Terry v. County of Milwaukee et al

Filing 127

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 6/4/2018 GRANTING 77 Defendant Armor Correctional Health Services' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and 81 Defendant Milwaukee County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Plaintiff 's Monell claim against such defendants based on a widespread custom or practice of ignoring inmates' serious medical needs is DISMISSED. Plaintiff may FILE an amended complaint within 10 days. The dispostive motion deadline is E XTENDED to 7/2/2018; responses to a dispositive motion are due within 21 days after the motion is filed; replies are due within 7 days of the filing of the response; no extensions of such deadlines will be considered. Defendant David David A. Clarke, Jr. is DISMISSED from this action; Plaintiff's personal capacity claims against Defendant Clarke are DISMISSED; the Clerk of Court shall SUBSTITUTE Richard R. Schmidt in place of Defendant Clarke on the docket as to Plaintiff's official capacity claims. See Order for further details. (cc: all counsel) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
REBECCA TERRY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 17-CV-1112-JPS

COUNTY OF MILWAUKEE, DAVID
A. CLARKE, JR., OFFICER BRIAN
WENZEL, UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES
OF MILWAUKEE COUNTY JAIL,
UNKNOWN JAIL SUPERVISORS,
ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH
SERVICES, CAROLYN EXUM,
MORGAN BEVENUE, MARGARET
HOOVER, UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES
OF ARMOR CORRECTIONAL
HEALTH SERVICES, and
UNKNOWN ARMOR
HEALTHCARE SUPERVISORS,

ORDER

Defendants.
Plaintiff Rebecca Terry (“Terry”) filed this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, complaining that her constitutional rights were violated
when she was ignored while she gave birth in a cell at the Milwaukee
County Jail (the “Jail”). See (Docket #1). Defendants include Milwaukee
County (the “County”), several County and Jail officials, including former
Milwaukee County Sheriff David Clarke (“Clarke”), and Armor
Correctional Health Services (“Armor”), a private corporation that
provides healthcare services to inmates at the Jail.
Against both the County and Armor, Terry asserts claims under
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell holds that

a municipal entity or a related corporate entity like Armor can be liable
under Section 1983, but not simply because its employees violate the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at 694.1 Instead, a municipality can be
liable for a constitutional violation only when the violation is brought about
by (1) its express policy, (2) a widespread, though unwritten, custom or
practice, or (3) a decision by an agent with “final policymaking authority.”
Darchak v. City of Chicago Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2009).
In this case, Terry advances a theory that the County and Armor had
a widespread custom or practice of ignoring inmates’ serious medical
needs.2 The County and Armor have each filed motions for judgment on
the pleadings, asserting that Terry’s Monell claim is overbroad and
unworkable. The motions are fully briefed and, for the reasons stated
below, they will be granted.3

Monell liability can be imposed upon private corporations sued under
Section 1983 when they contract with the state to provide essential services to state
prisoners, as Armor does. Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 790 (7th Cir.
2014); Iskander v. Vill. of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). Thus,
references to “municipal” liability in this Order encompass both the County and
Armor; there is no legal distinction between them for purposes of Monell.
1

Terry sometimes phrases the practice as ignoring an “obvious” need for
medical care rather than a “serious” need, but the two terms are functionally
equivalent here. See Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997) (a serious
medical need for constitutional purposes is “one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention”).
2

Terry also alleges a separate Monell claim against the County based on its
express policy of shackling pregnant inmates during transport and treatment,
which she believes exposed her to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Docket #1 ¶¶
95–101). That Monell claim is not at issue in the present motions.
3

Page 2 of 30

1.

LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(c) permits a party to move

for judgment after the complaint and answer have been filed. BuchananMoore v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009). A motion for
judgment on the pleadings is governed by the same standard as a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Adams v. City of
Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2014). To survive a challenge
under Rule 12(c) or 12(b)(6), a complaint must provide “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In other words, the complaint must give “fair notice of what
the. . .claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The allegations must “plausibly suggest
that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a
speculative level[.]” Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2016)
(citation omitted); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 555 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). In reviewing the
complaint, the Court is required to “accept as true all of the well-pleaded
facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” Kubiak, 810 F.3d at 480–81.
2.

RELEVANT FACTS
The following facts are drawn from Terry’s complaint. (Docket #1).

The Court first recounts Terry’s allegations regarding her childbirth at the
Jail, then her explanation as to how that episode fits into an alleged larger
pattern of medical mistreatment at the Jail.
2.1

Terry’s Childbirth at the Jail

On March 9, 2014, Terry was arrested in Franklin, Wisconsin and
taken to the Jail. She was nine months pregnant, due to give birth the next
day. During booking, she began to experience labor pains and was taken to
Page 3 of 30

Froedtert Hospital. Two sheriff’s deputies accompanied her. Hospital staff
told the deputies that Terry was in labor, but that she could return to the
Jail.
The deputies returned her to the Jail and she was placed in the
infirmary. Terry informed the correctional officer who was escorting her to
the infirmary that, based on her prior experiences in childbirth, she believed
delivery would occur that evening. Defendant Brian Wenzel (“Wenzel”), a
Jail correctional officer, was working in the infirmary at that time.
Wenzel placed Terry in an infirmary cell. The cell was extremely
dirty, including a filthy sink, toilet, and floor. Soon after entering her cell,
Terry began experiencing more labor pains, much more intensely and
closer together than before. Terry pushed the emergency button in her cell
to ask for assistance. Defendants, including Wenzel and Armor nursing
staff, ignored her. This occurred despite that fact that Wenzel was at his
post just yards from Terry’s cell.
Terry’s condition continued to worsen, her labor pains increased,
and she repeatedly cried out for help and hit the emergency button in her
cell. Wenzel ignored her, and no Armor staff ever made rounds to check on
her. After more than three hours in labor, alone in her cell screaming for
help, Terry finally birthed her son, who emerged from the birth canal
making choking sounds and blue in the face. She was terrified that her son
could not breathe, and in her desperation, she reached into his throat to
clear his airway herself. At this time, Wenzel finally looked into Terry’s cell
and called for help.
Some Armor employees arrived. They then called emergency
medical staff, who transported Terry to Sinai Hospital where she and her
child received post-partum care. Eventually, Terry was returned to the Jail.
Page 4 of 30

2.2

Terry’s Monell Allegations

Terry claims that her own instance of mistreatment during childbirth
fits into a larger practice whereby Jail and Armor staff routinely ignore
inmates’ requests for medical care or their obvious need for care. To flesh
out this claim, she details in her complaint several other instances of
medical mistreatment at the Jail.
First, in 2001, Milwaukee County entered into a consent decree
governing medical care at the Jail in Christensen v. Sullivan, Milwaukee
County Circuit Court Case No. 1996-CV-1835. The consent decree identified
several requirements for the Jail, including requirements related to
women’s health and medical emergencies.4 Under the consent decree, Dr.
Ronald Shansky (“Shansky”) was appointed as the Medical Monitor of the
Jail and has published reports documenting deficiencies in medical care at
the Jail.
In the years leading up to Terry’s experience, Shansky has
repeatedly reported inadequate medical and correctional staffing at the Jail.
He frequently explained that as a result of inadequate staffing and
inadequate monitoring of inmate medical needs, inmates do not receive the
care they need and suffer severe delays in receiving care. Shansky has also
opined that correctional officers choose to ignore symptoms reported by
inmates, causing a further breakdown in the provision of medical care.
Despite his admonitions, the Jail has failed to comply with Shansky’s
recommendations. According to Terry, Shansky’s reports put Defendants
on notice about a pattern of inadequate care and staffing at the Jail. Sixteen

A copy of the consent decree has not been provided, and the complaint
gives no more detail than this one sentence regarding its provisions.
4

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years after it was originally entered, the consent decree remains in force
because, according to Terry, the Jail is not in substantial compliance with
its provisions.
In addition to Shansky’s findings, a pattern of medical emergencies
and deaths at the Jail also demonstrates, in Terry’s view, Defendants’
indifference to inmate medical needs. On March 3, 2009, Virgilio Jimenez
(“Jimenez”) died in his cell at the Milwaukee House of Correction, which
was then under the supervision of Clarke. According to the policy in place
at the time, correctional officers were required to check on inmates every
thirty minutes. However, despite the fact that Jimenez missed breakfast and
did not get out of bed earlier that morning during a search, correctional
officers failed to conduct the required check-ins. Jimenez’s body was
discovered in his cell later that morning, more than six hours after he was
last seen alive.
Terry’s other cited instances of alleged neglect occurred at the Jail
itself. In April 2009, Corey Kleser, an inmate at the Jail and a Type I diabetic,
was denied proper medical care, including insulin, for a period of more
than three months. In October 2009, Robert Schmidt was detained at the Jail
and denied medical care, including his prescribed medication for a blood
disorder, for more than ten days, causing a severe and painful blood clot.
In January 2011, Antonio Cowser (“Cowser”) was booked into the
Jail and told correctional officers he was suicidal. Despite his clear medical
needs, Cowser received no treatment for his suicidal ideation. Over the
course of thirteen days, he committed suicide by starving and dehydrating
himself, and no correctional officer or medical staff intervened. Also in
2011, Paul Heytens (“Heytens”) committed suicide in his cell at the Jail after
he was denied his prescribed psychotropic medication and correctional
Page 6 of 30

officers failed to monitor his activities. Despite rules requiring correctional
officers to conduct thirty-minute checks on inmates, Heytens’ body was not
found for more than eleven hours after he hanged himself.5
Terry then turns to instances of claimed mistreatment occurring after
her experience in March 2014. In October of that year, inmate Kwame
Moore (“Moore”) suffered intense sudden pain in his groin, consistent with
testicular torsion. Moore complained to Jail and Armor staff about the
debilitating pain. They refused his requests for medical care. By the time
Moore received care the following day, it was necessary to remove the
affected testicle.
In April 2016, Terrill Thomas (“Thomas”) was detained at the Jail.
He suffered from bipolar disorder. For reasons Terry does not explain,
correctional officers shut off water to Thomas’ cell. He died in his cell seven
days later as a result of dehydration.
In July 2016, Shade Swayzer (“Swayzer”) was detained at the Jail at
a time when she was nearly nine months pregnant. Like Terry, Swayzer
went into labor at the Jail and was denied medical care. Swayzer’s daughter
did not survive the ordeal and died shortly after her birth at the Jail.
In August 2016, Kristin Fiebrink (“Fiebrink”) was detained at the Jail
having recently used heroin and alcohol. On the night of August 27, 2016,
Fiebrink screamed for help in her cell, but correctional officers ignored her
pleas. She was found dead the following morning, but Terry does not give
the cause of death. Presumably, it resulted from withdrawal symptoms.

Armor did not begin to provide medical care at the Jail until March 2013.
See (Docket #108 at 6). However, Terry alleges, and the Court must accept as true,
that Armor knew of the healthcare incidents at the Jail and House of Correction
prior to 2013. See (Docket #1 ¶ 77–79).
5

Page 7 of 30

Finally, in October 2016, Michael Madden (“Madden”) was detained
at the Jail. He suffered from a heart condition and heroin addiction. While
in custody, he suffered a seizure that rendered him unconscious, but
correctional officers failed to provide him medical care. They instead picked
Madden up and dropped him on his head. He died later that evening.
In Terry’s view, these injuries and deaths “did not occur in isolation
from each other. The County of Milwaukee and Armor Correctional Health
Services have consistently failed to provide adequate medical care for the
detainees at the jail.” (Docket #1 ¶ 68). Terry claims that each occurrence,
coupled with Shansky’s repeated pleas for reform of Jail medical practices,
put Defendants on notice of an ongoing, serious problem with medical care
at the Jail. Specifically,
[b]y March 2014, Defendant Clarke was on notice of a
widespread practice at the Milwaukee County Jail of ignoring
the serious medical needs of detainees like [Terry], thereby
exposing them to unreasonable risks of harm. In the
Milwaukee County Jail detainees with clear symptoms of
serious medical illness, injury, or conditions who ask for
medical care or to see a doctor are routinely delayed or
completely ignored.
Id. ¶ 74. Similarly, Terry alleges that
there exists a widespread practice at [the] Jail under which Jail
employees, including correctional officers and medical
personnel, commonly fail or refuse to: (1) properly examine a
detainee with a serious medical condition; (2) provide proper
medication to a detainee with a serious medical condition; (3)
respond to detainees who have requested medical attention
or medication or asked to see a doctor; (4) respond to
detainees who exhibit obvious signs of a serious medical
condition or illness; or (5) adequately staff the Jail with
correctional and medical personnel necessary to respond to
detainee needs.

Page 8 of 30

Id. ¶ 75. “This widespread practice is allowed to flourish,” says Terry,
“because Defendant Clarke, as Sheriff, directly encourages and is thereby
the moving force behind the very type of misconduct at issue by failing to
adequately train, supervise, and control correctional officers and medical
personnel, and by failing to adequately punish and discipline prior
instances of similar misconduct, thus directly encouraging future abuses
such as those affecting [Terry].” Id. ¶ 76. Likewise, Armor promoted these
practices by “encourag[ing] the very type of misconduct at issue in this case,
fail[ing] to provide adequate training and supervision of healthcare and
correctional employees, and fail[ing] to adequately punish and discipline
prior instances of similar misconduct.” Id. ¶ 81.
3.

ANALYSIS
As noted above, Monell allows governmental entities to be held liable

under Section 1983, but not on a theory of respondeat superior. Milestone v.
City of Monroe, Wis., 665 F.3d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 2011); City of Okla. City v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 810 (1985). Instead, “[m]isbehaving employees are
responsible for their own conduct,” and “‘units of local government are
responsible only for their policies, rather than misconduct by their
workers.’” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Fairley v. Fermaint, 482 F.3d 897, 904 (7th Cir. 2007)). For municipal liability
to attach, a constitutional violation must be brought about by (1) an express
municipal policy; (2) a widespread, though unwritten, custom or practice;
or (3) a decision by a municipal agent with “final policymaking authority.”
Darchak, 580 F.3d at 629.
The parties agree that Terry is proceeding solely under the second of
these three species of Monell liability. See (Docket #78 at 11); (Docket #82 at
Page 9 of 30

5); (Docket #103 at 6). To establish municipal liability under a “custom”
theory, Terry must plead facts allowing the reasonable inference that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to their subordinates’ widespread
practice of ignoring the serious medical needs of Jail inmates. Palmer v.
Marion Cnty., 327 F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 2003); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan
Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997). Only if Defendants
consciously ignored a need for action can it be said that they adopted a de
facto policy of violating inmates’ constitutional rights. City of Canton, Ohio
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th
Cir. 2005) (“If the same problem has arisen many times and the municipality
has acquiesced in the outcome, it is possible (though not necessary) to infer
that there is a policy at work.”). Put differently, Defendants must have had
notice of an ongoing problem such that allowing the problem to endure was
akin to a conscious choice among alternatives. Harris, 498 U.S. at 389; Tuttle,
471 U.S. at 823.
This can be demonstrated “by showing a series of bad acts and
inviting the court to infer from them that the policymaking level of
government was bound to have noticed what was going on and by failing
to do anything must have encouraged or at least condoned, thus in either
event adopting, the misconduct of subordinate officers.” Jackson v. Marion
Cnty., 66 F.3d 151, 152 (7th Cir. 1995). It can also arise from a failure to
provide adequate training in light of an obvious danger of constitutional
violations in the absence of training, Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434
F.3d 1006, 1029–30 (7th Cir. 2006), although Terry’s theory is not about
failure to train in view of an obvious need but instead failure to train in
response to a pattern of misconduct, see Dunn v. City of Elgin, Ill., 347 F.3d
641, 646 (7th Cir. 2003); (Docket #103 at 14); infra Part 3.1.
Page 10 of 30

In addition to showing sufficient culpability on the part of the
governmental entity, a Monell plaintiff must allege facts allowing the
inference that the challenged policy, practice, or custom was the “moving
force” behind her injury. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388. Simple but-for causation is
not enough. See Wilson v. Cook Cnty., 742 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing
Brown, 520 U.S. at 410). Instead, the challenged practice “must be closely
related to the ultimate injury” that the plaintiff suffered. Harris, 489 U.S. at
391; Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. Cnty. of Barbeau, 506 F.3d 509, 515 (7th Cir.
2009) (there must be a “direct causal link” between a custom and the alleged
constitutional violations). The Seventh Circuit has said that a “moving
force” is the “catalyst” for the injury in question, not merely a “contributing
factor.” Johnson v. Cook Cnty., 526 F. App’x 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013); Thomas
v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010) (training or
policy changes that “might” have had an effect on plaintiff’s treatment did
not satisfy causation requirement).
Terry’s allegations fall short of establishing that a cohesive practice
of ignoring medical needs exists or that such a practice directly caused her
injury. Thus, she has not pleaded the essential culpability and causation
elements of her Monell claim. The Court will address each of these problems
in turn below. First, however, it must address an argument hinted at in
Terry’s brief: that her Monell claim can proceed on a “single-incident”
theory under Harris, without proof of a pattern of misconduct.
3.1

Terry Does Not Allege a Single-Incident Monell Theory

The focus of Terry’s complaint is that a widespread practice of
ignoring inmate medical needs arose from a failure to train, supervise, and
discipline after repeated instances of misconduct. She does not allege that
there was such an obvious need for training that no prior pattern of
Page 11 of 30

misconduct was required to first put Defendants on notice of a problem.
That is a theory of Monell liability recognized in Harris, where the Court
held that even a single constitutional violation, “accompanied by a showing
that a municipality has failed to train its employees to handle recurring
situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation, could trigger
municipal liability.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 409 (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 390).
This extremely limited class of Monell liability applies only to situations
where “a violation of federal rights may be a highly predictable
consequence of a failure to equip [officials] with specific tools to handle
recurring situations.” Id. The Supreme Court has recently explained that in
Harris, “[t]he Court sought not to foreclose the possibility, however rare,
that the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train could be so
patently obvious that a city could be liable under § 1983 without proof of a
pre-existing pattern of violations.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 64
(2011).
In her brief in opposition to Defendants’ motions, Terry consistently
opines that her Monell theory arises from Defendants’ failure to respond to
a pattern of misconduct. Only once does she allude to an “obvious need”
for training, stating that “even in the absence of exactly analogous prior
incidents, a municipality can be liable for the obvious consequences of its
inaction. This case meets that standard as well.” (Docket #103 at 17)
(internal citation omitted). She does not develop this argument further, nor
does she grapple with the significant constraints on this type of Monell
theory. In the absence of meaningful argument on the question, the Court
finds that Terry has waived reliance on a single-incident Monell theory. See
Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001); Stransky v.
Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1335 (7th Cir. 1995).
Page 12 of 30

Moreover, even were the argument not waived, Terry provides no
support for the idea that her childbirth was a specific type of recurring
situation that would predictably give rise to a constitutional violation
absent some specific training. Instead, her case is about drawing together a
diverse set of medical incidents under the broad theme of “ignoring
medical needs.” In Harris, the Court gave an example of an actionable
“obvious need”:
city policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police
officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons. The city has
armed its officers with firearms, in part to allow them to
accomplish this task. Thus, the need to train officers in the
constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force, can be
said to be “so obvious,” that failure to do so could properly
be characterized as “deliberate indifference” to constitutional
rights.
Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10 (internal citation omitted).
Terry’s case lacks comparable clarity. What is the missing training?
Telling Armor and Jail staff not to “ignore” inmates’ medical needs? Given
that the practice of “ignoring” medical needs arises in myriad contexts—
inmate monitoring, medication distribution, care for injuries or addiction,
and care during childbirth—it cannot be said that some specific training
was obviously needed to forestall a highly predictable constitutional
violation in Terry’s case. Connick, 563 U.S. at 67 (noting that in light of
significant legal training for prosecutors regarding Brady obligations, it
could not be said that recurring violations of that constitutional right would
obviously flow from a failure to provide additional in-house training);
Johnson, 526 F. App’x at 697 (sexual assault by medical staff member was
not a “patently obvious” consequence of governmental policy or lack of a

Page 13 of 30

policy). As a result, Terry cannot proceed on a single-incident Monell theory
under Harris.
3.2

Terry Does Not Identify a Cognizable Practice

Having dispensed with Terry’s single-incident Monell theory, the
Court next considers whether she has alleged sufficient facts to show that a
widespread municipal custom or practice led to her injuries. She has not, as
the incidents she has identified do not bind into a recognizable practice to
which Defendants were deliberately indifferent. Only a few facts link the
incidents alleged in the complaint: all the persons who received inadequate
care were in state custody and, save the House of Correction incident, the
inadequate care occurred in the Jail.
Beyond these spare connections, there is such an array of differences
as to make the incidents totally distinct. The episodes occurred over a
period of eight years. None are alleged to have involved the same Jail or
Armor staff members. None involved similar medical conditions or
ailments except one other instance of childbirth at the Jail involving
Swayzer. Two incidents of childbirth-related mistreatment within the space
of two years would not be enough to sustain a Monell claim on their own,
Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463 F.3d 773, 790 (7th Cir. 2006), and Terry does not
argue otherwise.6

The parties disagree whether the Swayzer incident, which occurred in
2016, is pertinent to whether Defendants were on notice of a preexisting problem
on the day of Terry’s ordeal two years earlier. Compare Calusinski v. Kruger, 24 F.3d
931, 936 (7th Cir. 1994), with Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 205 (7th Cir. 1987),
vacated on other grounds, 835 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1988). The Court need not wade
into that dispute, as two incidents do not a custom make under these
circumstances. Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303 (a custom theory requires, at a minimum,
more than three supporting instances of the challenged practice).
6

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Terry tries to unite the incidents through the refrain that they all
involve medical needs being “simply ignored.” (Docket #103 at 16). It is
indeed hard to say what connects these occurrences except the 10,000-foot
observation that they concerned inmates’ medical needs being “ignored,”
though one instance of being “ignored” appears to mean something vastly
different from the next—sometimes it is being denied medication, other
times it is a failure to appreciate suicidal ideation or monitor inmate
behavior, and still other times it is failing to respond properly to an injury
or an inmate hunger strike.
This is not how Monell liability is supposed to work. The function of
a Monell claim is to hold a municipality liable for bad practices “so
persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick,
563 U.S. at 60. To assert that a custom is “so entrenched and well-known as
to carry the force of policy,” one should at a minimum be able to describe
the offending conduct with some precision. Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med.
Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012). In other words, to accuse a
municipality of acting with deliberate indifference toward a problem, one
must be able to articulate what the problem is; otherwise, it cannot be said
that tolerating the problem amounted to a conscious choice. Harris, 498 U.S.
at 389; Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823. Crucially, “[t]he custom or policy underlying
a Monell claim cannot be so amorphous that it effectively exposes a
municipality to respondeat superior liability.” Chaparro v. Powell, No. 07 C
5277, 2008 WL 68683, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2008).
To be capable of identification, the challenged practice must be
comprised of incidents that share common features. Connick, 563 U.S. at 60
(“[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations” is ordinarily required to
support a finding of deliberate indifference); Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850
Page 15 of 30

F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017) (faulting the plaintiff for failing to allege
examples of misconduct similar to that undertaken by the defendants). For
instance, a Monell claim could be premised on a prison’s longstanding
practice of failing to timely review inmate medical requests, Thomas, 604
F.3d at 303, or systemic problems in scheduling inmate medical
appointments and maintaining medical records, Daniel v. Cook Cnty., 833
F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2016), or where “the same instruments and methods”
of torture are used “on more than two dozen [detainees] in similar
circumstances,” Tillman v. Burge, 813 F. Supp. 2d 946, 978 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
These theories hold together because they focus on some logically related
incidents or series of acts which the governmental entity should have
noticed as a unified whole.
The incidents Terry has cataloged do not exhibit the same
meaningful commonalities. Rather, they are no more than isolated instances
of reprehensible misconduct. Gill, 850 F.3d at 344 (“To succeed on [a] de facto
custom theory, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the practice is
widespread and that the specific violations complained of were not isolated
incidents.”). If the Supreme Court distinguished the factual bases for
different types of Brady violations in Connick, finding them too dissimilar to
form a practice of which the municipality could be on notice, Connick, 563
U.S. at 62–63, then here, the specific types of medical care that were not
provided in varied contexts cannot be fused together by the content-free
phrase “ignoring medical needs,” Phelan, 463 F.3d at 790 (plaintiff’s
allegations of harassment and discrimination did not make a Monell claim
because she “failed to weave these separate incidents together into a
cognizable policy”).

Page 16 of 30

Indeed, Terry has alleged no more than that Defendants failed in
their general constitutional duty to provide adequate medical care to those
in their custody. This is not permissible. Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218–
19 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The challenged policy or custom cannot merely be the
abstract one of violating citizens’ constitutional rights.”). The district court
in Tillman put it well when it said, “[i]n establishing the existence of [] a
policy or practice, it is insufficient to ‘splatter-paint a picture of scattered
violations’ through ‘collateral accusations of marginally related incidents.’”
Tillman, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 978 (quoting Carter, 164 F.3d at 218–19). As a
result, Terry’s cited incidents cannot collectively be laid at the feet of the
County and Armor under the Monell banner.
Terry counters that the incidents cited in the complaint are workable
comparators because they involve similar conduct—ignoring requests or
obvious needs for medical care—even though the resulting injuries were
different. (Docket #103 at 13). The Court agrees that defining a challenged
practice does not depend on the quality or severity of the injury suffered.
But what is important is that the conduct in each instance alleged to support
the existence of the practice be sufficiently similar to place municipal
policymakers on notice of the existence of the practice and the risk of harm.
Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 769–70 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that
the plaintiff must allege facts showing a “systemic” problem based on prior,
similar instances of misconduct); Thomas v. City of Markham, Ill., No. 16 CV
08107, 2017 WL 4340182, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2017) (“[A]llegations of
general past misconduct or allegations of dissimilar incidents are not
sufficient to allege a pervasive practice and a defendant’s deliberate
indifference to its consequences.”). Terry concedes this, stating that she
must “allege incidents that are caused by the same or similar unconstitutional
Page 17 of 30

conduct and which give rise to an inference that a larger custom or practice
existed.” (Docket #103 at 13) (emphasis added). Yet she cannot describe the
series of acts that she believes constitute the challenged practice except at
the highest level of generality. If a practice is too expansively defined, as
Terry’s is, it becomes nonsensical to charge a municipal entity with notice
of such a practice. Freeman v. City of Crown Point, No. 2:13–CV–059 JD, 2014
WL 545511, at *10 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 11, 2014) (a plaintiff cannot tie together
disparate instances of misconduct that “would encompass nearly every
activity of the [police] department,” as it “deprives the [municipality] of the
notice to which it is entitled as to what policies it maintains that deprived
[the plaintiff] of his rights”).
Terry’s citations to Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2006), and
King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2012), help demonstrate the
deficiency in her pleading. In Davis, the plaintiff alleged harm arising from
a practice of failing to provide timely methadone treatment for inmates who
needed it. Davis, 452 F.3d at 693. The Seventh Circuit found that she was
not required to prove specifics about each instance of neglect, such as the
length of delay. Id. at 694. Instead, she adequately proved, through
testimony of institution officials, that delay was part of the routine practice.
Id. at 695. In King, the Court of Appeals allowed a Monell claim based on a
county’s decision to delegate medical care to a private provider despite
having notice that the provider was taking prisoners off medications
without physician oversight. King, 680 F.3d at 1020–21. By contrast, even

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when viewed favorably, Terry’s allegations here do not establish any sort
of recognizable routine conduct that led to harm.7
The consent decree and Shansky’s reports fail to fill the gap. Terry
does not describe what types of medical mistreatment led to Shansky being
engaged as Medical Monitor for the Jail. She does not say when or how
often he produced reports, or what specific problems he identified. He
appears to have expressed concerns about inadequate staffing which led to
delays in care or insufficient care. But Terry’s case concerns much more
than staffing problems; it also purports to cover instances where available
staff were on notice of a need for care and willfully ignored it. Indeed, that
is precisely the problem that occurred during Terry’s own ordeal.
Shansky’s reports are unlike the governmental reports leveraged in
Shields v. City of Chicago, No. 17 C 6689, 2018 WL 1138553, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 2, 2018), and Listenbee v. City of Harvey, No. 11 C 03031, 2013 WL
5567552, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2013), which documented specific allegations
of misconduct closely related to those suffered by the plaintiffs. The fact
that the Jail is under general scrutiny concerning the provision of medical
care cannot serve as the hook for any later Monell claim also touching on
medical treatment. See Carmona v. City of Chicago, Case No. 15-CV-462, 2018

Terry comes closest to a helpful analogue in Piercy v. Warkins, 14 CV 7398,
2017 WL 1477959, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2017), where the district court permitted
a broad Monell theory that a prison medical care provider would “cut corners in
all aspects of providing care.” Yet Piercy is distinguishable on its facts. There,
although the plaintiff drew on many dissimilar instances of medical mistreatment
to support his view that there existed a pattern of cutting corners, the incidents in
question were numerous, forming a high percentage of the overall cases of inmate
medical care, and they occurred within the span of a few years. See id. at *4–5. Here,
Terry proffers fewer incidents—despite attacking a far larger detention facility
than that in Piercy—over more than double the time span.
7

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WL 306664, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2018) (“Plaintiff’s broad citation to [a] 160page [Department of Justice] report, without any discussion of the specific
findings of the report or any allegations connecting the report findings to
the misconduct alleged in his Complaint, is insufficient to support his
Monell claim.”). As a result, Terry has not identified a cognizable practice
that can be challenged through a Monell claim.
3.3

Terry’s Monell Theory Fails to Establish Causation

Terry’s Monell theory falters not only on cohesion but also on
causation. Her primary retort to Defendants’ motions shows why. She says
that Defendants cannot avoid Monell liability by providing such uniformly
abysmal medical care at the Jail that it becomes difficult to define the
problematic conduct with specificity. (Docket #103 at 9–10). But whether
Defendants provide poor medical care to all inmates is not a relevant
consideration; Terry must allege that an identifiable practice directly
caused her injury, which arose during childbirth. Harris, 489 U.S. at 391. It
does not matter if other inmates, harmed in other ways, might bring
successful Monell claims tethered to their mistreatment. Terry’s belief that
all Jail inmates receive constitutionally inadequate medical care does not
mean that she can sue to remedy all of it at once. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 (a
Monell plaintiff must show “a direct causal link between the municipal
action and the deprivation of federal rights” visited upon him).
The Supreme Court addressed this very problem decades ago in
Tuttle when it said:
[s]ome limitation must be placed on establishing municipal
liability through policies that are not themselves
unconstitutional, or the test set out in Monell will become a
dead letter. Obviously, if one retreats far enough from a
constitutional violation some municipal “policy” can be
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identified behind almost any such harm inflicted by a
municipal official; for example, Rotramel would never have
killed Tuttle if Oklahoma City did not have a “policy” of
establishing a police force. But Monell must be taken to require
proof of a city policy different in kind from this latter example
before a claim can be sent to a jury on the theory that a
particular violation was “caused” by the municipal “policy.”
At the very least there must be an affirmative link between
the policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823. Terry’s claim that there is a policy of ignoring inmate
medical needs in diverse, truly unrelated circumstances amounts to no
more than the policy of “establishing a police force” that Tuttle forbade. As
the County aptly notes, “‘[i]nadequate care’—alleged in the broadest sense,
encompassing all medical conditions, and spanning decades—is simply not
a plausible policy on which to base a Monell claim.” (Docket #109 at 5). In
Terry’s case in particular, there is no reasonable basis on which to infer that
such an ill-defined policy directly caused her injury.
Terry’s Monell theory is comparable to that rejected in Chaparro.
There, the plaintiff challenged his arrest under the Fourth Amendment.
Chaparro, 2008 WL 68683, at *2. He further alleged that the police
misconduct surrounding his arrest was enabled by a “code of silence” in
the department whereby officers would not suffer discipline for
misconduct. Id. He cited two decades’ worth of alleged police misconduct
covering a variety of situations having nothing to do the arrest conduct in
his case, including misconduct allegations against officers not involved in
his arrest, inadequate oversight of officers, allegations of torture, and
abandonment of a software program intended to predict misconduct by
officers. Id.

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The court found that this Monell claim failed both in terms of
definition and causation. Id. First, the alleged practice was based on
“tenuously related instances of police misconduct” that were “so
multifarious that the allegations do not identify a discrete policy or
custom.” Id. at *3. Indeed, “[u]nder [plaintiff’s] logic, any instance of police
misconduct would be ‘caused’ by the ‘code of silence,’ because any
misconduct could be linked to an officer’s imputed belief he could escape
punishment.” Id. The alleged custom was so overbroad that it “collapse[d]
into respondeat superior, an outcome explicitly forbidden by the Supreme
Court.” Id. Second, the plaintiff’s wide-ranging Monell theory did not
plausibly suggest a link between the municipal policy and his injury. Id.
The policy of “lawlessness” among police officers was “so nebulous that
any connection to a particular constitutional violation [was] highly
attenuated.” Id.
Terry’s Monell claim fails for similar reasons. First, it proves too
much: nearly any medical mistreatment at the Jail could emanate from a
practice of ignoring medical needs. Indeed, according to Terry, Defendants’
practice can be expressed in such disparate circumstances as: (1) failing to
properly examine an inmate with a serious medical condition; (2) failing to
provide proper medication to an inmate with a serious medical condition;
(3) failing to respond to inmates who have requested medical attention or
medication; (4) failing to respond to inmates who exhibit obvious signs of a
serious medical condition; and (5) failing to adequately staff the Jail with
correctional and medical personnel necessary to respond to inmate medical
needs. (Docket #1 ¶ 75). Because of its massive breadth, Terry’s Monell
theory strays too close to being the functional equivalent of respondeat
superior. Chaparro, 2008 WL 68683, at *3.
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Additionally, the connection between Terry’s injury during
childbirth and the challenged practice of ignoring inmates’ medical needs
is too highly attenuated, since ignoring medical needs also includes failure
to observe suicidal ideation, failure to medicate or treat a variety of
ailments, and failure to monitor inmates. Like the code of silence in
Chaparro, the link between a practice of ignoring medical needs and any
particular instance of medical mistreatment—including Terry’s own
ordeal—is too nebulous to say that such a practice was the “moving force”
behind the mistreatment. Id.
It must be remembered that Monell does not authorize “a roving
commission to root out and correct whatever municipal transgressions [the
court] might discover—[the court’s] role is to decide concrete cases.” Carter,
164 F.3d at 218. No matter how horrendous the state of healthcare may be
at the Jail, Defendants cannot be haled into court by Rebecca Terry to
answer for every one of their alleged bad practices. Her recovery is limited
to particular practices that were the moving force behind her injury. Tuttle,
471 U.S. at 817. A referendum on the overall quality of medical care at the
Jail is a question for another day.
3.4

White Does Not Lower Terry’s Pleading Standard

The Court well appreciates that it is assessing this case from the
posture of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, where Terry’s
allegations enjoy an assumption of truth and the benefit of all reasonable
inferences therefrom. It further understands that Monell claims, despite
being inherently complex, are not subject to a heightened pleading burden.
White, 829 F.3d at 843–44; McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th
Cir. 2000); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination

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Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993). But even so, the Court cannot say that Terry
has alleged a plausible Monell claim.
Determining the plausibility of a claim is “a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Like the equal-protection Monell claim in
McCauley, which required greater supporting factual content because it was
“complicated and counterintuitive,” here Terry advances a uniquely
expansive Monell theory without factual allegations binding the theory
together. McCauley, 671 F.3d at 619. Given the scope of her Monell claim,
Terry should have come forward with enough factual heft to unite the cited
incidents and support the reasonable inference that they amount to a
pervasive governmental practice that was the catalyst for her injury. Gill,
850 F.3d at 344; McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616 (to state a Monell claim, a plaintiff
is required to “‘plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference’ that the [municipality] maintained a policy, custom,
or practice” that deprived her of her constitutional rights) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678). She did not, and so her claim cannot survive even the
generous review afforded at the pleading stage. Foy v. City of Chicago, No.
15 C 3720, 2016 WL 2770880, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2016) (dismissing Monell
claim based on series of deaths at a police station where the circumstances
of the deaths did not “share substantive similarities” and thus could not
rise to the level of a “well-settled” practice).
White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2016), a case heavily
relied upon by Terry, does not suggest a different result. There, the plaintiff,
White, was arrested pursuant to a warrant. Id. at 840. The warrant was
obtained by Chicago police officers, who submitted a criminal complaint to
a state judge. Id. The complaint form contained spaces for personal details
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of the offender and a brief description of the alleged offense, but the
common practice in the department was to simply identify the offense
rather than provide factual details about the offense conduct. Id. This
practice was followed by O’Donnell, the attesting officer in White’s case. Id.
White alleged that the information O’Donnell submitted in the form was
insufficient, standing alone, to support a probable cause finding, and by
extension the department’s practice of filling out the form in this way gave
rise to a Monell claim. Id. at 841 (“White also alleges a Monell claim against
the city for the allegedly widespread practice of seeking arrest warrants on
the basis of the conclusory complaint forms.”).
The district court dismissed the Monell claim because it was “based
upon the sole allegation that [the attesting officer] acted in accordance with
a widespread practice of the police department of the City of Chicago when
seeking a warrant.” Id. at 843. The Seventh Circuit disagreed that this was
too conclusory a statement under the circumstances. Id. at 844. The Court
of Appeals explained:
White alleged in his amended complaint: “In accordance with
a widespread practice of the police department of the City of
Chicago: O’Donnell requested the judge to issue a warrant on
the basis of O’Donnell’s conclusory allegation that other law
enforcement officers claimed or believed plaintiff had
committed an offense, and O’Donnell did not present the
judge with an affidavit setting out any affirmative allegation
of facts that would indicate that plaintiff had committed an
offense.” Together with the individual claim against
O’Donnell and the standard printed form that does not
require specific factual support for an application for an arrest
warrant, this allegation was enough to satisfy the “short and
plain statement of the claim” requirement of Rule 8(a)(2).
White was not required to identify every other or even one
other individual who had been arrested pursuant to a warrant

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obtained through the complained-of process. See, e.g., Jackson
v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 152–53 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. Thus, in the Seventh Circuit’s view, the otherwise conclusory statement
in White’s complaint sufficed under Rule 8 because a practice could be
inferred from O’Donnell’s conduct with respect to White, coupled with the
allegation that the department regularly used a standard complaint form
that did not demand a constitutionally sufficient amount of information. Id.
Terry relies on White in an effort to set her pleading bar very low. See
(Docket #103 at 7–8). She argues that “[a]fter White,” she need only “allege
that the constitutional violation she suffered was one of a larger pattern” in
order to survive review under Rule 8. Id. Terry’s point seems to be that she
does not need to give any examples of similar misconduct to plead her
Monell claim, or that her examples do not need to be comparable.
She is mistaken. To the extent the line of district court decisions Terry
cites hold that plaintiffs may proceed on a Monell custom theory after White
if they simply allege the existence of a practice, this Court declines to follow
them. See (Docket #103 at 7–8). That flies in the face of longstanding
precedent that a Monell custom theory is not legally sufficient without
evidence of a pattern of misconduct. See Gill, 850 F.3d at 344.8

If one could properly plead a Monell custom theory by simply offering the
talismanic phrase “widespread practice or custom,” then Monell liability is not the
narrowly confined species of liability the Supreme Court intended it to be. Indeed,
it is even less fact-bound than many ordinary legal claims. The cost of such an
approach is high; as Defendants in this case have several times complained, the
volume of discovery dedicated to Terry’s Monell claim dwarfs that attributable to
her individual claim, and the Monell claim is so broad it essentially will require
production of every record of every instance of medical care at the Jail during the
requisite time frame. See Armour v. Country Club Hills, Case No. 11 C 5029, 2014
WL 63850, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2014) (rejecting Monell claim premised on
“virtually all the activities of a police department and every contact it has with the
8

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More to the point, it appears those courts and Terry simply
misunderstand White. The allegations in that case, though brief, were not
conclusory. The “practice” challenged in White involved not only a
practice—officers offering conclusory assertions regarding the subject
offense—but also an express policy—Chicago’s adoption of a standard
criminal complaint form that required insufficient information for a
probable cause determination. Utilizing a constitutionally deficient
standard form amounted to an affirmative act of wrongdoing by the
municipality that did not need to be implemented in order to be challenged.
See Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822 (“Obviously, it requires only one application of
a[n] [unconstitutional express] policy. . .to satisfy fully Monell’s
requirement that a municipal corporation be held liable only for
constitutional violations resulting from the municipality’s official policy.”).
Stated another way, the municipality in White could be culpable because it
engaged in its own affirmative misconduct coupled with its indifference to
the misconduct of its officers.
This made White unique, and it helps explain why the otherwise
conclusory Monell allegations worked in that instance. White does not
condone conclusory Monell allegations, nor is it carte blanche for plaintiffs to
attribute every constitutional violation they suffer to a municipal practice
without corroborating factual allegations.9

public,” amounting to a “boundless” claim that was “the epitome of a fishing
expedition”).
The limited reach of the holding in White is confirmed by its citation to
Jackson. In Jackson, the plaintiff brought a Monell claim arising out the municipal
entity’s efforts to cover up misconduct by its employees. Jackson, 66 F.3d at 152.
The Seventh Circuit noted that “proof of a single act of misconduct will not suffice”
when the governmental entity is alleged to have notice of an ongoing problem and
9

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4.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Terry’s Monell claims against the

County and Armor based on a practice of ignoring inmate medical needs
must be dismissed. However, Terry correctly observes that, upon request,
a plaintiff must usually be given one chance to amend deficient allegations
before they are dismissed with prejudice. (Docket #103 at 12 n.3); Bogie v.
Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the Court will
afford Terry ten (10) days to craft an amended complaint curing the
deficiencies the Court has identified.10

failed to rectify it. Id. However, when a complaint charges a municipality “with
having engaged in improper conduct directly,” as the Jackson plaintiff alleged,
“then the drawing of an inference from a series of bad acts by subordinate officers
is not required.” Id. at 152–53. Because of this, when the court in White said that
“White was not required to identify every other or even one other individual who
had been arrested pursuant to a warrant obtained through the complained-of
process,” that statement could only be referring to instances of affirmative
misconduct by the municipal entity, as was the case in Jackson. White, 829 F.3d at
844. In White itself, that misconduct was Chicago’s choice to use an obviously
inappropriate standard criminal complaint form.
Terry’s case undoubtedly falls within the first category of Jackson; she
claims that Armor and the County should have noticed the repeated failure to
provide medical care and should have done something to remedy it. Nowhere
does she claim that Defendants directly engaged in a cover-up or other misconduct
related to medical care at the Jail. Thus, Terry’s reliance on White’s holding, when
properly considered in the context of White’s own cited authority, is misplaced.
Terry alleges that she has learned in discovery of a Jail practice of
allowing inmates to return to the Jail from a hospital without proper
documentation of their condition or required follow-up care. (Docket #103 at 5).
Terry believes this occurred to her in 2014. Id. Such an allegation may form an
alternative Monell claim that inmates who return from a hospital are not
adequately cared for, but for reasons adequately covered above, Terry’s Monell
claim about ignoring inmate medical needs ranges well beyond that circumstance.
If she desires to craft a narrower Monell claim based on this intake procedure, she
may attempt to do so. The Court expresses no opinion on the merit of such a
theory.
10

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To the extent there remain deficiencies with any amended Monell
claims, Defendants may raise those challenges in a motion for summary
judgment. To accommodate Defendants’ need to receive and review an
amended complaint prior to filing a motion for summary judgment, the
Court will push back the dispositive motion deadline in this case to July 2,
2018. In order to ensure that the Court has sufficient time to consider any
such motions prior to trial, any response to a motion for summary judgment
must be filed no later than twenty-one (21) days after the motion is filed,
and any reply may be filed no later than seven (7) days after the filing of
the response.
Also addressed in the parties’ briefs is the posture of Defendant
David Clarke, the former Milwaukee County Sheriff. For claims against
Clarke in his official capacity, the acting Milwaukee County Sheriff, Richard
R. Schmidt (“Schmidt”), has been substituted in his place by operation of
law, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), and Terry has agreed to dismiss her claims
against Clarke in his personal capacity, (Docket #103 at 19). Thus, the Court
will dismiss Clarke from the case and direct that Schmidt be added to the
case caption.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Armor Correctional Health
Services’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket #81) be and the
same is hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Milwaukee County’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket #77) be and the same is
hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Monell claim against
Defendants Milwaukee County and Armor Correctional Health Services
Page 29 of 30

based on a widespread custom or practice of ignoring inmates’ serious
medical needs be and the same is hereby DISMISSED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended
complaint addressing the deficiencies the Court identified herein no later
than ten (10) days from the date of this Order;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any dispositive motions must be
filed no later than July 2, 2018. Any response to such a motion must be filed
no later than twenty-one (21) days after the motion is filed, and any reply
may be filed no later seven (7) days after the filing of the response. No
extensions of these deadlines will be considered; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant David A. Clarke, Jr. be
and the same is hereby DISMISSED from this action. Pursuant to Plaintiff’s
agreement, Plaintiff’s personal capacity claims against Clarke be and the
same are hereby DISMISSED; the Clerk of the Court shall substitute
Richard R. Schmidt in place of Clarke on the Court’s docket as to Plaintiff’s
official capacity claims.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 4th day of June, 2018.
BY THE COURT:

__________________
J. P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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