Madlock v. WEC Energy Group, Inc.

Filing 46

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 1/13/2017 GRANTING 21 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Action DISMISSED with prejudice. 20 Defendant's Motion to Seal Documents GRANTED. Clerk of Court to seal documents. See Order. (cc: all counsel) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
ROSEMARY MADLOCK,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 16-CV-332-JPS

WEC ENERGY GROUP INC.,
Defendant.

1.

ORDER

INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Rosemary Madlock (“Madlock”), filed this action against

the defendant, WEC Energy Group Inc. (“WEC”), on allegations of racial
discrimination in employment and retaliation. See generally (Docket #1). On
November 1, 2016, WEC filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docket #21).
Madlock submitted her response on December 1, 2016. (Docket #39). WEC
offered a reply in support of the motion on December 15, 2016. (Docket #43).
The motion is fully briefed and, for the reasons explained below, it will be
granted.
2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides the mechanism for

seeking summary judgment. Rule 56 states that the “court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016).
A “genuine” dispute of material fact is created when “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court construes

all facts and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 815 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir.
2016). In assessing the parties’ proposed facts, the Court must not weigh the
evidence or determine witness credibility; the Seventh Circuit instructs that
“we leave those tasks to factfinders.” Berry v. Chicago Transit Auth., 618 F.3d
688, 691 (7th Cir. 2010).
3.

RELEVANT FACTS
3.1

Improper Briefing

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the disposition of this motion is
based largely on the parties’ refusal to comply with the rules of summary
judgment practice. The parties’ factual briefing is replete with unsupported
facts, multiple assertions of fact within one paragraph, and legal argument.
They also have included numerous facts which are plainly irrelevant to the
issues presented.
The parties have also made curious additions and omissions in their
fact briefs. Madlock fails to reproduce all of WEC’s asserted facts and state
her disputes with them or lack thereof. As to the facts she actually mentions,
Madlock includes legal argument in the form of improper objections. For
instance, she often objects as to relevance, when that issue may be argued in
her legal brief, and objects to completeness or that “issues of fact exist” rather
than simply stating her dispute and citing the appropriate evidence. WEC is
not blameless either. Like Madlock, it submits a great deal of commentary
and legal argument on the facts rather than directly stating a given dispute.
It also regularly fails to cite any evidence to oppose facts. Finally, it offers a
“reply” in support of its statement of facts, though no such document is
contemplated by this District’s Local Rules; the “reply” will be entirely
disregarded. See Civil L. R. 56(b)(3).
Page 2 of 17

The Court expects that the parties will carefully review the
requirements of the federal and local rules on summary judgment, and that
these woeful submissions will not be repeated in the future. Despite the
substantial infirmities with the parties’ factual briefing, the Court has done
its best to formulate a set of undisputed facts. If the parties are surprised by
the inclusion or exclusion of certain facts, they have only themselves to
blame.
3.2

Undisputed Facts

The facts presented below are limited to a general timeline of events
and those relevant to the Court’s analysis. Madlock is African-American. She
has worked for WEC for almost forty years. Madlock has worked in the
Meter to Bill department for approximately the past twenty years. Meter to
Bill is further subdivided into the Industrial Billing group, handling large
commercial accounts, and Volume Billing, addressing small commercial
accounts and residential customers. Madlock began her Meter to Bill tenure
in the Industrial Billing group.
Madlock’s co-workers, and Madlock herself, describe her as a
confident and knowledgeable worker to whom other employees often go for
assistance. Though WEC had no formal training procedure for Industrial
Billing, Madlock and other experienced billers provided informal training.
In 2011, Cathy Wrycza (“Wrycza”) became Madlock’s supervisor. Prior to
that time, the parties dispute the quality of Madlock’s job performance and
whether there were hints or outright statements showing discriminatory
animus by her superiors.1

1

The Court gives short shrift to this time period because it is not only
beyond the scope of the Complaint, it is beyond the statute of limitations. See
(Docket #1); Dandy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 2004).

Page 3 of 17

Other employees on Wrycza’s team observed that she was not very
good at billing, and when Madlock tried to help her, Wrycza would become
upset. This, in Madlock’s view, led to retaliatory discipline. WEC maintains
that Madlock’s discipline was appropriate given its recent emphasis on
improving customer service through, inter alia, accurate billing. This was not
only Wrycza’s duty to implement, but fell to her superiors as well. Wrycza
and Renee Rabiego-Tiller (“Tiller”), the manager of the Meter to Bill area and
Wrycza’s boss, never specifically looked for errors in Madlock’s work; those
were always presented to them by a third party. Wrycza believes that
Madlock’s errors were due to carelessness, not a lack of experience or
training.
In February 2012, Madlock was issued a “Record of Corrective
Counseling” (“RCC”), a form of internal discipline, for two work errors, one
of which had occurred in December 2011. Both errors concerned an
inaccurate meter reading, and the parties dispute to what extent Madlock
was responsible for failing to investigate the error. WEC claims the errors
cost it over $80,000.2 Madlock filed a grievance in response to the discipline.
The grievance was denied by Wrycza and Tiller. In doing so, Wrycza
acknowledged that as to the December error, the account in question had
been consistently billed incorrectly in the months preceding Madlock’s
2

Madlock states that WEC never actually lost money on any of her errors,
while WEC counters that she has laid no foundation for the assertion; Madlock has
never worked in the company’s accounting department. (Docket #44 at ¶ 77).
Madlock merely states what she believes WEC’s accounting practices to be, while
Tiller’s testimony on the financial impact is based on her supervisory position and
exhibits from WEC’s computer system. (Docket #42-1 at 8, 12; Docket #23). The
Court cannot credit Madlock’s unsupported belief in the face of WEC’s direct
evidence, and so must find that WEC’s statements about the financial consequences
of Madlock’s errors are undisputed (this issue is repeated throughout the parties
factual briefing).

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involvement. When the grievance came to Tiller, she denied it on the basis
of a newly discovered error on a different account.
In May 2012, Wrycza issued a written warning to Madlock for taking
only twenty seconds to review an account, which led to the customer being
overbilled by almost $60,000. The warning stated that additional errors could
lead to greater discipline or even termination. Such warnings are a step
higher than an RCC on the disciplinary ladder.3
In August 2012, Jean Frelka (“Frelka”), the director of Meter to Bill,
reduced the February 2012 RCC to a “coaching,” a lesser form of discipline.
The May 2012 warning was also lowered to the level of an RCC. Frelka
nevertheless stressed that Madlock was to apply her experience and
knowledge with a critical eye to find potential problems and raise those
issues with management. The RCCs kept coming for Madlock, however. In
October 2012, Madlock was issued another RCC for a billing error, and in
light of her previous errors, Tiller concluded that it was the result of
Madlock’s inattention to detail. Yet another RCC was issued in November
2012, this time for inappropriate and unprofessional behavior. Madlock’s
grievance on this latest RCC was denied by Wrycza, on Frelka’s orders,
because the inappropriate behavior was reported by multiple sources.
Wrycza was made aware of another error in early 2013 which had
originated in December 2010. This error involved mis-coding an account such
that it would not be billed even though the customer was using energy.
Madlock maintains that the error was the result of the meter itself being
broken, which WEC ultimately confirmed was true. She further admits,
however, that her job was not restricted to merely passively receiving
3

This progressive disciplinary system is maintained in part because of a
workers’ union operating at WEC, of which Madlock was a member.

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information from broken meters, improper readings, or otherwise, but that
she needed to use her experience and judgment to critically assess the
information provided. In general, when assigned to review an account’s bill,
billers must use their skills and experience to determine whether the bill is
accurate and/or what caused an inaccuracy. Madlock contends that this can
be difficult, however, because the billers have no way of confirming whether
the data presented to them is correct. Wrycza believed that Madlock should
have discovered the December 2010 issue, but did not impose any discipline.
She did discipline another biller, Paul Zaren (“Zaren”), a white male, for an
error he made on the account.
WEC does not dispute that it has no formal standards for determining
whether, and what kind, of discipline is warranted for a given issue. It also
does not dispute that Madlock was the only person issued written discipline
by Wrycza while Wrycza worked in Madlock’s area. For instance, another
employee made a billing error in December 2011, and although Wrycza and
Tiller knew about it, they did not issue written discipline. Madlock and a few
of her fellow billers believe that management was aware of many mistakes
but cherry-picked those they wished to discipline. Madlock eventually began
copying Tiller and Frelka on her e-mails to Wrycza, given their strained
relationship, but was told to stop doing that. Madlock also met separately
with her co-workers, which upset Wrycza, and eventually led to a meeting
between the two and Tiller in February 2013, wherein Tiller asked them to
communicate better.
In March 2013, Tiller told Madlock that she was being transferred
from Industrial Billing to Volume Billing because of the impact of her

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repeated billing errors.4 Shemeika Phillips (“Phillips”), supervisor of the
Volume Billing team to which Madlock had been transferred, was told by
Wrycza that Wrycza was insecure about dealing with Madlock, a “strong
black woman.”5 Cynthia Armstead (“Armstead”), another of Madlock’s
coworkers, asked Wrycza about the transfer, who stated that Madlock had
wanted to leave Industrial Billing to explore other opportunities. WEC
maintains that the transfer decision was Tiller’s alone and that Wrycza was
not even asked her opinion on the issue.6 Madlock believes that Tiller’s
decision was meant to placate Wrycza and was also based on racial animus,
though she never heard Tiller make any racist comments and none were ever
relayed to her by anyone else.
As part of the move, Madlock was placed in the middle of the Volume
Billing room between two supervisors. Despite being in a supervisory
position, Madlock was also not initially given a team to lead (though she
apparently has a team now). Phillips also spoke with Madlock, relaying that
Tiller wanted to know if Madlock had been humiliated by the transfer.
Phillips suggested that Madlock file a complaint, which she did in

4

Madlock believes this was akin to a demotion, not because of a pay or title
change, but because the duties were lesser than what she previously had. (Docket
#44 at ¶ 60). This, and many other proposed facts on this issue, are based solely on
hearsay and are therefore not properly supported.
5

This comment has also been quoted as a “strong willed African-American
woman.”Madlock would characterize herself as strong-willed and concedes that
being strong-willed is not a negative attribute.
6

Madlock attempts to dispute this assertion by citing to a span of fifty-five
of her own statements of fact. This falls far short of making “specific references to
the affidavits, declarations, parts of the record, and other supporting materials
relied upon” to dispute facts. See Civil L. R. 56(b)(2)(B)(I) (emphasis added). The
Court will not hunt through the cited facts to find support for the dispute, and so
the dispute must be rejected.

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April 2013. Madlock’s complaint to WEC’s human resources department
stated that she had been discriminated against on the basis of age and race,
and she listed a number of coworkers as witnesses. Ebony Brumfield
(“Brumfield”), a human resources employee, investigated the discrimination
complaint and interviewed a number of witnesses. Brumfield concluded that
no discrimination could be substantiated. No one ever told Madlock that any
management personnel were upset with her for filing the discrimination
complaint.
In May 2013, Brumfield informed Wrycza of Madlock’s complaint.
Wrycza relayed that information to Tiller. Previously, in April 2013, Tiller
and Phillips had been made aware of another billing error Madlock had
made in August 2012. This error also involved field equipment problems and
again, the parties dispute whether this error was entirely Madlock’s fault,
though it is undisputed that she spent only three minutes reviewing the
account. The error caused the customer to be overbilled by $10,000.
Later in May, Phillips issued Madlock a written warning for that error.
The parties dispute whether Tiller ordered Phillips to do so or if it was a
mutual agreement. Shelly Ward (“Ward”), one of Madlock’s previous
supervisors, opined that the punishment did not make sense because it came
too long after the alleged error. Tiller confirmed that she knew of no one else
being disciplined for errors occurring nine months prior. Cynthia Mauch
(“Mauch”), a call center employee and union representative, also stated that
she had never seen a situation where WEC would discover an error months
after it occurred.
Madlock objected to the warning because she felt it was based on
equipment malfunction or other field errors, an issue for which she should
not have been subject to discipline, rather than something within her control.
Page 8 of 17

At the end of May 2013, Madlock filed a grievance on this latest warning,
questioning the time span between the alleged error and the imposition of
discipline. Wrycza and Phillips then compiled a history of Madlock’s
disciplinary actions, though some of the entries were not formal discipline
that Madlock had been made aware of. Wrycza presented the list to Tiller,
who asked for a similar update on discipline history for all of her
subordinates.
In June 2013, Phillips and Wrycza met with Mauch and Madlock, then
denied the grievance. Madlock contends that the discipline list, apparently
a factor in the denial, was not entirely accurate. Her grievance was then
denied at each subsequent level of review, including by Tiller in July, Frelka
in September, and Joan Shafer (“Shafer”), Vice President of Customer
Services, in November. Shafer said she was shocked at Madlock’s history of
errors and coachings. Despite being upheld, the written warning did not
result in Madlock’s suspension.
In December 2013, a claims analyst position was opened. A claims
analyst investigates and mediates customer disputes, requiring patience,
courtesy, and diplomatic and tactful communication skills. The position
would be a promotion and pay increase for Madlock, and she applied.
Phillips completed a recommendation form rating Madlock’s work as
generally adequate, while also noting coaching on unprofessional
communications and the recent written warning. At WEC, such warnings can
prevent an employee from obtaining a promotion or pay increase.
Connie Muñoz (“Muñoz”) was the hiring manager for the claims
analyst position. She decided not to hire Madlock based on the recent
warning, disciplinary history, and previous issues with interpersonal
relations. Muñoz instead selected Catherine Rouse, also African-American,
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for the position. Neither Wrycza nor Tiller had any role in Muñoz’s decision,
and Muñoz had no knowledge of Madlock’s discrimination complaint until
after the hiring decision was made.7
Madlock was informed that she did not get the job in January 2014.
She filed a grievance on the issue, which was denied by Muñoz later that
month. Muñoz indicated that Madlock lost out on the claims analyst job in
part based on a review of Madlock’s personnel file, which showed a pattern
of increasingly serious discipline. Madlock maintains that Muñoz was
presented an inaccurate history of discipline, including phantom coachings.
Madlock also contends that the connection between the recent written
warning and the denial of promotion was apparent, though she admits she
has no personal knowledge of Muñoz’s reasons for the decision. In March
2014, John Tice (“Tice”), apparently Muñoz’s superior, also denied the
grievance based on disciplinary concerns.
Madlock cites a number of similarly-situated employees as having
committed billing errors while receiving little or no discipline. However,
Madlock has few specifics for any of the alleged errors. She testified that
those employees never told her that management was aware of their errors,
and Madlock’s supervisors were unaware of any of her coworkers making
repeated errors. Madlock concedes that her coworkers’ errors did not cost
WEC any money. By contrast, WEC maintains that Madlock’s errors cost it
more than $100,000, far more than any other employee.

7

Madlock again cites a large span of her statements of fact as support,
without explanation as to how they raise a genuine dispute. The Court rejects
Madlock’s attempt to foist her obligation to find specific factual support for her
disputes onto the Court.

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One potential comparator, Zaren, was given a written warning by
Wrycza in February 2014 for unprofessional behavior. He filed a grievance
about the warning but the warning was not rescinded or reduced. He was
nevertheless promoted in July 2014. Wrycza completed a recommendation
form for Zaren, like the one Phillips wrote for Madlock, in the context of his
promotion. Zaren was hired by the human resources department; Frelka,
Tiller, and Wrycza were not involved in making the hiring decision. The
hiring manager, Mark Williamson, concluded that Zaren’s warning was an
isolated incident on his record and that he was otherwise the best-qualified
candidate for the position.
4.

ANALYSIS
Madlock brings two claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. First, she

alleges that the discipline she received and her transfer to Volume Billing was
the result of racial discrimination on Wrycza’s part. (Docket #39 at 1). Second,
Madlock contends that Wrycza and Tiller retaliated against her after she filed
her internal discrimination complaint. Id. Even when viewing the facts in a
light most favorable to her, neither of Madlock’s claims has merit.
4.1

Discrimination

The Seventh Circuit recently announced that the proper standard for
assessing discrimination claims “is simply whether the evidence would
permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity,
sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse
employment action.” Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir.
2016). This holding disposes of the distinction between direct and indirect
evidence. Id. It does not, however, affect the elements of a discrimination
claim or the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); Harris v. Off. of the Chief
Page 11 of 17

Judge of the Circuit Ct. of Cook Cnty., No. 16-1783, 2016 WL 7228703 *2 (7th Cir.
Dec. 13, 2016).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Madlock bears the burden
to produce evidence sufficient to support a favorable jury finding that: “(1)
[s]he is a member of a protected class, (2) [s]he was meeting [WEC’s]
legitimate expectations, (3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action, and
(4) similarly situated employees who were not members of [her] protected
class were treated more favorably.” Harris, 2016 WL 7228703 at *2. If she
establishes those elements, WEC must then articulate legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reasons for the allegedly discriminatory action. Chaib v.
Indiana, 744 F.3d 974, 982 (7th Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds, Ortiz, 834
F.3d at 764-65. Finally, the burden shifts back to Madlock to show that the
reasons WEC offered were mere pretext for its discriminatory motives. Id.
On the discrimination issue, Madlock’s brief is compilation of facts
and argument with little structural relation to the McDonnell Douglas
framework, making it difficult to discern her specific position with respect to
each element. See (Docket #39 at 2-13). Nevertheless, even gleaning what it
can from her brief, the Court finds that Madlock fails to establish the fourth
element of her initial burden. This is true even assuming, without deciding,
that she was meeting WEC’s expectations, and that the disciplinary actions
and transfer to Volume billing were adverse employment actions. Madlock
cannot point to any similarly-situated non-African-American employees who
were treated better than her.
First, Madlock has not provided examples of any similarly-situated
employees to which she might be compared. To prevail on this issue, “a
plaintiff must identify a comparator who is ‘directly comparable to her in all
material respects . . . to eliminate other possible explanatory variables.’”
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Williams v. Off. of Chief Judge of Cook Cnty., Ill., 839 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2013)). The
comparator “need not be identical in every conceivable way,” but of
particular note here, “[a]n employee who does not have a similar disciplinary
history and performance record as the plaintiff is not similarly situated.”
Harris, 2016 WL 7228703 at *3 (quotations omitted). A proper comparison
“normally entails a showing that the two employees dealt with the same
supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar
conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would
distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them.” Radue v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617-18 (7th Cir. 2000). Madlock concedes
that her supervisors were unaware of any other employee making repeated
mistakes like she did, and that no other employee’s mistakes were as costly
as hers. More importantly, her general averment that all billers made
mistakes, without providing specific examples commensurate with her own
extensive error- and discipline-ridden history, does not create a genuine
dispute of fact.
Second, WEC points to one potential comparator, Zaren, as an
example showing that Madlock was treated more favorably than a nonAfrican-American employee. While under Wrycza’s supervision, Zaren
committed billing errors and had an issue with unprofessional behavior, and
was disciplined in each instance. Unlike Madlock, the discipline visited on
him was not reduced or rescinded. Though Zaren was later promoted to a
human resources position, none of Madlock’s supervisors were involved in
that decision. Madlock’s discrimination claim fails, then, for want of any
similarly-situated, non-African-American employees who were treated more

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favorably than her. Williams, 839 F.3d at 627 (failure to identify similarlysituated employee “is fatal to her discrimination theory”).
4.2

Retaliation

To succeed on a retaliation claim “based on events occurring in the
workplace, an employee must show that she suffered a materially adverse
action because she engaged in protected activity.” Shott v. Katz, 829 F.3d 494,
497 (7th Cir. 2016). Madlock asserts two instances of adverse action: 1) the
written warning she received in May 2013, and 2) her non-selection for the
claims analyst position. Taking the second action first, Madlock cannot show
causality, since Muñoz was unaware of Madlock’s discrimination complaint
until after the claims analyst position was filled. Luckie v. Ameritech Corp., 389
F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The key inquiry in determining whether there
is a causal connection . . . is whether Patterson was aware of the allegations
of discrimination at the time of her decisions[.] . . . [A]bsent such knowledge,
there can be no causal link between the two. . . . It is not sufficient that
Patterson could or even should have known about Luckie’s complaints; she
must have had actual knowledge of the complaints for her decisions to be
retaliatory.”) (citation omitted). Thus, WEC’s failure to promote Madlock
cannot form a basis for retaliation.
As to the first action, Madlock never suffered any materially adverse
consequences. The emphasis here is materiality, as “[f]ederal law protects an
employee only from retaliation that produces an injury, and, therefore, an
employer’s retaliatory conduct is actionable only if it would be materially
adverse to a reasonable employee.” Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 790 (7th
Cir. 2009). The injury that results from the alleged retaliation must be severe
enough that “it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making
or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Boss, 816 F.3d at 918. Madlock
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must show that she “suffer[ed] something ‘more disruptive than a mere
inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.’” Id. at 918-19 (quoting
Hobbs v. City of Chicago, 573 F.3d 454, 463-64 (7th Cir. 2009).
Madlock does not contend that she was fired, demoted, or had her pay
reduced as a result of the May 2013 written warning. Her only claim that the
action was adverse is that it could lead to possible termination. The theoretical
possibility that a current action may lead to materially adverse action in the
future does not make the current action itself materially adverse. See Poullard
v. McDonald, 829 F.3d 844, 855-57 (7th Cir. 2016) (unfulfilled threats of future
discipline, without more, are not materially adverse); Brown v. Advocate S.
Surburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1106-09 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting retaliation
claim where the plaintiffs were not fired or denied pay, and where a negative
personnel review did not result in actual consequences); Nagle v. Village of
Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 2009) (similar to Poullard and
collecting cases). It is important to note the temporal constraints on this issue.
Though Madlock asserts various other potentially adverse actions, including
being placed in a workspace between two managers and being provided no
group to lead, those actions took place in March 2013, well before she made
her discrimination complaint.
Finally, the Court notes that Madlock has raised an issue of “false
peppering” of her personnel file with Tiller and Phillips’ compilation of her
disciplinary history, which she claims was inaccurate. First, her allegations
of inaccuracy fail to create a genuine dispute as to whether creation or
dissemination of the list was a materially adverse action. While Madlock
contends that there were some inaccurate entries on the list, she did not
testify that all or even the majority of the entries were imaginary. In fact, her
testimony on the point primarily relates to whether or not a particular
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instance qualified as a “coaching,” not whether the discipline incident
occurred at all. The Court cannot agree that the simple act of creating and
distributing the list, even when it may have included some inaccuracies,
would discourage a reasonable employee from asserting a charge of
discrimination. See Cole v. Illinois, 562 F.3d 812, 816-17 (7th Cir. 2009)
(imposition of employee improvement plan and receiving other work
criticisms was not a materially adverse action). Second, the “false peppering”
issue appears to relate in large measure to Madlock’s failure to obtain the
claims analyst position, which the Court has already rejected as temporally
improper.8
5.

CONCLUSION
Madlock has failed to marshal evidence sufficient to create triable

issues of fact on her claims. Thus, the Court must grant WEC’s motion for
summary judgment and dismiss this action. WEC’s motion to seal various
summary judgment filings—to avoid disclosure of confidential customer
information—will also be granted. (Docket #20).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
(Docket #21) be and the same is hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to seal
(Docket #20) be and the same is hereby GRANTED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same is hereby
DISMISSED with prejudice.
8

The parties’ briefs imply that the “false peppering” issue is not merely
based on the compiled list, but is in fact a challenge to Madlock’s actual history of
discipline. If true, the argument must also be rejected as lacking causality; it was
impossible for Wrycza to “pre-pepper” Madlock’s personnel file with instances of
discipline in retaliation for a non-existent discrimination complaint.

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The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 13th day of January, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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