Castellano v. Mahin et al
Filing
13
ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 6/13/2017 DISMISSING from action Defendant Wisconsin Department of Corrections Division of Community Corrections. Plaintiff PERMITTED to proceed on claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) that Defendan t Mahin imposed conditions of probation beyond those permitted by the applicable criminal judgment(s) or orders imposing same, or imposed existing conditions in an unconstitutional manner, in violation of Plaintiffs rights under the First, Fourth, Ei ghth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Copies of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and this Order to be electronically sent to the Wisconsin DOJ for service on Defendant, who shall file responsive pleading within 60 days. See Order for further details. (cc: all counsel, via mail to John J. Castellano at Racine Correctional Institution)(jm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
JOHN J. CASTELLANO,
v.
Plaintiff,
REBECCA MAHIN and WISCONSIN
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
DIVISION OF COMMUNITY
CORRECTIONS,
Case No. 17-CV-598-JPS
ORDER
Defendants.
Plaintiff John J. Castellano, who is incarcerated at Racine
Correctional Institution, proceeds in this matter pro se. He filed a lengthy
complaint alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights.
(Docket #1). The Court ordered Plaintiff to supply an amended complaint
in compliance with, inter alia, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Docket #11 at 7). Plaintiff did so on June 7, 2017, submitting a succinct
three-page amended complaint. (Docket #12).
As noted in its May 30, 2017 screening order on the initial complaint,
the Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking
relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a
governmental entity. See (Docket #11 at 1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court
must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims
that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The same standards
cited in the original screening order apply here. (Docket #11 at 1-3).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that Defendant Rebecca
Mahin (“Mahin”) was his parole agent from June 18, 2013 to January 17,
2014. (Docket #12 at 1). Plaintiff claims that in enforcing various parole rules
against him, Mahin violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 1-3. These
include an alleged violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights “by
intimidating him writing: ‘[Y]ou SHALL place your initials at the end of
each specific rule to show you have read the rule.’” Id. at 1. In the same vein,
Plaintiff claims his First Amendment rights were violated when Mahin
sought to revoke Plaintiff’s parole for his refusal to sign the parole rules. Id.
at 2. Plaintiff contends that other of his constitutional rights were violated
when Mahin enforced his parole rules on computer access (First
Amendment), employment (First Amendment), GPS monitoring (Fourth
Amendment), and incarcerating him for parole violations, thereby
interfering with his medications (Eighth Amendment). Id. Finally, Plaintiff
maintains that Mahin violated his Equal Protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment by seeking revocation of his parole. Id. at 2-3.
Most of Plaintiff’s claims are the proper subject of a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit holds that conditions of
probation are a form of custody. Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220, 1225
(7th Cir. 1977). A challenge to those conditions is an attack on the fact and/or
duration of the plaintiff’s confinement, which “is the traditional function of
the writ of habeas corpus.” Id. Now that Plaintiff’s parole has been revoked
and he is incarcerated, any potential habeas relief has been rendered moot.
Further, the plaintiff may not proceed on a claim “for having been
recommitted based on the violation of release conditions that he contends
are unconstitutional[.] . . . A successful damages claim would vitiate the
basis for his commitment, and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 . . . (1994),
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bars civil damages actions where a ‘judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.’” Henderson
v. Bryant, 606 F. App’x 301, 304 (7th Cir. 2015). To the extent Plaintiff was
revoked on any of the complained-of conditions, Heck bars any claim.
In a similar factual scenario, Henderson identified one type of claim
that could survive screening:
Henderson appears to seek damages for having had to
endure for three months the restrictive conditions of release
(or abusive actions of the defendants) that did not lead to his
recommitment but which he contends to have been
unconstitutional. Because a successful damages action
challenging those conditions or actions would not imply the
invalidity of his current confinement, Heck does not bar a §
1983 claim challenging them. But these claims face a different
hurdle: insofar as they seek damages from the defendants for
enforcing release conditions that a court specifically ordered,
the defendants may be protected by absolute quasi-judicial
immunity, which would bar any recovery. But for two
reasons it is too soon to treat these claims as blocked by
absolute immunity. First, Henderson contends that, by
barring all contact with family members and entering and
searching his home at night while he slept, the defendants
enforced the court’s order in an unconstitutional manner; a
claim that a defendant enforced a court order in an
unconstitutional manner is not necessarily barred by quasijudicial immunity. Second, the defendants have not yet been
served and so have not yet advanced any defenses, which the
district court should ordinarily consider in the first instance.
Henderson may thus proceed on this one aspect of his case.
Id. at 304-05 (citations omitted).
The complaint and related exhibits do not clearly explain the full
extent of the conditions to which Plaintiff was subject, the criminal case or
other action in which those conditions were imposed, and a complete list of
the reasons for his latest parole revocation. Without these facts, the Court
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cannot conclude that all of Plaintiff’s claims are invalid. However, upon
appearance by Mahin, the remainder may be dismissed pursuant to
applicable affirmative defenses, such as immunity or the Heck doctrine, if
the facts show that Plaintiff’s current confinement is pursuant to a violation
of the conditions. Id. Still, those considerations must wait until Mahin has
had an opportunity to respond to Plaintiff’s amended complaint.
In sum, the court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on the following
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b): Mahin’s imposition of conditions of
probation beyond those permitted by the applicable criminal judgment(s)
or other valid orders imposing the same, or the imposition of existing
conditions in an unconstitutional manner, in violation of Plaintiff’s rights
under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff is
not permitted to proceed on a claim for injunctive relief related to
enforcement of the parole supervision rules; a claim for past wrongs is moot
because he is now in prison, and a claim for future wrongs is premature
because no parole rules have yet been imposed. Id. at 304.1
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant Wisconsin Department of
Corrections Division of Community Corrections be and the same is hereby
DISMISSED from this action;
In addition to Mahin, Plaintiff names the Division of Community
Corrections, an arm of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, as a defendant.
The Eleventh Amendment generally precludes a citizen from suing a State or one
of its agencies or departments in federal court. Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588,
592 (7th Cir. 2001). The only relevant exception would be if Plaintiff sought
prospective equitable relief, but as noted above, he cannot do so. The Wisconsin
Department of Corrections must be dismissed from this action.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to an informal service
agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court,
copies of plaintiff’s amended complaint and this order are being
electronically sent today to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for service
on the state defendant; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the informal service
agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, the
defendant shall file a responsive pleading to the amended complaint within
sixty (60) days of receiving electronic notice of this order.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 13th day of June, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
J. P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge
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