Boyd v. Shannan-Sharpe et al

Filing 74

ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 3/23/16 denying 56 Motion for TRO; denying without prejudice 73 Motion to Appoint Counsel. (cc: all counsel, via USPS to plaintiff) (dm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________
DEMETRIUS M. BOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 15-CV-832

JONI SHANNON-SHARPE, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
Plaintiff is a Wisconsin state prisoner who is representing himself. On August 19,
2015, I allowed plaintiff to proceed on claims arising in connection with the decision to
place plaintiff in indefinite administrative segregation. (Docket #13.) On March 11, 2016,
plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order based on an alleged plot to
assassinate plaintiff. (Docket #56.) Plaintiff identifies his attackers as “three staff” from
his institution and “a patrol officer.” (Id.) It is not clear to me whether any of these
individuals are defendants in this lawsuit.
On February 26, 2016, I explained to plaintiff in a prior order that injunctive relief
is appropriate only if it seeks the same kind of relief sought in the underlying suit and
deals with the claims presented in that underlying suit. See Devose v. Herrington, 42
F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) ("[A] party moving for a preliminary injunction
must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's
motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.") (citations omitted); Alston v. City of
Madison, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106317, 2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 4, 2014) ("[T]he general

rule is that a plaintiff may not obtain injunctive relief on issues that do not relate to the
claims asserted in the complaint.").
Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order is based on assertions of
mistreatment that are different from the claims he states in his complaint. If plaintiff
believes that he has new claims (e.g., an excessive force claim) based on events that
occurred after he filed the complaint in this case, he must raise those claims in a
separate lawsuit. The only claims I can and will consider in this lawsuit are the claims
that plaintiff made in his amended complaint against the named defendants.
Plaintiff also filed a motion to appoint counsel on March 17, 2016. (Docket
#73.) This is the sixth motion that plaintiff has filed asking the court to recruit counsel to
represent him. At this point, all plaintiff must do is tell his version of the events in his
response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which they filed on March 14,
2016. He may do so, in part, by supporting his arguments with an unsworn declaration
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746 1 and any documents or information he obtained in
discovery. Plaintiff is cautioned to ensure that his response materials adhere to Civil
Local Rule 56(b)(2), which requires plaintiff to respond both to defendants’ brief and to
defendants’ statement of facts. (E.D. Wis.) I continue to believe that plaintiff has a good
grasp of his claims and that he is able to clearly communicate why he believes he is
entitled to the relief he seeks. Thus, he is capable of representing himself at this time,
and I will deny his motion.

1

Such a declaration should conclude with the following: “I declare under penalty of
perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on [date]. [Signature].” 28
U.S.C. §1746(2).
2

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for a temporary
restraining order (Docket #56) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (Docket
#73) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 23rd day of March, 2016.

s/ Lynn Adelman
______________________
LYNN ADELMAN
District Judge

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