Brooks v. Racine Correctional Institution et al

Filing 36

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 6/6/2017 DENYING 35 Plaintiff's Motion to Alter Judgment Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Derrick E. Brooks at Wisconsin Secure Program Facility) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
DERRICK E. BROOKS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-CV-77-JPS

v.
CAPTAIN GLOUDEMANS, LT.
SERRANO, R. SMITH, M. SMITH, S.
ANDERSON, C.O. GOTTI, SGT. STINE,
and C.O. MARTEN,

ORDER

Defendants.
On December 1, 2016, Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s claims. (Docket #18). Plaintiff never
responded, and the Court was obliged to grant the motion on the
undisputed facts in the record in an order dated January 19, 2017. See
(Docket #32). On June 5, 2017, nearly five months after judgment was
entered, Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) requesting leave to respond to Defendants’
motion for summary judgment. (Docket #35).1
Rule 59(e) empowers a court to alter or amend a judgment on motion
by a party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The party seeking relief under this Rule
must establish “a manifest error of law or present newly discovered
evidence.” Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 2008). Whether

In construing pro se filings generously, the Court is required to consider
what grounds for post-judgment relief might be appropriate, regardless of the
authorizing Rule the litigant actually cited. See Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489,
493 (7th Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff identifies only purported legal errors the
Court committed, Rule 59 is the appropriate starting point for his motion, and
other rules, like Rule 60(b), are not. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
1

to grant a motion to amend a judgment “is entrusted to the sound judgment
of the district court,” In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996), but the
movant must first “clearly establish” his right to relief, Romo v. Gulf Stream
Coach, Inc., 250 F.3d 1119, 1122 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001).
Similarly, Rule 60 allows the Court to vacate a judgment based on,
inter alia, a mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud by a party,
satisfaction of the judgment, or “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b). Relief under Rule 60 is an “extraordinary remedy and is
granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Wickens v. Shell Oil Co., 620 F.3d
747, 759 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court’s determination is constrained only by
its sound discretion. Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 656 (7th Cir. 2014).
Neither Rule affords Plaintiff any relief here. First, his Rule 59(e)
motion had to be filed no later than twenty-eight days after the entry of
judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The Court cannot extend this deadline.
Id. 6(b)(2). Thus, whatever its merit, Plaintiff’s request under Rule 59(e) is
untimely.
A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made “within a reasonable
time,” and usually within one year of the entry of judgment. Id. 60(c). Yet
even assuming for present purposes that Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion is
timely, it is without merit. Plaintiff points to no newly discovered evidence
supporting his claims, nor does he even attempt to justify his complete
failure to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in a timely
fashion. Indeed, he makes no effort to tether his request for relief to the
specific bases enumerated in the Rule. See (Docket #35 at 1).
Instead, he appears to claim that his verified complaint provided
facts sufficient to preclude the entry of summary judgment. See id.
Page 2 of 3

However, simply verifying a complaint is not enough under the Local
Rules, which provide that failure to respond to a movant’s statement of
material facts permits the Court to consider them admitted. Civ. L. R.
56(b)(4). Even in cases brought by pro se plaintiffs, in which the Court must
liberally construe the plaintiff’s filings, the Court is entitled to strictly
enforce the rules regarding summary judgment procedure. See Hill v.
Thalacker, 210 F. App’x 513, 515 (7th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff ignored these rules entirely. In such a case, the Court is not
required to search for helpful evidence on his behalf. See Waldridge v. Am.
Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994); Herman v. City of Chicago, 870
F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1989) (“A district court need not scour the record to
make the case of a party who does nothing.”). Plaintiff’s failure to
appreciate the consequences of disregarding the rules of this Court is no
excuse—and certainly not five months after the case was closed. As such,
Plaintiff’s motion must be denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for relief under Rules 59 and
60 (Docket #35) be and the same is hereby DENIED.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 6th day of June, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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