Walker-Hall v. Syed et al

Filing 34

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 4/26/2018. 20 Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against Emily Stadtmueller and Ann York are DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaint iff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies; Defendants Emily Stadtmueller and Ann York are DISMISSED from this action. Defendant RN Gela and the Doe defendants, having not been identified by Plaintiff, are DISMISSED from this action. 32 Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants' Reply and for Sanctions is DENIED. 24 Defendants' Motion to Extend the Dispositive Motions Deadline is GRANTED; either remaining party may file a disposition motion within 3 weeks of entry of this Order. See Order for further details. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Donovan Walker-Hall at Waupun Correctional Institution) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
DONOVAN WALKER-HALL,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 17-CV-1032-JPS

v.
DR. SALEM SYED, EMILY
STADTMUELLER, ANN YORK, RN
GELA, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE, and DR.
JOHN DOE,

ORDER

Defendants.
1.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Donovan Walker-Hall (“Walker-Hall”), a prisoner who is

representing himself, brought this action alleging that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Walker-Hall alleges that beginning in
August 2016, while he was incarcerated at Waupun Correctional Institution
(“WCI”), defendants Dr. Salem Syed (“Dr. Syed”) and Emily Stadtmueller
(“Stadtmueller”) withheld his pain medication as a way to coerce him to
take medication for his sickle cell anemia, despite Walker-Hall’s stated
concerns about the stroke risk associated with that medication. Walker-Hall
also alleges that defendant Ann York (“York”), RN Gela (“Gela”), and Jane
Doe failed to address his complaints of pain after he informed them that the
treatment they were offering him was ineffective. Finally, Walker-Hall

alleges that Dr. John Doe failed to treat his pain when Walker-Hall was
hospitalized at Waupun Memorial Hospital.1
On March 9, 2018, the defendants filed a motion for partial summary
judgment as to Walker-Hall’s claims against Stadtmueller and York on the
ground that Walker-Hall did not properly exhaust his administrative
remedies as to those claims. (Docket #20). That motion is now fully briefed.
(Docket #20-#23 and #25-31). For the reasons explained below, it will be
granted.2

Walker-Hall has not identified the Doe defendants, despite the Court’s
instruction to him in the Trial Scheduling Order that he use discovery tools to learn
their identities and amend his pleading with their names within 45 days, meaning
by December 31, 2017. (Docket #18 at 3). The Court warned that failure to identify
the Does by that date would result in dismissal of those defendants without
further notice. Id. The time for Walker-Hall to identify the Does has long since
passed. Therefore, the Doe defendants will be dismissed.
1

Additionally, the Wisconsin Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed a notice at
the outset of this case that they could not accept service for the defendant
identified in Walker-Hall’s Complaint as “RN Gela” because they were unable to
identify her based on the allegations of the Complaint. (Docket #14). The Court
instructed Walker-Hall to use discovery tools to learn the identity of RN Gela and
ordered that Walker-Hall file a pleading on or before January 2, 2018 supplying
information sufficient for the DOJ to determine if it could accept service on her
behalf. (Docket #18 at 1-2). Walker-Hall has not done so. The defendants indicate
that they still cannot identify the person referred to as RN Gela. (Docket #21 at 1).
The defendant referred to as RN Gela will likewise be dismissed.
The defendants’ summary judgment submissions include a reply to
Walker-Hall’s response to their proposed findings of fact, as well as two additional
declarations. (Docket #29-31). Walker-Hall has filed a motion to strike the
defendants’ reply and their “new evidence” as hearsay. (Docket #32). Walker-Hall
also asked for discovery sanctions. Id. The Court will deny Walker-Hall’s motion.
The evidence to which Walker-Hall objects is not hearsay, and, in any event, it is
not necessary to the Court’s decision on the pending motion.
2

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2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides the mechanism for

seeking summary judgment. Rule 56 states that the “court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016).
A “genuine” dispute of material fact is created when “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court construes
all facts and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 815 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir.
2016).
3.

BACKGROUND
The Court begins here with a primer on the law related to the

requirement that a prisoner exhaust available administrative remedies
before filing suit in federal court. This will place in proper context the facts
relevant to the pending motion.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) establishes that, prior to
filing a lawsuit complaining about prison conditions, a prisoner must
exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available[.]” 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a). To do so, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the
place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require,” and he
must do so precisely in accordance with those rules; substantial compliance
does not satisfy the PLRA. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.
2002); Burrell v. Powers, 431 F.3d 282, 284–85 (7th Cir. 2005). A suit must be
dismissed if it was filed before exhaustion was complete, even if exhaustion
is achieved before judgment is entered. Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d
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532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). Several important policy goals animate the
exhaustion requirement, including restricting frivolous claims, giving
prison officials the opportunity to address situations internally, giving the
parties the opportunity to develop the factual record, and reducing the
scope of litigation. Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 450–51 (7th Cir. 2001).
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be
proven by Defendants. Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 2005).
The Wisconsin Department of Corrections maintains an Inmate
Complaint Review System (“ICRS”) to provide a forum for administrative
complaints. Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.04.3 There are two steps an
inmate must take to exhaust their administrative remedies under the ICRS.
First, the inmate must file an offender complaint with the Institution
Complaint Examiner (“ICE”) within fourteen days of the events giving rise
to the complaint. Id. §§ DOC 310.07(1), 310.09(6). The ICE may reject a
complaint or, before accepting it, can direct the inmate to “attempt to
resolve the issue.” See id. §§ DOC 310.08, 310.09(4), 310.11(5). If the
complaint is rejected, the inmate may appeal the rejection to the appropriate
reviewing authority. Id. § DOC 310.11(6).4 If the complaint is not rejected,
the ICE issues a recommendation for disposing of the complaint, either
dismissal or affirmance, to the reviewing authority. Id. §§ DOC 310.07(2),

Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter DOC 310 as it existed at the time
of the events relevant to this case has been repealed. A new Chapter DOC 310 took
effect April 1, 2018. See Wisconsin Administrative Register, March 26, 2018 No.
747, available at http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/code/register/2018/747B/register.
Citations in this Order are to the version of Chapter DOC 310 as it existed at the
relevant time.
3

The ICRS defines a “reviewing authority” as “the warden, bureau director,
administrator or designee who is authorized to review and decide an inmate
complaint.” Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.03(2).
4

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310.11. The reviewing authority may accept or reject the ICE’s
recommendation. Id. § DOC 310.07(3).
Second, if the ICE recommends dismissal and the reviewing
authority accepts it, the inmate may appeal the decision to the Corrections
Complaint Examiner (“CCE”). Id. §§ DOC 310.07(6), 310.13. The CCE issues
a recommendation to the Secretary of the Department of Corrections who
may accept or reject it. Id. §§ DOC 310.07(7), 310.13, 310.14. Upon receiving
the Secretary’s decision, or after forty-five days from the date the Secretary
received the recommendation, the inmate’s administrative remedies are
exhausted. Id. §§ DOC 310.07(7), 310.14.
4.

RELEVANT FACTS
At all times relevant, Walker-Hall was an inmate at housed at WCI.

Stadtmueller and York were nurses at WCI. Stadtmueller informed WalkerHall by memorandum dated August 24, 2016 that he would not be given
narcotic pain medication if he refused to take medication for his sickle cell
anemia. (Docket #22-2 at 10). Walker-Hall alleges that York then refused to
give him pain medication at an appointment on June 5, 2017, though the
parties have not submitted evidence of this fact.
Walker-Hall’s inmate complaint history reveals that he filed many
inmate grievances during his time at WCI, including four medical-related
grievances during the timeframe relevant to this case. (Docket #22-1). In the
first and second grievances, received on March 10 and 13, 2017 by the ICE
at WCI, Walker-Hall complained that the Health Services Unit (“HSU”)
staff at WCI discontinued his pain medication because he was not taking
medication for sickle cell anemia. (Docket #22-2 at 8-12 and #22-3). The
grievances include copies of Stadtmueller’s August 2016 memorandum as
well as a February 23, 2017 memorandum from Nancy White (“White”), the
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HSU assistant manager, reiterating that if Walker-Hall refused to take his
sickle cell anemia medication he would not be given pain medication.
(Docket #22-2 at 10, 12 and #22-3 at 10). The ICE rejected the March 2017
grievances as untimely based on the number of days that has passed since
the February 23 memorandum and because the discontinuation of WalkerHall’s pain medication actually occurred before White sent the February 23
memorandum. (Docket #22-2 at 2 and #22-3 at 2). Walker-Hall appealed the
rejected grievances to the appropriate reviewing authority, who
determined that the grievances were properly rejected. (Docket #22-2 at 5-6
and #22-3 at 5-6).
In Walker-Hall’s third grievance, received by the ICE on April 26,
2017, he again complained about his pain medication being discontinued.
(Docket #22-4 at 11-15). The grievance is directed at the decision by WalkerHall’s treating physician, defendant Dr. Syed, to discontinue the pain
medication. Id. It does not mention Stadtmueller or York. Id. On April 27,
the ICE recommended dismissal of the grievance after speaking with the
HSU manager and determining that Walker-Hall’s medical needs had been
adequately addressed. Id. at 2-3. The reviewing authority agreed with the
ICE and dismissed the grievance on May 6, 2017. Id. at 4. Walker-Hall
appealed that decision to the CCE, who determined that the institution’s
decision was appropriate and recommended that the grievance be
dismissed. The Office of the Secretary dismissed the grievance on June 2,
2017. Id. at 7.
Finally, the ICE received Walker-Hall’s fourth medical-related
grievance on June 5, 2017, in which he complained that prison staff did not
send him to the hospital during a sickle cell crisis on March 18, 2017.
(Docket #22-5 at 8-9). The June 5 grievance was rejected as untimely, id. at
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2, and Walker-Hall’s appeal resulted in a determination that the rejection
was appropriate, id at 5.
5.

ANALYSIS
Walker-Hall filed many inmate grievances during his time at WCI,

but none that timely reported the allegedly unconstitutional conduct of
Stadtmueller and York about which he now complains.
First, only two of Walker-Hall’s medical-related grievances, those
received on March 10 and 13, 2017, reference Stadtmueller in any way. At
least as to Stadtmueller, those grievances were properly rejected as
untimely. See Wis. Admin. Code DOC § 310.07(2) (an inmate must file a
complaint with the ICE within fourteen days of the events giving rise to the
complaint). Specifically, Walker-Hall complains in the March 2017
grievances about being denied pain medication by HSU staff and refers to
the memorandum sent by Stadtmueller in August 2016 explaining that
Walker-Hall would be denied pain medication if he refused to take his
sickle cell anemia medication. Therefore, Walker-Hall’s March 10 and 13
grievances were filed seven months after Stadtmueller’s allegedly
unconstitutional conduct. Because Walker-Hall did not file these grievances
at the time the prison’s administrative rules require, and precisely in
accordance with those rules, he did not exhaust his claim against
Stadtmueller. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025.
Next, none of Walker-Hall’s four medical-related grievances
reference York in any way. His Complaint includes an allegation that York
refused to give him pain medication at an appointment on June 5, 2017, but
none of his grievances reference an appointment that took place on June 5.
He, therefore, did not begin, let alone exhaust, the administrative grievance
process with respect to his claim against York.
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Finally, Walker-Hall asks that the Court excuse, for “good cause,”
his tardiness in filing his June 2017 grievance, which related to an incident
in March 2017 when prison staff refused to send him to the hospital during
a sickle cell crisis. He argues that he was hospitalized for a period of time
between the March incident and his June grievance, without access to the
offender complaint system, and therefore he had good cause to submit his
grievance beyond the 14-day deadline. However, the Court need not decide
whether Walker-Hall’s June 2017 grievance should be deemed timely
because, in any event, it does not relate to Walker-Hall’s claims against
Stadtmueller and York as alleged in this case.
The PLRA requires complete or “proper” exhaustion, Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006), and Walker-Hall has not done so for his Eighth
Amendment claims against Stadtmueller and York. Those claims will be
dismissed without prejudice. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir.
2004) (dismissal for failure to exhaust under § 1997e(a) is always without
prejudice).
6.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained herein, the Court will grant the

defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to Walker-Hall’s
claims under the Eighth Amendment against Stadtmueller and York. Those
defendants will be dismissed.
The only remaining claim is Walker-Hall’s claim against Dr. Syed.5
The defendants have indicated that they intend to file a subsequent motion
for summary judgment on the merits of that claim. See (Docket #24). The
The defendants concede that Walker-Hall’s grievance received on April
26, 2017, which relates to Walker-Hall’s claim against Dr. Syed, was properly
exhausted. (Docket #21 at 7-8).
5

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defendants requested that the Court stay the deadline for the filing of
dispositive motions, currently set for May 1, 2018, until after the Court’s
resolution of the pending motion for partial summary judgment. Id. The
Court will grant the defendants’ motion and extend the dispositive motion
deadline to three weeks from the entry of this Order. No further extensions
will be considered.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for partial summary
judgment as to Walker-Hall’s Eighth Amendment claims against Emily
Stadtmueller and Ann York (Docket #20) be and the same is hereby
GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Walker-Hall’s claims against
Emily Stadtmueller and Ann York (Docket #1 at 4), be and the same are
hereby DISMISSED without prejudice;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Emily Stadtmueller
and Ann York be and the same are hereby DISMISSED from this action;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the John and Jane Doe defendants
and defendant RN Gela be and the same are hereby DISMISSED from this
action;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Walker-Hall’s motion to strike the
defendants’ reply and for sanctions (Docket #32) be and the same is hereby
DENIED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to extend
the dispositive motion deadline (Docket #24) be and the same is hereby
GRANTED. Either remaining party may file a dispositive motion on or
before three weeks from the entry of this Order.

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Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 26th day of April, 2018.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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