Daniels v. Deblanc et al
Filing
52
SCREENING ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph. The 42 Amended Report and Recommendation is WITHDRAWN. IT IS ORDERED that Daniels may proceed with his Eighth Amendment claims of failure to prevent harm and deliberate indifference against all defendants. He may not proceed on a harassment claim against Sgt. Voigt; a retaliation claim against Lt. Keupper, Lt. Nelson, or Sgt. Voigt, or a misconduct claim against Lt. Nelson. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Daniels' 46 motion for protec tive order is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that Daniels' 44 motion for relief is DENIED. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the defendants have 30 days from the date of this order to file a response to Daniels' motion for a prelimina ry injunction and a protective order. Once the defendants respond, Daniels has 14 days to file a reply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, under an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, the clerk's offic e electronically send copies of the plaintiff's complaint and this order to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for.service on defendants Dr. Deblanc, Captain Olson, Lt. Kuepper, Lt. Nelson, Sgt. Tritt, Sgt. Bouzak, Sgt. Keller, C.O. Geschke, C. O. Johnson, C.O. Pach, C.O. Peter, and Sgt. Voigt. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, under an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, that defendants shall file a responsive pleading to the complaint within sixty days of receiving electronic notice of this order. (cc: all counsel, via US mail to Plaintiff) (blr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
REMO HARRISON DANIELS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 17-CV-681
DR. DEBLANC, et al.,
Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER
Remo Daniels, a Wisconsin state prisoner who is representing himself, filed a civil
rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I issued an amended report and recommendation,
screening Daniels’ amended complaint, on November 15, 2017. (Docket # 42.) The case
was then transferred to the Honorable Pamela Pepper to rule on the report and
recommendation. In the interim, the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding that gives limited consent to magistrate
judges to screen prisoner complaints. I therefore have jurisdiction for purposes of screening
the complaint. Daniels has filed another amended complaint, but it is identical to his first
amended complaint. I therefore withdraw the report and recommendation and will issue an
order screening his amended complaint. Daniels may proceed on his Eighth Amendment
claims for failure to prevent harm and deliberate indifference against all defendants but may
not proceed on his harassment, retaliation, and misconduct claims. I will also address the
motions currently pending and order the defendants to respond to Daniels’ motion for a
preliminary injunction and protective order.
Screening of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
Federal law requires that I screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). I must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims
that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Upon reading Daniels’ second amended complaint, I immediately
noticed two issues: the first is that he incorporates a previous complaint by reference, which
he may not do.
To state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
“that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
However, a complaint that offers mere “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint’s allegations
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (citation omitted).
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In considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts should follow the principles
set forth in Twombly by first, “identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Legal
conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. Id. If there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, the court must, second, “assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
To proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: 1) he was deprived of
a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the defendant was
acting under color of state law. Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827
(7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Village of North Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir.
2004)); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). I will give a pro se plaintiff’s
allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Allegations in the Complaint
According to the complaint, Daniels had a Behavior Management Plan in place
because of certain mental health issues, including engaging in self-harm. (Am. Compl. at 1.)
On February 17, 2017, Daniels was placed on observation status around 12:00 p.m. (Id.)
Around 3:00 p.m., Officers Geschke and Johnson gave him a hard meal tray and left his
food trap open, despite knowing that while on observation status, Daniels was to receive an
observation status meal tray and his food trap was to stay closed. (Id.) Daniels alleges that
he attempted to return the tray many times. (Id. at 1-2.)
Around 3:50 p.m., Sgt. Tritt walked up and asked Daniels why his food trap was
open. (Id. at 2.) Daniels told her that the officers gave him a hard tray. (Id.) Despite this
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knowledge, Sgt. Tritt walked off. (Id.) Daniels alleges that around 4:01 p.m. he began
beating his hand with the tray Officers Geschke and Johnson had given him. (Id.) Officer
Pach walked up and asked Daniels to give him the tray. (Id.) Daniels alleges that he told
Officer Pach how he had received the tray and Officer Pach responded that he did not care
and walked off. (Id.) Daniels continued to engage in self-harming behavior with the tray.
(Id.)
Around 4:10 p.m., Sgt. Bouzak arrived and told Daniels to give him the tray Daniels
was harming himself with. (Id.) Daniels told Sgt. Bouzak what had happened and Sgt.
Bouzak said he did not care. (Id.) Daniels gave Sgt. Bouzak the tray; however, Sgt. Bouzak
denied Daniels medical care. (Id.) Around 4:40 p.m., Daniels began cutting himself because
he was angry and because he was denied medical treatment for his hand. (Id.)
Around 5 p.m., Daniels alleges that he saw a nurse in health services for the
selfharm. (Id.) While at health services, Daniels spoke to Lt. Kuepper, who asked Daniels
whether he was going to continue engaging in self-harm, to which Daniels responded
affirmatively. (Id.) Lt. Kuepper called Dr. Deblanc, who told Lt. Kuepper to put Daniels
back in his cell, despite knowing that Daniels was not going to cease engaging in self-harm.
(Id.) Daniels alleges that he told Lt. Kuepper that he was going to continue harming himself,
to which Lt. Kuepper responded that he did not care. (Id.) Daniels alleges that Lt. Kuepper’s
lack of concern was retaliatory. (Id.)
Daniels alleges that pursuant to his behavior management plan, he was supposed to
be placed in full bed restraints due to his tendency to engage in self-harm and all of the
defendants knew about this plan and did not care. (Id.) On February 18, 2017 at 12 a.m.,
Daniels cut himself and there was a lot of blood. (Id. at 2-3.) Officer Peter joked about
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Daniels cutting himself and asked what was she supposed to do? (Id. at 3.) Officer Peter
stated that if she called for help it would wake up the other inmates. (Id.) Daniels told her to
put him in full bed restraints, which she did not do. (Id.)
After a while, Officer Peter got Sgt. Keller to come to Daniels’ cell and Sgt. Keller
stated that there was no nurse in that day and there was nothing he could do at that time.
(Id.) Daniels continued to engage in self-harm. (Id.) Around 1 a.m., an officer told Sgt.
Keller that Daniels was engaging in self-harm and Daniels was pulled out of the observation
cell and placed in a cage. (Id.) Daniels was told that a supervisor would be there at 2 a.m.
(Id.) Around 2 a.m., Capt. Olson and Lt. Nelson arrived and denied Daniels medical care.
(Id.) Capt. Olson called Dr. Deblanc, who told Capt. Olson to put Daniels back in his cell.
(Id.) Daniels again asked to be put into full bed restraints to protect him from self-harm, but
Lt. Nelson refused. (Id.)
Around 2:05 a.m., a white inmate began harming himself by hitting his head against
a door. (Id.) Capt. Olson called Dr. Deblanc and Daniels overheard them say they were
going to put this inmate into full bed restraints to protect him from harm. (Id.) Daniels
alleges that he was treated differently from this white inmate because Daniels is black. (Id.)
Around 2:20 a.m. a nurse arrived to clean Daniels’ cuts and she asked when he cut himself.
(Id.) Daniels responded that the cuts occurred around 12:00 p.m. (Id.) The nurse asked the
officers why she was not contacted sooner. (Id.) Daniels alleges the officers did not contact
the nurse sooner because they did not care. (Id.)
Daniels alleges that on July 27, 2017, around 10:00 a.m., Sgt. Voigt (a defendant in
Daniels’ lawsuit No. 17-CV-680) ordered Officer Hess to take Daniels’ papers and legal
work and books. (Id. at 4.) Daniels alleges that he was mad and pushed his intercom and
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stated that he was going to do self-harm and began cutting himself with a pen. (Id.) Officer
Hess told him to stop and Sgt. Voigt came to Daniels’ door with a team. (Id.) Daniels was
taken out of his cell. (Id.) At 10:30 a.m., Lt. Nelson and Sgt. Voigt denied Daniels medical
care and placed him in observation around 11:10 a.m. (Id.) Daniels started doing self-harm
again. (Id.) Officer Demer said to let Daniels cut himself. (Id.)
Around 12:15 p.m., Daniels was able to see Nurse Larson. (Id.) Daniels alleges that
Lt. Nelson was supposed to place him in full bed restrains pursuant to his behavior
management plan, but failed to do so. (Id.) Daniels alleges that he told Dr. Van Buren to
place him in full bed restrains, but she refused. (Id.) Daniels alleges that Lt. Nelson wrote an
incident report stating that he received a call that Daniels had cut himself and that Lt.
Nelson contacted H.S.U. staff and a nurse arrived and treated Daniels’ cuts. (Id.) The report
stated that Daniels was placed in clinical observation and was strip searched and given a
smock and black mat. (Id.) Daniels alleges that Lt. Nelson’s report was fabricated to cover
up his misconduct. (Id.)
Analysis
Daniels alleges that all of the defendants violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment by failing to intervene and prevent his self-harm and through deliberate
indifference to his medical care. Daniels further alleges that Sgt. Voigt harassed him, Lt.
Kuepper, Lt. Nelson, and Sgt. Voigt retaliated against him, and Lt. Nelson engaged in
misconduct.
1.
Failure to Prevent Harm
Prison officials have a duty to “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing,
shelter, and medical care.” Estate of Miller, ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984, 989 (7th
6
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation and citation omitted). To determine whether an inmate’s
Eighth Amendment rights were violated by a deprivation, the alleged violation is examined
both objectively and subjectively. “First, the deprivation alleged must be objectively,
sufficiently serious.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). “Second, the mental state of the prison official
must have been ‘one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.’” Id.
In order to satisfy the first element, when a claim is based upon the failure to prevent
harm, the plaintiff must show that the inmate was “incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm.” Estate of Miller, 680 F.3d at 989 (internal quotation and
citation omitted). Suicide is a serious harm. Id. Under the second prong, “deliberate
indifference,” “‘a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.’” Id. (quoting Sanville, 266 F.3d at 734).
Viewing all of the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and construing all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Daniels, it is plausible that each of the
defendants were subjectively aware of Daniels’ serious medical condition (i.e., that he was a
risk of engaging in self-harm) and either knowingly or recklessly disregarded it. Daniels
alleges that a behavior management plan was in place in which he was supposed to be
placed in full bed restraints due to his tendency to engage in self-harm. He alleges that all of
the defendants knew about this plan and did not care.
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Daniels alleges that Officers Geschke and Johnson gave him a hard tray and left his
food trap open, despite knowing he was on observation status. He further alleges that Sgt.
Tritt, Officer Pach, and Sgt. Bouzak saw him with the hard tray, knowing he should not
have it, and did nothing about it. Daniels alleges that Officer Pach and Sgt. Bouzak saw him
injure himself with the tray and failed to act.
Daniels alleges that he told Lt. Kuepper and Dr. Deblanc that he intended to
continue engaging in self-harm and neither did anything about it. Daniels alleges that he
began cutting himself and Officer Peter saw blood all over his cell and refused to act.
Further, Daniels alleges that all of the defendants were aware of his cutting behavior and
failed to act. Based on these allegations, I will allow Daniels to proceed on his claim against
all defendants that they failed to prevent him from harming himself.
2.
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Care
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from a state actor’s “deliberate
indifference to his basic needs.” Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2003). In
order to prove a state actor’s failure to provide adequate medical treatment, a prisoner must
show that: (1) he or she had a serious medical need; and (2) the defendant(s) was
deliberately indifferent to it. Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001). An
objectively serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Zentmyer v. Kendall County, Illinois, 220 F.3d 805, 810
(7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, deliberate indifference entails more
than “mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836, and requires the prisoner to show that the
prison official was subjectively aware of the prisoner’s serious medical needs and
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disregarded an excessive risk that a lack of treatment posed to the prisoner’s health or safety.
Id. at 837.
The Seventh Circuit is clear insofar as it recognizes “the right to be free from
deliberate indifference to suicide” Cavalieri, 321 F.3d at 623 (citing Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d
402, 406 (7th Cir. 1992)), and has likewise upheld liability wherein prison staff ignored an
inmate’s visible symptoms of serious illness. Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d
293, 302 (7th Cir. 2010). Deliberate indifference to a risk of suicide is present when an
official is subjectively “aware of the significant likelihood that an inmate may imminently
seek to take his own life” but “fail[s] to take reasonable steps to prevent the inmate from
performing the act.” Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Estate of
Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2000)). An official must be
“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists” and the official “must also draw the inference.” Higgins v. Corr. Med. Servs. of
Ill., Inc., 178 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Again, I find that Daniels’ complaint plausibly states a claim under the Eighth
Amendment against all defendants. Daniels alleges that all of the defendants were aware
that he was under a behavior management plan due to his risk of self-harm. Daniels alleges
three specific instances of self-harm: (1) harm with the hard tray on February 17, 2017; (2)
cutting himself on February 18, 2017; (3) cutting himself on July 27, 2017. Daniels alleges
that Officers Geschke and Johnson, Sgt. Tritt, Officer Pach, Sgt. Bouzak, Lt. Kuepper and
Dr. Deblanc were aware that he was harming himself with the tray and failed to take any
steps to prevent his self-harm. Similarly, Officer Peter, Sgt. Keller, Capt. Olson, Lt. Nelson,
and Dr. Deblanc were aware that he was cutting himself and failed to take any steps to stop
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the self-harm. Daniels further alleges that once seeing he was injured, Sgt. Bouzak, Capt.
Olson, and Lt. Nelson denied him medical care. Daniels also alleges that, based on his July
27, 2017 cutting incident, Sgt. Voigt and Lt. Nelson denied him medical care. For these
reasons, I will allow Daniels to proceed on his deliberate indifference to medical care claim
against all defendants.
3.
Harassment Claims Against Sgt. Voigt
Daniels alleges Sgt. Voigt harassed him by ordering Officer Hess to take his legal
papers out of his cell for no reason. (Am. Compl. at 5.) Standing alone, verbal abuse or
harassment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, deprive a prisoner of a
protected liberty interest, or deny a prisoner equal protection of the laws. DeWalt v. Carter,
224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000). Daniels’ assertion that Sgt. Voigt removed his legal
papers to harass him fails to rise to the level of a cognizable constitutional violation.
Therefore, I will not allow Daniels to proceed on a harassment claim against Sgt. Voigt.
4.
Retaliation Claims Against Lt. Kuepper, Lt. Nelson, and Sgt. Voigt
Daniels alleges that Lt. Kuepper asked him whether he was planning on continuing
to engage in self-harm, to which Daniels responded affirmatively. Daniels alleges that Lt.
Kuepper said that he did not care and retaliated against him because it was a “PREA case of
sexual abuse.” (Am. Compl. at 3.) Daniels further alleges retaliation by Lt. Nelson and Sgt.
Voigt, without pointing to any specific facts. (Am. Compl. at 5.)
An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right
violates the Constitution. DeWalt, 224 F.3d at 618. To establish a claim of retaliation,
Daniels must show that he engaged in a protected activity, suffered a deprivation likely to
prevent future protected activities, and that there was a causal connection between the two.
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See Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2010); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546
(7th Cir. 2009). “To state a cause of action for retaliatory treatment, a complaint need only
allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may be inferred.” DeWalt, 224 F.3d at
618 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Even liberally construed, Daniels’ complaint fails to state a claim of retaliation
against Lt. Kuepper, Lt. Nelson, or Sgt. Voigt. Daniels does not allege that he was engaging
in a protected activity or that he suffered a deprivation likely to prevent future protected
activities. For these reasons, Daniels may not proceed on a retaliation claim against Lt.
Kuepper, Lt. Nelson, or Sgt. Voigt.
5.
Misconduct by Lt. Nelson
Daniels alleges that Lt. Nelson fabricated a false report in order to cover up his
misconduct. (Am. Comp. at 4-5.) Even assuming Lt. Nelson did make a false statement,
lying does not violate the constitution. Larry v. Meisner, No. 16-CV-1108, 2016 WL 5390882,
at *5 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 27, 2016). Even if Daniels received a false conduct report or even if
he was ultimately found guilty of a false conduct report, this will not, on its own, give rise to
a constitutional violation. Id. Although Lt. Nelson’s alleged misconduct does not state a
cause of action in and of itself, it may potentially constitute evidence of deliberate
indifference. For these reasons, I will not allow Daniels to proceed on a misconduct claim
against Lt. Nelson.
6.
Motion to for Protective Order
Daniels filed a motion for protective order, requesting that I order the defendants to
preserve evidence. (Docket # 46.) While Daniels mentions that disciplinary records can be
purged after one year and expresses concern this might happen, he has not presented
11
evidence that gives me reason to believe that an order is necessary. As I explained in my
order in Daniels’ other lawsuit, 17-CV-680, I am confident that the defendants are aware of
their responsibilities under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to ensure relevant
discoverable materials are not destroyed. At this time, I will deny Daniels’ motion without
prejudice. If circumstances change, Daniels may renew his motion.
7.
Motion for Emergency Relief
Daniels has also filed a motion that he entitled a motion for emergency relief.
(Docket # 44.) He filed this identical motion in 17-CV-680. In it, Daniels reiterates that he
believes that he is not getting adequate mental health care. He asks for various forms of
relief—namely that I grant his motion for appointment of counsel (in 17-CV-680) and his
motion for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order, and also asks that he
be able to call in to provide me with more information.
As I explained in my order in 17-CV-680, Daniels’ claims all must be in a single
complaint. When plaintiffs spread claims and allegations through multiple documents, they
risk having claims overlooked—and make it more difficult for the court and the defendants
to understand their claims. Additional facts that Daniels presents outside of the complaint
will not serve as a basis for relief. He is already proceeding against the defendants on claims
of failure to prevent harm and deliberate indifference. While he could add more instances of
alleged deliberate indifference and failure to prevent harm to his complaint, it will not
provide him with more relief should he win this lawsuit. As I already instructed him, if
Daniels feels these allegations should be included in the complaint, he should consult the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Rules 15, 18, and 20, which discuss amending
pleadings and when it is appropriate to join (that is, to have in the same lawsuit) claims and
12
defendants. Continuing to file additional allegations outside of the complaint, and
requesting relief that has already been requested, will only slow down the processing of the
case.
8.
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
Finally, Daniels filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. (Docket # 26.) I am ordering the defendants to respond to this motion
within 30 days of this order. Once the defendants file a response, Daniels has 14 days to file
a reply.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Daniels may proceed with his Eighth
Amendment claims of failure to prevent harm and deliberate indifference against all
defendants. He may not proceed on a harassment claim against Sgt. Voigt; a retaliation
claim against Lt.Keupper, Lt. Nelson, or Sgt. Voigt, or a misconduct claim against Lt.
Nelson.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Daniels’ motion for protective order (Docket #
46) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that Daniels’ motion for relief (Docket # 44) is DENIED.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the defendants have 30 days from the date of this
order to file a response to Daniels’ motion for a preliminary injunction and a protective
order. Once the defendants respond, Daniels has 14 days to file a reply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, under an informal service agreement between
the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, the clerk’s office electronically send
copies of the plaintiff’s complaint and this order to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for
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service on defendants Dr. Deblanc, Captain Olson, Lt. Kuepper, Lt. Nelson, Sgt. Tritt, Sgt.
Bouzak, Sgt. Keller, C.O. Geschke, C.O. Johnson, C.O. Pach, C.O. Peter, and Sgt. Voigt.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, under an informal service agreement between
the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, defendants Dr. Deblanc, Captain
Olson, Lt. Kuepper, Lt. Nelson, Sgt. Tritt, Sgt. Bouzak, Sgt. Keller, C.O. Geschke, C.O.
Johnson, C.O. Pach, C.O. Peter, and Sgt. Voigt file a responsive pleading to the complaint
within sixty days of receiving electronic notice of this order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may not begin discovery until after
the court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, under the Prisoner E-Filing Program, Daniels
shall submit all correspondence and case filings to institution staff, who will scan and email
documents to the court. If plaintiff ceases to be incarcerated at a Prisoner E-Filing
institution, he will be required to submit his objections to:
Office of the Clerk
United States District Court
Eastern District of Wisconsin
362 United States Courthouse
517 E. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
PLEASE DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE JUDGE’S CHAMBERS. It
will only delay the processing of the case.
The court advises Daniels that, if he fails to file documents or take other required
actions by the deadlines the court sets, the court may dismiss the case based on his failure to
prosecute. The parties must notify the clerk of court of any change of address. Failure to do
so could result in orders or other information not being timely delivered, thus affecting the
legal rights of the parties.
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Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 4th day of April, 2018.
BY THE COURT
s/Nancy Joseph_____________
NANCY JOSEPH
United States Magistrate Judge
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