Reliford v. Ottoway et al

Filing 14

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 4/26/2017 GRANTING 2 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed Without Prepayment of the Filing Fee; Agency having custody of Plaintiff to collect balance of filing fee from his institution trust accoun t. Defendants Robert E. Haney, Mary K. Luzi, Dr. Collins, and Jame C. Griffin DISMISSED from this action. 4 Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel DENIED. 7 Plaintiff's Motion to be Declared Indigent DENIED. 6 , 13 Plaintiff& #039;s Motions to Supplement Complaint DENIED. Action STAYED pending conclusion of Plaintiff's state court criminal proceedings; Plaintiff ORDERED to provide monthly updates on the status of those proceedings and to notify the Court when and how those proceedings concluded. Clerk of Court directed to ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE this action. See Order. (cc: all counsel; via mail to Christopher Lamont Reliford and Greg VanRybereck at Mendota)(jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
CHRISTOPHER LAMONT RELIFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 17-CV-271-JPS

ROBERT E. HANEY, MARY K. LUZI,
DR. COLLINS, JAME C. GRIFFIN,
CHRISTOPHER OTTOWAY, and JOHN
and JANE DOES,

ORDER

Defendants.
Plaintiff Christopher Lamont Reliford (“Reliford”), who is presently
housed at the Mendota Mental Health Institute, filed a pro se complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. (Docket #1). This
matter comes before the Court on Reliford’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Docket #2). Reliford lacks the funds to pay an initial partial filing
fee. (Docket #11); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4).
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a
governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a
complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Gladney v. Pendelton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773, 774

(7th Cir. 2002). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where
it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Gladney, 302 F.3d at
774. “Malicious,” although sometimes treated as a synonym for “frivolous,”
“is more usefully construed as intended to harass.” Lindell v. McCallum, 352
F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); accord Paul v. Marberry, 658
F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2011).
To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system,
the plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It is not
necessary for the plaintiff to plead specific facts and his statement need only
“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see Christopher v. Buss, 384 F.3d 879,
881 (7th Cir. 2004). However, a complaint that offers “labels and conclusions”
or “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, “that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The
complaint allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted); Christopher, 384
F.3d at 881.

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In considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts should
follow the principles set forth in Twombly by first, “identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Legal conclusions must be supported by
factual allegations. Id. If there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court
must, second, “assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that: 1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States; and 2) the deprivation was visited upon him by a person or
persons acting under color of state law. Buchanan-Moore v. County of
Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Village of North
Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.
635, 640 (1980). The Court is obliged to give the plaintiff’s pro se allegations,
“however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
On March 22, 2016, someone complained that Reliford had assaulted
a person at the Atkinson library. (Docket #1 at 4). Christopher Ottoway
(“Ottoway”), a police officer, was dispatched to the library. Id. When he
arrived, fire department personnel were already treating the victim’s injuries.
Id. Ottoway interviewed witnesses, including the victim, a security guard,
and a librarian. Id. at 5. He also took pictures of the scene and obtained some
video surveillance footage. Id. Reliford was apparently not present
throughout Ottoway’s investigation.

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Reliford was arrested two days later by the John and Jane Does, also
police officers, at a different library. Id. Reliford complains that no warrant
was issued for his arrest. Id. He also states that no witnesses ever positively
identified him prior to his preliminary hearing which occurred in December
2016. Id. Reliford seems to believe that the witnesses’ identification of him as
the perpetrator in the preliminary hearing was fabricated due to “officer
corruption,” apparently referencing Ottoway. Id.
Reliford alleges that his public defender, Robert E. Haney (“Haney”),
and Jame C. Griffin (“Griffin”), the district attorney, conspired together “to
process [him] and move [him] forward without an out of court identification
made by [the victim or] witnesses.” Id. Haney had Reliford examined by
mental health professionals in an attempt to “[use] incompeten[cy]
proceeding[s] to suppress the above proof.” Id. Reliford alleges that the
“conspiracy” regarding his incompetency included the doctors who
examined him. Id. Though he does not name those doctors in the body of the
complaint, the Court assumes they are Mary K. Luzi (“Luzi”) and Dr. Collins
(“Collins”), identified as “mental doctors” in the caption. Id. at 1.
Reliford complains about various aspects of Haney’s conduct,
including that he withheld relevant documents. Id. at 6. The Court cannot
determine the meaning of the next relevant sentence, so it transcribes the
sentence verbatim: “Due to these Defendants malice conduct of depriving the
plaintiff of his constitutional rights stated above and further abusing the
process of continuingly using the psychiatric evaluation in order to plaintiff
from having his request plea without and N.G.I. are the direct and proximate
cause of plaintiff mental suffering and night mare.” Id. Reliford requests

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$5,000,000 in damages for “false imprisonment base[d] on mistaken arrest
and detention was i[m]proper because police lacked probable cause to
arrest.” Id. He also references retaliation for filing grievances, but he alleged
no facts related to such a claim. Id.
As best the Court can discern, Reliford advances two claims. First is
against Ottoway, and potentially the John and Jane Doe officers, for arresting
him without probable cause. Specifically, Reliford contends that they have
the wrong person; no witness identified him as the culprit until many months
after the arrest. These allegations state a claim for false arrest in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 398-99 (7th Cir.
2007).
Nevertheless, this claim may run afoul of the Heck doctrine, which
holds that a claim for damages may not be pursued if its success would
necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal conviction or sentence. Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). However, Heck does not automatically
preclude Fourth Amendment claims related to conduct underlying a
conviction. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007). As long as a plaintiff’s
claims do not impugn the validity of his conviction or sentence, courts can
entertain Section 1983 suits based on police investigative conduct that
violates the Fourth Amendment. Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir.
2008).
Public records indicate that Reliford was charged with battery and
disorderly conduct. See State of Wisconsin v. Christopher Lamont Reliford, No.
2016-CF-1315,

Milwaukee

County

Circuit

Court,

available

at:

https://wcca.wicourts.gov. Reliford’s claim, if proven, would necessarily

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imply the invalidity of a conviction on these charges; he alleges that police
arrested the wrong person based on insufficient identification, and thus that
he is entirely innocent. The criminal case is still pending, however. On March
21, 2017, the court conducted a competency hearing and determined that
Reliford was incompetent to proceed in the case at the time, but was likely
to become competent. Id. at Court Record Events. The case was suspended
pending further mental health treatment for Reliford and a report from his
treating doctors due on June 27, 2017. Id.
The Court will abstain from hearing this claim while Reliford’s
criminal proceedings are ongoing under the Younger abstention doctrine.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971); Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 137
(7th Cir. 1995) (“[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances federal courts should
abstain from enjoining ongoing state criminal proceedings.”). The Seventh
Circuit has counseled that a judgment on the convict’s federal damage action
before the conclusion of his direct appeal “might undermine the supreme
court’s consideration of [the convict’s] constitutional defenses to his criminal
conviction.” Simpson, 73 F.3d at 138. As a result, the Court of Appeals
instructs that district courts should abstain from hearing such claims “while
the case works its way through the state appellate process.” Id. The Court
must, therefore, stay Reliford’s first claim pending final disposition of the
criminal proceedings. Id. at 139.
Reliford’s second claim is for a “conspiracy” between Haney, Griffin,
Luzi, and Collins, to use their roles in the incompetency proceedings as a
means to suppress the baselessness of Reliford’s arrest. This claim is not
viable. Haney acted as Reliford’s public defender, and is not a state actor as

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is required for Section 1983 liability. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325
(1981) (public defenders acting as counsel do not act “under color of state
law” and cannot be sued under Section 1983). Griffin prosecuted Reliford’s
case, and is thus immune from a damages claim based on her actions taken
toward that end. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (district
attorneys immune from suits based on prosecutorial actions). Reliford’s
allegations suggest that Luzi and Collins are also not state actors. (Docket #1
at 5) (“The plaintiff defense attorney Robert A. Haney conspire with
psychiatric[.] . . . [P]rivate party psychiatrist acted under color of state law
employees intertwined in process of evaluating and detaining individual
who are believe to be mentally ill.”). Even assuming they were, Reliford’s
allegations merely offer the label of “conspiracy” and state no facts relating
to Luzi or Collins’ conduct, and are thus insufficient to support any claims
against the doctors.
In sum, the Court finds that Reliford may proceed on the following
claim: false arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, against Ottoway
and the John and Jane Doe police officers. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). As noted
above, this claim must be stayed until the conclusion of Reliford’s criminal
case. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007) (“If a plaintiff files a
false-arrest claim before he has been convicted . . ., it is within the power of
the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action
until the criminal case . . . is ended. . . . If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted,
and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require
dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to
suit.”). This matter will be administratively closed in the interim. Reliford

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must provide updates on the status of his criminal case every thirty days. If
he does not, this matter will be dismissed. Reliford must further notify the
Court upon the conclusion of his criminal case, either by its dismissal or his
conviction.
Along with his complaint, Reliford filed a motion for appointment of
counsel. (Docket #4). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the “court may request an
attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” The Court should
seek counsel to represent the plaintiff if the plaintiff: (1) has made reasonable
attempts to secure counsel; and (2) “‘the difficulty of the case—factually and
legally—exceeds the particular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to
coherently present it.’” Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). Reliford’s
motion says nothing about his attempts to secure counsel. (Docket #4).
Further, this case is not complex; whether probable cause existed for his
arrest is not beyond a layperson’s understanding and requires no expert
opinion. Reliford’s motion for appointment of counsel will be denied.
On March 7, 2017, Reliford filed two additional motions. First is to be
declared indigent, as related to the payment of an initial partial filing fee.
(Docket #7). The Court has already waived the fee, so this motion will be
denied. (Docket #11). Reliford’s second motion is to “supplement” his
complaint to add new allegations against another defendant. (Docket #6). The
document is largely illegible, but even if it could be read, it must be denied.
Complaints cannot be “supplemented” piecemeal; an amended complaint
supersedes a prior complaint and must be complete in itself without
reference to the original complaint. See Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park

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Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1056-57 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, if Reliford
wished to offer an amended complaint, it must include all of the allegations,
defendants, and claims he wishes to pursue moving forward.
Finally, on April 17, 2017, Reliford offered a second motion to
supplement his complaint. (Docket #13). This document is much longer than
the first motion to supplement, and seeks to add a number of new
defendants to the overall “conspiracy,” including the state court judge
presiding over his criminal case. Id. It is just as illegible as the previous
attempted supplementation. Reliford’s second motion to supplemental must
be denied on the same grounds as the first. Because this matter will be
stayed, if Reliford desires to amend his complaint, he should do so once the
stay is lifted in accordance with Duda and all other applicable precedent.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (Docket #2) be and the same is hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having custody of the
prisoner shall collect from his institution trust account the balance of the
filing fee by collecting monthly payments from the plaintiff’s prison trust
account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited
to the prisoner’s trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of
Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case
name and number assigned to this action. If the plaintiff is transferred to
another institution, county, state, or federal, the transferring institution shall

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forward a copy of this Order along with plaintiff’s remaining balance to the
receiving institution;
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that a copy of this order be sent to the officer
in charge of the agency where the inmate is confined;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Robert E. Haney, Mary
K. Luzi, Dr. Collins, and Jame C. Griffin be and the same are hereby
DISMISSED from this action;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motions for
appointment of counsel (Docket #4), to be declared indigent (Docket #7), and
to supplement his complaint (Docket #6 and #13) be and the same are hereby
DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same is hereby
STAYED pending the conclusion of the plaintiff’s state court criminal
proceedings;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall provide updates
on the status of those proceedings on or before the 26th day of each month;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall notify the Court
when those proceedings have concluded, and the manner in which they were
concluded; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Clerk of the Court shall
administratively close this action.

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Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 26th day of April, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

____________________________________
J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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