Liddell v. State of Wisconsin et al
Filing
52
ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 6/27/2017: GRANTING 39 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; DENYING 44 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Motion to Appoint Counsel; DENYING 47 Plaintiff's Motion to Amend His Complaint; and DENYING 50 Plaintiff's Motion to Petition the Court to Appeal. Action DISMISSED without prejudice. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Anthony Liddell, Jr.) (jm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
ANTHONY LIDDELL, JR.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16-CV-472-JPS
v.
CHRIS GARCIA, BRIAN GENIKE, and
ANTHONY LACOMBE,
ORDER
Defendants.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Anthony Liddell, Jr. (“Liddell”), formerly an inmate
incarcerated at the Racine County Jail (“RCJ”), brought this action against
Officer Chris Garcia (“Garcia”), Officer Brian Genike (“Genike”), and
Sergeant Anthony LaCombe (“LaCombe”), alleging that the defendants
imposed conditions during his confinement at RCJ that violated his civil
rights.1 Specifically, Liddell alleges that he was housed in a cell with
cracked masonry bricks and, as a result, the temperature in his cell dipped
to 20 or 30 degrees and he suffered numbness and pain from the cold.
Liddell claims he advised the defendants of these conditions, and that
Genike conceded the jail’s cells were in disrepair, but that nothing was done
to abate the issue.
Liddell also named as defendants the State of Wisconsin, the Maintenance
Department and the Nurse Department, but those parties were dismissed upon
the Court’s screening of Liddell’s complaint. (Docket #12).
1
On May 1, 2017, the defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. (Docket #39). Liddell was required to respond to the defendants’
motion within twenty-one days, and he did not. See (Docket #34).2 The
motion will be addressed in its unopposed form and, for the reasons
explained below, it will be granted and this action will be dismissed
without prejudice.
2.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the court “shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th
Cir. 2016). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit”
Liddell did file three motions of his own after the defendants moved for
summary judgment, but none of Liddell’s filings actually respond to the
defendants’ motion or proposed findings of fact.
First, on May 12, 2017, Liddell moved for reconsideration of the Court’s
decision not to appoint him counsel. (Docket #44). Though Liddell attests that he
has tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain counsel on his own, that is not enough to entitle
him to Court-appointed counsel. Liddell must also show that the difficulty of the
case, factually and legally, exceeds his capacity to coherently present it. Navejar v.
Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). This case dos not raise complex claims, and
Liddell has proffered no reason that he is incapable of litigating this case on his
own. As such, the Court concludes recruitment of counsel is not justified, and
Liddell’s motion will be denied.
Next, Liddell filed a motion to amend his complaint on June 1, 2017.
(Docket #47). It appears Liddell wants to add two other inmates to the action,
though he does not specify whether they would be plaintiffs or defendants. Id.
Regardless, Liddell’s motion to amend must be denied, as it was filed far outside
the October 25, 2017, deadline for amendment imposed by the Court’s Trial
Scheduling Order and does not offer good cause for the delay. (Docket #13); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
Finally, Liddell filed a motion on June 12, 2017, to “petition the Courts to
Appeal.” (Docket #50). Liddell does not indicate which order he seeks to appeal,
and, regardless, there is no order in this case which is currently appealable. His
motion will therefore be denied.
2
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under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). A dispute of fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The
court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-movant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 815 F.3d
356, 360 (7th Cir. 2016). The court must not weigh the evidence presented
or determine credibility of witnesses; the Seventh Circuit instructs that “we
leave those tasks to factfinders.” Berry v. Chicago Transit Auth., 618 F.3d 688,
691 (7th Cir. 2010). The party opposing summary judgment “need not
match the movant witness for witness, nor persuade the court that [his] case
is convincing, [he] need only come forward with appropriate evidence
demonstrating that there is a pending dispute of material fact.” Waldridge
v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1994).
3.
RELEVANT FACTS
Because Liddell failed to respond to the defendants’ statement of
facts, the Court will consider them undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The
relevant facts are as follows. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Liddell
was an inmate at RCJ. (Docket #40 ¶ 1). The defendants were, presumably,
employees of RCJ—Garcia and Genike correctional officers and LaCombe
a sergeant—though the defendants’ filings in support of their motion do
not expressly indicate as much.
The RCJ Inmate Handbook (“Handbook”) prescribes the procedure
an inmate must follow to bring complaints to the jail’s attention. Id. ¶ 2. The
Handbook provides that when an inmate has a basis for a complaint, and
informal resolution is not possible, the inmate is to submit an Inmate
Request form detailing his complaint to jail supervisory staff. Id. A response
or resolution is provided for each legitimate complaint. Id. ¶ 5. An inmate
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may appeal a grievance response by submitting a written appeal to the Jail
Administrator within fifteen days using the same Inmate Request form. Id.
¶ 6.
Liddell filed numerous inmate requests and complaints during his
incarceration at RCJ from October 2015 to May 2016. Id. ¶ 8. Many relate to
his medical needs, and others relate to requests for supplies or for copies of
his trust account statement. See (Docket #42-9). For example, on April 4,
2016, Liddell filed an inmate complaint referencing various medical needs,
including numbness in his fingers due to nerve damage from arthritis.
(Docket #40 ¶ 12). On April 8, 2016, Liddell filed an inmate complaint again
referencing his arthritis and indicating that the “rain/snow/20-30 degree”
temperatures of that season were not good for his “old…bones.” Id. ¶ 13;
(Docket #42-9 at 38). In neither of these grievances—or any of Liddell’s
grievances—did Liddell mention deficiencies in the condition of his cell.
(Docket #40 ¶ 11-13). Although Liddell claims he directed relevant inmate
grievances regarding his cell conditions to the “maintenance department,”
the defendants deny the same and Liddell did not produce those grievances
in discovery. Id. ¶ 14-15. He also lost his best opportunity to bring those to
the Court’s attention—filing a response to the defendants’ motion. Liddell
did not appeal any of the grievances he submitted at RCJ. Id. ¶ 16.
4.
ANALYSIS
The defendants move for summary judgment on two grounds. First,
they argue that Liddell failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before
filing suit. (Docket #41 at 5-7). Second, they argue that Liddell is not entitled
to relief on his claim related to the conditions of his confinement because he
did not suffer a sufficiently serious injury and, further, the defendants did
not know of and disregard an injury-causing risk. Id. at 7-9. The Court must
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address the question of exhaustion first, because “[a] suit filed by a prisoner
before administrative remedies have been exhausted must be dismissed;
the district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on the merits[.]” Perez
v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999).
4.1
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) establishes that, prior to
filing a lawsuit complaining about prison conditions, a prisoner must
exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available[.]” 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a). To do so, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the
place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require,” and he
must do so precisely in accordance with those rules; substantial compliance
does not satisfy the PLRA. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.
2002); Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 2001). Failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be proven by the
defendants. Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 2005).
As described above, the RCJ Handbook sets out the procedure
inmates must follow to lodge complaints about jail conditions at that
facility. The procedure, in total, is as follows:
Grievances/Complaints: During your confinement you may
feel you have a basis for a grievance or complaint. When this
is the case, whenever possible, you are encouraged to resolve
the complaint informally with a Correctional Staff member.
When an informal resolution is not possible, a written
grievance/complaint can be submitted to jail supervisory staff
then reviewed by the jail captain. Use the Inmate Request
form for all grievance/complaint issues. The legitimacy of
each complaint will be determined and a response/resolution
will be provided. Keep in mind that the grievance/complaint
procedure is a means for the inmate to seek a resolution for
legitimate factual concerns. Grievance appeals must be done
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in writing within 15 days to the jail captain using the inmate
request form.
(Docket #42-8 at 9).
Liddell failed to follow this process for his allegation that cracks in
the masonry bricks of his cell allowed in frigid air that caused him
numbness and pain. Though he filed many grievances using the Inmate
Request form described in the Handbook’s “Grievances/Complaints”
section, none referenced the alleged cracks in the cell wall that let in cold
air. (Docket #40 ¶¶ 7, 11). Admittedly, Liddell’s April 8, 2016, complaint
does reference cold temperatures, but does not mention any deficiency in
the condition of his cell that would cause unusually cold temperatures. Id.
¶ 13; (Docket #42-9 at 38). In other words, if Liddell intended his April 8
complaint to put RCJ on notice that the condition of his cell was causing
him injury, he did not succeed in doing so. This is the very purpose of the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 450 (7th
Cir. 2001) (“The exhaustion requirement provides the prison system with
prompt notice of problems. This, of course, is preferable to a system where
the prison might get its first notice of a claim in a lawsuit…. Requiring
prompt notice and exhaustion also gives prison officials an opportunity to
address a situation internally[.]”). And, even if Liddell had properly
complained of cell conditions in his April 8 grievance, or any other
grievance, he did not appeal the same as is required by RCJ’s grievance
policy. (Docket #40 ¶ 16).
Liddell failed to complete each step in the administrative grievance
process for his claim against the defendants. The PLRA requires complete
or “proper” exhaustion in the manner established by prison rules, Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006), and Liddell has not done so. His claim must
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be dismissed without prejudice. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th
Cir. 2004) (dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under
Section 1997e(a) is always without prejudice).
5.
CONCLUSION
Liddell failed to oppose the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. For this reason alone, the Court could grant the motion and
dismiss Liddell’s case. See Civil L. R. 41(c). Moreover, on the undisputed
facts before the Court, the defendants have proven that Liddell did not
exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. This action will,
therefore, be dismissed without prejudice.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Docket #39) be and the same is hereby GRANTED;
IT
IS
FURTHER
ORDERED
that
plaintiff’s
motions
for
reconsideration of motion to appoint counsel (Docket #44), to amend his
complaint (Docket #47), and to petition the Court to appeal (Docket #50) be
and the same are hereby DENIED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same is
hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 27th day of June, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge
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