Barrera v. Colvin
Filing
19
ORDER signed by Judge Pamela Pepper on 2/21/2017 AFFIRMING the Final Administrative Decision of the Commissioner. (cc: all counsel)(pwm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
VERONICA BARRERA,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 15-CV-916-pp
NANCY BERRYHILL,1
Defendant.
ORDER AFFIRMING THE FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
OF THE COMMISSIONER
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Veronica Barrera seeks judicial review of a final decision of
defendant Nancy Berryhill, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, who
found that she was not “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security
Act. The Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council denied review,
making the administrative law judge’s (ALJ’s) decision the final decision of the
Commissioner.
The plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed because
(1) it is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the ALJ erred by affording
little weight to certain opinions offered by one of the plaintiff’s treating
physicians; and (3) the ALJ incorrectly found that that the plaintiff’s testimony
Nancy Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security as of
January 23, 2017. Accordingly, the court has amended the caption to
substitute Ms. Berryhill as the defendant in this action.
1
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was not entirely credible as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
her impairments. The plaintiff asserts that this court should reverse the
Commissioner’s decision and award her benefits, or remand the case to the
ALJ for further proceedings. For the reasons stated below, the court affirms the
Commissioner’s decision.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Judicial Review
When the Appeals Council denies a claimant’s request for review, the
ALJ’s decision constitutes the final decision of the Commissioner. Moore v.
Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120 (7th Cir. 2014). Judicial review of an ALJ’s
decision under §405(g) is limited; the district court will reverse only if the ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence, is based on legal error, or is
so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review. Hopgood ex rel. L.G. v.
Astrue, 578 F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 2009). “An ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence if the ALJ identifies supporting evidence in the record and
builds a logical bridge from that evidence to the conclusion.” Id. (citation
omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Barnett v. Barnhart, 381
F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). If conflicting evidence in the
record would allow reasonable minds to disagree about whether the claimant is
disabled, the district court must affirm the ALJ’s decision to deny the
application for benefits. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).
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The district court must review the entire record, including the evidence
that supports the ALJ’s conclusions as well as evidence that detracts from the
ALJ’s conclusions, but it may not “displace the ALJ’s judgment by
reconsidering facts or evidence, or by making independent credibility
determinations.” Id. “While judicial review is deferential, it is not abject . . . .”
Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010). The court will not affirm
“an administrative decision that fails to mention highly pertinent evidence, or
that because of contradictions or missing premises fails to build a logical
bridge between the facts of the case and the outcome.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). In sum, the district court will uphold a decision so long as the record
reasonably supports it and the ALJ explains his analysis of the evidence with
enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful review. Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534
F.3d 663, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2008).
B.
Disability Determination
The Social Security Administration provides “disability insurance benefits
and supplemental security income to persons who have a ‘disability.’” Barnhart
v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 22 (2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(2)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(B)). To qualify as “disabled,” the claimant must demonstrate a
“physical or mental impairment or impairments . . . of such severity that he is
not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. at 21-22. The Social
Security Act further
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defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.”
Id. at 23.
In evaluating a claim for disability benefits, the ALJ follows a five-step,
sequential process, asking:
(1)
Has the claimant engaged in substantial gainful
activity since her alleged onset of disability?
(2)
If not, does she suffer from a severe, medically
determinable impairment?
(3)
If so, does that impairment meet or equal any
impairment listed in SSA regulations as presumptively
disabling?
(4)
If not, does she retain the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform her past work?
(5)
If not, can she perform other jobs existing in
significant numbers?
E.g., Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 2009). If it appears at any
step that the claimant is not disabled, the analysis ends. 20 C.F.R.
§404.1520(a)(4). “The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through
four, after which at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner.” Briscoe ex
rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 2005).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ issued her decision on February 21, 2014. Dkt. No. 11-3, at 14.
At step one of the five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ found that the plaintiff
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had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the plaintiff’s alleged
disability onset date--March 31, 2011. Id. at 16. At step two, she found that the
plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “obesity; fibromyalgia; diabetes
mellitus; shoulder bursitis/tendonitis; obstructive sleep apnea; polyarthalgias;
depression and anxiety.” Id. at 17 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(c) and
416.920(c)).
1. The ALJ Determined That The Plaintiff Was Not Disabled Because Her
Impairments Were Not Sufficiently Severe
At step three, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled
because she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
met the listed requirements in 20 C.F.R. §404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. The
ALJ based this conclusion on her review of the medical evidence and the
plaintiff’s hearing testimony, and determined that the plaintiff’s severe
impairments did not meet the criteria of any listed impairment individually or
in combination. Id. The ALJ determined that the medical evidence did not show
that the plaintiff’s impairments rose to listing level severity, and found that no
medical source had made such a finding.
The plaintiff’s therapist, Dr. David Meyers, stated that the plaintiff had
marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning and maintaining
concentration, persistence or pace. The ALJ found that these mental
impairments resulted in mild to moderate difficulties, they did not meet or
medically equal the criteria of listings 12.04 or 12.06. Id. Specifically, the ALJ
found that the plaintiff had mild restrictions in activities of daily living
resulting from her physical symptoms, but was independent in the
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performance of tending to her personal needs, preparing meals, cleaning, doing
laundry, shopping and managing her finances. Id. at 18. The ALJ also found
that the plaintiff had mild difficulties in social functioning, but had been able
to navigate her personal relationships and family matters. Id. The ALJ found
that, depending on the situation, the plaintiff occasionally had moderate
limitations with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace resulting from her
mental health symptoms. Id. Nonetheless, the plaintiff “reported that she
finishes what she starts and her treatment records continually observed that
her thought processes were not impaired.” Id. Finally, the ALJ noted that the
plaintiff’s health history included no episodes of decompensation.
2. The ALJ Determined That The Plaintiff Had The Residual Functional
Capacity To Perform Sedentary Work
Having found that the plaintiff was not disabled, the ALJ proceeded to
the two-step process in assessing the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.
First, the ALJ evaluated whether the plaintiff had an underlying medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that reasonably could be expected
to produce her pain or symptoms. Id. at 19. Second, the ALJ evaluated the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the plaintiff’s symptoms to
determine the extent to which they limited her functioning. Id.
In June 2011, the plaintiff alleged that she was disabled as a result of
her arthritis, which had worsened since that time and affected her activities of
daily living and her ability to care for her personal needs. Id. She has had
surgery on her two big toes and has pins and plates in her ankles. Id. She
testified that she had pain in her head, neck, shoulders, elbows, fingers, lower
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back, spine, knees, thighs, ankles, feet, and toes, which she treated with
multiple medications and a cortisone shot every three months in her thighs
and knees. Id. The plaintiff testified that side effects from her medications
blurred her vision and made her sleepy, dizzy, and fatigued, so she rested a lot
throughout the day, alternating between lying down, sitting, sewing by hand,
or doing household chores such as mending clothes, dusting, mopping, and
washing dishes. The plaintiff testified that she constantly needed to take
breaks when performing those chores. Id. at 20.
The ALJ found that the plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms; however,
the [plaintiff’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely credible . . . .” Id. The ALJ determined
that the medical evidence (including treatment records and diagnostic test
results) reflected mild to moderate findings with respect to the plaintiff’s
fibromyalgia, right knee arthritis, diabetes, shoulder bursitis/tendonitis, sleep
apnea, and polyarthalgias. The ALJ concluded that the evidence did not
support the high degree of limitation that the plaintiff claimed to suffer from
these conditions. Further, the ALJ found that the plaintiff’s medical records
showed that treatment “has been generally successful in helping to alleviate”
her symptoms. Id. at 21. The ALJ found that the plaintiff’s obesity was a severe
impairment which could cause limitations in itself, and that, when combined
with other impairments, the effects of all of the plaintiff’s limitations might be
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greater than if obesity were not present. Id. For that reason, the ALJ considered
the impact of the plaintiff’s weight on the plaintiff’s medical conditions.
The ALJ next determined that the state agency medical consultants’
opinions, which initially assessed the plaintiff as able to perform work at the
medium exertional level and then reduced her capability to the light exertional
level, were entitled to little weight. Id. According to the ALJ, the state agency
consultants’ opinions were consistent with the objective medical evidence, but
they did not take into account the plaintiff’s subjective complaints regarding
the side effects of her medications. Id.
The ALJ found that the plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to
work at the sedentary exertional level, with the ability to alternate between
sitting and standing; with no climbing, balancing, or working at heights or
hazards; and with only occasional stooping and crouching. Id. The ALJ stated
that this RFC determination was consistent with the rheumatology
examinations in the record, and took into account the side effects of her
medications, her joint and muscular conditions, and her obesity. Id.
The ALJ then evaluated the effect of the plaintiff’s psychological
symptoms. After reviewing the medical evidence, the ALJ concluded that the
plaintiff’s mental impairments were not seriously debilitating and not as severe
as the plaintiff reported. Id. at 22. The ALJ explained that the plaintiff’s mental
impairments were exacerbated by situational stressors, such as family issues
and relationship problems. The plaintiff did not often report that her thought
process or content were impaired, but when she did report such difficulties,
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her medications were adjusted. Id. The ALJ further found that, despite her
depression and anxiety, the plaintiff maintained a somewhat normal level of
daily activity and interaction. She was independent in preparing meals, doing
laundry, dusting, and managing her finances, though she had some physical
difficulties with these tasks. Id. Based on evidence that the plaintiff maintained
a normal level of daily activity and interaction, the ALJ gave little weight to the
opinion offered by the plaintiff’s therapist, Dr. Meyers, that the plaintiff “would
be absent more than four days per month, require three unscheduled breaks
for 10 minutes each and be off-task 30 percent of an eight-hour workday.” Id.
at 23. The ALJ determined that Dr. Meyers’ opinions “appear to rely quite
heavily on the subjective report of symptoms and limitations provided by the
[plaintiff], and seemed to uncritically accept as true most, if not all, of what the
claimant reported since the record does not support his opinion.” Id.
In contrast, the ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Meyers’ opinions that the
plaintiff would have (a) no limitations in her ability to understand, remember
and carry out simple instructions; (b) mild limitations in her ability to interact
with the public; and (c) moderate limitations in her ability to maintain attention
and concentration for simple, routine and repetitive tasks and in her ability to
interact appropriately with supervisors and co-workers in work situations. The
ALJ found those opinions were supported by the plaintiff’s statement and the
medical evidence. Id. For the same reason, the ALJ gave great weight to the
state agency psychological consultant’s opinion that the plaintiff would have
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moderate limitations with detailed instructions and maintaining attention and
concentration for extended periods. Id.
The ALJ found that the plaintiff’s RFC allows her to perform simple,
routine, repetitive, non-complex work with a specific vocational preparation
rating of one or two, consistent with unskilled work. Id. The ALJ then explained
her determination that the plaintiff’s testimony as to her degree of symptoms
and limitations was not entirely credible. First, the ALJ noted that the
plaintiff’s work history showed that she worked only sporadically prior to her
alleged disability onset date, and she stopped working due to a businessrelated layoff, not because of her allegedly disabling impairments. Id. at 24. The
ALJ questioned whether the reason for the plaintiff’s continuing unemployment
was, in fact, her impairments or something else. The ALJ found that the
plaintiff’s responses at the hearing “were evasive or vague and left the
impression that” the plaintiff had not been fully candid with the ALJ. Id. The
ALJ also noted that the plaintiff had received unemployment benefits for two to
three years after she stopped working, “indicating an ability to work
inconsistent with the [plaintiff’s] allegations.” Id.
In sum, the ALJ found that the medical evidence and the plaintiff’s
testimony did not support all of her allegations of limitations.
B.
The ALJ’s Decision Is Supported By Substantial Evidence
The plaintiff contends generally that the ALJ’s decision that the plaintiff
was not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence. The plaintiff’s
argument has two subparts, which the court discusses individually. The
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plaintiff argues that (1) the ALJ erred by giving certain portions of the plaintiff’s
treating physician’s treating source statement great weight, but giving other
portions no weight; and (2) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the plaintiff’s
credibility.
1. The ALJ Sufficiently Explained Her Determination that Certain of
Dr. Meyers’ Opinions Were Entitled to Great Weight While Other
Opinions Were Entitled to Little Weight
Dr. Meyers was the plaintiff’s treating therapist, and submitted a treating
source statement expressing several opinions regarding the plaintiff’s
limitations and ability to work. The ALJ is required to consider a number of
factors in weighing a treating doctor’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2)
governs the weighing of treating source opinions:
Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your
treating sources, since these sources are likely to be
the medical professionals most able to provide a
detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to
the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the
objective medical findings alone or from reports of
individual examinations, such as consultative
examinations or brief hospitalizations. If we find that a
treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature
and severity of your impairment(s) is well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in your case record, we will give it
controlling weight. When we do not give the treating
source’s opinion controlling weight, we apply the
factors listed in paragraphs (c)(2)(i) and (c)(2)(ii) of this
section, as well as the factors in paragraphs (c)(3)
through (c)(6) of this section in determining the weight
to give the opinion. We will always give good reasons in
our notice of determination or decision for the weight
we give your treating source’s opinion.
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The opinions of treating doctors are not always entitled to controlling
weight. The ALJ must weigh the medical evidence, applying the factors set forth
in §404.1527, and must give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight if
two conditions are met: (1) the opinion is supported by ‘medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques[,]’ and (2) it is ‘not inconsistent’
with substantial evidence in the record.” Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 875
(7th Cir. 2010) (citing §404.1527). If an ALJ declines to give controlling weight
to a treating physician’s opinion, she must determine what weight to assign it
by considering “the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship;
frequency of examination; the physician’s specialty; the types of tests
performed; and the consistency and support for the physician's opinion.”
Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2010); see also 20 C.F.R.
§404.1527(c)(2). The Seventh Circuit repeatedly has criticized decisions that
“said nothing regarding this required checklist of factors.” Larson, 615 F.3d at
751; Campbell, 627 F.3d at 308. While the ALJ is not required to mention every
piece of evidence, “[s]he must at least minimally discuss a claimant’s evidence
that contradicts the Commissioner’s position.” Godbey v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 803,
808 (7th Cir. 2000).
The plaintiff argues that the ALJ manipulated the plaintiff’s hearing
testimony, and cherry-picked certain portions of Dr. Meyers’ treating source
statement to justify her denial of disability benefits. According to the plaintiff,
the ALJ gave great weight to the portions of Dr. Meyers’ statement that
supported the ALJ’s decision that the plaintiff was not disabled, and
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disregarded the portions of his statement that conflicted with her disability
determination. In support of her argument, the plaintiff points to the ALJ’s
decision to give little weight to Dr. Meyers’ opinions regarding absenteeism,
unscheduled breaks, and going off task, alleging that the ALJ’s decision was
based on “unfounded speculation.” Dkt. No. 16, at 8. The plaintiff similarly
contends that the ALJ erred by using out-of-context snippets of her hearing
testimony as the basis for the ALJ’s determination that the plaintiff’s activities
of daily living and social interaction undermined Dr. Meyers’ opinion of the
plaintiff’s limitations.
The ALJ evaluated Dr. Meyers’ treating source statement at length in her
decision. Dr. Meyers’ statement contained various opinions regarding the
plaintiff’s limitations, certain of which the ALJ found to be supported by the
record and others not. The ALJ rejected Dr. Meyers’ opinions regarding
absenteeism, because she found that the plaintiff’s symptoms were exacerbated
by relationship difficulties, not her physical limitations. The ALJ reasoned that
Dr. Meyers’ opinion was based on the symptoms subjectively reported by the
plaintiff, not the objective medical evidence, and she concluded that the record
did not support Dr. Meyers’ opinion.
In contrast, the ALJ found that the record supported Dr. Meyers’
opinions that (1) the plaintiff would have no limitations in her ability to
understand, remember and carry out simple instructions; (2) mild limitations
in her ability to interact with the public; and (3) moderate limitations in her
ability to maintain attention and concentration for simple, routine and
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repetitive tasks and in her ability to interact appropriately with supervisors and
co-workers in work situations. The ALJ determined that those opinions were
supported by the plaintiff’s treating physician’s statement and the medical
evidence.
The ALJ considered Dr. Meyers’ opinion in evaluating the severity of the
plaintiff’s mental health symptoms. Dkt. No. 11-3 at 22-23. The ALJ found
that, despite the plaintiff’s depression and anxiety, she engaged in a “somewhat
normal level of daily activity and interaction,” albeit with “reported difficulties
of only a physical nature.” Id. at 22. The ALJ considered the range of the
plaintiff’s activities of daily living (laundry, dusting, managing finances,
mending clothes, attending family gatherings when she had transportation),
and determined that the plaintiff’s ability to participate in those activities
undermined the credibility of her allegations regarding her ability to focus and
concentrate and the severity of her mental health symptoms. Id.
The plaintiff argues that, when assigning portions of Dr. Meyers’ opinion
little weight, the ALJ disregarded aspects of the plaintiff’s testimony, as well as
progress notes from her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Ahmad Khan, regarding her
limitations and difficulties. The court disagrees. The ALJ evaluated the
plaintiff’s activities of daily living in connection with determining the severity of
her mental health symptoms. The ALJ expressly recognized that the plaintiff
had physical limitations that interfered with her ability to do household work
and attend family gatherings. She found, however, that the fact that the
plaintiff could engage in those activities undermined both her own allegations
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as to the severity of her mental health symptoms and Dr. Meyers’ opinions as
to the plaintiff’s absenteeism, her need to take unscheduled breaks, and the
amount of time the plaintiff could be expected to be off task. Id. It is proper for
the ALJ to consider the plaintiff’s activities of daily living as a factor when
considering the limiting effects of symptoms and conditions. Loveless v. Colvin,
810 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2016); see also 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(c)(3)(i).
Further, the ALJ referenced Dr. Khan’s contemporaneous progress notes when
analyzing Dr. Meyers’ opinions, ultimately concluding that Dr. Khan’s progress
notes did not support Dr. Meyers’ opinions as to the plaintiff’s alleged
disability. Dkt. No. 16-3 at 22-23.
This court’s function is not to reweigh the evidence evaluated by the ALJ
and replace it with the court’s own judgment. Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306,
310-11 (7th Cir. 2012). The court finds that the ALJ satisfied her obligation to
“minimally articulate” the reasons she discounted portions of Dr. Meyers’
opinions and found that the contrary evidence did not persuade her that the
plaintiff’s symptoms and limitations were not as severe as she alleged. Berger v.
Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2008).
2.
The ALJ’s Credibility Determination Was Not Patently Wrong.
The plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to comply with SSR 96-7p in
finding her testimony “not entirely credible.” Dkt. No. 16 at 14. After the parties
filed their briefs, the Social Security Administration rescinded SSR 96-7p and
replaced it with SSR 16-3p. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016).
SSR 16-3 eliminates the use of the term “credibility” and clarifies “that
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subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s
character.” Id. at *1. It otherwise adheres to the same two-step symptom
evaluation process used by the ALJ under SSR 96-7p to evaluate the plaintiff’s
description of her impairments. First, the ALJ “must consider whether there is
an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) that
could reasonably be expected to produce the individual's symptoms, such as
pain.” Id. at *2. If there is such an impairment, the ALJ must “evaluate the
intensity and persistence of those symptoms to determine the extent to which
the symptoms limit an individual's ability to perform work-related activities.”
Id. In evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, “an ALJ must consider several factors,
including the claimant's daily activities, her level of pain or symptoms,
aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and limitations, . . . and justify the
finding with specific reasons.” Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir.
2009). An ALJ’s credibility finding is entitled to great deference and a district
court will reverse an ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s subjective complaints
only if “patently wrong.” Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1162 (7th Cir. 2010);
See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008).
The ALJ used language in her decision that the Seventh Circuit often has
criticized as “meaningless boilerplate.” E.g., Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920,
922 (7th Cir. 2010)). The use of such boilerplate language alone, however, does
not provide a basis for remanding the case, as long as “the ALJ said more” and
explained her reasons for discounting the credibility of plaintiff’s statements as
to the severity and limiting effects of her symptoms. Jackson v. Colvin, No. 1216
C-1324, 2013 WL 1499010, at *5 (N.D. Ill. April 11, 2013) (citing Richison v.
Astrue, 462 F. App’x 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2012)). See also Loveless v. Colvin, 810
F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he use of boilerplate is not a ground to
remand if the ALJ justified his credibility assessment based on the evidence.”).
The ALJ went well beyond the so-called “boilerplate,” and explained the
reasons why she found the plaintiff's stated symptoms inconsistent with the
evidence. She explained that: (1) the medical records conflicted with the
plaintiff’s statements about the severity of her physical and psychological
symptoms; (2) the objective diagnostic testing results were relatively mild; (3)
the plaintiff’s mental health treatment had not been aggressive and generally
had been successful in alleviating her symptoms; (4) the plaintiff received
unemployment benefits two to three years after she alleged that she became
disabled, which was inconsistent with the plaintiff’s alleged disability; (5) there
was conflicting evidence in the record as to whether the plaintiff was let go from
a previous job due to her limitations or due to her employer’s economic
condition; and (6) the plaintiff had sporadic work history predating her alleged
disability. Dkt. No. 11-3 at 20-23.
The court finds no error with respect to this portion of the ALJ’s analysis,
or with the evidence that the ALJ considered in assessing the plaintiff’s
credibility. SSR 16-3 (like SSR 96-7p before it) requires the ALJ to “consider
whether an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of his or her symptoms are consistent with the medical signs
and laboratory findings of record.” SSR 16-3, 2016 WL 1119029 at *4. “[I]f the
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frequency or extent of the treatment sought by an individual is not comparable
with the degree of the individual’s subjective complaints, . . . , we may find the
alleged intensity and persistence of an individual’s symptoms are inconsistent
with the overall evidence of record.” SSR 16-3, 2016 WL 1119029 at *8. A
plaintiff’s work history is one factor the ALJ can consider, though it is not
dispositive. Shumaker v. Astrue, 632 F. App’x 861, 867 (7th Cir. 2015).
In her brief, the plaintiff contends that there is no logical bridge between
the evidence and the ALJ’s conclusion that the plaintiff was not entirely
credible. Dkt. No. 16 at 16. She disagrees with the ALJ’s characterization of her
testimony as vague and evasive and, in essence, urges the court to give the
plaintiff’s testimony more credit than the ALJ gave it. Id. The court is satisfied
that the ALJ appropriately weighed the evidence—both the plaintiff’s testimony
and the plaintiff’s medical records—and discounted the plaintiff’s credibility as
to the severity of her symptoms and limitations for reasons that are supported
by the record. See Shideler, 688 F.3d at 312 (noting that an ALJ’s credibility
determination does not need to be perfect to survive judicial review). The court
will not reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment of the plaintiff’s
credibility for the ALJ’s.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The court ORDERS that that the final administrative decision of Nancy
Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, denying the plaintiff’s
application for disability benefits, is AFFIRMED. The court will enter judgment
accordingly.
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Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 21st day of February, 2017.
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