Love v. Medical College of Wisconsin et al

Filing 186

ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 6/11/18. Defendants' motions to convert Love's expedited motion for leave to amend his complaint into a non-expedited motion 150 , 151 and 152 are DENIED; Love's motion to strike defendants� 39; briefs in opposition to his expedited motion for leave to amend his complaint 165 is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall STRIKE those briefs 157 , 161 , and 162 from the record; Love's expedited motion for leave to amend his complain t 147 is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall file Love's third amended complaint [147-2] but shall do so UNDER SEAL; Love's motion to strike affirmative defenses pleaded in defendants' answers to his second amended complaint 125 and Froedtert's motion for clarification of my order granting Loves motion for leave to file his second amended complaint 127 are DENIED as moot; Love's and Gahnz's motions to quash MCW's subpoena commanding Lawton & Cates S.C. to produce materials related to its representation of Love 131 and 133 are GRANTED; Gahnz's motion for a protective order prohibiting further attempts by MCW to elicit information from Lawton & Cates about its representation of Love 131 is DENIED without prejudice. The parties' motions to seal documents filed as exhibits to Love's expedited motion for leave to amend his complaint 148 , 154 , and 156 are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as discussed above, and the Cler k of Court shall publicly file Exhibit 14 to Loves motion [147-15], but all other exhibits to that motion that were filed under seal shall remain sealed. Within 7 days after the date of this order, Love shall publicly file a version of his third amen ded complaint in which all individual identifiers from personal health information are redacted, as discussed above; MCW's motion to claw back documents filed as exhibits to Love's expedited motion for leave to amend his complaint 154 is DENIED; Love's motion to seal three exhibits filed in opposition to MCW's motion to claw back documents 173 is DENIED, and the Clerk of Court shall publicly file Exhibits D-F to the Declaration of Alexander Hess [172-4 to -6]; MCW's motion to seal two exhibits filed in response to Loves expedited motion for leave to amend his complaint 159 is GRANTED; and MCW's motion for a protective order prohibiting depositions of the parties and their employees until the court resolves Love's expedited motion for leave to amend his complaint 182 is DENIED as moot. (cc: all counsel) (jad)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
ROBERT LOVE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 15-C-0650

MEDICAL COLLEGE OF WISCONSIN et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
Robert Love brings this action against the Medical College of Wisconsin (MCW),1
Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hospital, and physicians employed by them alleging
retaliation in violation of the False Claims Act, defamation, tortious interference with
prospective contractual relations, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The parties have filed numerous motions that I will now address.
I. THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Love moves for leave to file a third amended complaint. “[A] party may amend its
pleading” with “the court’s leave,” which [t]he court should freely give . . . when justice
so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater
Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 520 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[A]pplying the liberal
standard for amending pleadings . . . is the best way to ensure that cases will be
decided justly and on their merits.”). Indeed, leave should be given except where there
is good reason to deny it, “such as undue delay, bad faith . . . on the part of the movant,
. . . futility of amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
1

Throughout this order, I also use “MCW” to refer to the so-called MCW Defendants,
which are MCW itself, Alfred Nicolosi, David Warltier, and Larry Lindenbaum.

Defendants challenge Love’s use, in seeking leave to amend, of this court’s
procedure for expedited non-dispositive motion practice. See Civil L. R. 7(h)(1) (E.D.
Wis.). By local rule, if a party seeks non-dispositive relief by expedited motion, “[t]he
motion must not exceed 3 pages”; “[t]he movant may not file a separate memorandum”
but “may file . . . an affidavit or declaration” that does not “exceed 2 pages”; “[t]he
respondent must file a memorandum in opposition to the motion,” which “must not
exceed 3 pages,” no later than “7 days [after] service of the motion” and “may file with
its memorandum an affidavit or declaration” that does not “exceed 2 pages”; and the
movant may not file a reply brief “absent leave of Court.” See Civil L. R. 7(h)(2).
Defendants move to convert Love’s expedited motion into a “non-expedited
standard motion.” They first argue that Love’s motion is not “non-dispositive” because
properly resolving the motion may dispose of one or more of his claims, e.g., if I find that
amendment would be futile and, thus, deny Love leave to amend. In general, though, a
motion to amend is considered to be non-dispositive, even where denying the motion
would effectively deny relief on claims asserted in the proposed amendment, at least
where denying the motion would not “terminate [the] existing lawsuit.” See Hall v.
Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2006). Denying Love’s motion to amend
would not terminate this lawsuit, so his motion is non-dispositive, and the relief he seeks
falls within the scope of this court’s procedures for expedited motion practice.
Defendants also argue that the issues raised by Love’s motion to amend are too
complex to be responsibly addressed under the page and time constraints that apply to
expedited motions. Yet, for the most part, defendants do not oppose amendment, as

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such. Rather, they primarily seek dismissal of claims asserted in Love’s proposed
amended pleading before that pleading becomes operative.
A defendant may object that amendment is futile because “the proposed
amendment . . . could not survive a . . . motion to dismiss,” Perkins v. Silverstein, 939
F.2d 463, 472 (7th Cir. 1991), but I will not allow defendants to co-opt Love’s motion for
leave to amend to seek dismissal of his claims on their preferred schedule and subject
to their preferred constraints. If I permit amendment and defendants wish to seek
dismissal of any claims asserted in Love’s proposed amended pleading, they may do so
free of the constraints of expedited motion practice by moving to dismiss after the
proposed amendment becomes the operative complaint in this case. For now, they are
subject to the procedures for expedited motion practice that Love properly invoked.
Love moves to strike defendants’ briefs in opposition to his motion to amend
arguing that they were filed in violation of local rules governing expedited motion
practice. Defendants filed their opposition briefs 21 days after Love filed his expedited
motion, far beyond the 7 days allowed by local rule. Civil L. R. 7(h)(2). Moreover, two of
defendants’ three opposition briefs substantially exceed the 3-page limit on briefs set by
that rule. id. Finally, defendants filed their briefs, which were not authorized by rule or
court order, without attaching them to a motion requesting leave to file them, as required
by local rule. Civil L. R. 7(i). In light of these substantial procedural violations, I will grant
Love’s motion and direct the Clerk of Court to strike defendants’ opposition briefs.
As defendants did not properly oppose Love’s motion for leave to file a third
amended complaint, I see no reason to deny him leave to do so. Thus, I will grant his
motion. Love’s third amended complaint supersedes his prior complaints, Wellness

3

Community–National v. Wellness House, 70 F.3d 46, 49 (7th Cir. 1995), so I will deny
as moot two pending motions that respectively concern (1) affirmative defenses pleaded
in defendants’ answers to Love’s second amended complaint and (2) clarification of my
prior order granting Love’s motion for leave to file that complaint.
II. MCW’S SUBPOENA
Love moves to quash a subpoena that MCW served on Lawton & Cates S.C., the
law firm that represented him in negotiating his separation agreement with MCW. The
separation agreement is at issue here because it contains a broad release that, if
enforceable, bars Love from asserting many of his claims in this case. The subpoena
directs the president of Lawton & Cates, Dixon Gahnz, to produce “all materials in [his]
possession, custody or control related to [his] firm’s representation of . . . Love,”
including “all materials related to his disputes with [MCW], Froedtert . . . and [the
[Clement J. Zablocki Veterans’ Affairs Medical Center].” See Subpoena, ECF No. 132-1,
at 1. Gahnz separately moves to quash this subpoena.
Love and Gahnz argue that the subpoena requires disclosure of materials
protected by the attorney-client privilege, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d), while MCW argues
that Love waived the attorney-client privilege by “put[ting] his attorney’s advice at issue
in the litigation,” see Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1175 n.1 (7th Cir.
1995). According to MCW, Love put Lawton & Cates’s advice at issue by alleging that
he was not aware and had not been advised that the Zablocki VA had
revoked his privileges, that he “would not have signed” the separation
agreement if he had known that the Zablocki VA was revoking or had
revoked his privileges, and that MCW induced him to sign the separation
agreement by fraudulently concealing from him that the Zablocki VA
revoked his privileges.
Defs.’ Resp. Br., ECF No. 137, at 1 (citing 2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 120, ¶¶ 139–41).

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Whether Love’s allegations in his second amended complaint put Lawton &
Cates’s advice at issue, those allegations are no longer operative, and they differ
markedly from the related allegations in Love’s third amended complaint. Compare 2d
Am. Compl., supra, ¶¶ 126–46, with 3d Am. Compl., ECF No. 147-2, ¶¶ 253–68. For
instance, Love no longer alleges that MCW concealed from him that the Zablocki VA
revoked his privileges—in fact, he now alleges that “the Zablocki VA [n]ever revoked
[his] privileges,” 3d Am. Compl., supra, ¶ 311. Instead, he now alleges that MCW
induced him to sign the separation agreement by concealing from him that its general
counsel, Froedtert’s chief compliance officer, defendant Alfred Nicolosi, and others
“perpetrated [a] covert, months-long conspiracy . . . to injure [him] in his reputation and
profession” and that, “[h]ad [he] been aware of the conspiracy, he would not have
signed the Separation Agreement.” Id. ¶¶ 266–67.
Because MCW’s defense of its subpoena rests on the purported relevance of the
material sought to an issue raised by Love’s second amended complaint but apparently
abandoned by his third amended complaint—specifically, “whether the VA privileges
were material to the separation agreement,” Defs.’ Resp. Br., supra, at 2—I will grant
Love’s and Gahnz’s motions to quash the subpoena.
Gahnz also moves for a protective order “prohibiting further attempts to elicit
information from [him] relating to his representation of . . . Love.” Mot., ECF No. 131, at
4. At this time, I cannot say whether MCW will attempt to elicit such information again
and, if it does, whether it can justify such an attempt in light of the allegations in Love’s
third amended complaint. Thus, I will deny Gahnz’s motion for a protective order without
prejudice. Gahnz may seek appropriate relief in the future, if necessary.

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III. DOCUMENTS FILED UNDER SEAL
The parties move for leave to file various documents under seal. In general, this
court considers any document filed to be public unless it is accompanied by a separate
motion requesting that the document be sealed. General L. R. 79(d)(1) (E.D. Wis.). The
motion to seal must be publicly filed and must describe the general nature of the
information withheld. General L. R. 79(d)(2). “To the extent possible, the movant should
include with the public filing a version of the document or material that redacts only
those portions of the document that are subject to the sealing request.” Id.
“Any motion to seal must be supported by sufficient facts demonstrating good
cause for withholding the document . . . from the public record.” General L. R. 79(d)(3).
“In civil litigation only trade secrets, information covered by a recognized privilege (such
as the attorney-client privilege), and information required by statute to be maintained in
confidence (such as the name of a minor victim of a sexual assault), is entitled to be
kept secret . . . .” Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 2002).
Yet, “[t]he strong presumption of public disclosure” only applies to documents that
“influence or underpin [a] judicial decision,” which is to say, documents that “reached
this court unnecessarily” need not be “open to public inspection.” See id. at 545, 548.
A. Exhibits Filed in Support of Love’s Motion to Amend
Love moves to seal 30 of the 35 exhibits to his expedited motion for leave to file
a third amended complaint, which nearly all consist of documents that MCW and
Froedtert produced in discovery and designated confidential, pursuant to the terms of
the protective order in this case. Love objects to continued sealing of these documents,
but MCW and Froedtert move to continue sealing them. See General L. R. 79(d)(3).

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I did not review or rely upon any of these documents in deciding Love’s motion to
amend—as discussed above, I granted that motion based on the liberal presumption in
favor of amendment that applies in federal court and defendants’ failure to adequately
oppose amendment—so, for the most part, these documents need not be publicly
disclosed. However, one of these documents is Love’s third amended complaint, which
is certainly subject to the presumption of public disclosure. Moreover, Love says that his
third amended complaint reveals information contained in the other 29 documents
subject to the parties’ motions to seal. Accordingly, I must consider whether Love’s third
amended complaint reveals information that should be kept secret and, thus, whether
that pleading, or any part of it, should remain under seal.
Before considering the parties’ arguments on public disclosure of information
contained in the documents at issue, I note that Froedtert has withdrawn its
confidentiality designations from 7 of the documents that Love filed under seal as
exhibits to his motion to amend. Love’s third amended complaint need not remain under
seal to the extent that it reveals information contained in those documents.
1. Protected Health Information
MCW and Froedtert assert that 12 documents that Love filed as exhibits to his
motion to amend contain health information protected from disclosure under HIPAA. As
relevant here, HIPAA protects from disclosure information “created or received by a
health care provider” about “the provision of health care to an individual” that “identifies”
or “can be used to identify” the individual. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. Typical individual
“identifiers” include names, medical record numbers, and photographs. See id.
§ 164.514(b)(2). Love’s third amended complaint does not contain any such identifiers.

7

Yet, health information often includes lesser-known individual identifiers, such as
“elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual, including birth
date, admission date, discharge date, [and] date of death.” § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(C). Love’s
third amended complaint contains such “elements of dates.” See, e.g., 3d Am. Compl.,
supra, ¶ 66 (alleging the month and date, in addition to the year, on which a patient died
at Froedtert). As such, I will keep Love’s third amended complaint sealed as filed and
order him to publicly file an appropriately redacted version of that pleading.
2. Sensitive Commercial or Business Information
MCW and Froedtert also assert that 19 documents that Love filed as exhibits to
his motion to amend contain sensitive, proprietary, or confidential commercial or
business information that should not be publicly disclosed. Yet, their arguments in favor
of keeping this information sealed are vague and conclusory. For example, Froedtert
initially says little more than that “[t]he documents reflect . . . critical internal data and
assessments regarding the core of its business.” Froedtert’s Mot., ECF No. 156, at 6.
Such arguments are insufficient to justify withholding the information contained in these
documents from the public record, see Baxter, 297 F.3d at 547, at least to the extent
that Love’s third amended complaint reveals such information.
3. Attorney-Client Communications
MCW moves to seal and “claw back” five documents that Love filed as exhibits to
his motion to amend, asserting that they are covered by the attorney-client privilege,
which protects “[c]onfidential communications between a client and [its] lawyer for the
purpose of receiving legal advice,” United States v. Bey, 772 F.3d 1099, 1101 (7th Cir.

8

2014). In general, “the burden is on the party seeking to invoke the privilege . . . to
establish that it applies.” Shaffer v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 662 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir. 2011).
Love does not dispute that these documents fall within the scope of the privilege.
Still, one of them does not. Exhibit 14 to Love’s motion contains emails dated
September 25, 2013, in which MCW’s dean generically asks its general counsel for
advice “on the inflammatory nature” of a physician’s resignation letter in anticipation of a
meeting with the physician the following day and counsel suggests, among other things,
that the dean “[e]xpress [his] regret that irreconcilable differences have occurred.” See
Pl.’s Mot. ex. 14, ECF No. 147-15. MCW argues that counsel provided “employment law
advice,” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 178, at 10, but I cannot infer from these emails that the
dean sought or that counsel provided legal advice, in particular, as opposed to personal
or business advice. Thus, MCW hasn’t shown that the privilege applies to these emails.2
With respect to the remaining documents, Love argues that MCW waived the
privilege by intentionally producing them in discovery in this case, failing to timely assert
the privilege, citing to the documents in supplemental responses to various discovery
requests, and failing to object when some of the documents were used during
depositions. MCW argues that its attorneys acted under the sincere (but mistaken)
belief that it had waived the privilege as to these documents but that it neither waived
the privilege nor consented to, authorized, or ratified waiver by its attorneys.
I agree with MCW that production of these documents in discovery did not waive
the privilege. On June 14, 2016, I granted the parties’ motion for an order, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d), that the “attorney-client privilege . . . applicable to any
2

Because I considered Exhibit 14 in detail, it influenced or underpinned a judicial
decision in this case, and its contents are not privileged, I will deny the parties’ motions
to seal it and direct the Clerk of Court to publicly file it.
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written or electronic documents or communications produced in discovery in this matter
is not waived by any production or disclosure that occurs in the context of the pending
litigation.” Stip. Mot., ECF No. 70-2, at 3 (emphasis added). Love argues that, when the
parties moved for that order, they meant for it to apply only to inadvertent disclosures,
but their motion does not mention inadvertence, and I will not limit its scope by reading
into it language that it clearly does not contain. As such, the privilege is not waived by
production in discovery in this case “irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing
party.” See Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee explanatory note (rev. Nov. 28, 2007).
Yet, that MCW did not waive the privilege by producing these documents in
discovery does not mean that it did not otherwise waive the privilege, say, by failing to
assert it after production. For example, a client, whether “individually or through . . .
counsel,” ordinarily waives the privilege if it “fails to invoke the privilege in a situation
where [it] could have” or “otherwise conducts [itself] in a manner inconsistent with an
assertion of or reliance on the privilege.” Paul F. Rothstein & Susan W. Crump, Federal
Testimonial Privileges § 2:27 (2d ed.), Westlaw (updated Dec. 2017) (collecting cases).
Courts in this circuit consider various factors to determine whether a party has
waived the privilege with respect to a given document or communication. As relevant
here, those factors include “the time taken to rectify the error,” “the scope of the
discovery,” “the extent of the disclosure,” and “overriding issues of fairness.” Judson
Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 388 (7th Cir.
2008) (quoting Harmony Gold U.S.A., Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 117 (N.D. Ill.
1996)). Normally, I would also consider “the reasonableness of the precautions taken to
prevent disclosure,” id. (quoting Harmony Gold, 169 F.R.D. at 117), but as discussed

10

above, my Rule 502(d) order broadly protects the parties from waiver by disclosure in
discovery in this case, even where they fail to act reasonably to prevent it.
The first factor, the time taken to rectify the error, weighs in favor of waiver.
MCW’s attorneys produced the documents at issue on January 8, 2018, and cited them
in supplemental responses to discovery requests nine days later. After Love’s counsel
used several of the documents at issue during a deposition on February 15, 2018, MCW
first raised concerns with its attorneys about the production of potentially privileged
documents. Nearly two months then passed before MCW’s attorneys first objected on
privilege grounds to the use, during a deposition, of one of these documents. Another
two weeks then passed before MCW asserted the privilege before this court and moved
to claw back these documents. By that time, Love had already filed the documents with
the court, and his motion to amend had been pending for three weeks. In sum, MCW’s
“attempt to rectify the error was lax at best.” See Harmony Gold, 169 F.R.D. at 117.
The second factor, the scope of the discovery, weighs against waiver. Overall
discovery in this case has been extensive, and MCW seeks to claw back documents
comprising a mere 11 pages of a “consecutively-paginated” document that it produced
in discovery containing more than 500 pages of “what appear to be communications
and notes of its former General Counsel.” See Hess Decl., ECF No. 172, ¶ 9. And yet,
this is hardly an extreme case. In Judson Atkinson, for example, the Seventh Circuit
held that the district court did not err in finding that the scope of discovery weighed
against waiver where “30–40 boxes of documents were produced on the date the
memorandum [at issue] was produced.” 529 F.3d at 389 (emphasis added). Thus, while
the scope of discovery weighs against waiver here, it does not weigh heavily.

11

The third factor, the extent of the disclosure, weighs in favor of waiver. “A limited
disclosure resulting from glancing at an open file drawer or designating documents for
copying may not justify a finding of waiver when the party does not know the essence of
the document’s contents,” but “when disclosure is complete, a court order cannot
restore confidentiality and, at best, can only attempt to restrain further erosion.”
Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Grp., Inc., 116 F.R.D.
46, 52 (M.D.N.C. 1987), quoted in part in Harmony Gold, 169 F.R.D. at 117, and cited in
Judson Atkinson, 529 F.3d at 389. MCW disclosed the documents at issue here in full,
and Love filed them with the court. Thus, this factor weighs heavily in favor of waiver.
The last factor, overriding issues of fairness, also weighs in favor of waiver. Love
has already relied on the documents at issue during depositions and in support of his
motion to amend his complaint. See Harmony Gold, 169 F.R.D. at 118. As such, “the
bell has already been rung, and the court cannot now unring it by denying [Love] access
to the [documents].” Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 184 (N.D. Cal.
1990), quoted with alterations in Harmony Gold, 169 F.R.D. at 118. The documents also
seem to contain evidence that directly supports Love’s allegations of misconduct. Cf.
Judson Atkinson, 529 F.3d at 389 (suggesting that fairness may weigh in favor of waiver
where a document “appear[s] to contain . . . evidence of a crime or fraud”). Thus,
fairness suggests that MCW should not be permitted to claw back these documents.
Based on the overall balance of these factors, MCW clearly waived the attorneyclient privilege with respect to the documents at issue. Therefore, I will deny its motion
to claw these documents back, and Love’s third amended complaint need not remain
under seal to the extent that it reveals information contained in them.

12

B. Exhibits Filed in Opposition to MCW’s Motion to Claw Back Documents
Love moves to seal three exhibits that he filed in opposition to MCW’s motion to
claw back documents, containing excerpts from transcripts of depositions. During these
depositions, Love’s counsel questioned witnesses about documents that MCW later
sought to claw back as privileged. These exhibits influenced my decision on MCW’s
motion, so they are subject to the presumption of public disclosure. Also, as discussed
above, MCW waived the privilege as to the documents at issue, so I see no reason to
keep transcripts of deposition testimony about those documents sealed. I will deny
Love’s motion to seal these exhibits and direct the Clerk of Court to publicly file them.
C. Exhibits Filed in Response to Love’s Motion to Amend
Finally, MCW moves to seal two exhibits that it filed in response to Love’s motion
for leave to amend his complaint. Because I struck MCW’s response to Love’s motion to
amend, I did not consider any of the materials that it filed in response to that motion. As
those materials did not influence a judicial decision, I need not make them open to
public inspection. I will, therefore, grant MCW’s motion to seal its exhibits.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, IT IS ORDERED that:
●

Defendants’ motions to convert Love’s expedited motion for leave to

amend his complaint into a non-expedited motion (ECF Nos. 150–52) are DENIED;
●

Love’s motion to strike defendants’ briefs in opposition to his expedited

motion for leave to amend his complaint (ECF No. 165) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of
Court shall STRIKE those briefs (ECF Nos. 157, 161, and 162) from the record;

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●

Love’s expedited motion for leave to amend his complaint (ECF No. 147)

is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall file Love’s third amended complaint (ECF
No. 147-2) but shall do so UNDER SEAL;
●

Love’s motion to strike affirmative defenses pleaded in defendants’

answers to his second amended complaint (ECF No. 125) and Froedtert’s motion for
clarification of my order granting Love’s motion for leave to file his second amended
complaint (ECF No. 127) are DENIED as moot;
●

Love’s and Gahnz’s motions to quash MCW’s subpoena commanding

Lawton & Cates S.C. to produce materials related to its representation of Love (ECF
Nos. 131 and 133) are GRANTED;
●

Gahnz’s motion for a protective order prohibiting further attempts by MCW

to elicit information from Lawton & Cates about its representation of Love (ECF No. 131)
is DENIED without prejudice;
●

The parties’ motions to seal documents filed as exhibits to Love’s

expedited motion for leave to amend his complaint (ECF Nos. 148, 154, and 156) are
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as discussed above, and the Clerk of Court
shall publicly file Exhibit 14 to Love’s motion (ECF No. 147-15), but all other exhibits to
that motion that were filed under seal shall remain sealed;
●

Within 7 days after the date of this order, Love shall publicly file a version

of his third amended complaint in which all individual identifiers from personal health
information are redacted, as discussed above;
●

MCW’s motion to claw back documents filed as exhibits to Love’s

expedited motion for leave to amend his complaint (ECF No. 154) is DENIED;

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●

Love’s motion to seal three exhibits filed in opposition to MCW’s motion to

claw back documents (ECF No. 173) is DENIED, and the Clerk of Court shall publicly
file Exhibits D–F to the Declaration of Alexander Hess (ECF Nos. 172-4 to -6);
●

MCW’s motion to seal two exhibits filed in response to Love’s expedited

motion for leave to amend his complaint (ECF No. 159) is GRANTED; and
●

MCW’s motion for a protective order prohibiting depositions of the parties

and their employees until the court resolves Love’s expedited motion for leave to amend
his complaint (ECF No. 182) is DENIED as moot.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 11th day of June, 2018.

s/Lynn Adelman_________
LYNN ADELMAN
District Judge

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