von Germeten v. Planet Home Lending LLC

Filing 121

ORDER DISMISSING CASE signed by Judge Pamela Pepper on 7/2/2019. 97 Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim GRANTED. 120 Plaintiff's motion to void mortgage and attorney fees DENIED. The court FINDS the record establi shes no basis for plaintiff to assert property interest against personal property of defense counsel or any officer, director or employee of defendant. Case DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state claim. Clerk of Court to accept no further filings in this case from plaintiff and return to plaintiff any documents he files bearing this case number. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Dean von Germeten)(cb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
DEAN VON GERMETEN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 17-cv-167-pp

PLANET HOME LENDING, LLC,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM (DKT. NO. 97) AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
VOID MORTGAGE AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES (DKT. NO. 120)
On June 6, 2019, the court held a hearing to consider the defendant’s
motion for sanctions for the plaintiff’s alleged violations of the court’s March
21, 2019 order barring him from filing frivolous documents asserting
previously rejected arguments. Dkt. No. 104. The court considered also the
defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 97. During
that hearing, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the case but
declined to impose monetary sanctions against the plaintiff for his conduct.
This order memorializes those rulings, with additional comments.
When it reviewed the defendant’s additional/renewed motion for
sanctions, the court mostly concerned itself with the defendant’s allegation that
the plaintiff had filed an approximately $4 million “notice of lien” with the
Racine County register of deeds against the defense counsel’s personal
property. See Dkt. No. 104-1 at 1. The record in this case provides no basis for
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the plaintiff to assert an interest in defense counsel’s personal property. To the
extent the plaintiff alleges that his interest in defense counsel’s property stems
from an alleged “misuse” of his “commercial name,” dkt. no. 104-1, the court
notes that it (and others) have rejected this and other frivolous legal theories
that are based on the idea of rejecting so-called “federal citizenship.” See
United States v. Davis, 545 F. App’x 513, 517-18 (7th Cir. 2013) (defendant’s
belief that he could “proclaim[] a copyright in his name” found “consistent with
‘sovereign citizen’ ideology” and such beliefs found frivolous); Bey v. State, 847
F.3d 559, 560-61 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “many sovereign citizen
organizations teach that whenever a Moor’s name is spelled in capital letters in
a government document, the name identifies not the individual but instead his
‘corporate shell identity,’ or in other words a ‘straw man’ controlled by the
government;” further stating the “[w]e have repeatedly rejected such [sovereign
citizen] claims.”). The court can discern no reason for the plaintiff to file a
“notice of lien” against a defense attorney’s personal property except to harass
that attorney, and to try to dissuade him from acting in his client’s interest. It
appears to this court that the plaintiff’s filing of the notice of lien with the
county register of deeds constituted an abuse of process, and harassment.
At the June 6, 2019 hearing, defense counsel asked the court to opine on
counsel’s affidavit documenting the legal fees incurred in its defense of this
case. The affidavit appears at dkt. no. 97-2 and states that the defendant has
incurred 75.2 hours of work defending against this case at a rate of $215 per

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hour. Id. at 1-2. At the June 6, 2019 hearing, defense counsel asked the court
to deem those fees “reasonable.”
The question of whether the fees are reasonable is not appropriately
before the court. The defendant has not filed a motion for the award of
attorneys’ fees, and the court declined to impose attorneys’ fees as a sanction
for the plaintiff’s conduct. The court understands that the defendant likely will
seek to add its “reasonable attorneys’ fees” to the debt it will attempt to collect
from the plaintiff. That is the defendant’s prerogative, assuming the mortgage
contract provides for such a process. That question—the interpretation of the
mortgage contract, and the collection of any debt due under the mortgage and
the note—are not before this court.
Finally, after the court already had orally dismissed the case for failure to
state a claim, the plaintiff filed a document titled “Motion that Mortgage and
Defendant Attorney Fees be Voided per Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Void Agreement,
Fraudulent Concealment and UCC.” Dkt. No. 120. This is another attempt by
the plaintiff to assert his theories regarding American capital markets, the UCC
and the rights of “free,” or “non-federal,” citizens. The court has rejected these
arguments. And the questions of whether the mortgage is void, or whether the
contract provides for attorneys’ fees, are not before this court.
The court GRANTS the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 97.
The court FINDS that the record establishes no basis for the plaintiff to
assert a property interest against the personal property of defense counsel (or,
for that matter, against any officer, director or employee of the defendant).
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The court DENIES the plaintiff’s motion to void the mortgage and
attorneys’ fees. Dkt. No. 120.
The court ORDERS that this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for
failure to state a claim.
The court ORDERS that the clerk’s office must not docket anything else
the plaintiff sends to the court in this case. The court ORDERS that the clerk’s
office shall return any filings bearing this case number to the plaintiff.
Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 2nd day of July, 2019.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________________
HON. PAMELA PEPPER
United States District Judge

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