Brown v. Felten et al

Filing 79

ORDER DISMISSING CASE signed by Judge Pamela Pepper on 8/4/2017. 40 Defendant Stonefeld's MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, Summary Judgment GRANTED. 43 Defendant Felten's MOTION for Summary Judgment GRANTED. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Calvin Brown at Stanley Correctional Institution)(cb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________________
CALVIN BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 15-cv-1191-pp

BEVERLY FELTEN and
DONALD STONEFELD,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NOS. 40, 43)
______________________________________________________________________________
The plaintiff, who is representing himself, filed this lawsuit under 42
U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights.
On November 10, 2015, the court allowed the plaintiff to proceed on his claims
that the defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs. Dkt. No. 7. On August 16, 2016, defendant Donald Stonefeld filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, a motion for
summary judgment. Dkt. No. 40. The next day, defendant Beverly Felten filed a
motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 43. This decision resolves those
motions.

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I.

RELEVANT FACTS1
A. Parties
The plaintiff is a Wisconsin state prisoner who was formerly incarcerated

at the Milwaukee County Jail (“Jail”) and the Milwaukee County House of
Correction (“HOC”). Dkt. No. 70 at 24 ¶1.
Defendant Beverly Felton is a registered nurse, an advanced practice
nurse practitioner (APNP), a clinical specialist in gerontological nursing, and
holds a PhD in nursing. Id. at 24-25 ¶3. From 2007 through 2013, Felten
worked as a psychiatric APNP for the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Department
and provided psychiatric services to inmates housed at the Jail and the HOC.
Id. at 25 ¶4. Her duties at the Jail included assessing inmates’ health care
needs, including evaluating whether an inmate exhibited mental illness and a
need for psychotropic medication, and prescribing psychotropic medication, if
necessary and appropriate. Id. at ¶5.
Defendant Donald Felten is a state licensed physician specializing in the
field of psychiatry who previously provided psychiatric services to inmates

The court takes the facts from the “Response of Defendant, Beverly Felten, to
Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact in Support of Response Brief to
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, and Reply of Defendant, Beverly
Felten, to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant, Beverly Felten’s Proposed Material
Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment” (dkt. no. 70). The court
takes additional facts from the plaintiff’s response to defendant Stonefeld’s
proposed material facts in support of his motion for summary judgment (see
dkt. no. 62 at 4-10. The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
1

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housed in the Jail and the HOC. Dkt. No. 62 at 7 ¶17. Stonefeld’s duties
included providing psychiatric consultation to inmates referred by a physician,
psychologist, or nurse practitioner to evaluate whether the subject exhibited
severe mental illness and a need for psychotropic medication, as well as
prescribing psychotropic medication if necessary and appropriate. Id. at ¶18.
B. The Plaintiff’s Interactions with the Defendants
The plaintiff was admitted to the Jail on November 2, 2009. Dkt. No. 70
at 29 ¶14. At the time he was admitted, he was prescribed Levothyroxine for
his thyroid and Ranitidine for his acid reflux. Id. at ¶15.
On November 4, 2009, a social worker at the Jail (who is not named as a
defendant) conducted a mental health exam of the plaintiff. Id. at ¶16. The
plaintiff responded affirmatively to the social worker’s inquiry about whether
the plaintiff was willing to receive help and possibly medication for his being
sad about being back in Jail. Id. at 30 ¶18. The social worker referred the
plaintiff to “Pych MD” for a medical evaluation. Id. at 31 ¶19.
On November 5, 2009, the plaintiff told a nurse practitioner (who is not
named as a defendant) that he was depressed and needed help. Id. at ¶21. That
same day, someone (it is unclear who) prescribed the plaintiff 150 milligram
tablets of Ranitidine. Id. at 32 ¶22. Ranitidine is used to treat and prevent
ulcers; it also treats conditions in which the stomach produces too much acid,
and it treats gastroesophageal reflux disease and other conditions in which

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acid backs up from the stomach into the esophagus, causing heartburn. See
https://www.drugs.com/ranitidine.html.
On November 8, 2009, Jail medical personnel discontinued the plaintiff’s
prescription for Ranitidine because the plaintiff’s fiancé brought his
prescription to the Jail. Dkt. No. 70 at 32 ¶23. When his personal prescription
ran out later that month, the Jail personnel re-prescribed Ranitidine through
May 11, 2010. Id. at ¶23.2
In December 2009, the plaintiff was transferred from the Jail to the
House of Correction. Dkt. No. 62 at 7 ¶7.
On December 28, 2009, Felten examined the plaintiff. Dkt. No. 70 at 32
¶24. During the examination, the plaintiff told Felten that he felt like hurting
people when they get in his face and that he had previously tried to commit
suicide two times by cutting himself. Id. Felten states that the plaintiff also
said that he heard voices, including the voices of his dead mother and the devil
and that he felt like breaking people’s necks or poking their eyes out. Id. at 33
¶25. Felten asserts that the plaintiff also displayed jerking movements. Id. The
plaintiff states that he told Felten that he recalled things that his mother used
to say to him and that he had cut his arm when he was nineteen or twenty but

Stonefeld asserts that the plaintiff was never prescribed Ranitidine and
Risperidone at the same time; the plaintiff disputes this, explaining that the
Jail’s prescription for Ranitidine was cancelled only while he was taking the
prescribed Ranitidine brought to him by his girlfriend. Once that prescription
ran out, the Jail re-prescribed Ranitidine on November 22, 2009; that
prescription continued until March 2010. See Dkt. No. 62 at 8 ¶28-30.
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that he would not ever do that again. Id. Based on her conversation with the
plaintiff, Felten concluded that the plaintiff demonstrated “active thoughts of
hurting others with viable plans.” Id. at 34 ¶26. She then called for assistance
and ordered the plaintiff into psychiatric custody. Id. at ¶27.
Felten states that the plaintiff resisted being moved into psychiatric
custody and began to bang his head. Id. at 34-35 ¶28. The plaintiff asserts that
he did not resist or bang his head; he states that he was handcuffed,
surrounded and restrained by correctional officers at the time. Id.
Felten ordered that the plaintiff receive a two-milligram injection of
Ativan, an antianxiety medication, and that he be placed on homicide watch
with a “razor restriction.” Id. at 35 ¶29. She also prescribed the plaintiff a onemilligram dose of Risperidone, an antipsychotic medication used to treat
schizophrenia and symptoms of bipolar disorder, and a daily fifty-milligram
dose of Sertraline, an inhibitor used to treat depression, obsessive-compulsive
disorder, and anxiety disorders. Id. at 36 ¶30. Felten did not have any further
involvement with the plaintiff after December 28, 2009. Id. at ¶32.
Stonefeld examined the plaintiff the next day, December 29, 2009. Dkt.
No. 62 at 8 ¶16. During that examination, Stonefeld determined that the
plaintiff was calm and rational and “just wanted someone to talk to.” Id. at 9
¶19. Stonefeld concluded that the plaintiff posed no pending danger to himself
or others and should be released from psychiatric custody to general
population. Id. at ¶20. Stonefeld continued the medications prescribed by
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Felten, and his assessment report indicates that he discussed the medications
and their potential side effects with the plaintiff; the plaintiff disputes that
such a conversation occurred. Id. at ¶21.
On December 31, 2009, the plaintiff’s Risperidone prescription was
increased to a daily dose of two milligrams (it is unclear who ordered this
increase). Id. at ¶14. On January 7, 2010, the plaintiff’s Sertraline prescription
was increased to one hundred milligrams (again, it is unclear who ordered this
increase). Id. at 10 ¶26.
On March 24, 2010, Stonefeld met with the plaintiff for a second and
final time. Id. at ¶32. The plaintiff complained that he was experiencing side
effects commonly associated with Risperidone, including involuntary spasms in
his back, chest, arms, and legs. Id. at ¶31. In response to those complaints,
Stonefeld discontinued the plaintiff’s Risperidone prescription. Id. ¶33.
The plaintiff was transferred to Dodge Correctional Institution on May
11, 2009. Id. at 11 ¶34. Doctors at Dodge Correctional and New Lisbon
Correctional (neither of whom are named as defendants) prescribed the plaintiff
medication for severe headaches. Id. at 6 ¶37-38. The plaintiff asserts that
these headaches, which he continues to suffer, are due to taking Risperidone
and Sertraline. Id. at ¶38. The plaintiff also states that on August 19, 2016, an
unidentified doctor (who is not named as a defendant) diagnosed him with
tardive dyskinesia (which causes stiff, jerky, uncontrolled movements of one’s
face and body), which the plaintiff also asserts he developed as a result of
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taking Risperidone and Sertraline. Id. at ¶39; see
http://www.webmd.com/schizophrenia/guide/tardive-dyskinesia#1.
C. The Plaintiff’s Grievance
On May 4, 2015, more than five years after his interactions with Felten
and Stonefeld, the plaintiff filed an inmate grievance form with the HOC,
alleging that Felten demonstrated deliberate indifference when she examined
him on December 28, 2009. Id. at ¶40, 41. The grievance stated:
While in custody at the Milwaukee County House of
Corrections, Calvin Brown (the plaintiff), was subjected to
deliberate indifference by HOC nurse Beverly Felten to the
plaintiff’s serious medical need in violation of The Fourteenth
Amendment, to wit; on 12/28/09, Felten has harmed the
plaintiff by (1) giving the plaintiff Risperidone without the
approval on examination of the plaintiff’s doctor, (2) the
plaintiff’s doctor was of the written opinion that Felten had no
psychiatric experience to place the plaintiff on R[i]speridone,
and (3) Felten giving the plaintiff R[i]seperidone has caused the
plaintiff serious physical and mental harm. See Balla v. State
Bd. Of Pardons 595 D.Supp 1558 (D.Idaho.1984). Please send
the answer to this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) to
Calvin Brown #317946 Stanley Correctional Institution 100
Corrections Drive Stanley, Wisconsin 54768-6500
Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Summary Judgment Standard

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
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324 (1986); Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 629 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir.
2011). “Material facts” are those under the applicable substantive law that
“might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute
over a “material fact” is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
A party asserting that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed
must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information,
affidavits
or
declarations,
stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B)
showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the
fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a
motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to
testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
B.

Exhaustion

According to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, “No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or
any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). Various important policy goals give rise to the
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rule requiring administrative exhaustion, including restricting frivolous claims,
giving prison officials the opportunity to address situations internally, giving
the parties the opportunity to develop the factual record, and reducing the
scope of litigation. Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir. 2001).
If a court determines that an inmate failed to complete any step in the
exhaustion process prior to filing a lawsuit, the court must dismiss the
plaintiff’s complaint. Perez v. Wis. Dept. of Corrs., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir.
1999) (“[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies have been
exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the
claim on the merits.”).
The defendants argue, in part, that the court must dismiss the plaintiff’s
lawsuit because he did not comply with the time limits for filing his grievance.
They rely on the affidavit of Kevin Nyklewicz, a deputy inspector at the
Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office. See Dkt. No. 44-3. Nyklewicz states that
every inmate booked into the Jail is given a copy of the inmate handbook,
which includes information about the grievance procedures. Id. at ¶6; Id. at 512. Nyklewicz also asserts that inmates must file their grievances within
fourteen days after the occurrence that gave rise to the complaint. Id. at ¶9.
Nyklewicz cites to the Wisconsin Department of Corrections Complaint
procedures, Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310, et seq., in support of this assertion.
Id.

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While the plaintiff does not dispute that he was given a copy of the
handbook, he does dispute that the handbook contains a fourteen-day time
limit for inmates to file a grievance. In fact, the plaintiff argues that the
handbook contains no time limit for the filing of grievances. See Dkt. No. 44-3
at 7-8, 10. Further, the plaintiff argues that the Wisconsin Administrative
Code, which Nyklewicz cites as the source of the fourteen-day time limit,
applies only to the Wisconsin Department of Corrections institutions, and does
not apply to the Jail or the HOC. Neither defendant addresses these
arguments.
The plaintiff is correct. The Wisconsin Administrative Code applies to
state institutions. The defendants have offered no evidence demonstrating that
the county adopted the state code, or that county inmates are told that they
must comply with state regulations. Instead, the county inmates are given a
copy of the relevant handbook, and that handbook is silent on whether there is
a time limit by which an inmate must file a complaint. Because the plaintiff
cannot be required to comply with a time limit that does not exist, the court
will not dismiss his lawsuit for failure to timely file his grievance.
The defendants also argue that the plaintiff failed to comply with the
procedures in the handbook, because he did not first “address[] the problem
with the Pod Deputy” before filing his grievance. Dkt. No. 44-3 at 8. Because
the plaintiff had long before transferred out of the HOC, it was impossible for
him to comply with this requirement—he had no Pod Deputy at the time he
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filed his grievance. The court will not fault the plaintiff for failing to comply
with requirements that were rendered irrelevant by a change in circumstances
over which the plaintiff had no control.
Finally, Stonefeld separately argues that, even if the court considers the
plaintiff’s grievance timely filed, the plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies as to Stonefeld because the plaintiff’s grievance
focused exclusively on Felten’s conduct. The court agrees. The plaintiff’s
grievance is very specific: he complained only that Felten demonstrated
deliberate indifference to his medical needs when she prescribed medication to
him without the approval of his doctor and without relevant experience or
qualifications to do so. The plaintiff did not complain generally about the care
he received (in which case identifying the individual actors would not be
required); instead, his grievance focused on the specific actions of one person.
Some of the policy goals giving rise to the exhaustion requirement
include giving prison officials the opportunity to address situations internally,
and giving the parties the opportunity to develop the factual record. Here, given
the focus of the plaintiff’s grievance on Felten’s actions, the HOC would not
have known to broaden any internal investigation to include the actions of
Stonefeld, thus potentially depriving it of the exhaustion requirement’s ability
to address the plaintiff’s concerns with Stonefeld internally.

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The court concludes that, given the specific nature of the plaintiff’s
grievance, he did not exhaust his claim against Stonefeld before he filed his
lawsuit. Accordingly, the court will dismiss Stonefeld as a defendant.
C.

Deliberate Indifference

"Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates 'deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.'" Gutierrez v. Peters, 111
F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). This standard contains
both an objective element (that the medical needs be sufficiently serious) and a
subjective element (that the officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind). Id.
The parties agree that the plaintiff presented with a serious mental
health need at the time Felten examined him. The plaintiff previously had told
a social worker at the Jail that he was willing to receive help, and possibly
medication, to treat his sadness over being back in jail. He also told a nurse
practitioner at the Jail that he was depressed and needed help. When the
plaintiff met with Felten, he told her, among other things, that he felt like
hurting people when they got in his face and that he had cut himself twice in
the past. The court finds that these facts are sufficient to satisfy the objective
element of the deliberate indifference standard. See Gutierrez v. Peters, 111
F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997) (a medical need is serious when “the failure to

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treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”)
The parties disagree, however, about whether Felten acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind when she treated the plaintiff. When a
prisoner alleges deliberate indifference, often it is because a prison official
ignored, failed to treat, or provided only minimal treatment in response to a
prisoner’s medical needs. Here, the plaintiff alleges the opposite: he alleges that
Felten over-treated his medical needs by prescribing medication that she was
not qualified to prescribe, and that the plaintiff did not need.
Specifically, the plaintiff argues that Felten demonstrated deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs when she prescribed two unnecessary
psychotropic medications without contacting a psychiatrist or physician. Dkt.
No. 66-1 at 3. He says that Felten knew these drugs had common side effects,
but that she failed to warn him of those side effects before prescribing the
drugs. Id. at 4. Finally, the plaintiff asserts that Felten failed to account for the
other medication the plaintiff was taking, which resulted in the plaintiff taking
a dangerous combination of drugs. Id. The court finds that no jury could
reasonably conclude that Felten was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s
serious medical needs.
First, the plaintiff focuses on Felten’s work history and education,
arguing that she lacked the qualifications and experience to prescribe the
medication. The evidence Felten provided undermines the plaintiff’s argument.
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The plaintiff argues that Felten had no experience in psychiatry. According to
Felten’s resume, however, she worked as a gero-psych clinical nurse specialist
from 1989 to 1992; from 1992 to 1994, she worked on a gero-psych unit; from
1994 to 2007, she performed outpatient psychotherapy and geriatric and
psychiatric prescribing; and from 2006 to 2007 she was employed as an APNP
acute care psychiatric nurse prescriber. Dkt. No. 44-2 at 6. In addition, Felten
began her position with the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s department as a psych
APNP in 2007—two years before she prescribed medication to the plaintiff. Id.
On these facts, no jury could reasonably conclude that Felten lacked the
necessary qualifications or relevant work experience to prescribe antipsychotic
medication to the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that Felten was
not qualified is not enough for this claim to survive summary judgment.
Next, the plaintiff argues that, if Felten was qualified to prescribe these
medications, she should have warned the plaintiff of the medication’s potential
side effects. He explains that, as a result of taking Risperidone, he developed
involuntary muscle spasms in his back, chest, arms and legs, and tremors in
his face, chest and legs—all of which are common side effects.
In Phillips v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit explained that “[t]he Eighth Amendment protects inmates from
deliberate indifference to substantial risks of serious damage to their health.”
522 Fed.Appx. 364, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). Under this
standard, a prescriber must warn her prisoner-patient only of those side effects
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that the patient has a substantial risk of developing, and which present a
substantial risk of serious damage to his health. See id. The plaintiff asserts
only that he experienced common side effects; he does not provide any evidence
to support his assertion that Felten knew that he had a substantial risk of
developing those common side effects (or that these common side effects posed
a substantial risk of damage to his health). While muscle spasms and tremors
are unpleasant and uncomfortable, they do not constitute serious damage to
the plaintiff’s health.
Finally, the plaintiff also appears to argue that Felten demonstrated
deliberate indifference because she failed to account for the other medication
he was taking when she prescribed Risperidone. To support his claim, the
plaintiff points to a document which he appears to have pulled from the
Internet, with the heading “Drug details – MICROMEDEX 2.0,” which warns
with regard to Risperidone that, “There are many other medicines that you
should not use while you are taking risperidone. Taking risperidone with
certain other medicines may be dangerous, even life-threatening. Make sure
your doctor and your pharmacist knows about all other medicines you [take.]
Make sure your doctor knows if you are taking . . . ranitidine . . . .” Dkt. No.
62-18 at 2.
The plaintiff does not provide evidence that he experienced a negative or
life-threatening reaction as a result of taking Risperidone (the antipsychotic
medication) and Ranitidine (the anti-reflux medication) at the same time, or
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even that he personally had a heightened risk of experiencing such a reaction.3
The drug details state only that “taking risperidone with certain other
medicines may be dangerous.” Id. In addition, they do not state that
Risperidone should not be taken with Ranitidine; they state only that a patient
should inform his doctor that he is taking Ranitidine. In other words, the
plaintiff has alleged only that he may have been at risk of suffering harm, not
that he actually suffered any harm. That allegation is insufficient for the court
to allow him to proceed on a deliberate indifference claim. See Babcock v.
White, 102 F.3d 267, 270-72 (7th Cir. 1996).
Nor has the plaintiff presented any evidence that Felten knew that he
was taking Ranitidine when she prescribed Risperidone. The plaintiff does not
assert that he informed Felten that he was taking Ranitidine (as the drug
details instructed him that he should do); he states only that Felten had access
to his medical records, which documented the medication he was taking. Dkt.
No. 66-1 at 4. Felten, on the other hand, contends that she did not prescribe
Ranitidine and Risperidone at the same time, dkt. no. 44-22 ¶14, implying that
she did not know the plaintiff was already taking Ranitidine when she
prescribed Risperidone. The reasonable inference to draw from this evidence is
that, although Felten had access to the plaintiff’s medical records, she did not

The plaintiff asserts that the shakes and tremors he experienced were a result
of taking the antipsychotic medication (specifically Risperidone), dkt. no. 62 at
17 ¶34; dkt. no. 62-17, not a result of taking Risperidone and Ranitidine in
combination.
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3

realize that the plaintiff was taking Ranitidine at the time she prescribed the
Risperidone. At most, this fact proves negligence; negligent conduct on the part
of a state official does not constitute a constitutional violation. Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 333-34 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S.
344, 347-48 (1986); Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788-89 (7th Cir. 2005).
The plaintiff disagrees with Felten’s decision to prescribe the medications
she ordered, but that disagreement is not enough to allow a reasonable jury to
conclude that Felten acted with deliberate indifference. Felten was free to make
her own, independent medical determination as to the necessity of certain
medications. Holloway v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1074 (7th
Cir. 2012). The plaintiff has not provided any evidence to support his assertion
that her decision was “such a substantial departure from accepted medical
professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate” that she did
not base her decision on a medical judgment. Id. at 1073. To the contrary,
Felten’s decision about which medications to prescribe was affirmed by
Stonefeld, the plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, on the following day when he
decided to continue her prescriptions.4 See Dkt. No. 62 at 9 ¶21.

The plaintiff makes much of Stonefeld’s comment that Felten “overreacted”
and that “with no psych background [Felten] was not equipped to determine
whether [the plaintiff’s] [th]oughts were of impending danger or he wanted to
discuss and understand.” See Dkt. 1-1 at 8. Given that Stonefeld continued the
medications Felten prescribed, it is reasonable to infer that Stonefeld’s
comments were directed at Felten’s decision to remove the plaintiff from
general population and place him on homicide watch with a razor restriction,
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4

The court will dismiss the plaintiff’s claims against Felten.
III.

CONCLUSION
The court ORDERS that defendant Donald Stonefeld’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgmentis
GRANTED. Dkt. No. 40.
The court ORDERS that defendant Beverly Felten’s motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. No. 43.
The court DISMISSES this case, and will enter judgment accordingly.
This order and the judgment to follow are final. A dissatisfied party may
appeal this court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by
filing in this court a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of judgment.
See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, 4. This court may extend this
deadline if a party timely requests an extension and shows good cause or
excusable neglect for not being able to meet the 30-day deadline. See Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A).
Under certain circumstances, a party may ask this court to alter or
amend its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or ask for relief
from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Any motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) must be filed within 28 days of the entry

see dkt. no. 1-1 at 6, and not at her decision to prescribe psychotropic
medications. The plaintiff has not challenged Felten’s decision to remove him
from general population.
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of judgment. The court cannot extend this deadline. See Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 6(b)(2). Any motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) must
be filed within a reasonable time, generally no more than one year after the
entry of the judgment. The court cannot extend this deadline. See Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2).
The court expects parties to closely review all applicable rules and
determine, what, if any, further action is appropriate in a case.
Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 4th day of August, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________________
HON. PAMELA PEPPER
United States District Judge

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