Ripple v. Zurich Financial Services Group

Filing 26

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 9/13/2017: DENYING 8 Zurich's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction and DENYING as moot 10 Zurich's Motion for Expedited Discovery. See Order. (cc: all counsel) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
THOMAS RIPPLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY,

Case No. 17-CV-469-JPS

ORDER

Defendant.

1.

INTRODUCTION
On March 31, 2017, the plaintiff, Thomas Ripple (“Ripple”), filed

this lawsuit seeking a declaration as to the enforceability of the terms of
his employment agreements with the defendant, Zurich American
Insurance Company (“Zurich”).1 (Docket #1). Ripple claims that the
agreements he executed pursuant to his employment at Zurich are void
and unenforceable. See generally id.2 Zurich, for its part, denies the
allegations in Ripple’s complaint and brings several counterclaims against
him for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty,

According to the defendant, “Zurich Financial Services Group,” was
incorrectly named as the defendant, as “it is not a separate corporate entity but
rather a trade name that is no longer in use.” (Docket #13 at 1). The proper
defendant is Zurich American Insurance Company. Id. Ripple has not expressed
disagreement. The Court has updated the defendant’s name in the case caption.
1

Ripple has invoked this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a), which the Court deems proper because it is uncontested that the
citizenship of the parties is completely diverse and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. (Docket #1 at 2).
2

misappropriation of trade secrets, and conversion. (Docket #7). Zurich’s
counterclaims are based on Ripple’s alleged misconduct following the
termination of his employment with Zurich, including his operation of a
competing business, RBI, LLC (“RBI”), which Zurich claims is unfairly
competing in the same territory previously serviced by Ripple on Zurich’s
behalf.
On April 26, 2017, Zurich filed a motion for a temporary restraining
order and a preliminary injunction. (Docket #8). That motion sets forth the
same core allegations as appear in Zurich’s counterclaims: that Ripple
continues to breach the non-solicitation and confidentiality terms of his
former employment contract and that such activities are irreparably
harming Zurich’s reputation and business relationships. (See generally
Docket #9). In light of these harms, Zurich asks the Court to grant it a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule
65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket #8, #9). Specifically,
Zurich asks this Court to enter an order enjoining “Ripple, and all parties
in active concert or participation with him, . . . from using or disclosing
any of Zurich’s confidential, proprietary and/or trade secret information”
and from “engaging in or participating in any employment or activity,
insomuch as such activity is directed to or designed to solicit or divert any
of Zurich’s customers or potential customers that Ripple contacted,
targeted or serviced, or about which he had access to confidential
information while in Zurich’s employ.” (Docket #9-1). Zurich further asks
the Court to direct Ripple, and all parties in concert with him, to return to
Zurich any files, devices, or documents that contain its confidential
information. Id.

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Zurich’s motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. (Docket
#8, #9, #16, #17, #22). For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes
that a preliminary injunction is inappropriate and will, therefore, deny
Zurich’s motion for preliminary equitable relief. (Docket #8).3
2.

BACKGROUND
The following facts, most of which are undisputed, are drawn from

the complaint and the parties’ submissions. (Docket #1, #8, #9, #16, #17,
#22).
2.1

Ripple’s Employment with Zurich

Zurich is a commercial property-casualty insurance provider with
its principal place of business in Illinois. One of Zurich’s categories of
offerings is Finance & Insurance (“F&I”) products for auto dealerships.
These products include vehicle service contracts, tire and wheel
protections, prepaid maintenance, guaranteed asset protection, limited
warranty programs, theft deterrent, paintless dent repair, environmental
protection, windshield protection, and key protection.
Generally, Zurich’s account executives are responsible for
cultivating and growing relationships with dealerships in their territory.
They also provide consulting services to dealerships and help them to
maximize their profitability in the sale of add-on services after a customer
purchases a vehicle from the dealership. Zurich states that it invests

Zurich has also moved for expedited discovery. (Docket #10). The motion
is unnecessary. As the Court explained to the parties at the Scheduling
Conference on May 19, 2017, the Court leaves deadlines, including discovery
deadlines, to be sorted out by the parties themselves. In this branch of the Court,
discovery on all issues is open once the FRCP 26(f) conference is held between
the parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d). The motion will be denied as moot.
3

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substantial time and resources to build and maintain goodwill and longterm relationships with dealerships across the country.
Ripple began working for Zurich in its auto dealership F&I division
in July 2008. He remained at Zurich for ten years until he voluntarily
resigned in January 2017. Ripple’s assigned territory included five
counties in Southeastern Wisconsin: Milwaukee, Ozaukee, Washington,
Waukesha, and Dodge. As a function of his position as an F&I executive
for Zurich, Ripple had access to “Zurich’s trade secret information with
respect to its product offerings, including marketing analysis, fee
schedules for profit sharing with customers, and customer portfolios for
those customers and prospective customers in his Territory only.” (Docket
#9 at 7). In addition, Ripple was entrusted with Zurich’s “highly valuable
customer relationships.” Id. He was the “direct liaison between Zurich and
its customers.” Id. In Ripple’s capacity as one of Zurich’s national sales
trainers, he had access to information regarding “Zurich’s proprietary
sales process, how Zurich used it to increase its dealership satisfaction,
and how to use this proprietary information as an enticement to new
dealerships to move their F&I business from their existing provider to
Zurich.” Id. at 4.
Ripple signed two agreements at the commencement of his
employment with Zurich—an Employment Agreement and an Agreement
Relating to Proprietary Information/Equipment/Work Development
(“Proprietary Information Agreement”). Id. at 7. The Employment
Agreement contains several provisions relevant to this dispute. First, in
Paragraph 9, Ripple agreed that during his employment with Zurich and
for five years afterward, he would keep confidential and not use or
disclose, but for the benefit of the company, any “sensitive and/or
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confidential information of Company.” (Docket #9-4 at 3). It goes on to
define sensitive and confidential information to include various things
such as customer lists, business plans, and pricing strategies. Id.
Paragraph 10 of the Employment Agreement relates to trade secrets,
which are defined to include an array of things such as customer lists,
premiums charged, expiration dates of policies, the company’s prospect
list, inspection reports, maps, rate computations, inventory reports, and
etcetera. Id. Under this Paragraph, Ripple agreed not to disclose such
“trade secrets,” except to other employees or affiliates, “during or after the
term of his/her employment,” with no outer time limit. Id. Breach of
Paragraph 10 entitles Zurich to an injunction restraining inference with
Zurich’s rights for one year following the employee’s termination. Id. at 4.
The next paragraph requires Ripple to return company documents and
property to Zurich upon leaving the company. Id.
Finally, Paragraph 12 contains a non-solicitation provision
prohibiting Ripple, for one year following termination of his employment,
from soliciting policies, applications, or inquiries about insurance, or
“insurance-related products or services,” from any person or firm that
was a customer of Zurich or its affiliates within one year prior to Ripple’s
termination, or, in the case of insurance policies (as opposed to insurancerelated products), with whom Zurich regularly transacted business. Id.
The restriction applies within the territory to which Ripple was assigned
during the year preceding his termination. Id. The Employment
Agreement contains a Kansas choice-of-law provision. Id. at 5.
The other agreement Ripple signed at the start of his employment
with Zurich, the Proprietary Information Agreement, covers much of the
same type of information referenced in the Employment Agreement.
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(Docket #1-2 at 1). It prohibits Ripple from disclosing, during or after his
employment, “proprietary information” including, for example, computer
software programs, access codes, marketing and pricing information,
financial data, strategic information, and etcetera. Id. Zurich downplays
the importance of this agreement, stating that this agreement was not
tailored to Ripple’s work as an F&I account executive, but instead was a
standard agreement that all Zurich employees are required to sign upon
hire.
2.2

Ripple’s Separation from Zurich

On January 3, 2017, Ripple gave a two-week notice of his
resignation to Zurich. Ripple told Zurich he was starting his own business
because his goals and ambitions no longer lined up with Zurich’s model
and because he was suffering effects from a serious back injury in 2013.
Ripple told Zurich that his new business would focus on training and
consulting for dealerships, as that was the area in which he had extensive
experience. Zurich did not want to lose Ripple and made attempts at
convincing him to stay, but Ripple left Zurich’s employ on January 16,
2017.
After Ripple left, Zurich reviewed Ripple’s business email and
learned that in August 2016, months before his resignation, Ripple had
already started his business, RBI LLC (“RBI”), with John Bonner, a former
F&I director for EvS Auto Group, a Zurich customer. Ripple, for his part,
states that although Bonner registered the name of RBI with the Wisconsin
Department of Financial Institutions in August 2016, he and Bonner did
not draft any organizational documents, otherwise operate RBI, or reach
out to customers on RBI’s behalf until after Ripple left Zurich.

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Zurich also learned that, for several months prior to his departure,
Ripple emailed confidential and trade secret information from Zurich to
his RBI email account as well as to his and his wife’s personal email
accounts. Zurich states that this information “would give any competitor
an immediate and substantial competitive advantage.” (Docket #9 at 11).
Ripple maintains that he did not take Zurich’s trade secrets or
confidential information and is not using any such information to unfairly
compete with Zurich. He says that he sent e-mails to his personal e-mail
account because it was easier to use his personal computer to work on
presentations and other projects for Zurich. Ripple states that Zurich
knew he worked from home often, including during the time following
his December 13, 2016 back surgery, when he worked from home
exclusively. Ripple sometimes sent e-mails to his wife’s account so that
she could help with styling, formatting, making labels, and other similar
tasks. He claims Zurich knew that his wife helped with such tasks and
encouraged the practice. Finally, Ripple states that a significant number of
the supposedly confidential e-mails and documents about which Zurich
complains contained information that was readily available or freely
shared with Zurich’s customers and potential customers without
confidentiality protections. For example, Ripple states that “[p]ricing and
fees charged to an auto dealer are an ‘open book’ in this industry.”
(Docket #16 at 12).
At the end of January 2017, Ripple had second thoughts about his
departure from Zurich and contacted Eric Hart, a Zurich executive, to
inquire about the possibility of returning to Zurich in some capacity. Hart
told Ripple that Ripple’s position had been filled, but that Zurich would
be willing to explore whether there were other opportunities available.
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The two men met on February 2, 2017, at Zurich’s Waukesha office to
discuss Ripple’s possible return to Zurich. At that meeting, “Hart
confronted Ripple about his formation of his business, RBI (while still
employed by Zurich) and the fact that Ripple had sent Zurich’s
confidential and trade secret information to his personal email accounts.”
(Docket #9 at 12). Zurich states that Ripple responded by saying that “the
information had been destroyed and not used by him.” Id. Ripple states
that he addressed the e-mail controversy by “explain[ing] that the
information was not secret or confidential, and the issue was dismissed by
Zurich.” (Docket #16 at 12).
On February 17, 2017, Zurich offered Ripple the position of
regional manager, a significant promotion from his previous position as
an account executive. Zurich provided Ripple with compensation details,
and Ripple said he needed time to think over the offer and discuss it with
his wife. On February 20, 2017, after not hearing from Ripple, Hart
contacted Ripple, who turned down the job. Zurich states that
immediately afterward, Zurich began hearing from its customers that they
were receiving solicitations from Ripple on behalf of his new business.
On March 24, 2017, Zurich sent a cease and desist letter to Ripple,
citing the restrictive covenants in the employments agreements Ripple
signed upon his hiring at Zurich. Ripple’s counsel responded by letter to
Zurich on March 28, 2017, stating that Ripple believed his agreements
with Zurich were not enforceable and that Ripple was entitled to engage
in competitive conduct. On March 31, 2017, Ripple filed his complaint in
this case, asking the Court to declare his rights and obligations under his
Zurich employment agreements.

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2.3

Harm to Zurich

Zurich claims that “[b]ased on Ripple’s conduct, including his
misappropriation of Zurich’s trade secret information, Zurich stands to
lose hundreds of thousands of dollars in business with automotive
dealerships as well as losing the value of its goodwill, customer
relationships,

trade

secrets

and

confidential

and

proprietary

information[.]” (Docket #9 at 14). Zurich states that Ripple was exposed to
and helped to develop information related to Zurich’s customers and
offerings, including “selling strategies, customer product portfolios, and
competitive pricing regarding Zurich’s F&I services.” Id. Zurich states that
“Ripple is now utilizing that confidential information and trading off of
Zurich’s customer relationships, to erode Zurich’s standing in the
insurance services market[,]” and that the “trade secret information and
customer relationships . . . are invaluable[.]” Id. Zurich believes that
Ripple is competing, and will to continue to attempt to compete, with
Zurich with respect to the same customers with whom he had a
relationship while at Zurich. Id.
3.

LEGAL STANDARD
“[A] preliminary injunction is an exercise of a very far-reaching

power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it.”
Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 389 (7th Cir. 1984)
(quotation omitted). “To determine whether a situation warrants such a
remedy, a district court engages in an analysis that proceeds in two
distinct phases: a threshold phase and a balancing phase.” Girl Scouts of
Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S. of Am., Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1085–
86 (7th Cir. 2008).

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In the “threshold phase,” the Court must determine if the movant
has met its burden to establish that: (1) “absent a preliminary injunction, it
will suffer irreparable harm in the interim period prior to final resolution
of its claims”; (2) “traditional legal remedies would be inadequate”; and
(3) “its claim has some likelihood of succeeding on the merits.” Id.
(internal citations omitted). If the party seeking a preliminary injunction
fails to satisfy its obligation to demonstrate any of these elements, the
Court must not grant the injunction. See Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co.,
971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992). And, only in the event that “the [C]ourt finds
that the moving party has passed this initial threshold, [will] it then
proceed[] to the balancing phase of the analysis.” Girl Scouts of Manitou
Council, Inc., 549 F.3d at 1086.
“In this second phase, the court, in an attempt to minimize the cost
of potential error, ‘must somehow balance the nature and degree of the
[movant]’s injury, the likelihood of prevailing at trial, the possible injury
to the [non-movant] if the injunction is granted, and the wild card that is
the ‘public interest.’” Id. (quoting Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d
1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986)). “Specifically, the [C]ourt weighs the irreparable
harm that the moving party would endure without the protection of the
preliminary injunction against any irreparable harm the nonmoving party
would suffer if the [C]ourt were to grant the requested relief.” Id. (citing
Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 11–12). This process involves engaging in what
the Court of Appeals terms “the sliding scale approach; the more likely
the [movant] will succeed on the merits, the less the balance of irreparable
harms need favor the [movant’s] position.” Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237
F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001). “[T]his balancing process should also
encompass any effects that granting or denying the preliminary injunction
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would have on nonparties (something courts have termed the ‘public
interest’).” Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc., 549 F.3d at 1086. “Taking
into account all these considerations, the district court must exercise its
discretion ‘to arrive at a decision based on a subjective evaluation of the
import of the various factors and a personal, intuitive sense about the
nature of the case.’” Id. (quoting Lawson Prods., 782 F.2d at 1436).
4.

ANALYSIS
Zurich has not made the robust showing needed to secure a

preliminary injunction in this case. The Court need only discuss one of the
required elements—irreparable harm—to demonstrate why Zurich’s
motion must be denied.
The Seventh Circuit teaches that “[o]nly if [the movant] will suffer
irreparable harm in the interim—that is, harm that cannot be prevented or
fully rectified by the final judgment after trial—can he get a preliminary
injunction. . . . The question is [] whether the [movant] will be made whole
if he prevails on the merits and is awarded damages.” Roland Mach. Co.,
749 F.2d at 386. This is an exceedingly high burden. The movant must
show not simply that obtaining money damages at judgment will be
“inadequate”—he must show that they will be “seriously deficient as a
remedy for the harm suffered.” Id. Further, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that a movant must do more than show a possibility that
irreparable harm may occur; it must “demonstrate that irreparable injury
is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (emphasis in original).
The movant may meet this burden by demonstrating that, absent
an injunction, (1) it will become insolvent or lose its business; (2) it will be
unable to finance its lawsuit; (3) it will incur damages that are very
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difficult to calculate; or (4) the non-movant will become insolvent or lose
its business (and thus become unable to pay any money damages). Roland
Mach. Co., 749 F.2d at 386. Where a movant will not incur losses so great as
to threaten its solvency and where its losses will be largely economic and
thus measurable and compensable, the movant does not establish
irreparable harm. Praefke Auto Elec. & Battery Inc. v. Tecumseh Prods. Co.,
255 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2001).
Zurich has not asserted that it cannot afford to finance this lawsuit
absent an injunction, or that it or Ripple will become insolvent if an
injunction does not issue. Zurich’s only argument bearing upon
irreparable harm is that its damages will be difficult to measure. (Docket
#9 at 26-27). Zurich complains that Ripple is “attempting to displace and
replace Zurich” in the Wisconsin market Ripple previously serviced “by
using Zurich’s own confidential and trade secret information against it.”
Id. at 27. Zurich worries that, without an injunction, it will “los[e] sales
and market share” and its “reputation and goodwill in the highlycompetitive F&I services marketplace” will be damaged. Id. These harms,
Zurich contends, are not the type which are readily compensable by
money damages.
Zurich has not met its heavy burden of showing that it is likely to
incur irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction does not issue. First,
RBI has not yet secured a single customer. (Docket #16 at 26). This, of
course, means that Ripple’s competing business—which Zurich alleges
was started in August 2016 and Ripple states was operational as of his
departure from Zurich in January 2017—has not yet taken any business
from Zurich, let alone enough business to seriously diminish Zurich’s
place in the market. This is especially true given that Ripple is only
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equipped to compete with Zurich, an international commercial propertycasualty company, in one discrete subsection of Zurich’s overall business,
F&I for auto dealerships, and in one relatively small area, Southeastern
Wisconsin. Given the limited measure of documented damage to its
business thus far—namely, notice from one Zurich customer, Andrew
Chevrolet, that Ripple has marketed RBI’s training services to it, and
speculation that Ripple will solicit one other customer, Heiser—it is
unlikely Zurich will suffer significant harm between now and entry of
final judgment. (Docket #9-2 at 11-12); see also Roland Mach. Co., 749 F.2d at
391 (court is concerned only with damages that might be incurred up to
the entry of final judgment).
Although Zurich’s business is one in which relationships between
its representatives and clients are important in establishing goodwill that
drives business, see (Docket #9-2 at 2-3 and #9-3 at 2-3), Zurich has not
shown that Ripple’s competition is likely to threaten its reputation or
goodwill in any significant way before entry of final judgment. This case
is unlike BMO Harris Bank NA v. Lailer, where the movant “provided the
Court with declarations from two of [its] financial services employees that
attest to their having experienced damaged, if not totally destroyed, client
relationships from [the former employee’s] contacts and meetings with
[their] clients” and where the former employee sent e-mail solicitations
attacking the reputation of her former employer. No. 16-CV-545-JPS, 2016
WL 6155997, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 21, 2016). Zurich’s speculation that
Ripple will attempt to lure customers away and tarnish Zurich’s
reputation, without more, it not enough to satisfy the Court that an
injunction is necessary.

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Next, Zurich’s plea that a denial of its motion will “impair [its]
ability to protect [its proprietary] information” is not, at this point in the
litigation, supported by the record. Zurich has not put forward evidence,
beyond conjecture from its executives, that Ripple is using its proprietary
information in his new business. Zurich has presented evidence that
Ripple sent e-mails to his personal and business accounts attaching
Zurich’s confidential information before he left Zurich, but it does not
present evidence that Ripple retained that information and is using it for
nefarious purposes. For example, although Scott Gangne, a manager at
Zurich, states in his declaration that he has personal knowledge of Ripple
marketing his consulting services to Zurich’s customers, he does not
present evidence that Ripple has shared Zurich’s proprietary information
with any potential customer. (Docket #9-2 at 11-13).
Finally, Zurich’s untimeliness in requesting an injunction militates
against granting its motion. Ty, Inc., 237 F.3d at 903 (“Delay in pursuing a
preliminary injunction may raise questions regarding the plaintiff’s claim
that he or she will face irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not
entered.”); Rexnord, Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 628 F. Supp. 467, 473–74 (E.D.
Wis. 1986) (delay in seeking relief “undercuts the sense of urgency that
ordinarily accompanies a motion for preliminary relief and suggests that
there is, in fact, no irreparable injury.”). Zurich concedes that it knew
about Ripple’s competing business and alleged theft of Zurich’s
proprietary information by mid-January 2017 when Ripple resigned.
Despite this knowledge, Zurich offered him a more senior position at
Zurich a month later. After Ripple turned down the offer, Zurich did not
file a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief. It might not have sought any relief
from this Court if not for Ripple’s filing of this declaratory judgment
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action on March 31, 2017. Zurich then waited the full twenty-one days
after service to file its answer and, along with it, its motion for a
preliminary injunction. While delay alone is not sufficient to negate
irreparable harm, it is an important factor in this case. Zurich’s delay
reassures the Court that Zurich can wait until entry of final judgment to
collect any damages to which it proves it is entitled.
The outcome here is not changed by Zurich’s citation to JAK
Products, Inc. v. Wiza, in which the Seventh Circuit held that “[w]henever
an employee uses his experience gained from an employer in violation of
a reasonable covenant not to compete, irreparable injury occurs and
injunctive relief is appropriate.” 986 F.2d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing
Indiana law). The JAK Products court relied on clear precedent from
Indiana, which the parties agreed governed the dispute, id. at n.2, in
finding that irreparable injury is assumed when the violation of a
reasonable non-compete is proved. Id. at 1084. This precedent is not
helpful for present purposes, where, although the parties disagree about
which state’s law governs the enforceability of the employment
agreements, the only states whose laws they argue might apply are
Wisconsin or Kansas, not Indiana. The JAK Products decision, therefore, is
not sufficient to tilt the Court’s analysis in Zurich’s favor.
Further, the parties have not addressed whether the question of
irreparable harm is a matter of substantive law, to which state law would
apply, or procedural law, to which federal law would apply. See Turnell v.
CentiMark Corp., 796 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2015) (federal courts sitting in
diversity apply state substantive law but federal procedural law under the
eponymous Erie doctrine). In other words, although the parties present
argument as to which state’s law the Court should apply to construe the
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employment agreements, they do not advise the Court as to which law
should govern the irreparable harm analysis. Absent argument from
either party on this issue, the Court elects to apply federal law.
Furthermore, Zurich bore the burden to present the Court with all of the
facts and arguments necessary to grant its requested relief. It failed to do
so and the Court will not craft the arguments necessary to save its motion.
See Luddington v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 230 (7th Cir. 1992).
5.

CONCLUSION
Zurich has not established that it faces irreparable harm from

Ripple’s conduct, and thus cannot prove all of the prerequisites necessary
to obtain a preliminary injunction. As a result, its motion must be denied.
Abbott Labs, 971 F.2d at 11 (if the [movant] cannot establish both likelihood
of success and irreparable injury, “a court’s inquiry is over and the
injunction must be denied”).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Zurich’s motion for a temporary restraining
order and a preliminary injunction (Docket #8) be and the same is hereby
DENIED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Zurich’s motion for expedited
discovery (Docket #10) be and the same is hereby DENIED as moot.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 13th day of September, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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