Schaetz v. Paper Converting Machine Company Inc

Filing 18

ORDER signed by Chief Judge William C Griesbach on 5/24/2017 Granting 10 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk is to enter judgment if Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within 30 days of this Order. (cc: all counsel and via US Mail to Plaintiff) (Griesbach, William)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ADAM SCHAETZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 17-C-272

PAPER CONVERTING MACHINE COMPANY INC,
Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Adam Schaetz, proceeding pro se, filed this action against Paper Converting
Machine Company Inc. (“PCMC”). Although not entirely clear, the complaint appears to assert
claims of employment discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”). On April 21, 2017,
PCMC moved to dismiss Schaetz’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
For the reasons below, the motion to dismiss will be granted.
ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT
The following factual allegations are largely taken directly from Schaetz’s complaint and are
accepted true for the purpose of the motion to dismiss. Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582,
585 (7th Cir. 2002). Schaetz, a former employee at PCMC, asserts he was subjected to an
overwhelming amount of discrimination and harassment beginning on March 6, 2015. On that day,
Jason Messamore, a team leader at PCMC, conducted Schaetz’s annual performance review and
moved Schaetz from his skilled painter position to an entry level position. Schaetz believes the move

was in retaliation for Schaetz checking the box which indicated that he had concerns with his review.
(ECF No. 1-2 at 1.)
Schaetz alleges he was subjected to unwelcome conduct on a daily basis while at PCMC,
including Messamore calling him and other co-workers “homos” and other derogatory terms. He
expressed his concerns about Messamore and the possible retaliation to human resources on March
24, but Schaetz claims this only resulted in more ridiculing and retaliation. Schaetz asserts he was
given three write-ups within a span of 21 days despite never being written-up before, that supervisors
harassed him at his son’s doctor appointment, and that supervisors called and emailed his wife to
threaten his employment. Schaetz includes in his complaint a right to sue letter from the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) dated December 1, 2016, but does
not include the original charge of discrimination or the bases upon which he filed his claim with the
EEOC. (ECF No. 1-1.)
Schaetz claims he was constructively discharged on January 4, 2017 because “[a]fter more
threats to be fired, more discrimination, and more intense harassment, creating such a hostile work
environment[,] I felt I could no longer work there for the well being of my family and I.” [sic] (ECF
No. 1 at 3.) He then filed this action on February 27, 2017.
ANALYSIS
PCMC moved to dismiss Schaetz’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a)(2) mandates that
a complaint need only include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has held that a complaint must
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contain factual allegations that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Alt. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While a plaintiff is not required to plead detailed factual
allegations, he or she must plead “more than labels and conclusions.” Id. A simple, “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. In evaluating a motion to dismiss,
the court must view the plaintiff’s factual allegations and any inferences reasonably drawn from them
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Yasak v. Retirement Bd. of the Policemen’s Annuity &
Benefit Fund of Chi., 357 F.3d 677, 678 (7th Cir. 2004). In addition, the court construes pro se
complaints liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).
A. Discrimination and Retaliation Claims
Although the complaint alleges a history of harassment and despicable conduct by
supervisory personnel at PCMC, a crucial element to a claim under Title VII is missing. There is no
allegation that the harassment and intimidating behavior was on account of Schaetz’ sex, race, ethnic
origin, religion, or the other categories protected by Title VII. Nor is there any allegation that
Schaetz suffered retaliation for opposing any policy or practice prohibited by Title VII. These
omissions are fatal. Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). Retaliation under Title VII
occurs when a plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action “because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). To demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse
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employment action: and (3) there is a casual link between the protected activity and the adverse
action. See Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing McKenzie v. Illinois Dept.
of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Schaetz’s complaint asserts he experienced numerous instances of harassment and
discrimination while he was employed at PCMC. The complaint also alleges that he experienced
several adverse employment actions, such as losing his skilled painter position and being excluded
from overtime opportunities. However, his complaint simply fails to allege that he suffered any
adverse action on account of his membership in a protected class or that he experienced retaliation
in response to opposing discrimination on the basis of a protected class. The complaint utterly fails
to provide the defendant with the kind of notice Rule 8(a)(2) requires. Schaetz therefore fails to
plausibly assert a discrimination, harassment, or retaliation claim under Title VII.
B. Constructive Discharge Claim
The complaint suffers an additional problem with respect to the constructive discharge claim.
It appears clear that Schaetz failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to such a claim before
filing his lawsuit. Before a plaintiff can challenge an unlawful employment practice under Title VII,
the employee must first exhaust his administrative remedies. Chaudhry v. Nucor Steel-Indiana, 546
F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2008); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–5(e)(1), 2000e–(f)(1). Exhaustion of
administrative remedies occurs when the employee files a timely charge of discrimination with the
EEOC and then secures a right to sue letter from the EEOC with respect to the timely charge. Id.
“[C]laims brought in judicial proceedings must be within the scope of the charge filed with the
EEOC; ‘[a]n aggrieved employee may not complain to the EEOC of only certain instances of
discrimination, and then seek judicial relief for different instances of discrimination.’” Conner v. Ill.
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Dep’t of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Rush v. McDonald’s Corp, 966
F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992)); see also Herron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 388 F.3d 293, 303,
n. 2 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Herron's EEOC charges in February and April 2000 described racial
discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, not constructive discharge. As the district court found,
the four-month delay between his February EEOC complaint and his decision to leave was
inconsistent with notice of constructive discharge. Since the charges contained in the EEOC
complaint were not ‘like or reasonably related to’ his EEOC allegations, Herron cannot proceed
under Title VII on a constructive discharge claim.”).
There is nothing in the complaint that indicates whether Schaetz has exhausted his
administrative remedies on the constructive discharge claim. In support of its motion to dismiss,
however, PCMC filed Schaetz’s EEOC Charge dated January 26, 2016.1 (ECF No. 12-1.) Schaetz
raised claims of sex-based discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII with the EEOC, but
did not claim constructive discharge. He did not claim that the alleged discrimination and harassment
was continuing and instead noted that it only occurred from March 26, 2015 until November 10,
2015. Additionally, Schaetz received his right to sue letter from the EEOC on December 1,
2016—more than a month before he claims he was constructively discharged. Schaetz does not
dispute that he has not filed any additional complaints with the EEOC since he left PCMC in January
2017. In short, it is clear that Schaetz has not attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies on
his constructive discharge claim. The constructive discharge claim will be dismissed.

1

A court may take judicial notice of an EEOC charge as a matter of public record when
addressing a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment.
See Faibisch v. University of Minnesota, 304 F.3d 797, 802–03 (8th Cir. 2002).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, PCMC’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED and
the complaint is dismissed. I cannot say the plaintiff is unable to state a Title VII claim, however,
so the dismissal is without prejudice. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in the event an
amended complaint curing the defects noted above is not filed within 30 days.
SO ORDERED this 24th

day of May, 2017.
s/ William C. Griesbach
William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge
United States District Court

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