Keith v. Ruples et al

Filing 76

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 4/27/2017: GRANTING 59 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; DENYING 57 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; DENYING as moot 66 Plaintiff's Motion for Declaratory Judgment; DENYING as moot 70 Plaintiff's Motion for Injunction; and DISMISSING action with prejudice. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Crystal Priscilla Keith at Taycheedah Correctional Institution) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
CRYSTAL PRISCILLA KEITH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-CV-311-JPS

v.
DAVID RUPLES, HEATHER JUSTMANN,
DEANNE SCHAUB, DAVID TARR, and
CHRISTOPHER COOPER,

ORDER

Defendants.

1.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Crystal Keith (“Keith”), a prisoner, brings this action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, prison officials at Taycheedah
Correctional Institution (“TCI”), alleging that they were deliberately
indifferent to her risk of suicide.1 Both parties have filed motions for
summary judgment on Keith’s claims. (Docket #57 and #59). The motions are
fully briefed and, for the reasons stated below, the Court will grant summary
judgment in favor of Defendants and dismiss this action.
2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the court “shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016). A

1

Keith previously raised a claim that Defendants failed to protect her from
assaults by a fellow inmate. See (Docket #8 at 5–6). This claim was dismissed for
Keith’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. (Docket #54). In that order,
the Court granted the parties additional time to seek summary judgment on the
merits of the remaining deliberate indifference claims.

fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit” under the
applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A dispute of fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The
court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the non-movant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 815 F.3d 356, 360
(7th Cir. 2016). The court must not weigh the evidence presented or
determine credibility of witnesses; the Seventh Circuit instructs that “we
leave those tasks to factfinders.” Berry v. Chicago Transit Auth., 618 F.3d 688,
691 (7th Cir. 2010). The party opposing summary judgment “need not match
the movant witness for witness, nor persuade the court that her case is
convincing, she need only come forward with appropriate evidence
demonstrating that there is a pending dispute of material fact.” Waldridge v.
Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1994).
3.

RELEVANT FACTS
The relevant undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to

Keith, are fairly brief.2 Keith is an inmate at TCI. TCI is the only female
facility within the Wisconsin Women’s Correctional System and it houses
both medium- and maximum-security inmates. Defendant Deanne Schaub
(“Schaub”) is the warden. Defendant David Ruples (“Ruples”) is a sergeant
at TCI. Defendants Heather Justmann (“Justmann”) and Christopher Cooper

2

Though warned previously about the proper procedures for raising factual
disputes on summary judgment, see Keith v. Ruples, Case No. 16–CV–311–JPS, 2017
WL 237624, at *2–3 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2017), Keith again failed to submit a response
to Defendants’ statement of material facts. Yet she did submit an affidavit and some
documentary evidence, see (Docket #67, #68, #69), and because her claims must be
dismissed even after considering her evidence, the Court will not penalize her
further for the procedural failings in her submission.

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(“Cooper”) are captains at the institution. At all times relevant to Keith’s
complaint, Defendant David Tarr (“Tarr”) was the Security Director at TCI.
This case focuses on the events of April 27, 2015, but it originated
much earlier. Keith and another inmate, Ashli Castillo (“Castillo”), were both
designated as maximum-security inmates at TCI. They were housed in the
McCauley unit, the only general population and maximum-security housing
unit in the prison. They were cellmates from October 2013 until January 2014.
At that time, correctional officers learned that Castillo was physically abusing
Keith. Castillo was disciplined with segregation but then returned to the
McCauley unit. In light of their history, prison officials tried to keep Keith
and Castillo separated as much as possible.
Yet on January 21, 2015, Keith submitted an inmate complaint
requesting a separation order from Castillo, alleging that Castillo continued
to verbally harass her when they crossed paths and that Keith felt threatened.
During this period, Keith received mental health treatment for the emotional
trauma she suffered as a result of Castillo’s abuse. On April 23, 2015, Keith
attempted suicide by overdosing on medication. After treatment at a
hospital, it appears she was placed in the restrictive housing unit (“RHU”)
on observation status—a protective form of confinement for inmates at risk
of harming themselves or others.
The instant claims arise from a single incident on April 27, 2015. That
day, Keith was being released from observation in the RHU. Sergeant Ruples
was working his post in the McCauley unit. At approximately 11:15 a.m.,
Keith arrived at the unit and Ruples directed Keith to go into cell 204-2,
which was her new, general population cell assignment. Keith refused,
telling Ruples that she had a separation order preventing her from being
placed in the McCauley unit with Castillo.
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In response to Keith’s concerns, Ruples called Correctional Program
Supervisor Gierach. Gierach told Ruples that the separation order was no
longer in effect, which he in turn had learned from Tarr. Ruples informed
Gierach that he would try to separate Keith from Castillo within the unit by
keeping them in different areas of the unit.
After this call, Ruples again directed Keith to go into cell 204-2. Keith
continued to refuse, stating she would not go into “that room or that side.”
Keith also told Ruples that she would kill herself by cutting if he persisted in
making her enter cell 204-2. Ruples next called the security supervisor on
duty, Justmann. Nothing in the record indicates whether Ruples mentioned
Keith’s suicide threat at this time. When she arrived at the scene, Keith
informed Justmann that she had told Ruples that she would kill herself if
forced to go into cell 204-2.3 Due to Keith’s continued refusals to enter her
assigned cell, Justmann placed Keith on temporary lock-up (“TLU”) status
in the RHU pending issuance of a conduct report by Ruples for disobeying

3

Keith claims that while Justmann was en route to assist Ruples, she was
placed in a “back room,” wherein she contemplated strangling herself with a
television power cord. (Docket #58 ¶¶ 8–9). She never told anyone about this,
however, and she admits that she did not actually touch the cord before Justmann
arrived and escorted her away. Id. ¶ 10.

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orders.4 Ruples proceeded to issue a conduct report to Keith for her refusal
to obey orders.5
Justmann took over custody of Keith from Ruples and escorted her to
the RHU. During intake at the RHU, Keith stated she would try to kill herself
and then began to bang her head against nearby cell bars. Justmann and
security staff members consulted with psychological services staff, and Keith
was then placed back in observation status by prison psychologist Dr.
Ferguson.
The entire incident on April 27, 2015 took approximately forty-five
minutes. The time between when Justmann reported to the McCauley unit
and when Keith was moved into observation placement on Dr. Ferguson’s
orders was only about ten minutes.
4.

ANALYSIS
Keith claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her risk

of suicide on April 27, 2015. Such a claim has both an objective and a
subjective component. Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2006).
First, Keith must show that the harm (or potential harm) was objectively,
sufficiently serious and a substantial risk to her health. Id.; Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “It goes without saying that ‘suicide is a serious
harm,’” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting
4

TLU is a non-punitive status which separates an inmate from the rest of the
population for purposes of completing a disciplinary or other investigation.
5

Defendants maintain that Keith never made suicide threats to Ruples at all,
(Docket #62 ¶ 11), and never mentioned any thoughts of self-harm to Justmann
until after Justmann and Keith arrived at the RHU for Keith’s TLU placement,
(Docket #63 ¶¶10–13). Although Keith failed to dispute Defendants’ proffered facts,
the Court presents her version of events here because it is clear what factual
disputes she intended to raise and, even generously considering the facts as she
recalls them, her claims cannot proceed.

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Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 261 (7th Cir. 1996)), so this
element is not in dispute here.
The parties’ attention focuses instead on the second element: that
Defendants must have displayed deliberate indifference to Keith’s risk of
suicide. Collins, 462 F.3d at 761; Sanville, 266 F.3d at 733. This, in turn,
requires a dual showing that Defendants (1) subjectively knew Keith was at
substantial risk of committing suicide and (2) were deliberately indifferent
to that risk. Matos ex rel. Matos v. O’Sullivan, 335 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 2003).
As to the first prong, Keith must prove that Defendants knew—rather than
merely should have known—of a significant likelihood that she might
imminently seek to commit suicide. Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. County
of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000); Matos, 335 F.3d at 557.
As to the second prong, Keith must establish that Defendants failed
to take reasonable steps to prevent her from committing suicide. Estate of
Novack, 226 F.3d at 529; Fisher v. Lovejoy, 414 F.3d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 2005) (a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was “aware of a substantial
risk of serious injury to [her] but nevertheless failed to take appropriate steps
to protect [her] from a known danger”). This is a heavy burden; the Seventh
Circuit has emphasized that deliberate indifference “comprehends more than
mere negligence but less than the purposeful or knowing infliction of harm.”
Estate of Novack, 226 F.3d at 529; Peate v. McCann, 294 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir.
2002). Indeed, the Court of Appeals has characterized the required showing
“as ‘something approaching a total unconcern for [the prisoner’s] welfare in
the face of serious risks.’” Collins, 462 F.3d at 762 (quoting Duane v. Lane, 959
F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, to establish deliberate
indifference, the plaintiff must present evidence “that an individual

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defendant intentionally disregarded the known risk to inmate health or
safety.” Id.; Matos, 335 F.3d at 557.
Applying these principles to Keith’s case, the Court is obliged to
conclude that her claims are without merit. Initially, the Court finds that
factual disputes about what Keith said to Ruples and Justmann, and when
such things were said, preclude a finding that they did not know that Keith
presented a risk of suicide. Viewing the evidence presented in Keith’s favor,
it would not be unthinkable that an inmate coming from suicide observation,
who told Ruples and Justmann that she was going to commit suicide,
presented a significant risk of carrying out the threat. This suffices at the
summary judgment stage to carry Keith’s burden on this element. See
Pittmann ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766, 776–78 (7th
Cir. 2014).6
Nevertheless, her claim falls apart because nothing in the record
suggests that Ruples or Justmann were deliberately indifferent to Keith’s
suicide risk. Ruples did not force Keith to go inside cell 204-2; instead, he
ordered her to wait in the back room for Justmann to arrive. He may have
harbored more concern for her disobedience than her suicidality, but Keith’s
claim cannot rest solely on the idea that Ruples was not sufficiently sensitive
to her complaints. Some objective manifestation of his indifference must have
resulted, and to be sure, there is no evidence of that here.

6

Defendants’ reliance on Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), is misplaced.
There, the Supreme Court found that a party’s version of events need not be
believed if indisputable evidence in the record, like a video recording of the
relevant events, contradicted it. Id. at 380. But here, Defendants question the timing
of Keith’s suicide threats, her motivation for threatening suicide, and her
motivation in bringing this lawsuit. (Docket #60 at 12–13). Keith disputes all these
things, and such facts cannot be disproven in the manner contemplated by Scott,
whatever Defendants may believe about Keith’s veracity.

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Keith’s situation stands in stark contrast to cases like Pittmann, where
the officers totally ignored the inmate’s requests for crisis counseling,
Pittmann, 746 F.3d at 772, or Sanville, where prison guards left a suicidal
inmate in his cell, unsupervised, for hours, Sanville, 266 F.3d at 739; see also
Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2003) (police officer placed a
single call to a suicidal detainee to reassure him). More telling still is a
comparison between her case and Mombourquette ex rel. Mombourquette v.
Amundson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 624 (W.D. Wis. 2007). There, the court found a
jury question existed where, upon returning from the hospital after a suicide
attempt, correctional officers did not place the inmate on suicide watch, put
her in observation, or keep her away from dangerous objects. Id. at 649. By
contrast, it is indisputable here that Ruples took steps to keep Keith from
entering cell 204-2—a situation which, in her view, may have led to her
suicide. He also obtained help from a supervisor to address Keith’s behavior.
Thus, no reasonable jury could find that Ruples was deliberately indifferent
since he “responded reasonably to the risk [of harm].” Peate, 294 F.3d at 882
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847).
The same goes for Justmann. She collected Keith and took her to the
RHU for TLU placement. Justmann’s choice not to force Keith to enter cell
204-4 but instead to place her in restricted housing was not an unreasonable
response under the circumstances. During intake, Keith banged her head
against the cell bars. She was apparently stopped from continuing to do this,
either by her choice or by restraint. Justmann then contacted psychological
services staff, and they thereafter took Keith back into observation. The fact
that Keith was permitted a few seconds in which she could have harmed
herself is not enough to carry the day for her. If that were true, correctional
officers faced with suicidal prisoners would generally have to keep them
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restrained from head to toe at all times or risk liability. See Bowers v. Pollard,
602 F. Supp. 2d 977, 993 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (noting that a suicidal inmate
presents prison officials with “a dilemma with no easy options”).
Keith’s theory in this case is that when she informed Ruples and
Justmann that she would commit suicide, their sole duty was to contact
psychological services personnel. (Docket #57 at 3–4); (Docket #67 at 4). She
feels that rather than place her in TLU and issue her a conduct report, they
should have placed her immediately in observation status. (Docket #58 at
7–8). In short, she believes she should not have been punished for refusing
to follow Ruples’ order.
But prison officials are not required to perform their duties
“flawlessly,” nor is negligence enough to establish a constitutional violation.
Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2004). A defendant need not
“take perfect action or even reasonable action[,]. . .his action must be reckless
before § 1983 liability can be found.” Cavalieri, 321 F.3d at 622. The Court
cannot say that Keith’s desired response was the only way for Ruples and
Justmann to reasonably respond to her suicide risk. The pertinent inquiry is
whether they took reasonable steps to stop her from committing suicide, not
whether they took the steps she would have preferred. See Mombourquette,
469 F. Supp. 2d at 650 (noting that “random acts of kindness” to the inmate
did not suffice to show that the officers took steps to stop her from
attempting suicide). Ruples’ notifying his supervisor of a problem, and
Justmann’s committing Keith to the RHU and then observation—all within
a space of forty-five minutes—were not unreasonable choices to make. At a
minimum, their decisions were neither reckless, nor did they display

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anything approaching total unconcern for Keith’s safety. Collins, 462 F.3d at
762. No reasonable jury could find otherwise.7
Keith has therefore not raised any triable issues of material fact with
respect to her claim that Ruples or Justmann were deliberately indifferent to
her suicide risk. As to the other defendants—Schaub, Tarr, and
Cooper—Keith’s claims fail because none of these defendants had any
personal involvement in the alleged misconduct, nor were they presented
with any opportunity to correct the alleged misconduct before it occurred.
Liability under Section 1983 is generally premised on personal fault. An
individual cannot be held liable in a Section 1983 action unless she caused or
participated in an alleged unconstitutional deprivation of rights. See Palmer
v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d
592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Liability depends on each defendant’s knowledge
and actions, not on the knowledge or actions of persons they supervise.”). To
demonstrate that these individuals were deliberately indifferent to her
suicide risk, Keith had to proffer evidence that they knew of a substantial risk
that she would commit suicide and disregarded it. Collins, 462 F.3d at 761. To
establish that any of them might be liable in a supervisory capacity, Keith
would have to meet an even higher bar, showing that they knew about the

7

Nor were Ruples’ actions inconsistent with Department of Corrections
policy, as Keith seems to believe. (Docket #57 at 4). The relevant policies provide
that a staff member who discovers that an inmate is attempting self-harm should
“notify Security staff or other staff available nearby.” (Docket #58-1 at 8). Although
Keith was not actually attempting suicide at the time, Ruples followed this policy,
and Keith does not explain what better or different result she expected had Ruples
contacted the psychological services staff instead. She seems to think that
contacting psychological services for a placement in observation was the better
option in her case, (Docket #58 at 8–9), but this is not the relevant standard.
Moreover, Keith has not explained why her placement in observation less than an
hour later, after she attempted suicide during RHU intake, was not sufficient.

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unconstitutional actions of their subordinates and facilitated them, approved
them, condoned them, or turned a blind eye to them. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65
F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995).
Here, the most that can be said about Tarr is that he removed the nocontact order between Castillo and Keith. No evidence suggests he had
knowledge of Keith’s suicidal tendencies or that removing the no-contact
order, which preceded her suicide threats, was an act of deliberate disregard
for those tendencies. As for Schaub and Cooper, they were only involved in
this case because Cooper issued punishment to Keith as a result of
Justmann’s conduct report, and Schaub affirmed the decision. Neither of
these individuals had a role in the events of April 27, 2015, nor could they
have acted to remedy any alleged misconduct afterwards. As such, there can
be no claim maintained against them on these facts. Zentmeyer v. Kendall
County, 220 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2000). Therefore, Keith’s claims against all
Defendants must be dismissed.
5.

CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Keith has failed to raise triable issues of fact as to

her remaining claims in this case. As a result, the Court must grant summary
judgment to Defendants and dismiss this action with prejudice.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(Docket #59) be and the same is hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Crystal Keith’s motion for
summary judgment (Docket #57) be and the same is hereby DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Crystal Keith’s motion for
a declaratory judgment (Docket #66) be and the same is hereby DENIED as
moot;
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Crystal Keith’s motion for
an injunction (Docket #70) be and the same is hereby DENIED as moot; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same is hereby
DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 27th day of April, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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