Winston v. Hannah et al

Filing 142

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 10/17/2017: DENYING as moot 52 Defendant Erin Quandt's First Motion for Summary Judgment; GRANTING 101 Defendant Erin Quandt's Second Motion for Summary Judgment; GRANTING 120 Defendant O fficer Mario Dantzler's Motion for Summary Judgment; DENYING as moot 85 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; DENYING as moot 136 Plaintiff's Motion to Strike; and DISMISSING action with prejudice. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Michael L. Winston at Columbia Correctional Institution) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MICHAEL L. WINSTON,
Plaintiff,

v.

ERIN QUANDT and OFFICER
MARIO DANTZLER,

Case No. 16-CV-1420-JPS

ORDER

Defendants.
1.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff proceeds against Defendants in this action on a single

claim—deliberate indifference to his risk of suicide, in violation of his rights
under the Eighth Amendment. (Docket #9 at 5; Docket #20 at 1; Docket #26).
All parties have filed motions for summary judgment. Defendant Erin
Quandt (“Quandt”) filed her first motion on June 22, 2017 on procedural
grounds, namely Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies,
which is a prerequisite to this lawsuit. (Docket #52). On August 9, 2017, she
filed a second motion directed at the substance of Plaintiff’s claim. (Docket
#101). Defendant Mario Dantzler (“Dantzler”) also filed a substantive
motion on September 1, 2017. (Docket #120).1 Plaintiff submitted his own
motion on July 10, 2017, seeking judgment against both Defendants.
(Docket #85). For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ substantive
motions must be granted, and this action must therefore be dismissed.

1

Plaintiff had previously identified Dantzler only as “Officer Danzler.”

2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the court “shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th
Cir. 2016). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit”
under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). A dispute of fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The
court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-movant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 815 F.3d
356, 360 (7th Cir. 2016).
3.

ANALYSIS
The Court will address each party’s motions in separate sections. For

clarity, the Court will also discuss the facts relevant to each motion within
the appropriate section. All facts are drawn from the applicable factual
briefing unless otherwise noted.
3.1

Quandt’s Motions

The Court has considered Quandt’s first motion on exhaustion of
administrative remedies and, standing alone, would grant that motion. If
the Court did so, it would be required to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against
Quandt without prejudice. Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004).
As discussed below, Quandt’s second, substantive motion must also be
granted. This would warrant dismissal with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit
holds that in this scenario, with the parties having a full opportunity to
conduct discovery and litigate the claims presented, it is a far more efficient
use of judicial and party resources to address the substantive summary
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judgment motion and dismiss the claim with prejudice. See Fluker v. County
of Kankakee, 741 F.3d 787, 793-94 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court will do so here,
addressing the merits of Quandt’s second motion and denying the first
motion as moot.
3.1.1

Plaintiff’s Failure to Dispute the Material Facts

The facts relevant to Quandt’s second motion are undisputed
because Plaintiff failed to dispute them. In the Court’s scheduling order,
entered February 13, 2017, Plaintiff was warned about the requirements for
opposing a motion for summary judgment. (Docket #13 at 3).
Accompanying that order were copies of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56 and Civil Local Rule 56, both of which describe in detail the form and
contents of a proper summary judgment submission. In Quandt’s motion
for summary judgment, she too warned Plaintiff about the requirements for
his response as set forth in Federal and Local Rules 56. (Docket #101). He
was provided with additional copies of those Rules along with the motion.
(Docket #101-1). In connection with her motion, Quandt filed a supporting
statement of material facts that complied with the applicable procedural
rules. (Docket #103). It contained short, numbered paragraphs concisely
stating those facts which Quandt proposed to be beyond dispute, with
supporting citations to the attached evidentiary materials. See id.
In response, Plaintiff submitted a two-page brief on September 7,
2017. (Docket #127). The brief states that it is intended as his “reply to
defendants Quandt motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 101-103).” Id. at
127. Plaintiff further states that he “hereby stands by his own motion for
summary judgment (Dkt. 85-87). He believes that he can argue the facts or
legal conclusions no further. Plaintiff believes that his reply brief in support
of his own motion for summary judgment is sufficient as a response to
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either defendants motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 1-2. The brief
makes no attempt to actually respond to Quandt’s statements of fact. See
generally id.
Plaintiff’s belief is incorrect. In addressing Quandt’s motion, Plaintiff
was obligated to submit a response to her statement of facts in accordance
with the procedural rules which were provided to him more than once.
Instead, Plaintiff ignored those rules by failing to properly dispute
Quandt’s proffered facts with citations to relevant, admissible evidence.
Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003). This failing is particularly
egregious in light of Plaintiff’s demonstrated ability to submit an
appropriate response to a statement of facts. See (Docket #71, #74, #83, #125,
and #135). Though the Court is required to liberally construe a pro se
plaintiff’s filings, it cannot act as his lawyer, and it cannot delve through
the record to find favorable evidence for him. Thus, the Court will, unless
otherwise stated, deem Quandt’s facts undisputed for purposes of deciding
her second motion for summary judgment.2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Civ. L.
R. 56(b)(4); Hill v. Thalacker, 210 F. App’x 513, 515 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that
district courts have discretion to enforce procedural rules against pro se
litigants).

To find that Plaintiff has adequately disputed the facts Quandt presents
with her second motion, the Court would first need to determine which facts he
would likely want or need to dispute. Next, the Court would have to search
though all of the evidence, including all parties’ factual submissions throughout
the case, to find appropriate bases to dispute those facts. This is clearly untenable
and goes far beyond the Court’s duty to liberally construe pro se filings. To do so
would be to abandon the Court’s role as a neutral arbiter of the parties’ disputes,
to instead become Plaintiff’s advocate.
2

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3.1.2

Relevant Facts

At all times relevant, Plaintiff’s primary place of incarceration has
been Columbia Correctional Institution. On April 21, 2016, Plaintiff was
transferred to the Milwaukee County Jail (the “Jail”) so that he could appear
in state court for proceedings in a criminal case. During that time, Quandt
was employed as a “Psych Social Worker” (“PSW”) in the Jail. Prior to
working at the Jail, Quandt obtained a master’s degree in social work and
certification as an advanced practice social worker. While at the Jail, Quandt
received job training in the form of department meetings and shadowing
more experienced PSWs. Quandt’s duties as a PSW included addressing
suicide crisis calls, wherein she would assess the distressed inmate and
determine how best to handle their mental health issues. During her time
at the Jail, Quandt would often handle three of these suicide crisis calls per
day.
On April 22, 2016, Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch. The next
day, Quandt was called to Plaintiff’s cell to handle an active suicide
attempt. She had no previous interactions with Plaintiff. When she arrived
at his cell, Quandt learned that Plaintiff had taken a string from his mattress
and wrapped it around his neck. He was not actually suspended from the
string at that point, but instead merely standing on his tip toes.
Plaintiff told Quandt that if he was not taken to the special needs
unit of the Jail, he would bang his head on the cell’s sink. Quandt explained
that the protocol for addressing that threat was to tie him to his bed using
arm and leg restraints (known as “RIPP” restraints). Quandt was not
actually authorized to order that an inmate be placed in RIPP restraints, but
could recommend that based on her review of the situation. Her

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recommendation would be based on balancing the need to keep the inmate
safe with the desire to impinge as little as possible on their civil liberties.
In her professional judgment, Plaintiff’s situation did not warrant
RIPP restraints. She noted that Plaintiff had not, and did not, actually bang
his head on the sink at any time. Further, Quandt knew that RIPP restraints
may have caused more harm than good with respect to Plaintiff’s mental
health. Indeed, at the time of her evaluation, Quandt felt that RIPP restraints
would have been unethical, given that Plaintiff was not actively attempting
to harm himself. Finally, she believed that the restraints would have been
an unwarranted infringement on Plaintiff’s civil liberties. Quandt’s decision
was also influenced by information provided by security staff. They
informed Quandt that Plaintiff’s mattress would be replaced with a special
suicide watch mattress, which would limit Plaintiff’s ability to use the
mattress for self-harming activities. When Quandt left Plaintiff’s cell, he no
longer had anything in his possession by which he could readily continue
his suicide attempts. After she left, Quandt had no further interaction with
Plaintiff or any involvement in his care.
Before Quandt left, security staff noted that Plaintiff was to remain
on suicide watch, rather than be transferred to the special needs unit.
Quandt herself had no authority to grant Plaintiff’s request for a transfer to
the special needs unit. Further, she believed the officers’ decision posed no
additional threat to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Quandt concluded that a
transfer to the special needs unit would not actually aid Plaintiff’s mental
health treatment. Instead, she determined that Plaintiff was attempting to
manipulate the system in an effort to move to that unit. Plaintiff’s “suicide
attempts,” namely threatening to bang his head, and tying a thin string
around his neck while standing on the floor, rang hollow to Quandt. The
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special needs unit, as its name implies, houses particularly vulnerable or
mentally disturbed inmates. In Quandt’s experience, when someone like
Plaintiff takes extreme measures to force a move to the unit, transferring
that inmate to the unit can jeopardize the safety of the other special needs
inmates.
3.1.3

Plaintiff

No Reasonable Jury Could Conclude that Quandt
was Deliberately Indifferent to Plaintiff’s Risk of
Suicide

claims

that

Quandt’s

actions

reflected

deliberate

indifference to his risk of suicide, in violation of his rights under the Eighth
Amendment. To show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must prove that
“(1) [he] had an objectively serious medical condition; (2) the defendants
knew of the condition and were deliberately indifferent to treating [him];
and (3) this indifference caused [him] some injury.” Gayton v. McCoy, 593
F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). With respect to self-harming or suicidal
behavior, the Court of Appeals holds that suicide satisfies the “serious
medical condition” element. Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison,
Ill., 746 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2014). The Collins court provides further
relevant instruction:
Where the harm at issue is a suicide or attempted
suicide, the second, subjective component of an Eighth
Amendment claim requires a dual showing that the
defendant: (1) subjectively knew the prisoner was at
substantial risk of committing suicide and (2) intentionally
disregarded the risk. [Matos ex. rel. Matos v. O’Sullivan, 335
F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003)]; see also Estate of Novack ex rel.
Turbin v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000)
(defendant must be aware of the significant likelihood that an
inmate may imminently seek to take his own life and must fail
to take reasonable steps to prevent the inmate from
performing the act).

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With respect to the first showing, “it is not enough that
there was a danger of which a prison official should have been
aware,” rather, “the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Estate of Novack, 226 F.3d at 529 (emphasis added). In other
words, the defendant must be cognizant of the significant
likelihood that an inmate may imminently seek to take his
own life. Id.; [Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 737 (7th Cir.
2001)] (issue is whether the defendant was subjectively
“aware of the substantial risk that [the deceased prisoner]
might take his own life”). Liability cannot attach where “the
defendants simply were not alerted to the likelihood that [the
prisoner] was a genuine suicide risk.” Boncher ex rel. Boncher
v. Brown County, 272 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 2001).
...
[As to the second showing], [d]eliberate indifference
requires a showing of “more than mere or gross negligence,
but less than the purposeful or knowing infliction of harm.”
Matos, 335 F.3d at 557; Estate of Novack, 226 F.3d at 529. We
have characterized the required showing as “something
approaching a total unconcern for [the prisoner’s] welfare in
the face of serious risks.” Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th
Cir. 1992). To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must
present evidence that an individual defendant intentionally
disregarded the known risk to inmate health or safety. Matos,
335 F.3d at 557. A defendant with knowledge of a risk need
not “take perfect action or even reasonable action[,] ... his
action must be reckless before § 1983 liability can be found.”
Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2003).
...
[In sum,] [t]he deliberate indifference standard
imposes a “high hurdle” for a plaintiff to overcome.
Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 761-62 (7th Cir. 2006).
In light of these holdings, Quandt is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. First, there is no evidence
that she was subjectively aware of a serious risk of Plaintiff committing
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suicide. Rather, based on her professional judgment, she believed his risk
was low. His alleged suicide attempts were, relatively speaking, not overly
serious. In fact, Quandt thought that Plaintiff’s real goal was to manipulate
his way into the special needs unit, where he would assumedly get better
treatment than in his current housing assignment.
Second, her response to Plaintiff’s suicide risk fell far short of “a total
unconcern for [his] welfare.” Duane, 959 F.2d at 677. Quandt carefully
weighed the benefits and burdens of RIPP restraints and decided against
recommending them. Further, Plaintiff was to remain on suicide watch and
his potentially harmful mattress was replaced with a safer one. When she
left Plaintiff, Quandt had no reason to believe that his risk of suicide
remained serious.
As noted above, Plaintiff cannot rely on his briefing for the other
summary judgment motions to dispute the facts material to this motion.
The Court will, nevertheless, consider the relevant legal arguments
presented in his reply in support of his own motion, as he requested.
Plaintiff maintains that Quandt’s conduct was “unreasonable” because: 1)
he had a history of “self-destructive tendencies;” 2) replacing the mattress
did not address the “head banging” issue; 3) Jail policy allegedly dictates
that Plaintiff should have been transferred to the special needs unit; and 4)
there was available space in the special needs unit for him. (Docket #124 at
3-4).
None of these contentions has merit. First, Plaintiff has not shown
that Quandt was aware of his “tendencies” or that these would have
affected her professional judgment. Second, Quandt could have completely
eliminated the “head banging” concern with RIPP restraints, but applied
her professional judgment in balancing the true need for the restraints
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against Plaintiff’s overall mental health and his civil liberties. Third,
adherence or non-adherence to an institution’s policies does not establish a
violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights. Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549,
553 n.5 (7th Cir. 1997). Fourth, the space available in the special needs unit
was irrelevant; Quandt’s decision not to recommend a transfer was not
based on whether space was available.
Plaintiff’s other primary argument is that in response to another
suicide crisis which occurred later on April 23, 2016, a different PSW
recommended RIPP restrains and Plaintiff’s transfer to the special needs
unit. (Docket #124 at 6-7). In his view, this demonstrates that Quandt’s
medical judgment departed from accepted professional standards. Id. The
Seventh Circuit holds, however, that “a difference of opinion among
physicians on how an inmate should be treated cannot support a finding of
deliberate indifference.” Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff does not contest that Quandt’s interaction was limited to the first
suicide crisis that day. The other PSW was presented with a different
scenario, including knowledge that Plaintiff had a previous suicidal
incident earlier in the day, and applied his judgment accordingly. A mere
difference of opinion between two professionals on Plaintiff’s treatment, at
different times and under different circumstances, does not show that
Quandt’s actions were “so far afield of accepted professional standards as
to raise the inference that [they] was not actually based on a medical
judgment.” Id.
The undisputed facts are such that no reasonable jury could find
Quandt to have been deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s suicide risk in her
single interaction with him on April 23, 2016. Namely, Quandt has shown
that she exercised her professional judgment in determining what care
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Plaintiff should be provided, and Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are
unavailing. Quandt’s second motion for summary judgment must be
granted.
4.2

Dantzler’s Motion

On September 1, 2017, Dantzler filed his one and only motion for
summary judgment, addressing the substance of Plaintiff’s claim against
him. As quoted above, Plaintiff’s September 7, 2017 filing states that it is
intended to serve as a response to both Defendants’ summary judgment
motions. (Docket #127 at 2). In light of that representation, Dantzler filed a
reply in support of his motion on September 21, 2017, claiming that Plaintiff
had failed to dispute his statements of fact. (Docket #133).
However, on September 28, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a response to
Dantzler’s statement of facts, unaccompanied by a legal brief. (Docket
#135). This submission was within the thirty-day period for responses to
summary judgment as provided in this District’s Local Rules. See Civil L. R.
56(b)(2). Defendant suggests that the Court should not take the factual
response into account, (Docket #138 at 5), and considering Plaintiff’s
representation in his September 7 filing, this might be the proper thing to
do. The Court will, nevertheless, generously consider the factual response;
Plaintiff’s disputes of fact are not sufficient to avoid summary judgment.
As before, the Court will look to Plaintiff’s reply in support of his own
summary judgment motion for applicable legal argument. See supra pg. 34, 9.
4.1.2

Relevant Facts

Dantzler worked as a correctional officer during Plaintiff’s April
2016 spell at the Jail. At no time was he involved in determining Plaintiff’s
housing assignments or classification status. On April 22, 2016, Plaintiff was
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placed on suicide observation status by a PSW (not Quandt). Plaintiff was
sent to Pod 4D, an area for inmates with mental health issues or who were
on suicide observation status. The pod also houses inmates who have had
disciplinary problems. The disciplinary status inmates are allowed an hour
of recreation time per day, but the suicide observation inmates are not (to
avoid opportunities for self-harm).
Dantzler worked the first shift in Pod 4D on April 23, 2016. The
officer’s station has floor-to-ceiling windows which separate it from the pod
itself. Dantzler states that these are one-way windows, but Plaintiff
contends that he can see an officer’s face while they are in the station. From
the officer’s station, Dantzler had a partially obstructed view of Plaintiff’s
cell. Dantzler says that during the shift, he did not see any other inmates
passing contraband or other dangerous items to Plaintiff during his shift.
Dantzler further avers that he never knowingly allowed any inmate to
provide anything to Plaintiff. Plaintiff counters with a sworn statement that
Dantzler saw another inmate pass him a bed sheet,3 and that Dantzler
mockingly told Plaintiff to kill himself.
Dantzler and the other Pod 4D officers performed suicide checks
every fifteen to twenty minutes throughout their shift to minimize the
inmates’ ability to attempt suicide. During one such check, Plaintiff was
found attempting to hang himself with a string tied to the cell’s ceiling.
Plaintiff was never actually free-hanging from the string at any time; at

Plaintiff’s dispute on this point is oddly couched. In one paragraph of his
affidavit, Plaintiff affirmatively states that Dantzler saw another inmate pass the
bed sheet. (Docket #87 ¶ 6). Later, he says that “[i]t would have been impossible”
for Dantzler to miss the transaction because it happened directly in front of the
officer’s station. Id. ¶ 10. The second statement casts doubt on the veracity of the
first, but the Court need not grapple with the issue to grant summary judgment.
3

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most, he was standing on his tip toes. Dantzler did not know that Plaintiff
had a string and never observed one during his many earlier suicide checks.
Later in the day, after Dantzler’s shift ended, Plaintiff attempted to hang
himself with a bed sheet. As noted above, Plaintiff claims that he obtained
the bedsheet during Dantzler’s shift. Dantzler reiterates that he had not
observed Plaintiff with a bed sheet during his shift, and did not see any
other inmates give Plaintiff a bed sheet. Plaintiff does not dispute that he
did not tell Dantzler that he possessed the bed sheet or that he intended to
use it to attempt suicide.
3.1.3

No Reasonable Jury Could Conclude that Dantzler
was Deliberately Indifferent to Plaintiff’s Risk of
Suicide

Plaintiff asserts the same type of deliberate indifference claim—
indifference to a risk of suicide—against Dantzler, as he did to Quandt. The
overarching cause of action, as defined by Collins, remains the same. Collins,
462 F.3d at 761-62. On the facts presented, Plaintiff cannot maintain his
claim against Dantzler. As the parties have done, the Court will address the
two suicide attempts separately. As to the string hanging incident during
Dantzler’s shift, Plaintiff does not dispute that Dantzler performed regular
suicide checks on Plaintiff and never knew that Plaintiff had the string.
These facts show that far from being indifferent to Plaintiff’s risk of suicide,
Dantzler was doing all he could to actively abate the risk.
Plaintiff’s theory on the bed sheet incident appears to be as follows.
Dantzler allowed an inmate to pass a bed sheet to Plaintiff, and mockingly
told him to kill himself. These actions were deliberately indifferent to his
risk of suicide, which did not manifest itself immediately, but instead
culminated later that day. This theory does evince deliberate indifference.

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The first deliberate indifference prong requires evidence that Dantzler
knew—rather than merely should have known—of a significant likelihood
that Plaintiff might imminently seek to commit suicide. Estate of Novack ex
rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000); Matos ex rel.
Matos v. O’Sullivan, 335 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff has offered no
evidence that Dantzler knew of a significant likelihood that Plaintiff would
imminently use the bed sheet in a suicide attempt. Rather, Plaintiff admits
that he never told Dantzler that he intended to use the bed sheet to hurt
himself. See Pittmann ex rel. Hamilton, 746 F.3d at 776–78 (even an inmate’s
affirmative request for mental health attention “does not, standing alone,
put a prison officer on notice of the imminent possibility of suicide.”).
At best, the bed sheet presented an unspecified risk of potential
future harm. This is not the serious and imminent risk of suicide
contemplated by Collins and Estate of Novack. Dantzler’s allowing Plaintiff
to keep the bed sheet does not demonstrate a total unconcern for Plaintiff’s
welfare, particularly in combination with his regular suicide checks. Duane,
959 F.2d at 677. Viewing the facts in Plaintiff’s favor, Dantzler’s conduct
may have been negligent, but negligence cannot support a deliberate
indifference claim. Likewise, as to Dantzler’s comment (which was
certainly inappropriate if it was in fact made), it too was merely negligent
and fails to show Dantzler’s actual knowledge of an imminent risk of harm.
Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. First, he states
that Dantzler lied to medical staff about him being suspended from the
string during his first suicide attempt. Plaintiff alleges that Dantzler told
staff that he was not suspended, when in fact “plaintiff was suspended to
the point where only the tips of his toes touch the ground.” (Docket #124 at
8) (quotation omitted). This is a semantic distinction without a difference.
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Whether on his toes or the soles of his feet, Plaintiff was not free-hanging
from the string at any point. In any event, the key facts for the string
hanging incident are Dantzler’s lack of knowledge of the string and his
regular suicide checks, neither of which Plaintiff disputes. Second, Plaintiff
accuses Dantzler of violating Jail policy by failing to write a report on the
incidents. Id. As discussed above, institutional policies, particularly
procedural ones such as this, do not define constitutional rights. Lewis, 107
F.3d at 553 n.5. Dantzler’s motion for summary judgment must be granted.
4.3

Plaintiff’s Motion

Because Defendants’ motions have been granted, Plaintiff’s is
rendered moot. It will therefore be denied as such.
5.

CONCLUSION
On the undisputed facts presented, both defendants are entitled to

summary judgment. This action must, therefore, be dismissed with
prejudice. The Court will deny as moot Plaintiff’s pending motion to strike.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Erin Quandt’s first motion for
summary judgment (Docket #52) be and the same is hereby DENIED as
moot;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Erin Quandt’s second
motion for summary judgment (Docket #101) be and the same is hereby
GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Officer Mario
Dantzler’s motion for summary judgment (Docket #120) be and the same is
hereby GRANTED;

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment (Docket #85) and motion to strike (Docket #136) be and the same
are hereby DENIED as moot;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same is
hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 17th day of October, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

____________________________
J. P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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