks Chief Justice Roggensack to open
a John Doe investigation under Wisconsin law.
The first law the plaintiff cites in this motion is 18 U.S.C. §241. This
statute is a federal criminal statute that allows the United States government—
the federal prosecutor—to bring charges if two or more people conspire to
deprive someone of his or her civil rights. A private citizen, such as the
plaintiff, cannot sue someone under 18 U.S.C. §241; only a federal prosecutor
(such as the United States Attorney or the Attorney General) may bring charges
under this statute. This court does not have the authority to begin an
investigation into whether violations of this statute occurred. If the plaintiff
wishes someone to begin such an investigation, he should report his
allegations either directly to the United States Attorney General or to the
United States Attorney’s Office.
The second statute the plaintiff cites is 42 U.S.C. §1414. There is no
section 1414 in Title 42 of the United States Code.
The final statute the plaintiff cites is Wis. Stat. §968.26. This is the
section of the Wisconsin statutes that states that if a district attorney asks a
Wisconsin judge to do so, the judge shall convene a John Doe proceeding to
investigate whether a crime has been committed. Wis. Stat. §968.26(1m). The
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statute requires that if the person making the request is not a district attorney,
the Wisconsin judge must refer the complaint to the district attorney or
another prosecutor. Wis. Stat. §968.26(2)(am). This court is a federal court. It
does not have the authority to open a John Doe investigation; only Wisconsin
judges or justices have that authority. And only a district attorney has the
authority to make a John Doe request. If the plaintiff wishes a Wisconsin judge
to open a John Doe investigation, he should report his allegations to the
district attorney in Milwaukee County.
For the above reasons, the court will deny the plaintiff’s motion for a civil
rights investigation or John Doe proceeding.
Petition to Leave Proceeds of Civil Suit to Family Upon Death
On October 2, 2015, the plaintiff filed a document entitled “Petition to
Leave Proceeds of Civil Suit to Family Upon Death.” Dkt. No. 18. In this
pleading, the plaintiff asks for two different things. First, he asks that if he dies
before this case is over, the court allow his family to step in and pursue the
case. Second, he attaches, as the last three pages of the pleading, a document
entitled “Last Will & Testament of Ennis Lee Brown Sr.,” in which he expresses
his intent to leave all of his possessions—including the payment of any claims
resulting from this lawsuit—to his family. As grounds for these requests, the
plaintiff indicates that he was attacked and beaten by a cell mate, and then
was threatened by that cell mate, and placed into segregation for his safety.
The plaintiff indicates that it is for this reason that he is concerned that he may
not survive the completion of his lawsuit.
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As an initial matter, federal courts must not decide issues unless they
are “ripe.” That means that a court can’t issue a decision about something that
hasn’t happened yet, just in case it happens. Second, the issue of whether a
plaintiff’s “estate” may proceed with a lawsuit after a plaintiff has passed away
is a complicated one—even more reason why this court should not take it upon
itself to decide the issue while the plaintiff remains active on his own behalf.
Finally, the plaintiff has filed the “Last Will & Testament” with the court. This
court does not need to take any action on that document’s direction that any
proceeds from this suit should go to the plaintiff’s family. There are laws in
Wisconsin that govern the validity of “testamentary” documents such as wills.
The question of whether the document the plaintiff has filed with this court
constitutes a valid will in the state of Wisconsin is one that a Wisconsin
probate court would have to decide if ever the document was challenged after
the plaintiff’s death.
For these reasons, the court will deny the plaintiff’s motion to the extent
that it asks the court to decide now whether his family can continue with this
lawsuit in the event of his death, and will deny the motion to the extent that it
asks to leave any proceeds of this suit to the plaintiff’s family because it is not
this court’s order which governs what the plaintiff intends to do with his
possessions after his death.
Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint
The law requires the court to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
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governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint
or portion thereof if the plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or
malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that
seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §1915A(b).
A claim is legally frivolous “‘when it lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact.’” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim
as frivolous where it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or
where the factual contentions are clearly “baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
“Malicious,” although “sometimes treated as a synonym for ‘frivolous,’ . . . is
more usefully construed as intended to harass.” Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d
1107, 1109-10 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, the
plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
[he] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff does not need to
plead specific facts, and his statement need only “give the defendant fair notice
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)). However, a complaint that offers “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To state a claim,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, “that is
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plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint allegations “must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
In considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts follow the
principles set forth in Twombly. First, they must “identify[] pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A plaintiff must support legal conclusions
with factual allegations. Id. Second, if there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, courts must “assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege
that the defendants: 1) deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States; and 2) acted under color of state law. BuchananMoore v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer
v. Vill. of N. Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The court is obliged to give the plaintiff’s pro
se allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal construction. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)).

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The plaintiff has named as defendants the Milwaukee County Jail,
Attorney J. Hicks, Assistant District Attorney Sara B. Lewis, Milwaukee County
Clerk of Court John Barrett, State Public Defender Jeremy Perri, the Office of
Lawyer Regulation, and Jane and John Does. The majority of the complaint
allegations relate to a claim that the plaintiff previously has raised in two other
lawsuits filed in this district: the constitutionality of his state criminal
conviction.1
The first federal case the plaintiff filed, Brown v. Wisconsin, Case
Number 14-CV-872-CNC (E.D. Wis.), was a habeas petition filed under 28
U.S.C. §2254. That habeas petition raised multiple constitutional challenges to
his state court conviction.
In ground one, Brown attacks pretrial matters—he asserts
that he was arrested illegally and that his Miranda rights were
violated.
In ground two Brown attacks the conduct of the
prosecution—he asserts, among other things, prosecutorial
misconduct, multiplicity, vindictive prosecution, and due process
violations. Ground three is aimed at the trial court’s actions;
Brown asserts violations of his rights to a speedy trial, due
process, to choose and fire counsel, and to represent himself. This
ground for relief and the facts section of Brown’s filing charges that
his first attorney, Michael J. Hicks, was suspended from practice
yet represented Brown during the suspension, thereby suggesting
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ground four is aimed
at the prosecution and court, charging denial of discovery, denial
of a public hearing and trial, denial of the right to represent
himself, denial of the right to attend the trial, and denial of the
right to confront his accusers.
(Brown v. Wisconsin, Case No. 14-CV-872-CNC (E.D. Wis.) Dkt. No. 33 at 3-4.)

The plaintiff acknowledges that he previously began a lawsuit relating to the
same facts involved in this action, and he cites to his prior §1983 case, Case
No. 14-CV-795-CNC.    
1

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On February 2, 2015, Judge Clevert dismissed the habeas petition
without prejudice for failure to exhaust state-court remedies. In other words,
Judge Clevert dismissed the habeas petition because the plaintiff had not
completed the state court appeal of his criminal conviction.
The second case, Brown v. Hicks, et al., Case No. 14-CV-795-CNC (E.D.
Wis.), was a 42 U.S.C. §1983 lawsuit, in which the plaintiff again alleged that
his appointed counsel had been suspended from practice at the time he
represented the plaintiff, and alleging that his criminal conviction was invalid.
He asked the court to conduct an investigation of the State Public Defender
and his appointed lawyer, asked to be released from prison, and sought
monetary damages. On October 31, 2014, Judge Clevert dismissed that case
without prejudice, and directed the plaintiff to file a habeas petition if he
wanted to attack an alleged wrongful criminal conviction. Id. at Dkt. No. 14.
(Judge Clevert noted that Mr. Brown had recently filed a habeas petition based
on his criminal conviction, Case No. 14-CV-872-CNC. Id.)
In this case, which he filed approximately six months after Judge Clevert
dismissed his last §1983 case, the plaintiff alleges that defendant Attorney J.
Hicks (also referred to in his complaint as “Michael J. Hicks”), his public
defender, did not have a valid license to practice, which resulted in violation of
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights at his criminal trial. Dkt. No. 1 at 4.
Specifically, he alleges that the license suspension unnecessarily delayed the
plaintiff’s trial, which resulted in his illegal detention (without charges having
been filed) at the Milwaukee County Jail from July 26, 2012, through June 28,
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2013. Id. at 8. The plaintiff also alleges that Attorney Hicks knowingly
practiced law without a license. Id. at 4-5. He alleges that defendant Assistant
District Attorney Sara B. Lewis knew that Attorney Hicks did not have a
license, and that she conspired with him to sabotage the plaintiff’s criminal
trial, which included holding the plaintiff hostage in jail until he signed the
waiver of right to an attorney, using false charges and false evidence, and
deliberately misleading the jury. Id.
The plaintiff also alleges that Attorney Jeremy Perri and John and Jane
Does (allegedly supervisors from the State Public Defender’s Office) deliberately
appointed Attorney Hicks to represent him, even though they knew Attorney
Hicks’ license had been suspended. Id. at 5. He argues that this violated his
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id.
The plaintiff alleges that the Milwaukee County Jail violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when it
housed him with “already convicted inmates due to the fact that [he] was not
allegedly charged until June 28, 2013 contrary to the D.A.’s minestery [sic]
duty . . . .” Id. at 3.
Next, the plaintiff alleges that from July 31, 2012 to October 7, 2013,
defendant Clerk of Court John Barrett “held numerous hearings to make it
appear the case was on the docket, yet the case was never processed with the
Clerk of Courts.” Id. at 9. He alleges that these “fake” court dates were used to
make it appear as though there was a valid court process, and to disguise the

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fact that a crime was being committed, in order to mislead the public and the
plaintiff. According to the plaintiff,
[t]here is no official circuit court docket –
duty and it clearly shows the state failed
falsely imprisoned, convicted, tortured,
medical attention and the basic of human

the clerk failed to do his
to process me and I was
beaten, starved, denied
rights[.]

Id. at 10.
Finally, the plaintiff alleges that the Wisconsin Office of Lawyer
Regulation was aware that Attorney Hicks had been suspended, but that it
deliberately turned a blind eye to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at 7.
He argues that the Office of Lawyer Regulation is supposed to “correct
attorneys’ misconduct(s),” but that it ignored the fact that an unlicensed lawyer
was representing the plaintiff, thus allowing him to suffer injustice. Id. at 7-8.
As an initial matter, the plaintiff may not proceed on claims that
challenge his criminal conviction, i.e., that his trial counsel was ineffective or
that his trial was otherwise unconstitutional, in this §1983 action. Such claims
are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), which bars any
suit under §1983 where “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction” unless the conviction has already been
invalidated. As Judge Clevert told the plaintiff when he dismissed the last
§1983 case in October 2014, the proper way for someone to challenge the
validity of a state criminal conviction in federal court is to file a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before a federal court may
consider the merits of a habeas petition, however, the plaintiff must have

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exhausted his state court remedies, including completing his state-court
appeal of his criminal conviction.
Wisconsin court online records reveal that the plaintiff’s appeal (State v.
Ennis Lee Brown, Court of Appeals District I, Case No. 2015AP522-CR) of his
criminal case (State of Wisconsin v. Ennis Lee Brown, Milwaukee County Case
No. 2012CF3796) may recently have been completed, although it is not entirely
clear. On October 9, 2015, the District I Court of Appeals issued its decision
affirming the state court conviction. (Decision available at www.wicourts.gov.)
The plaintiff filed a petition for review with the Wisconsin Supreme Court on
October 16, 2015. On November 18, 2015, there is a docket entry that reads,
“Opinion Ordered Unpublished.” The last entry on the Court of Appeals docket
is dated December 3, 2015, and states, “Remittitur.” Wis. Stat. §809.26(1)
indicates that “remittitur” is when the clerk of the Court of Appeals must
transmit that court’s judgment and the court record to the circuit court within
thirty-one days of the date of the decision, unless the losing party files a
petition for review with the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In that case, the Court
of Appeals holds off on transmitting the decision to the circuit court “until the
supreme court rules on the petition.” Id.
It is not clear to this court whether the November 18, 2015 docket entry,
combined with the December 3, 2015 remittitur, indicates that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has ruled on the plaintiff’s petition for review. If the Supreme
Court has not yet ruled, then it would be premature for the plaintiff to file a
habeas petition at this time. If the Wisconsin Supreme Court has granted the
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plaintiff’s petition for review, it also is premature for the plaintiff to file a federal
habeas petition; he would have to wait for the Supreme Court to decide the
merits of his case. If the Wisconsin Supreme Court has denied the plaintiff’s
petition for review, the law gives the plaintiff a period of time to file a habeas
petition. (The court will mail the plaintiff the court’s habeas corpus form
petition, which he may use once he makes sure that he has exhausted state
court remedies, and the court’s guide, “Habeas Corpus: Answers to State
Petitioners’ Common Questions.”) Regardless, because a §1983 suit is not the
proper way to attack the validity of a state criminal conviction, the court will
not allow the plaintiff to proceed on those claims.
In addition to challenging the validity of his conviction, the plaintiff’s
current complaint also contains brief allegations that suggest that he is trying
to raise claims related to his conditions of confinement at the Milwaukee
County Jail. These allegations are that the plaintiff was tortured, beaten,
starved, and denied medical attention during his confinement at the Milwaukee
County Jail. Dkt. No. 1 at 10, ¶23. The complaint, however, does not say which
particular individuals at the Milwaukee County Jail did these things to the
plaintiff. He also does not provide any details as to what happened and when it
happened. If the plaintiff wants the court to consider these allegations, he must
file an amended complaint. The amended complaint should identify, by name,
who allegedly tortured the plaintiff, who beat him, who starved him, and who
denial him medical attention. If the plaintiff doesn’t know the names of the
individuals personally involved in his claims, he may call them John or Jane
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Doe(s), and describe them (by, for example, identifying their job title, such as
“nurse” or “Lieutenant, first shift”). The plaintiff also must describe what,
exactly, each individual did to him, and, as much as possible, when they did it.
For example, if the plaintiff wishes to allege that someone denied him food, he
could state something like, “On March 5, 2015, Lieutenant Jones refused to
give me my lunch tray, and I did not eat lunch that day.”
If the plaintiff wants to proceed on his claims that he was tortured,
beaten, starved and denied medical attention at the Milwaukee County Jail, he
must file an amended complaint, describing the details that the court
discussed above. He must not include in the amended complaint any
allegations attacking the validity of his state court conviction—as the court has
indicated, the proper way for him to challenge the validity of that conviction is
by filing a habeas corpus petition once he is sure he has exhausted his state
remedies. He must file the amended complaint on or before February 19,
2016. If he doesn’t file the amended complaint on or before that date, the court
may dismiss the plaintiff’s case.
The amended complaint must contain the docket number assigned to
this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” The amended complaint
will supersede the prior complaint, and must be complete in itself without
reference to the original complaint. See Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1056-57 (7th Cir. 1998). If the plaintiff
files the amended complaint by the deadline the court set—February 19,
2016—the court will screen it under 28 U.S.C. §1915A.
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Again, the court reminds the plaintiff that the amended complaint in this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action may only contain allegations and claims related to his
conditions of confinement. If the plaintiff want to challenge his criminal
conviction, he may file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
after he exhausts his state court remedies.
Conclusion
The court GRANTS the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. Dkt. No. 2.
The court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE that plaintiff’s motion to
appoint counsel. Dkt. No. 9.
The court DENIES the plaintiff’s petition for a civil rights investigation or
John Doe investigation. Dkt. No. 14.
The court DENIES AS UNNECESSARY the plaintiff’s petition for to leave
the proceeds of this civil suit to his family. Dkt. No. 18.
The court ORDERS that on or before February 19, 2016, the plaintiff
may file an amended complaint complying with the requirements the court set
out above.
The court also ORDERS that the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department
of Corrections or his designee shall collect from the plaintiff’s prisoner trust
account the $335.87 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments
from the plaintiff’s prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the
preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s trust account and
forwarding payments to the clerk of court each time the amount in the account
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exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(2). The Secretary or his
designee shall clearly identify these payments by the case name and number.
The court will mail the plaintiff the court’s habeas corpus form petition,
and the court’s guide, “Habeas Corpus: Answers to State Petitioners’ Common
Questions.”
The court also ORDERS that, pursuant to the Prisoner E-Filing Program,
the plaintiff shall submit all correspondence and case filings to institution staff,
who will scan and e-mail documents to the court. The Prisoner E-Filing
Program is in effect at Dodge Correctional Institution, Green Bay Correctional
Institution, Waupun Correctional Institution, and Wisconsin Secure Program
Facility and, therefore, if the plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at one of those
institutions, he must submit all correspondence and legal material to:
Office of the Clerk
United States District Court
Eastern District of Wisconsin
362 United States Courthouse
517 E. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
The court will mail of a copy of this order to the Warden at Waupun
Correctional Institution.
Dated at Milwaukee this 12th day of January, 2016.

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