Jackson v. Kuepper et al

Filing 13

ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 6/1/18. IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for reconsideration 11 is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs amended complaint [12-1] is the operative complaint in this lawsuit. IT IS FURTHER ORD ERED that Lieutenant Norman, Warden Judy P. Smith, Segregation Supervisor Hass Kuster, WDOC Secretary Jon Litscher, Secretary Cathy Jess, Administrator Security Captain Tony, and Division of Adult Institutions James R. Schwochert are DISMISSED as def endants. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, copies of plaintiff's amended complaint and this order are being electronically sent today to the Wisconsi n Department of Justice for service on CO II Officer Kuepper, Deputy Warden Robert Hable, and Security Director James Zanon. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that, pursuant to the informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this cour t, defendants CO II Officer Kuepper, Deputy Warden Robert Hable, and Security Director James Zanon shall file a responsive pleading to the complaint within sixty days of receiving electronic notice of this order. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that a copy of thi s order be sent to the officer in charge of the agency where plaintiff is confined. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may not begin discovery until after the court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions. (cc: all counsel, plaintiff, warden) (jad)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________
LONNIE L. JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 17-CV-627

CO II OFFICER KUEPPER,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
Plaintiff Lonnie L. Jackson, a pro se transgender Wisconsin state prisoner who
identifies as female, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that several
defendants violated her constitutional rights. Docket No. 1. I screened her complaint
and allowed her to file an amended complaint that complied with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 18(a) and 20. Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint. Docket No. 12-1. She
has also filed a motion asking me to reconsider my denial of her motion to use $100 of
her release account to pay for her litigation. Docket No. 11. This order screens plaintiff’s
amended complaint and resolves her motion.
I.

SCREENING AMENDED COMPLAINT

I am required to screen complaints, including amended complaints, brought by
prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). I must dismiss a complaint or portion
thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, plaintiff is
required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [she] is
entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It is not necessary for plaintiff to plead specific
facts and her statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, a complaint that
offers mere “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when [] plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that [] defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint’s allegations “must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(citation omitted).
In considering whether a complaint states a claim, I follow the principles set forth
in Twombly by, first, “identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Legal
conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. Id. If there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, the court must, second, “assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.

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To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: 1)
she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States;
and 2) the deprivation was by defendants acting under color of state law. BuchananMoore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v.
Village of North Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). I am obliged to give plaintiff’s pro se allegations,
“however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
A.

ALLEGATIONS
At all times relevant to this complaint, plaintiff was an inmate at Oshkosh

Correctional Institution (OCI) and defendants were employed by the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections (WDOC).
Plaintiff alleges the following facts. On the evening of April 25, 2015, while she
was being housed in the segregation unit, she asked defendant Kuepper to fill her
medical ice bag—which was dark blue at the time—with ice, in accordance with her
medical restriction. Defendant Kuepper took the bag and returned it to plaintiff half full of
ice. Plaintiff wrapped the bag in a blue towel, placed it in her bed against her back, and
went to sleep.
At some point, the ice in the bag had melted, and plaintiff was awakened by its
leaking contents. She removed the bag from her bed. She later poured some of its
contents into her red segregation cup, drank it, and then went back to sleep.

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At some time between 3:05 a.m. and 3:20 a.m., plaintiff began feeling pains in
her stomach, lightheaded, dizzy, and “quizzy.” Docket No. 12-1 ¶ 22. She vomited
twice. She then noticed “a great deal of ‘Bubbles’ in the toilet water.” Id. She reviewed
the medical ice bag contents, tasted what she had poured into her cup from the bag,
and surmised that the bag contained “industrial hand sanitizing hand soap,” a product
used throughout the institution for cleaning. Id.
Plaintiff spoke with a third-shift range officer about what had happened and
asked him if the use of soap in medical ice bags was a practice. The range officer said
that it was common practice to use salt and pepper in medical ice bags to prevent
abuse but not soap or any other products. The range officer also stated that the officer
is supposed to inform the inmate of any additives he may have put in the bag prior to
giving it to the inmate.
After the range officer left plaintiff’s cell, plaintiff vomited once more and then
informed the housing sergeant of what had happened. Plaintiff asked the sergeant to
inform the health services unit (HSU) right away. He did, and he also wrote an incident
report.
At about 6:30 a.m., Nurse Cory (not a defendant) took plaintiff to the treatment
exam room and evaluated her. Cory explained to plaintiff that he had contacted poison
control regarding plaintiff’s ingestion of the soap and was told that plaintiff would simply
have to let the soap pass through her system. There was nothing else that could be
done. Cory told plaintiff that she would “feel nauseated for some time, and [may] get a
runny-stool while it pass[es] through” but that she was to let the HSU know if her

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symptoms worsened. Id. ¶ 24. At the time, plaintiff was taking “female hormones,”
“psychotropic medication,” high blood pressure medication, diabetic medication, and
pain medication, and so she asked Cory about the effects that the soap ingestion would
have. Id. ¶ 25. Cory stated he would monitor plaintiff’s progress. Plaintiff states she
suffered symptoms of an “upset stomach, lightheadingness [sic], dizzy and quizzy [sic]”
that lasted a week. Id.
At some point after being examined by Cory, plaintiff spoke with another
correctional officer regarding the incident. She learned that “there is no standard of
practice for any officer to use any kind of soap in ice bags, because of its danger to the
inmate.” Id. ¶ 27.
A short time later, defendant Kuepper came to plaintiff’s cell smiling and
laughing. He asked plaintiff whether she drank from the medical bag. When plaintiff
responded yes, defendant Kuepper admitted that he put the soap in plaintiff’s medical
bag. Plaintiff asked defendant Kuepper why he did not tell her about the soap.
Defendant Kuepper responded that he did not have to tell plaintiff anything and that he
is “allowed to put anything [he] want[s] into those ice bags in order to prevent abuse of
the privilege.” Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff asserted that she had a right to know what was in the
medical bag and that Kuepper had “violated WDOC policies, and the Criminal Code of
Wisconsin Laws related to ‘intentionally poisoning inmates.’” Id. Defendant Kuepper
again stated that he did not have to tell her anything and that plaintiff would find out
when she drank it. He also stated that if he really wanted to poison plaintiff, “[he] would
have used ‘rat poison’” and that “he does this to all of the inmates when he works

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segregation, and as a correctional officer, he is authorized to put [whatever] he chooses
into medical ice bags, in order to teach the inmates a lesson when they abuse the
medical ice bag privilege.” Id. Defendant Kuepper also asserted that it was just soap
and that plaintiff was making a big deal out of it. He then walked away.
Plaintiff subsequently wrote a formal complaint to defendant Warden Judy Smith
asking for a full investigation regarding the incident. The complaint was denied. She
also filed an inmate complaint and was interviewed by Teresa Murphy. Defendant
Murphy informed plaintiff that her complaint “will be dismissed pursuant to DOC
Executive Directive #16, for ‘Confidentiality Reasons.’” Id. ¶ 29. The blue medical ice
bags were later changed to clear, and defendant Kuepper left OCI for Waupun
Correctional Institution.
In May 2015, plaintiff filed a formal complaint with defendant Edward Wall
requesting a full investigation regarding her soap-ingestion incident. Defendant Wall did
not respond.
In June 2015, plaintiff wrote a letter to defendant Cathy Jess explaining the
incident and requesting to press charges against defendant Kuepper for assault.
Plaintiff asserts that “defendant [James] Schwochert answered the letter.” Id. ¶ 15.
Plaintiff also sent a letter regarding the incident to each of the following agencies:
Oshkosh District Attorney's Office, Oshkosh Sheriff Department, and Oshkosh Police
Department. In those letters, plaintiff requested an investigation and for criminal charges
be filed against defendant Kuepper.

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On June 15, 2015, Detective Paul Frey (not a defendant) came to the institution
to see plaintiff and interviewed her regarding the incident. He asked plaintiff if she had
any other evidence to support her claim; plaintiff responded that she would provide it to
him. Id. ¶ 33. Frey told plaintiff that his office would get back in touch with her “to give[]
her the decision as to where to go next.” Id. Weeks later, Plaintiff received a letter from
Frey stating that the matter was investigated but the Deputy District Attorney Scott A.
Ceman (not a defendant) decided not to file criminal charges.
On August 22, 2015, plaintiff spoke with defendant Officer Zanon about the use
of soap in medical ice bags. Defendant Zanon stated that he “authorized [his] officers to
use any means of preventive measures to make and get inmates to comply with
departmental policies and one of those measures is the use of [soap], which will prevent
the inmates from drinking the melted ice water after the ice has been used for its
intended purpose.” Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff attempted to explain to defendant Zanon that such
practices were “wrong.” Id. Defendant Zanon responded by telling her to file an inmate
complaint or a civil suit. At a later time, plaintiff again attempted to talk with defendant
Zanon about the use of soap in inmates’ medical ice bags. Defendant Zanon again told
her to file a lawsuit. He also informed her that he knew she had contacted the police
department about the incident and that the use of soap in medical ice bags had been
approved by the WDOC via defendants Jess and Wall.
On September 2, 2015, the Corrections Complaint Examiner Deputy Secretary
Morgan (not a defendant) issued a decision regarding plaintiff’s complaint and directed
the OCI to place it on the "prioritized investigation list."

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Id. ¶ 36. Although it was

returned to the institution for further investigation, the complaint was ultimately
dismissed.
On September 15, 2015, plaintiff spoke with defendant Murphy about the practice
of allowing officers to put dangerous chemicals into medical ice bags. Defendant
Murphy said that
“[T]here’s no known policy or no such policy that allows that
to happen, and that if it is done, then the officer doing so is
liable for any injury sustained by the inmate…Inmates need
not be told that they can’t drink the melted ice water after the
ice was used for its intended purpose because it’s common
sense; however, officers are allowed to use ‘salt and pepper’
in those ice bags as preventative measures, but those officer
still have to clear that with HSU.”
Id. ¶ 37.
Sometime thereafter, plaintiff wrote to Health Service Manager Danielle Foster
(not a defendant) and Assistant Health Service Manager Jamie Barker (not a defendant)
regarding the HSU policy allowing the use of soap in inmates’ medical ice bags. Plaintiff
received a response stating that “[a]nything other than ice being used in medical ice
bags is ‘prohibited.’” Id.
At some point, plaintiff spoke with defendants Captain Hass Kuster and
Lieutenant Norman about the use of soap in inmates’ medical ice bags. They told her
that the “practice would continue” and that if she did not “approve or like it, then don’t
come to segregation.” Id. ¶ 38.
In November 2015, while plaintiff was being seen for her scheduled diabetic
insulin appointments, she asked her treating physician about whether officers can place
substances in medical bags. The physician explained that the use of any chemical in
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medical ice bags other than ice is prohibited. If abuse of medical ice bags is suspected,
the officer is instructed to issue a conduct report and to call the HSU.
Also in November 2015, plaintiff spoke with Center Director Jenny Delvaux (not a
defendant) about whether there is a policy authorizing the use of soap in medical ice
bags. Delvaux informed her that “to her knowledge there is no such policy but was
generally unsure as to whether such a policy existed.” Id. ¶ 38.
At some point, plaintiff spoke with defendant Deputy Warden Robert Hable about
the use of soap in medical ice bags. Defendant Hable responded that “they are allowed
to choose this kind of method, and that he will not stop it.” Id. ¶ 40. Plaintiff informed
Smith of Hable’s decision. Smith responded that “she will support the decision of [Hable]
and will not reverse or change his position.” Id.
Plaintiff states that the OCI continues to use soap in the medical ice bags of
inmates that are housed in the segregation unit. She seeks damages and declaratory
and injunctive relief.
B.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seems to be claiming that criminal charges should be filed against

defendant Kuepper for having put soap in her medical ice bag, that the OCI has an
unconstitutional policy of allowing officers to put soap in inmates’ medical ice bags, and
that defendants violated her constitutional rights by putting or authorizing the use of
soap in her medical ice bag. I will discuss each claim in turn.
1. Failure to Prosecute or Investigate Claims

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To the extent plaintiff is asking me to declare that criminal charges should be
filed against defendant Kuepper, her complaint fails to state a claim. “ ‘[T]he decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor’s] discretion.’ ” United States v. Moore, 543
F.3d 891, 899 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464
(1996) (quotation omitted)). This “discretion cannot be successfully challenged merely
on the ground that it is irrational or arbitrary; in the realm of prosecutorial charging
decisions, only invidious discrimination is forbidden.” Id. Indeed, a victim of allegedly
criminal conduct is not entitled to the prosecution of the alleged perpetrator of the crime
or even a criminal investigation. See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U .S. 83, 87 (1981) (per
curiam) (inmates alleging beating by prison guards lack standing to challenge prison
officials' request that magistrate not issue arrest warrants); see also Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“in American jurisprudence at least, a private
citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another”). Accordingly, plaintiff may not proceed on this claim.
2. Unconstitutional Policy Claim
To the extent plaintiff’s complaint seeks prospective injunctive relief, the claim is
moot as she is no longer housed at the OCI. See Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 668
(7th Cir. 2009) Before plaintiff filed this complaint she had already been transferred from
the OCI to another correctional facility, and she does not allege that there is any
possibility of her returning to the OCI. “Any relief that [my] judgment might permit would
be purely speculative in nature.” Id. Therefore, plaintiff may not proceed on this claim.

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3. Eighth Amendment Claim
To the extent that plaintiff is asserting a claim for damages against defendants
for violating her Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting her the use of soap in her
medical ice bag, that claim has not been rendered moot by her transfer. To sufficiently
state such a claim
[plaintiff] must allege facts that, if true, would satisfy both
prongs of a bifurcated test. First, [she] must allege that,
objectively, the conditions were serious enough to be
considered cruel and unusual. Second, from a subjective
point of view, [she] must allege that the defendants acted
with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1993).
At this stage, I will construe plaintiff’s alleged injuries from the ingestion of soap
in her medical ice bag as objectively serious. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33,
(1993) (noting a constitutional right to be free from deliberate indifference to current
serious health problems and unreasonable risk of serious damage to future health); see
also Davis-Clair v. Turck, 714 F. App'x 605, 606 (7th Cir. 2018) (same); see also Board
v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 2005) (same). This leaves me to focus on the
second element of whether plaintiff has sufficiently alleged defendants acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. “A prison official acts with a sufficiently culpable state
of mind when he or she knows of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and either acts
or fails to act in disregard of that risk.” Howard v. Bartow, 131 F. Supp. 3d 789, 797
(E.D. Wis. 2015) (citing Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011)).
Plaintiff has adequately alleged that defendant Kuepper acted with deliberate
indifference when he gave plaintiff her medical ice bag that he had purposefully infused
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with soap. As pled, defendant Kuepper knew that there was a possibility that plaintiff
would drink the bag’s contents, but he disregarded that risk and did not tell plaintiff
about the soap. Thus, plaintiff may proceed with her claim against defendant Kuepper.
Plaintiff may also proceed with a claim of deliberate indifference against
defendants Zanon and Hable. Generally, there is no liability under § 1983 unless the
defendant is personally involved in the violation of plaintiff’s rights. See Morfin v. City of
East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1001 (7th Cir. 2003). “An official satisfies the personal
responsibility requirement...if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs
at [his] direction or with [his] knowledge and consent…[T]he defendants must know
about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of
what they might see.” Comsys, Inc. v. City of Kenosha Wisconsin, 223 F. Supp. 3d 792,
806 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff asserts that defendant Zanon
admitted to authorizing defendant Kuepper’s use of soap in her medical ice bag. She
also states that Hable said the officers are allowed to use this method of deterrence.
Zanon therefore approved of Kuepper’s action, and Hable condoned it.
Plaintiff, however, has not sufficiently alleged a claim against defendants Norman
or Kuster. She alleges that these defendants agreed with Kuepper’s action and even
supported the continued use of the practice. Yet, she does not allege that they knew of
such a practice prior to Kuepper’s act, let alone authorized or condoned it.
Likewise, plaintiff has not sufficiently pled a claim of deliberate indifference
against Smith, Wall, Jess, or Schwochert. Indeed, she states she filed complaints and
informed these defendants about Kuepper’s use of soap in her medical ice bag after the

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incident had occurred. She does not allege that they were personally involved with
Kuepper’s act or that Kuepper was acting under their direction or with their knowledge
and consent.
Additionally, plaintiff names Jon Litscher and Captain Tony as defendants.
However, she does not allege what Litscher or Tony did or failed to do to violate her
rights. Since there is no liability under § 1983 unless the defendant is personally
involved in the violation of plaintiff’s rights, plaintiff may not proceed with a claim of
deliberate indifference against Litscher or Tony. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592,
595-96 (7th Cir. 2009); Hildebrandt v. Illinois Dept. of Natural Resources, 347 F.3d
1014, 1039 (7th Cir. 2003).
II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDER TO ALLOW USE OF RELEASE ACCOUNT
Lastly, plaintiff has asked me to reconsider my denial of her motion to use her
release account to support her litigation. In my denial of her motion, I informed plaintiff
of the limited purpose for which a court can order the use of a prisoner’s release
account to pay for case proceedings. Plaintiff has, however, asked me to reconsider my
denial because of her understanding of statutory language and in light of an order
issued in another case. I will deny plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
Plaintiff cites Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 309.49 and suggests that this regulation
grants me authorization to order the use of her release account to pay for her litigation
costs. Plaintiff fails to note that the section specifically states that the court order
granting the disbursement of a prisoner’s release account funds must be “lawful.” And

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as I explained in my prior order, no law allows me to order the State of Wisconsin to use
an inmate’s release account to pay federal litigation costs.
Plaintiff directs me to the order issued by U.S. District Judge Charles N. Clevert,
Jr. in Jackson v. Hamblin, No. 12-CV-1035, 2014 WL 3196243, at *1 (E.D. Wis. July 8,
2014), on October 7, 2013, where the court ordered the use of release account funds to
assist with the plaintiff’s litigation costs. However, the court clearly noted that it did so
because the plaintiff had not only exceeded her ability to apply for legal loans but had
also used the last of her legal loan funds to seek relief from the court due to the
defendants’ untimely filed motion for summary judgment. In contrast, despite plaintiff’s
claims that she has exceeded her legal loan application ability, this matter has only just
begun. I am only now screening plaintiff’s complaint. Thus, her professed lack of funds
has nothing to do with actions or inactions taken by defendants as it relates to the
proceedings in this case.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
(Docket No. 11) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s amended complaint (Docket No. 12-1)
is the operative complaint in this lawsuit.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Lieutenant Norman, Warden Judy P. Smith,
Segregation Supervisor Hass Kuster, WDOC Secretary Jon Litscher, Secretary Cathy
Jess, Administrator Security Captain Tony, and Division of Adult Institutions James R.
Schwochert are DISMISSED as defendants.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to an informal service agreement
between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, copies of plaintiff’s
amended complaint and this order are being electronically sent today to the Wisconsin
Department of Justice for service on CO II Officer Kuepper, Deputy Warden Robert
Hable, and Security Director James Zanon.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that, pursuant to the informal service agreement
between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, defendants CO II Officer
Kuepper, Deputy Warden Robert Hable, and Security Director James Zanon shall file a
responsive pleading to the complaint within sixty days of receiving electronic notice of
this order.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that a copy of this order be sent to the officer in charge
of the agency where plaintiff is confined.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may not begin discovery until after
the court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive
motions.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall submit all correspondence and
legal material to:
Office of the Clerk
United States District Court
Eastern District of Wisconsin
362 United States Courthouse
517 E. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

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PLEASE DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE JUDGE’S CHAMBERS. It will
only delay the processing of the matter. As each filing will be electronically scanned and
entered on the docket upon receipt by the clerk, plaintiff need not mail copies to
defendants. Defendants will be served electronically through the court’s electronic case
filing system. Plaintiff should also retain a personal copy of each document filed with the
court.
Plaintiff is further advised that failure to make a timely submission may result in
the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. In addition, the parties must notify
the Clerk of Court of any change of address. Failure to do so could result in orders or
other information not being timely delivered, thus affecting the legal rights of the parties.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 1st day of June, 2018.

s/Lynn Adelman______
LYNN ADELMAN
District Judge

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