Noonan v. Schweitzer

Filing 2

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 12/30/2016 DENYING 1 Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Tim Noonan) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
TIM NOONAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 16-CV-1723-JPS

JOSEPH SCHWEITZER,
Defendant.

ORDER

On December 29, 2016, the plaintiff filed this action.1 The document
the plaintiff filed is captioned as follows: “PLAINTIFF’S EX-PARTE NOTICE
AND APPLICATION FOR: AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE: A
TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING

ORDER

RE:

A

PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION; AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.”
(Docket #1 at 1). The document begins by asking for a temporary restraining
order forbidding the defendant from foreclosing on the plaintiff’s home. Id.
Beyond this request, however, the remainder of the document is in the style
of a standard civil complaint. It includes allegations of the parties’
citizenship, the Court’s jurisdiction, the transactions underlying the action,
and twenty-five counts alleging violations of various federal laws. Id. at 2-11.
To the extent the document may be construed as a request for a
temporary restraining order, as opposed to a standard complaint, it must be
denied for two reasons. First, it appears to be barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. That rule:
precludes lower federal court jurisdiction over claims seeking
review of state court judgments . . . [because] no matter how
erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be,

1

Tim Noonan also names Linda Noonan as a co-plaintiff, but she did not
sign the document, and as neither she nor Tim is represented, she cannot be
included as a party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a).

the Supreme Court of the United States is the only federal
court that could have jurisdiction to review a state court
judgment. Therefore, if a claim is barred by the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine, the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
the case.
Taylor v. Federal Nat. Nortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations
and quotations omitted). As applied to this case, Rooker-Feldman strips this
Court of power to overturn a state court judgment of foreclosure. The
Court’s research reveals that the defendant sued the plaintiff in Racine
County Circuit Court and obtained a judgment of foreclosure on August 31,
2016. Joseph R. Schweitzer v. Timothy P. Noonan et al., 2016-CV-786 (Docket
#30). Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes the Court from granting
the plaintiff the relief he seeks.2
Second, even if Rooker-Feldman did not apply, the plaintiff’s request
falls far short of the showings required for entitlement to a temporary
restraining order. As noted by the Seventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme
Court, “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy,
one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries
the burden of persuasion.” Goodman v. Ill. Dept. of Fin. and Prof. Reg., 430 F.3d
432, 437 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972
(1997)). Temporary restraining orders are assessed using the same standards
as used for preliminary injunctions, and require the plaintiff to prove the

2

This is not to say that the remainder of the plaintiff’s complaint is not also
barred by Rooker-Feldman. His other claims appear to seek money damages for
violations of federal laws occurring at the time of the original land contract
transaction. (Docket #1 at 11). Those claims do not seek to stop the effect of the
foreclosure judgment as directly as the request for a temporary restraining order.
However, they may still be barred if the claims are “inextricably intertwined” with
the judgment. Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533. Without further briefing and factual
development, the Court cannot say whether the other claims are “inextricably
intertwined” with the foreclosure judgment.

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following elements: (1) his underlying case has some likelihood of success on
the merits, (2) no adequate remedy at law exists, and (3) he will suffer
irreparable harm without the injunction. Merritte v. Kessel, 561 F. App’x 546,
548 (7th Cir. 2014).
The plaintiff’s motion/complaint includes only two statements of those
elements, posed merely as legal conclusions. (Docket #1 at 2, 10). He
otherwise presents no argument that the elements are present here. Further,
the allegations of the complaint portion of the document are not verified, so
they cannot function as evidence themselves.3 The Court is left only with the
collection of exhibits appended to the motion/complaint, and those
documents, standing alone, do not make a clear showing as to any of the
elements. See (Docket #1-1). The plaintiff’s request for a temporary
restraining order must, therefore, be denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for a temporary
restraining order (Docket #1) be and the same is hereby DENIED.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 30th day of December, 2016.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

3

The document supplies blank lines for a notary’s signature and stamp, but
those lines have been crossed out.

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