Schaetz v. Paper Converting Machine Company Inc

Filing 35

ORDER OF DISMISSAL (cc: all counsel)(Griesbach, William)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ADAM J. SCHAETZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 17-C-272

PAPER CONVERTING MACHINE COMPANY INC.,
Defendant.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Adam Schaetz filed this pro se action against his former employer, Paper Converting Machine
Company, Inc. (PCMC), alleging employment discrimination. This case is now before the court on
PCMC’s request for dismissal with prejudice for Schaetz’s failure to comply with the court’s order
granting PCMC’s motion to compel. ECF No. 32 at 2. For the reasons that follow, PCMC’s motion
will be granted.
The case was last before the court back in October on PCMC’s motion to compel Schaetz
to respond to the Interrogatories and Requests to Produce it had served on him on August 15, 2017.
ECF No. 24. PCMC asserted that Schaetz had provided meritless objections to PCMC’s discovery
requests and refused to confer with its attorneys other than in writing when they attempted to reach
a resolution that would not involve the court. PCMC filed its motion on October 2, 2017, under
Civil L.R. 7(h), meaning Schaetz was required to file his response within seven days. Assuming
Schaetz would file a timely response, the court scheduled a hearing on the motion for October 26,
2017. On October 18, Schaetz filed a motion to adjourn on the ground that he had child care

responsibilities and could not appear in person. ECF No. 27. The court removed the case from the
calendar and proceeded to decide the motion on the record.
In a decision issued on October 19, 2017, the court granted PCMC’s motion. ECF No. 29.
Noting Schaetz had failed to file a timely response, the court concluded that PCMC’s motion could
be granted for that reason alone. ECF No. 27 at 2 (citing Civil L.R. 7(d)). The court nevertheless
proceeded to address PCMC’s motion on the merits and found his objections without merit. Id. The
court further held, “Schaetz’s refusal to provide the basic information requested by the defendants
in their discovery requests and his refusal to confer with them before forcing them to file their motion
to compel is inexcusable.” Id. at 3. It thereupon granted the motion to compel and ordered Schaetz
to respond to the defendant’s discovery requests within ten days of the date of the order. The court
explicitly warned Schaetz that failure to comply “may result in the dismissal of his lawsuit with
prejudice.” Id. Finally, the court also awarded PCMC its reasonable expenses in bringing the
motion, including reasonable attorneys fees, subject to Schaetz’s right to object within ten days and
show cause why fees should not be imposed. Id.
On October 27, 2017, Schaetz filed a request for relief from the award of attorney fees,
explaining that he “had already supplied the defendants with everything they had asked for plus more
before they filed their motion to compel” and reiterating that he has “always been more than willing
to participate in a meaningful discovery.” ECF No. 30. The court ordered PCMC to respond. ECF
No. 31. In its response, PCMC contends that not only did Schaetz fail to offer a reason not to
impose attorneys fees, but he still has not provided proper responses to PCMC’s discovery requests.
PCMC therefore asks the court not only to enforce its award of reasonable attorney fees but also to
dismiss this action with prejudice. ECF No. 32. PCMC notes that while Schaetz did serve his
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response within ten days of the court’s order, his new responses once again consisted of boilerplate
objections.
PCMC’s request for dismissal will be granted. Schaetz waived any new objections to
PCMC’s interrogatories by failing to assert them earlier. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (“Any ground not
stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.”). A party
does not get to try one set of objections and, if the court doesn’t buy them, come back later with
another set. Schaetz was told in clear and unequivocal terms to answer the questions. He did not
do so.
Even aside from the question of waiver, Schaetz’s new objections are as meritless as the last
set. For example, in response to Interrogatory No. 1, which directs him to “Identify any and all
individuals with knowledge of any discoverable information concerning any of the claims raised in
the Complaint,” Schaetz responded:
A) INFORMATION ALREADY SUPPLIED - Plaintiff objects to this discovery
request because the information requested by the Defendant had already been
supplied to the Defendant by other methods. B) INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO
REQUESTING PARTY - Plaintiff objects to this discovery request. This
information is readily or equally available to the Defendants as it is to the Plaintiff.
If a moving party can obtain the documents or information without resort to
discovery no cause exists for requesting the discovery.
ECF No. 33-1 at 1.
Neither objection has merit. Nowhere does Schaetz say where, when, or by what method
he has already supplied the information requested. If he means his Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures,
the information called for by Interrogatory No. 1 is not the same. Rule 26(a)(1) requires the
disclosure of the name, address and telephone number of the individuals with discoverable
information, along with the subjects of that information, “that the disclosing party may use to support
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its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(1)(A)(I). The challenged Interrogatory seeks the name of people with “any discoverable
information,” whether they support the plaintiff’s claim or, even more importantly, do not support
it.
As for Objection B, the interrogatory calls for Schaetz’s knowledge of the evidence in his
case. Schaetz’s knowledge of the evidence may be right or wrong, true or false, but PCMC certainly
has a right to discover it and there is no other way PCMC can learn what evidence he thinks he has
than by getting it from him. To refuse to answer because PCMC has equal access to the information
is absurd. Yet, Schaetz interposed the same or similarly meritless objections to each of PCMC’s
Interrogatories and Requests for Production. ECF Nos. 33-1, 33-2.
I recognize that dismissal is a harsh sanction and should not be ordered lightly. Williams v.
Chicago Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Dismissal is a very harsh sanction,
however, and should be used ‘only in extreme situations, when there is a clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct, or when other less drastic sanctions have proven unavailing.’”) (quoting
Dunphy v. McKee, 134 F.3d 1297, 1299 (7th Cir.1998)). I also recognize that Schaetz is pro se,
though he claims to have consulted with an attorney. ECF No. 33-1 at 4. At the same time,
dismissal is an essential tool available to district courts “to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962). And filing a case
pro se is not a license to ignore the Rules of Civil Procedure and orders of the court, and thereby
increase the costs of defense and possibly the settlement value of the case.
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs district courts that all of the rules
“should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just,
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speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Allowing this case to
proceed would frustrate every one of those goals. By failing to properly respond to PCMC’s
discovery requests in a timely manner, Schaetz has delayed the case and forced PCMC to
unnecessarily incur attorneys fees and costs in attempting, first informally, and then by motion, to
compel him to respond to its lawful discovery requests. The court found no merit to Schaetz’s
objections and ordered him to provide responses to PCMC within ten days, warning him that he
risked dismissal if he did not comply. PCMC was then forced to incur additional attorneys fees when
Schaetz again failed to answer its discovery requests and simply exchanged the earlier objections he
had interposed with new ones that had no more merit. To allow Schaetz, pro se or not, to continue
to delay the case and unnecessarily increase the costs PCMC must incur in its defense is not just.
Ordering Schaetz to pay additional attorneys fees is unlikely to have any impact since Schaetz claims
he is unable to pay them in any event.
Lastly, I have considered the merits of Schaetz’s case to the extent I am able to discern them
from the record as it now stands. Schaetz initially filed his complaint by mistake in the Milwaukee
division almost a year ago on February 27, 2017. It was first assigned to a magistrate judge, but then
reassigned to a district judge after PCMC refused to consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction. The
district judge to whom it was assigned then transferred it to the Green Bay division on April 28,
2017. In the meantime, PCMC had filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because, even though
Schaetz alleged his employer discriminated against him, he failed to allege any unlawful basis on
which the alleged discrimination occurred. The court granted PCMC’s motion on May 24, 2017,
with leave to amend within thirty days. Schaetz then filed an amended complaint on June 19, 2017,
alleging the discrimination was on account of his sex (male) and perceived sexual orientation. He
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has also supplemented the record with CDs containing surreptitious recordings he made of coemployees and supervisors while working at PCMC that he contends support his claims of
discrimination. While I have not taken the time to listen to all of the CDs (he submitted five), the
one conversation I did listen to is of a male supervisor listening to Schaetz and the male co-employee
he claims was tormenting him complain about each other. The supervisor can be heard telling them
both that he didn’t believe either one of them, and that they needed to learn to get along and do their
jobs. Neither in the recording I listened to, nor in any Schaetz has identified is there evidence of
discrimination against Schaetz because of his sex or perceived sexual orientation. In other words,
Schaetz’s case has all the earmarks of an extortionate lawsuit. For this reason, too, I conclude that
dismissal is appropriate.
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, this case is ordered dismissed on its merits
and with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3). The Clerk is directed to enter judgment of
dismissal forthwith.
SO ORDERED at Green Bay, Wisconsin this 22nd day of January, 2018.
s/ William C. Griesbach
William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge
United States District Court

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