McDuffie v. Swiekatowski et al

Filing 20

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 9/29/2017. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Docket #19) SCREENED and shall be the operative complaint in this action. Plaintiff PERMITTED to proceed against Defendant on claims of excessive force and of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Defendant to FILE responsive pleading to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint within 60 days. 14 Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order DENIED. See Order for further details. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Brandon C. McDuffie and Warden at Green Bay Correctional Institution) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
BRANDON C. MCDUFFIE,
Plaintiff,

v.

WILLIAM SWIEKATOWSKI,

Case No. 17-CV-984-JPS

ORDER

Defendant.
On August 10, 2017, the Court screened Plaintiff’s original
complaint. (Docket #8). The Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed on a claim
of excessive force under the Eighth Amendment against Defendant William
Swiekatowski (“Swiekatowski”). Id. at 2–5. On August 25, 2017, the Court
entered a scheduling order in this matter and afforded Plaintiff until
September 25, 2017, to file an amended complaint if he chose to do so.
(Docket #12). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 19, 2017.
(Docket #19). The Court now turns to screening that amended complaint.
As noted in the first screening order, the Court is required to screen
complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental
entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, if the
prisoner has raised claims that are “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b). All of the
standards cited in the first screening order remain applicable here. (Docket
#8 at 1–2).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is almost identical to his original
complaint. Compare (Docket #1), with (Docket #19). Put briefly, Plaintiff’s
claims arise from his attempted suicide on February 14, 2017, by jumping
off of a three-story-high structure. (Docket #19 at 3). Swiekatowski shot
Plaintiff with a pepper ball gun in order to encourage him to come down
from the structure. Id. at 4. Plaintiff did not jump, but he says that
Swiekatowski’s shooting did not help matters and was unwarranted under
the circumstances. Id. at 4–5.
The only differences of note between the original and amended
complaints are that (1) a previously dismissed defendant, Warden Scott
Eckstein, is no longer mentioned, and (2) Plaintiff appears to assert an
additional claim for Swiekatowski’s deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs—here, his mental health issues. See id. at 7. While
correctional officers are not often liable for failing to care for an inmate’s
serious medical needs, see Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011),
because Plaintiff’s claim implicates alleged suicidality, and in light of the
lenient standard of review applied at screening, the Court will permit the
claim to proceed, see Matos ex rel. Matos v. O’Sullivan, 335 F.3d 553, 556 (7th
Cir. 2003); Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529
(7th Cir. 2000). Consequently, the Court will permit Plaintiff to proceed
against Swiekatowski on a claim of excessive force, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, and a claim of deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs, also in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b).
The Court will close by addressing Plaintiff’s pending motion for a
temporary restraining order. (Docket #14). In the motion, Plaintiff seeks an
order separating him from Swiekatowski during the pendency of this
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litigation and for a prison transfer to avoid what he views as retaliation for
his bringing this lawsuit. (Docket #15 at 1–2). The alleged acts of retaliation
include punitive segregation, denial of access to the law library, and
harassment by prison staff other than Swiekatowski. Id.
To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, whether through a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must
show that (1) his underlying case has a reasonable likelihood of success on
the merits, (2) no adequate remedy at law exists, and (3) he will suffer
irreparable harm without the injunction. Wood v. Buss, 496 F.3d 620, 622 (7th
Cir. 2007). If he shows those three factors, the court then balances the harm
to each party and to the public interest from granting or denying the
injunction. Id.; Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013).
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only
be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A preliminary
injunction is appropriate only if it seeks relief of the same character sought
in the underlying suit, and deals with a matter presented in that underlying
suit. Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing De
Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)); Devose v.
Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[A] party moving for a
preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between
the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in the
complaint.”).
Against this backdrop, the Court must deny Plaintiff’s motion. First,
his allegations of retaliation are conclusory at best. He does not create a
colorable link between the actions of prison officials—none of whom are

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defendants in this case—and the filing of his lawsuit. His conjecture that
these acts are being done with retaliatory animus is not enough.
Second, Plaintiff’s request for a transfer is unrelated to his
underlying claims of excessive force and deliberate indifference to his
medical needs. Indeed, he does not identify any ongoing retaliation by the
lone defendant in this case, Swiekatowski. As a result, the Court is not
inclined to grant the requested relief, as doing so would expand the reach
of this case to matters outside the complaint. If the actions of other prison
officials interfere with his ability to litigate this case, that may be a separate
claim not related to the operative allegations here.
Third, Plaintiff’s requested relief is overbroad. With respect to
preliminary injunctive relief regarding prison conditions, Congress
provides that such relief must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further than
necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief,
and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(2). Further, the court must give “substantial weight to any adverse
impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused
by the preliminary relief[.]” Id. Plaintiff’s requests for a no-contact order
and for a transfer out of his present institution are well beyond the scope of
what the court can order in any narrowly tailored preliminary injunction.
See id.; Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he PLRA
enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases
challenging prison conditions: ‘[P]rison officials have broad administrative
and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage.’”) (quoting
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983)). At a minimum, such requests are
“highly intrusive to the inner workings of the prison system and would
tread upon the DOC’s authority over running their institution.” Capoeria v.
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Pollard, Case No. 16-CV-224, 2016 WL 1452398, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 13,
2016) (citing Baird v. Hodge, Case No. 13–cv–0376–MJR–SCW, 2013 WL
6493694, at *8–9 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2013)). His request for injunctive relief
will, therefore, be denied. See Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund
v. K & I Constr., Inc., 270 F.3d 1060, 1064 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should not be granted unless the
movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Docket #19)
shall be the operative complaint in this action;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the informal service
agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this Court,
Defendant shall file a responsive pleading to the amended complaint within
sixty (60) days of receiving electronic notice of this order;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary
restraining order (Docket #14) be and the same is hereby DENIED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this order be sent to the
officer in charge of the agency where the inmate is confined.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 29th day of September, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

____________________________________
J. P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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