Brown v. Bank of America NA et al

Filing 26

ORDER signed by Judge Pamela Pepper on 5/26/2016 DENYING 24 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (cc: all counsel; by US Mail to plaintiff (pwm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________________
AMY JO BROWN,

Case No. 15-cv-1250-pp
Plaintiff,

v.
RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (DKT. NO. 24)
_____________________________________________________________________________
On May 24, 2016, the court entered an order granting in part motions to
dismiss filed by Bank of America and Residential Credit Solutions (“RCS”). Dkt.
No. 23. In that order, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful
foreclosure and quiet title against Bank of America and RCS. Id. at 22-23. The
court based its decision on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits a
federal court from exercising the equivalent of appellate review over a final state
court judgment. Id. at 11-13. The only claim left remaining in this case is the
plaintiff’s claim against Bank of America for violations of the Truth In Lending
Act. Id. at 22.
Later that day, the plaintiff filed the instant motion for preliminary
injunction. Dkt. No. 24. She asserted in the motion that the date scheduled for
the foreclosure sale of her home was May 25, 20151—the following day. Id. at
2. She asked the court to issue an order vacating the May 25, 2016 sheriff’s
The court believes that the plaintiff meant to list the date of the sale as
May 25, 2016, not May 25, 2015.
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sale, based on her arguments that Bank of America was not the servicer of the
loan on the property, and therefore had no standing to seek foreclosure. Id. at
5-7.
A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must
demonstrate that (1) the moving party has a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at
law exists; (3) the moving party will suffer irreparable harm
without injunctive relief; (4) the irreparable harm suffered
without injunctive relief outweighs the irreparable harm the
defendant will suffer if the injunction is granted; and (5) the
injunction will not harm the public interest.
Rust Environment & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen, 131 F.3d 1210, 1213
(7th Cir. 1997). (Citations omitted.) The plaintiff must prove each of these
elements in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. Id. (Citations omitted.)
In this case, the plaintiff has not met any of the five elements. Not only
can she not prove that she has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits
of her case, but the court already has ruled against her (albeit on the same day
she filed the motion for preliminary injunction). She already has taken
advantage of the remedies at law available to her, by contesting the foreclosure
case in state court. Interestingly, regarding irreparable harm, she does not
argue that she will lose her home even though she has made her payments.
Rather, the plaintiff argues that the party seeking foreclosure—Bank of
America—isn’t the proper party to bring the foreclosure action. This does not
constitute irreparable harm. Because she has not demonstrated irreparable
harm, the plaintiff cannot show that her irreparable harm if she doesn’t receive
injunctive relief outweighs the defendant’s irreparable harm if she does.
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Finally, granting injunctive relief in this situation—one in which a state court
has finally and definitively ruled on the issues in this case—would harm the
public interest, by allowing (in violation of established case law) a federal court
to overturn a final state-court judgment.
The court DENIES the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
Dkt. No. 24.
Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 26th day of May, 2016.

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