Gill v. Brown County Jail et al

Filing 98

ORDER signed by Chief Judge Pamela Pepper on 6/1/2020 DENYING 94 plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Charles Gill at Kettle Moraine Correctional Institution) (cb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________________
CHARLES B. GILL, SR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 17-cv-873-pp

HEIDI MICHEL, J. MEKASH,
BRENT MEYER, and IAN HIGGINS,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
(DKT. NO. 94)
______________________________________________________________________________
On September 16, 2019, the court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and dismissed this case.1 Dkt. No. 87. The court entered
judgment the same day. Dkt. No. 88. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or
amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), dkt. no. 89, and
the court denied that motion on January 28, 2020, dkt. no. 93. The plaintiff
since has filed a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 60(a), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(6) and (c). Dkt. No. 94. The court will deny the
plaintiff’s motion.
The plaintiff contends that the court erroneously determined that the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on his First Amendment claim
that the defendants prohibited him from praying outside of his cell. Dkt. No. 94
at 1-3. He cites to a 2006 case from the Southern District of Indiana, which he
The court also denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and his
motion to strike filings and/or motions. Dkt. No. 87.
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says supports his contention that it was clearly established that he had a
constitutional right to pray outside of his cell in the absence of a legitimate
penological justification requiring him to pray in his cell. Id. at 3. The plaintiff
also contends that his First Amendment claim should have survived summary
judgment because he sued the defendants in their official capacities, and
qualified immunity applies to defendants only in their individual capacities. Id.
Rule 60(a) allows a court to “correct a clerical mistake or a mistake
arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order,
or other part of the record.” The plaintiff does not assert that the court made a
clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission. The plaintiff
asserts that the court erred in its legal analysis of his claim. Rule 60(a) does
not apply.
Rule 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for the
following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b);
(3) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
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The plaintiff relies on sections (1), (2) and (6). Dkt. No. 94 at 1. Rule
60(b)(1) allows a court to remedy its own mistakes. Mendez v. Republic Bank,
725 F.3d 651, 660 (7th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff thinks that the court erred by
dismissing the defendants at summary judgment because he sued them in
their official capacities. The plaintiff did not proceed on a claim against the
defendants in their official capacities. See Dkt. No. 14 at 7-8. At screening the
court allowed the plaintiff to proceed on claims against the defendants in their
individual capacities. See id.; see also Dkt. No. 87 at 9, 19. The court did not
make a mistake, and it has no need to remedy one under Rule 60(b)(1).
Rule 60(b)(2) does not afford the plaintiff relief because he has not
presented newly discovered evidence.
Rule 60(b)(6), which is the “any other reason” “catch-all category is
limited to ‘extraordinary circumstances . . . .’” Id. at 657 (quoting Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863-64 (1988)). The plaintiff has
not identified any extraordinary circumstances requiring the court to
reconsider its decision; he just doesn’t think the court got it right.
In its order denying the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend judgment, the
court revisited its decision that the defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity. Dtk. No. 93. This motion is another attempt by the plaintiff to argue
this same issue. His citation to Dixon v. Woodruff-Fibley, No. 1:04-cv-1374DFH-VSS, 2006 WL 2644934 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 14, 2006), an unpublished
district court case, does not demonstrate that it is clearly established in the
law that prohibiting him from praying in the gym or dayroom, and requiring
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him to pray in his cell, violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.
Dixon, 2006 WL 2644934, at *4-5 (holding that Miami Correctional Facility
employees “did not violate Dixon’s First Amendment rights when they
prohibited him from praying outside his cell” because prohibiting inmates from
praying in common areas was “reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests”).
The court DENIES the plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment. Dkt.
No. 94.
Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 1st day of June, 2020.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________________
HON. PAMELA PEPPER
Chief United States District Judge

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