Ali v. Eckstein et al

Filing 52

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 3/13/2018: GRANTING in part and DENYING in part 24 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; DISMISSING with prejudice Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Michael Donovan and Scott Eckstein; and DISMISSING Defendants Michael Donovan and Scott Eckstein from this action. See Order. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Ouati K. Ali at Green Bay Correctional Institution)(jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
OUATI K. ALI,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 16-CV-1518-JPS

SCOTT ECKSTEIN, MICHELLE HAESE,
and MICHAEL DONOVAN,

ORDER

Defendants.
1.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Ouati Ali (“Ali”), a prisoner at Green Bay Correctional

Institution (“GBCI”), brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against defendants Scott Eckstein (“Eckstein”), Michelle Haese (“Haese”),
and Michael Donovan (“Donovan”), employees of GBCI, for a violation of
his First Amendment rights. Specifically, Ali alleges that the defendants
prevented him from fasting properly during Ramadan in 2016.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, and the
motion has been fully briefed. (Docket #24-32, #35-48). For the reasons
stated below, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of the
defendants as to Ali’s claims against Donovan and Eckstein but will deny
their motion as to Ali’s claim against Haese.
2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the court “shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th

Cir. 2016). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit”
under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). A dispute of fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The
court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-movant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 815 F.3d
356, 360 (7th Cir. 2016). The court must not weigh the evidence presented
or determine credibility of witnesses; the Seventh Circuit instructs that “we
leave those tasks to factfinders.” Berry v. Chicago Transit Auth., 618 F.3d 688,
691 (7th Cir. 2010). The party opposing summary judgment “need not
match the movant witness for witness, nor persuade the court that [his] case
is convincing, [he] need only come forward with appropriate evidence
demonstrating that there is a pending dispute of material fact.” Waldridge
v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1994).
3.

RELEVANT FACTS
Ali is an inmate in the custody of the Wisconsin Department of

Corrections (“DOC”). He is an adherent of Islam. At all times relevant to
this lawsuit, Ali was incarcerated at GBCI. Donovan was the chaplain at
GBCI, Haese was the social services director, and Eckstein was the warden.
3.1

GBCI Policy Regarding Religious Dietary Observances

At DOC institutions, including GBCI, religious diets are available to
inmates whose religious beliefs require them to adhere to religious dietary
laws. (Docket #37 at 2). For example, inmates who observe Ramadan, a
Muslim holy month that includes daytime fasting, can sign up to receive
meal bags to consume prior to dawn and after sunset. Id. at 2-4. Inmates can
also sign up to participate in the Eid ul-Fitr meal, a feast celebrated at the
end of Ramadan. Id. at 4-5.
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Each year, the religious practices coordinator for DOC sends a memo
to the institutions with dates for annual religious celebratory meals and
multi-day religious observations. Id. at 5. This includes dates for Ramadan,
which occurs during the ninth month of the Islamic lunar calendar. Id.
Institutions are required to post the information from the memo in the
chapel, and they may also post it in other places, such as the restrictive
housing units or on facility televisions, at the discretion of the warden. Id.
GBCI posts the memo in the chapel, library, and in the restrictive housing
units. Prior to 2016, GBCI broadcasted the information on institution
televisions as well, but it discontinued that practice before the events of this
case took place. Id. at 5-6. Inmates can also request information about
religious observance dates by writing to the chaplain. Id. at 7.
Pursuant to DOC policy, inmates must sign up to participate in
Ramadan at least sixty days in advance to receive the multi-day religious
meal accommodations. Id. at 4. Inmates at GBCI sign up for Ramadan by
submitting a written request to Chaplain Donovan. Id. Donovan’s practice
is to retain inmates’ requests for participation in Ramadan in order to
double check the participant list prior to sending it to the food service
department. Id. at 9. In 2016, Ramadan began on June 6, meaning that
inmates were required to notify Donovan of their intent to participate by
April 7. Id. at 8.
3.2

Ali’s Request to Participate in Ramadan

Ali claims that he sent a request form to Donovan on April 1, 2016
asking that he be placed on the participation list for the Ramadan fast and
that he be sent the additional form necessary to participate in the Eid ul-Fitr
meal. Id. at 8. According to Ali, Donovan returned Ali’s request form to him
on April 4 along with the Eid ul-Fitr sign-up form. Id. Donovan does not
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recall ever receiving Ali’s request or responding to it, but says that if he did
receive it, he must have mistakenly overlooked the portion requesting to be
placed on the Ramadan list. Id. at 8-10. Ali produced a copy of the alleged
April 1 request form in opposition to summary judgment; it includes
handwriting in the section for an official’s response that reads “here is the
form.” (Docket #43 at 1-2). Donovan cannot confirm that the handwriting is
his because he has no recollection of writing it. (Docket #28 at 5). The
defendants concede that, for the purposes of summary judgment, the Court
must accept Ali’s assertion that he sent a timely sign-up request. (Docket
#44 at 2).
Sometime soon after (Ali says April 5), Ali sent a request to Donovan
asking why information about Ramadan had not been displayed on the
institution televisions that year. (Docket #47 at 4). Then, sometime between
April 10 and 13, after Ali learned that other inmates had received
confirmation of their placement on the Ramadan participation list, Ali sent
a second request form (without mentioning the first) to Donovan asking to
be placed on the participation list. Id. at 4-5. On April 13 or 14, Ali received
responses from Donovan to both of these inquiries stating that the April 7
deadline had passed and that “management” no longer allowed the
information about Ramadan deadlines to be posted on the televisions. Id. at
5; see also (Docket #37 at 13).
On April 14, Ali encountered Donovan on his way to the dining
facility. (Docket #47 at 6). Ali says he asked Donovan if he had been placed
on the Ramadan participation list per his April 1 request. Id. Donovan told
Ali he did not recall receiving the request and because Donovan had
already turned over the final list to the kitchen staff, Ali would have to talk
to Haese, Donovan’s supervisor, to resolve the issue. Id.
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On April 15, Ali wrote to Haese to inform her that many inmates
were not able to sign up for the fast because there had been no television
announcement about the deadline that year. Id. at 6-7. He attached his
second (untimely) request to Donovan to be put on the list as well as his
correspondence with Donovan about the deadline not being broadcasted
on the institution televisions. Id. According to Ali, he also informed Haese,
in a separate correspondence sent the same day, that he had timely
submitted a sign-up request to Donovan and included his alleged April 1
request form. Id.1 On April 16, Ali received a response from Haese in which
she explained why GBCI did not broadcast information about Ramadan on
the televisions that year. Id.

Ali produced the alleged second letter to Haese, but it is not accompanied
by any attachment. (Docket #43 at 20); see also (Docket #47 at 6-7). The letter states
“Ms. Haese: I am forward my requests to Mr. Donovan with his responds in order
for you to see that I had met the deadline for the Ramadan sign up.” (Docket #43
at 20). The defendants say that Ali never sent this second letter to Haese, and
therefore she was not aware that he had submitted a timely request to participate
in Ramadan; she only knew of his untimely request. (Docket #47 at 6-7).
1

The defendants ask the Court to find that Ali’s representations about the
second letter contradict sworn statements in his amended complaint and should
therefore be disregarded. (Docket #44 at 4-5). In his amended complaint, Ali states
that on April 15, 2016 he sent Haese “an Interview/Information Request attached
with Donovan’s response.” (Docket #9 at 5). This statement does not disavow a
second letter. In other words, it is not necessarily contradictory for Ali to swear
that he sent letter A and then later swear that he sent letters A and B. This amounts
to a disputed material fact. The defendants will be free to argue to a jury about the
inconsistencies in Ali’s averments. See Berry, 618 F.3d at 691 (“[W]e long ago
buried—or at least tried to bury—the misconception that uncorroborated
testimony from the non-movant cannot prevent summary judgment because it is
‘self-serving.’ If based on personal knowledge or firsthand experience, such
testimony can be evidence of disputed material facts. It is not for courts at
summary judgment to weigh evidence or determine the credibility of such
testimony; we leave those tasks to factfinders.”) (internal citations omitted).

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On April 18, Ali wrote to Haese again, this time asking that the
document attached to his first correspondence to her be returned to him. Id.
at 9. Haese wrote back on April 23, stating “Yes—Also I am working on
your requests—please remain patient as I will have some resolve shortly.”
Id. at 11.
3.3

Ali’s Inmate Complaint Regarding Ramadan

On April 18, Ali filed a grievance with the institution complaint
examiner (“ICE”) about not being placed on the Ramadan list. Id. at 9. In his
grievance, Ali states the he submitted to Donovan timely sign-up requests
on April 1 and April 5, and that he attempted to resolve the issue by
contacting Haese but she had not responded. (Docket #30-2 at 19-20). On
May 10 or 11, the ICE recommended dismissal of the grievance because,
according to Haese, Ali did not show that he had submitted a timely signup request. Id. at 9-10. The ICE also said Ali could fast on his own without
the provision of morning and evening meal bags by purchasing food items
from the canteen or saving food from his daytime meals. Id. Eckstein
approved the dismissal. Id. at 11.
On May 12, Ali appealed the dismissal to the corrections complaint
examiner (“CCE”). In the appeal, Ali states that he timely requested
placement on the Ramadan list and attaches as proof his alleged April 1
correspondence to Donovan. (Docket #30-2 at 18-19). Notably, the April 1
request form attached to his appeal does not include handwritten language
in the space for the official’s response. Instead, that space is devoid of any
type or handwriting and is instead filled by a CCE date-stamp of May 20,
2016. The CCE dismissed Ali’s appeal. Id. at 17.
According to Ali, on or after June 1 (after he submitted his CCE
appeal, which included a copy of the alleged April 1 request), he finally
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received back from Haese one of the two documents he supposedly sent to
her on April 15. (Docket #47 at 15). Ali describes the returned document as
“my initial request dated April 1, 2016, [to] which Donovan had responded
with: ‘here is the form’ and dated April 4, 2016.” (Docket #42 at 6); see also
(Docket #37 at 8-9).
That document, which Ali produced to the defendants during
discovery and filed with the Court in opposition to summary judgment, is
ostensibly the same document that he submitted to the CCE with his
appeal. But, as noted earlier, the version Ali produced during this litigation
is notably different. In the space for the official’s response, there appears
handwriting stating “here is the form.”2
3.4

Ali Questions Eckstein about Broadcasting the Ramadan
Dates and Deadlines

On or around April 22, Ali says he and two other inmates
encountered Eckstein and the GBCI security director while on their way to
the dining facility. (Docket #47 at 9-10). Ali asked why GBCI did not
broadcast an announcement about Ramadan that year and informed
Eckstein that he had signed up in time but had not yet been placed on the
participation list. Id. Ali does not claim to have asked for Eckstein’s help to
ensure his name was put on the list. Eckstein said he would investigate with
Donovan and Haese the issue of the policy change regarding the broadcast
The Court harbors concern about the possibility that Ali fabricated some
of the material evidence in this case, but it cannot say on the record before it that
Ali’s evidence—specifically, the April 1 request and the letter to Haese attaching
the April 1 request—is inauthentic. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 759–60 & n.7
(7th Cir. 2003) (Documents submitted in support of a summary judgment motion
must be authenticated in order to be admissible); Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1) (A
document can be authenticated with testimony of a witness with knowledge). Ali’s
credibility, including the credibility of his averment that his evidence is authentic,
is for a jury to weigh.
2

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of Ramadan dates and deadlines. Id. at 11. Ali did not hear anything further
from Eckstein after that conversation. Id.
3.5

Ali’s Attempted Fast

Ali attempted to participate in the 2016 Ramadan fast on his own but
was unsuccessful. (Docket #47 at 16). He claims that he could not afford
canteen items to eat outside of daylight hours and his spiritual experience
was diminished. Id.; see also (Docket #36 at 17 and #43 at 17-19).
4.

ANALYSIS
Ali alleges that defendants Donovan and Haese deprived him of the

First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion by preventing him
from participating in the 2016 Ramadan meal bag program at GBCI. He
alleges that Eckstein violated his free exercise right by changing GBCI’s
policy of broadcasting the dates and deadlines for Ramadan on the
institution televisions.
The defendants oppose these claims on their merits, arguing that
they fail as a matter of law. The defendants also request qualified immunity,
which the Court will consider only as to the claim that does not fail on its
merits. Finally, the defendants ask the Court to find that Ali is not entitled
to recover compensatory or punitive damages.
4.1

Participation in Ramadan Meal Bag Program

To survive summary judgment, Ali must proffer evidence from
which a jury could reasonably find that the defendants “intentionally and
substantially interfere[d] with [his] ability to practice his faith” and the
restriction was not “reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”
Garner v. Muenchow, No. 16-3707, 2017 WL 5172142, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 8,
2017) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). A substantial
interference, or burden, equates to “pressure on an adherent to modify his
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behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376, 379 (7th
Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted).
The defendants do not argue that Ali was prevented from
participating in the meal bag program for some legitimate penological
reason. Instead, they argue, first, that they did not “intentionally” interfere
with his ability to practice his faith because he was left off the Ramadan
participation list by mistake, and, second, he did not face a “substantial”
burden because he could have fasted on his own.
As to the latter argument, the Seventh Circuit has found that denial
of meal bags during Ramadan is a substantial burden on a Muslim’s free
exercise rights. Id. at 380 (“Without the meal bags [for two days], Thompson
was forced to choose between foregoing adequate nutrition or violating a
central tenant of his religion.”). In this case, where the parties agree that Ali
did not receive meal bags for the entire month of Ramadan in 2016, there
can be no serious dispute that he faced a substantial burden on the exercise
of his faith.
But Ali must also show that the defendants “intended to prevent
[him] from practicing” his religion. Garner, 2017 WL 5172142, at *2. On this
issue, Garner provides a helpful comparator. The plaintiff inmate in that
case had been placed in segregation where he did not have access to his
prayer items. Id. at 1. He was allowed only to borrow a Quran from the
chapel or use an approved catalog to buy from an outside vendor the
religious items he needed for praying. Id.
The plaintiff sought a catalog by writing to the defendant unit
manager six times but never received a response. Id. The unit manager
knew the catalogs were in short supply, but he did not tell that to the
plaintiff. Id. Eventually the unit manager sent the plaintiff on a “wild goose
Page 9 of 16

chase” for a catalog, but everyone to whom the plaintiff turned was
unhelpful. Id. Finally learning that catalogs were unavailable, the plaintiff
wrote to the defendant chaplain to request use of a Quran, and the chaplain
refused to provide one. Id. at 2. Instead, the chaplain directed the plaintiff
back to the unit manager to request a catalog. Id. At this point, three months
had gone by and the plaintiff was soon released from segregation, never
having received any prayer items. Id.
The court found that a trier of fact could reasonably believe that the
unit manager intended to prevent the plaintiff from practicing his religion
because the unit manager “knew that [the plaintiff] wanted a catalog and
knew that they were unavailable,” but “chose not to tell [the plaintiff] that
the catalogs were unavailable (or try to resolve the shortage) and thereby
willfully deprived [the plaintiff] of the chance to seek another option for his
religious exercise.” Id. As to the chaplain, the court found that a factfinder
could conclude that he, too, intentionally prevented the plaintiff’s practice
of his faith because he knew of the plaintiff’s desire to use a religious text,
as allowed under the prison policy, but ignored the plaintiff’s request. Id.
Here, Ali has not shown that defendant Donovan intentionally
prevented him from exercising his faith. Ali admits in his brief opposing
summary judgment that “the initial act by Chaplain Donovan in not placing
Ali on the list for Ramadan participants may [have] been a mistake.”
(Docket #36 at 5). This is consistent with Donavon’s own testimony, as he
claims that if he did receive a timely sign up request on April 1, he must
have mistakenly misread the request. (Docket #28 at 5-6). Ali also agrees
that he sent his second request to Donovan after the deadline, and that it
did not mention the first request. (Docket #37 at 11-12). Finally, when Ali
confronted Donovan en route to the dining facility and, for the first time, put
Page 10 of 16

Donovan on notice that he had indeed timely submitted a sign-up request,
Donovan directed Ali to speak with the person who could remedy the
problem, Haese. Id. at 9.
Unlike the defendant unit manager in Garner, Donovan did not
ignore the plaintiff’s request; as soon as he had knowledge of Donovan’s
(timely) request, Donovan provided Ali with direction on the appropriate
avenue for securing a place on the participation list. Further, unlike the
defendants in Garner, Donovan had no reason to suspect that the route he
advised Ali to take—writing to Haese—would not resolve the problem. Ali
told Donovan that he had a copy of the alleged April 1 request and
Donovan’s response thereto, so Ali was equipped with the information
necessary to show Haese, the person with authority to adjust the
participation list, that he deserved to be included. Even assuming all
inferences in Ali’s favor, no reasonable jury would find that Donovan
intentionally violated Ali’s free exercise rights. At most, Ali has shown that
Donovan acted with negligence, and that is insufficient to prove his claim.
See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). The Court will grant
summary judgment as to Ali’s claim against Donovan.
The same cannot be said for Haese. The record, viewed in Ali’s favor,
shows that Ali was told that Haese was the person with authority to add
him to the Ramadan list, and Ali submitted to Haese a request to be added
along with proof of his timely request to Donovan. As noted above, the
defendants swear that Ali never made Haese aware that he had submitted
a timely request, and that she only knew of his untimely request. But Ali
swears the opposite is true, and although “[d]efeating summary judgment
requires more than just a swearing match,” Ali has also presented “some
evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Matter of Wade, 969
Page 11 of 16

F.2d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1992). Ali presented a declaration based on personal
knowledge as well as a copy of the alleged request to Haese informing her
that he should have been placed on the list. Further, Haese’s last
communication to Ali included a promise that she was “working on [his]
requests” and to “please remain patient as [she] will have some resolve
shortly.” (Docket #47 at 11). Indeed, the defendants concede that “[h]ad Ali
told Haese that he submitted a timely request and Donovan nevertheless
left him off the list, Haese would have been made aware of the problem.”
(Docket #44 at 3). Viewing the evidence in Ali’s favor, this is exactly what
happened. A reasonable jury could find that Haese knew Ali wanted to
participate in Ramadan and had timely complied with the sign-up
requirement, but then chose to leave him off the list anyway.
For that reason, Haese is also not entitled to qualified immunity at
this juncture. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231 (2009) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The
defendants couch the issue of qualified immunity as to Haese in the wrong
way; they argue that Haese only had “tangential involvement” in Ali’s
attempt to secure placement on the Ramadan list and that she had no way
of knowing that “abiding by a reasonable policy” can constitute a
constitutional violation. (Docket #25 at 24 and #44 at 7). But, as explained
above, Ali has proffered evidence that Haese knew Ali should have been
placed on the Ramadan participation list, had authority to put him there,
and intentionally refused to do so. As the Seventh Circuit has made clear, a
prisoner has a clearly established right to a diet consistent with the tenets
Page 12 of 16

of his professed religion, and “forc[ing] him to choose between his religious
practice and adequate nutrition” violates that clearly established right.
Thompson, 809 F.3d at 381. Thus, based on the facts currently in the record,
Haese is not entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court is constrained to deny summary judgment as to Ali’s
claim against Haese.
4.2

Policy Regarding Television Broadcast of Ramadan Dates

Ali’s free exercise claim against Eckstein is based on Eckstein’s
decision, as the warden, to discontinue GBCI’s practice of notifying inmates
by television broadcast of the date Ramadan would begin and the deadline
for inmates to sign up to receive Ramadan meal bags.
The defendants argue that the change in notification procedure for
Ramadan in 2016 was “neutral and of general applicability,” (Docket #25 at
12-14), and therefore does not violate the First Amendment. See Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (“[A]
law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect
of burdening a particular religious practice.”).
The Court need not decide whether this is true because Ali’s claim
against Eckstein fails for another reason. Ali’s own evidence demonstrates
that his alleged injury was not caused by Eckstein’s policy change. To
recover under Section 1983—in either an individual or official capacity
claim against Eckstein—Ali must present evidence of a causal link between
his injury and Eckstein’s conduct. See Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1372
(7th Cir. 1991) (“To establish personal liability in a Section 1983 action,” the
plaintiff must show that the official “caused the deprivation of a federal
right.”) (internal quotation omitted); see also Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's
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Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2010) (in Section 1983 claims against
governmental bodies, “we have always required plaintiffs to show that
their injuries were caused by the policies or practices complained of.”)
(citation omitted). It is undisputed that, despite the policy change regarding
broadcast of the Ramadan sign-up deadline, Ali knew the deadline and
submitted a timely sign-up request. (Docket #47 at 1-2). Ali’s claimed
injury—not receiving meal bags during Ramadan in 2016—was not caused
by Eckstein’s decision to change the way GBCI notified inmates of the
Ramadan sign-up deadline. The defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as to Eckstein will be granted.
5.

DAMAGES
Finally, Ali states in his second amended complaint that he seeks to

recover $75,000 against each defendant in punitive damages and $1,300 in
compensatory damages. (Docket #17 at 9). The defendants argue that even
if Ali proves a constitutional violation, he is entitled to recover only
nominal, not compensatory or punitive, damages.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act precludes a prisoner from
recovering compensatory damages for mental or emotional injuries
“without a prior showing of physical injury[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
However, if a prisoner proves a constitutional violation and “some other
type of non-physical injury, the statute would not foreclose recovery,
assuming that the damages sought were not ‘for’ any mental or emotional
injuries suffered.” Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted); see also Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781–82 (7th Cir. 1999)
(“A prisoner is entitled to judicial relief for a violation of his First
Amendment rights aside from any physical, mental, or emotional injury he
may have sustained.”).
Page 14 of 16

Ali claims to have suffered mental and emotional injures, see (Docket
#17 at 9 and #42 at 6-7), but he has not presented evidence that he suffered
a physical injury. In his brief opposing summary judgment, Ali states that
“there is plenty [of] evidence of physical injury, which upon a jury trial Ali’s
legal counsel will be permitted to obtain documents from Green Bay
Corrections Psychological Unit showing the injury.” (Docket #36 at 20). This
is too little too late. If evidence of Ali’s alleged physical injury exists, he
should have used the discovery process to obtain it and present it in
opposition to summary judgment. See Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621
F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010) (“We often call summary judgment, the ‘put up
or shut up’ moment in litigation . . ., by which we mean that the non-moving
party is required to marshal and present the court with the evidence [he]
contends will prove [his] case.”) (internal citations omitted). Compensatory
damages are therefore not available in this case.
However, punitive damages are recoverable under Section 1983
even in the absence of compensatory damages “where the jury concludes
that the defendant’s conduct was ‘motivated by evil intent or involv[ed]
reckless or callous indifference to the federally-protected rights of others.’”
Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). As
discussed above, Ali’s evidence, construed favorably to him, supports the
inference that Haese acted intentionally, and that is sufficient to refute the
defendants’ contention that punitive damages are unavailable. Thompson,
809 F.3d at 381.
Therefore, if a trier of fact credits Ali’s evidence that Haese
intentionally violated his rights, he may receive both nominal ($1.00) and
punitive damages against her. Id.

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6.

CONCLUSION
Ali has failed to proffer evidence raising triable issues of fact as to

his First Amendment claims against Donovan and Eckstein. Rather, on the
undisputed facts and evidence in the record, the Court must grant
judgment as a matter of law as to those claims. However, Ali has raised a
triable issue of fact as to his First Amendment claim against Haese. The
Court is constrained to deny the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on that claim. Ali is entitled to pursue nominal and punitive
damages against her. A jury trial will be scheduled by separate order.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Docket #24) be and the same is hereby GRANTED in part as to
the plaintiff’s claims against defendants Donovan and Eckstein and
DENIED in part as to the plaintiff’s claim against defendant Haese;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff’s claims against
defendants Donovan and Eckstein be and the same are hereby DISMISSED
with prejudice; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Donovan and Eckstein
be and the same are hereby DISMISSED from this action.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 13th day of March, 2018.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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