Lockhart v. Reinke et al
Filing
51
DECISION AND ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 9/20/18. IT IS ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment 33 is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 40 is DENIED. (cc: all counsel, plaintiff) (jad)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________
JERMAINE LOCKHART,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 17-C-0715
C.O. SHAWN K. REINKE, and
NURSE CAROL A. AL-TAHRAWY,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jermaine Lockhart is a prisoner in the custody of the State of Wisconsin.
In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he claims that the defendants violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to the risk that he would commit
suicide. Before me now are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 23, 2016, Lockhart was housed in the restrictive-housing unit at
Waupun Correctional Institution. At 1:00 p.m., he pressed his cell’s emergency call
button. A correctional officer who is not a defendant in this case answered the call.
According to Lockhart, he asked this officer if he could have his inhaler, which he needed
to control a minor breathing problem. The officer then informed defendant Shawn Reinke,
another correctional officer at Waupun, of Lockhart’s request. However, according to
Reinke, the officer told her that, in addition to his inhaler, Lockhart had requested his
naproxen medication. Naproxen is a pain medication that is sold under the brand name
Aleve.
Lockhart’s inhaler and his naproxen were stored on a medication cart that inmates
do not have direct access to. When Reinke arrived at the cart, she reviewed a binder that
is kept on the cart and saw a notation that Lockhart was on a “control all meds” restriction.
According to Reinke, she then informed Lockhart that he was on this restriction, but
Lockhart insisted that he could have both his inhaler and his naproxen. Lockhart disputes
this. According to him, Reinke approached his cell and asked him why he was not allowed
to possess his medications in his cell, and Lockhart informed her that the psychologicalservices unit feared that if he was allowed to keep his medications in his cell he would
take them all at one time. (Pl. Prop. Findings of Fact (“PFOF”) ¶¶ 7–9.)
The parties
agree, however, that after seeing the control-all-meds notation and speaking to Lockhart,
Reinke called the institution’s health-services unit to find out whether Lockhart could have
his inhaler and his naproxen in his cell. (Def. PFOF ¶ 11.)
Reinke’s call to the health-services unit was answered by defendant Carol AlTahrawy, a licensed practical nurse. Reinke asked Al-Tahrawy whether there were any
medical restrictions prohibiting Lockhart from receiving his inhaler and his naproxen in his
cell. Al-Tahrawy told Reinke that she would look into it and get back to her. The parties
agree that control-all-meds restrictions are ordered by the institution physician and that
they are normally marked in the medication-profile section or the prescriber’s orders
section of the inmate’s medical chart. (Def. PFOF ¶ 15.) The parties also agree that AlTahrawy reviewed these sections of Lockhart’s medical chart and did not see a controlall-meds restriction. (Id. ¶¶ 13–14.) Al-Tahrawy did not conduct any further review of the
plaintiff’s medical records. She then called Reinke and informed her that she could not
find anything in Lockhart’s medical records indicating that he could not have his inhaler
or his naproxen in his cell.
2
Following her discussion with Al-Tahrawy, Reinke returned to Lockhart’s cell and
told him that a nurse in the health-services unit said that he could have his inhaler and
his naproxen in his cell. Lockhart states that he then told Reinke for a second time that
he is on a control-all-meds restriction and that if she gave him the naproxen pills he would
take them all. (Pl. PFOF ¶ 11.) According to Lockhart, Reinke responded by telling him
that he was not on a control-all-meds restriction and then giving him his inhaler and his
naproxen. Reinke states that she gave Lockhart a “card” of naproxen. (Reinke Decl.
¶ 18.) Lockhart, in his verified complaint, alleges that Reinke gave him “approximately 88
Naproxen pills.” (Compl. ¶ 19.) Reinke denies that Lockhart said that he had any intent
to harm himself. But she states that after receiving his medications, Lockhart said, “Good,
now I can take these and you can take me out.” (Def. PFOF ¶ 29.) Reinke states that
she did not interpret this comment as meaning that he would use his medications to
attempt suicide.
At some point after giving Lockhart his medications, Reinke informed her
supervisors of her interaction with Lockhart. However, she states that she did this not as
a precaution to prevent Lockhart from overdosing, but because her interaction with him
was outside the scope of her normal daily activities. (Reinke Decl. ¶ 22.)
In his summary-judgment materials, Lockhart states that after Reinke left him with
his medications, he counted out 92 pills and began ingesting handfuls of them. (Pl. PFOF
¶ 14.) He would later tell medical providers that he took 58 naproxen pills and 30
simvastatin pills (a cholesterol medication). (Def. PFOF ¶ 32.) (Lockhart does not claim
that Reinke gave him any simvastatin pills.)
3
Lockhart states that, about 15 to 20 minutes after taking the pills, he experienced
“sudden excruciating pain.” (Pl. PFOF ¶ 15.) He pushed the call button in his cell and
told the officers who answered that he had taken all of his pills. The officers then brought
Lockhart to a “strip cage” where a nurse examined him. (Pl. PFOF ¶ 17.) Eventually, it
was determined that because Lockhart claimed to have taken so many pills, he should
be taken to the local hospital.
At the hospital, the plaintiff complained of “nausea, burning in stomach, and
sensations of weakness.” He was given activated charcoal to help prevent absorption of
the ingested medications.
discharged the next day.
Lockhart remained in the hospital overnight and was
When he returned to the correctional institution, he was
evaluated by the psychological-services unit and was placed in observation status for his
safety.
Lockhart now contends that defendants Reinke and Al-Tahrawy violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by being deliberately
indifferent to the risk that he would harm himself.
II. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is required where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). When considering a motion for summary judgment, I view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and must grant the motion if no reasonable juror
could find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 255 (1986).
Lockhart’s Eighth Amendment claims are based on a failure to prevent harm.
Thus, to prevail, he must establish two elements. First, he must show that he was
4
“incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Second, he must show that each defendant was
deliberately indifferent to that risk, meaning that she knew of and disregarded the
substantial risk to his health or safety. Id. at 837. The defendants contend that Lockhart
has not produced evidence from which a reasonable jury could find either of these
elements. They also contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
The defendants first contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because
Lockhart has not shown that either of them subjected him to a substantial risk of serious
harm. Lockhart responds by pointing out that his overdose caused him to experience
severe stomach pain and nausea and that it left psychological scars. But the question
here is not whether Lockhart actually suffered serious harm as a result of taking the
quantity of pills that he claims to have taken. See Williams v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183
(7th Cir. 1988) (the Eighth Amendment does not require proof of “severe injury”). The
question is whether the defendants failed to protect Lockhart from a substantial risk of
serious harm. See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. As to that question, it is clear that
Lockhart is arguing that the defendants failed to do enough to prevent him from attempting
suicide by overdosing on his medications. Suicide is a serious harm, see, e.g., Rosario
v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2012), and thus if the defendants failed to protect
Lockhart from a substantial the risk that he would commit suicide, they would have
subjected him to a substantial risk of serious harm.
Of course, to prevail, Lockhart must show that the defendants were aware that
their conduct exposed him to a substantial risk of suicide and that they disregarded that
risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Here, Lockhart’s evidence comes up short. Nurse Al-
5
Tahrawy’s involvement in this case was limited to answering Reinke’s question about
whether Lockhart was subject to a control-all-meds restriction. It is undisputed that,
before she answered this question, Al-Tahrawy reviewed the two places in Lockhart’s
medical file where such a restriction would have been noted and found none. She then
communicated this fact to Reinke. Lockhart contends that Al-Tahrawy should have
delved deeper into his medical history to determine whether he may have been suicidal
and in need of a control-all-meds restriction. (Pl. PFOF ¶ 6.) However, no evidence in
the record suggests that Al-Tahrawy was qualified or authorized to make a determination
as to whether Lockhart should be on a control-all-meds restriction. To the contrary, AlTahrawy’s uncontradicted declaration states that such restrictions are ordered by the
institution physician and that she did not have the authority to impose one. (Al-Tahrawy
Decl. ¶¶ 12, 20.) Al-Tahrawy acted reasonably in checking to see whether the institution
physician had ordered that Lockhart not keep his medications in his cell.
Thus, a
reasonable jury could not find that Al-Tahrawy engaged in negligent conduct, much less
that she exhibited deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s safety. Accordingly, Al-Tahrawy
is entitled to summary judgment.
As for Reinke, Lockhart contends that, regardless of what the health-services unit
told her, she should not have given him his naproxen pills once he insisted that he was
on a control-all-meds restriction and told her that if she gave him the pills he would take
them all at once. However, to prove deliberate indifference, Lockhart must show that
Reinke completely disregarded a substantial risk that Lockhart would use the pills to
commit suicide. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. And the very fact that Reinke called the
health-services unit to ask if it was safe to give Lockhart his pills defeats the inference
6
that she completely disregarded that risk.
Simply put, Reinke took a reasonable
precaution before giving the plaintiff his medications and therefore could not have been
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that he would use them to commit suicide.
Perhaps she could have taken additional precautions, but those precautions would not
have been required by the Eighth Amendment, as that amendment does not require that
prison officials act perfectly or create a cause of action against them for negligence. See
Giles v. Tobeck, 895 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, Reinke is entitled to
summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 33) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF
No. 40) is DENIED.
This order and the judgment to follow are final. A dissatisfied party may appeal this
court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by filing in this court a
notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 3, 4. This court may extend this deadline if a party timely requests an extension
and shows good cause or excusable neglect for not being able to meet the 30-day
deadline. See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A).
Under certain circumstances, a party may ask this court to alter or amend its
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or ask for relief from judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Any motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) must be filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment. I cannot extend
7
this deadline. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2). Any motion under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b) must be filed within a reasonable time, generally no more than
one year after the entry of the judgment. I cannot extend this deadline. See Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2).
A party is expected to closely review all applicable rules and determine, what, if
any, further action is appropriate in a case.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 20th day of September, 2018.
s/Lynn Adelman______
LYNN ADELMAN
U.S. District Judge
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?