Sierra-Lopez v. Kozak et al

Filing 83

ORDER DISMISSING CASE signed by Judge Pamela Pepper on 7/31/2019. 36 Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment DENIED. 41 Plaintiff's motion for default DENIED. 43 Defendants' motion for summary judgment GRANTED. 77 Movant Glen Turner's motion to intervene DENIED. 80 Plaintiff's motion for alternative dispute resolution DENIED. Case DISMISSED. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Kevin Sierra-Lopez)(cb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________________
KEVIN SIERRA-LOPEZ ,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 17-cv-1222-pp

BROWN COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT.
NO. 36), GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(DKT. NO. 43), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
(DKT. NO. 41), DENYING MOTION TO INTERVENE (DKT. NO. 77), DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (DKT.
NO. 80) AND DISMISSING CASE
______________________________________________________________________________
The plaintiff, a state prisoner, deliberately cut his right arm with a pencil
while incarcerated at the Brown County Jail (“the jail”). In a screening order,
the court allowed him to proceed on claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging
that staff at the jail failed to protect him from harming himself, failed to treat
the wound on his arm properly and failed to train jail staff. He is also
proceeding with a claim that Brown County violated his First Amendment right
to practice his religion. Dkt. No. 14. Although it has little to do with the other
claims in this lawsuit, the plaintiff properly joined the last claim due to the
overlap of Brown County as a defendant in the failure-to-train claim. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 18(a); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
On January 17, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment
and supporting documents. Dkt. Nos. 36-40. He also filed a motion seeking
default judgment against one defendant, Nurse Pagels. Dkt. Nos. 41-42. The
following month, the remaining defendants (apart from Nurse Pagels) filed a
1

motion for summary judgment, supported by numerous declarations and
exhibits. Dkt. Nos. 43-62. The plaintiff then filed a combined response/reply
brief and additional supporting materials. Dkt. Nos. 63-68. (This combined
brief is a reproduction of his initial brief, with six pages of new argument added
at the end.) The inmate assisting the plaintiff in filing his briefs also filed a
motion to intervene. Dkt. No. 77. Finally, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking
alternative dispute resolution. Dkt. No. 80. The court will deny the plaintiff’s
motions, grant the defendants’ motion and dismiss the case.
I.

FACTS
The plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim arises out of the events of

July and August 2016, during which the plaintiff, a Wisconsin state inmate,
was temporarily incarcerated at the jail for the purpose of attending court. Dkt.
No. 14 at 10 n.1. When they booked the plaintiff on July 18, 2016, jail staff
assessed the plaintiff’s risk of suicide. Dkt. No. 45 at ¶42. The jail uses a
standardized form called a Suicide Screening Questionnaire, which indicates
that the plaintiff denied ever attempting suicide and denied that he had any
thoughts of doing so currently. Dkt. No. 46-4. The officer who completed the
form indicated that the plaintiff “does not appear suicidal.” Id.
At booking, jail staff assigned the plaintiff to a unit known as the Fox
Pod, which is designed for high-risk inmates and those placed in segregation
for punitive reasons. Dkt. No. 45 at ¶30. The jail placed the plaintiff in that
unit due to major rules violations he had committed during previous
incarcerations at the jail. Id. at ¶44. In fact, the plaintiff was no stranger to the
jail or its jailors, having been incarcerated at the jail approximately twenty-two
times in the last decade. Id. at ¶38. Among other restrictions, the Fox Pod
2

strictly limits inmate activities to one hour per day of recreation time, and its
rules allow inmates to possess only two books at a time—one religious and one
non-religious. Id. at ¶32. An inmate may take one shower per day, which must
occur during the inmate’s recreation time. Id. at ¶¶32-34.
At about 10:00 a.m. on July 29th, guards escorted the plaintiff to the
showers. Id. at ¶46. The plaintiff stated that the shower was too cold, so he
tried a second shower, which proved hot enough initially but then turned cold.
Id. at ¶48. Maintenance staff agreed that the first shower wasn’t “as warm as it
could be,” but they couldn’t fix it; the defendants indicate that the second
shower was 104 degrees. Id. at ¶49; Dkt. No. 46-6 at 8. Maintenance had
tested the showers earlier in the week due to other inmate complaints. Id.
Contemporaneous jail notes indicate that the plaintiff believed taking a cold
shower would cause him to “get sick and die,” so he refused a shower that
morning but also explained that he would like to take a shower once the
problems were fixed. Id.
Defendant Officer Kozak spoke with the plaintiff at approximately 4:00
that same day. Dkt. No. 45 at ¶52. During that discussion, Kozak informed the
plaintiff that defendant Corporal Dequaine had given instructions that the
plaintiff would not have another opportunity to shower that day. Id. The
plaintiff responded by saying he was suicidal. Id. at ¶53. The defendants assert
that Kozak and the plaintiff continued to talk, that the plaintiff eventually
calmed down, and that Kozak questioned the plaintiff about whether he was
feeling suicidal or thinking about hurting himself. Id. at ¶¶54-59. While the
plaintiff did not respond to Kozak’s inquiries, the defendants indicate that the

3

plaintiff did not appear to Kozak to be angry or sad and wasn’t displaying signs
one might associate with an inmate who was planning to harm himself. Id.
The plaintiff asserts that Duquaine instructed Kozak to tell the plaintiff,
“No matter what you do, you’re not getting a second shower.” Dkt. No. 38 at
¶36. The plaintiff also says that at some point, he spoke to Kozak on the incell intercom and told Kozak that he was suicidal and was going to cut himself.
Id. at ¶30. The defendants dispute that the plaintiff stated an intent to cut
himself. Dkt. No. 53 at ¶30. The plaintiff alleges that at some point after seeing
Kozak he covered his cell window with paper, dkt. no. 38 at ¶29, but the
defendants dispute this, too, dkt. no. 53 at ¶29.
At any rate, about ten minutes after talking with the plaintiff, Kozak
called Dequaine to inform him about the plaintiff’s statement regarding being
suicidal. Dkt. No. 45 at ¶61. Duquaine told Kozak to monitor the plaintiff and
to let Duquaine know if the plaintiff’s behavior changed. Id. at ¶62. Neither
Kozak nor Dequaine informed anyone in the jail’s psychological services unit
that the plaintiff had indicated a suicidal intent. Dkt. No. 38 at ¶35. Dequaine
states that in his experience, the plaintiff had a long history of claiming to be
suicidal as a means of manipulating jail staff, dkt. no. 55 at ¶8; Kozak,
defendant Lieutenant Rhode and Captain Michel (not a defendant) had a
similar experience, dkt no. 45 at ¶40.
Dequaine informed Rhode that although the plaintiff was angry about
being denied the opportunity to shower and had threatened suicide, Fox Pod
officers could see him in his cell, apparently doing legal work. Dkt. No. 45 at
¶63. Kozak served the plaintiff his dinner around 4:15 and found the plaintiff
“conversational,” id. at ¶64; when Kozak picked up the tray at 4:30, the
4

plaintiff had eaten, and spoke “Normally” to Kozak, id. at ¶65. At 4:35, Kozak
saw the plaintiff interacting with the nurse who was giving the plaintiff his
medication; again, Kozak perceived that the plaintiff was acting normally. Id. at
¶66. Around 5:05, Duquaine came to the pod and asked about the plaintiff,
and Kozak reported that the plaintiff was behaving normally, continuing to
work quietly on legal work. Id. at ¶67.
Kozak left the Fox Pod to move another inmate; when he returned
around 5:30 he started on his rounds to check on the inmates. Id. at ¶69. The
inmate in a cell neighboring the plaintiff’s pressed his emergency intercom
button and stated that the plaintiff was suicidal. Id. at ¶70. Kozak heard the
intercom, went to the dayroom and saw the inmate who’d pushed the intercom
gesturing toward the plaintiff’s cell. Id. at ¶71. In the incident report he wrote
on July 29, Kozak explained what happened next:
I looked inside cell F103, where Sierra-Lopez is housed, and
saw him cutting himself on the right arm. I ordered SierraLopez to stop what he was doing and radioed for back[up] to
come to Fox Pod for an inmate cutting himself with what
appeared to be a pencil. I continued to order Sierra-Lopez to
stop what he was doing.
Dkt. No. 54-1 at 2. Several officers responded to the scene, one of whom
observed the plaintiff ingest several pills, which turned out to be ibuprofen.
Dkt. No. 45 at ¶¶75-76. The plaintiff asserts that the pills were “psychotropic
pills,” dkt. no. 38 at ¶41, while the defendants indicate that the only
medication the plaintiff was receiving was ibuprofen1 and no other inmates in

Defendant Nurse Pagels’s notes from later that evening indicated that the
plaintiff also took venlafaxine (an antidepressant) at noon, and loratadine (an
antihistamine) in the morning. Dkt. No. 46-8 at 33.
5
1

the dayroom had accepted medication, dkt. no. 45 at ¶80. The officers were
able to convince the plaintiff to come out of his cell, and placed him in a
restraint chair. Id. at ¶77. They moved him into the dayroom, where defendant
Nurse Pagels inspected and cleaned the cut. Id. at ¶78. Her patient notes
describe the injury:
A 2 inch wound to patient’s right forearm was seen. Moderate
amount of bloody drainage covered the area in addition to
blood that was seen on patient's clothing. Area was cleansed
with NaCI 0.9% and then was covered with 4x4 gauze, ABD
pad, and Krilex. When asked why patient hurt himself, patient
stated, “Because I don't get to take a shower everyday and I
wanted the corporal to know that he can't treat me like this
as well as HSU not giving me my records about my UA
[urinalysis] because per policy I am allowed to get my records
for free unless I damage the original copy”. Then patient
became verbally aggressive towards LPN when she stated that
she would come back to check on him and recheck his
dressing.
Dkt. No. 46-8 at 32. Pagels classified the wound as a “superficial cut or scrape
to his arm where an existing scar was already.” Dkt. No. 45 at ¶86. The
plaintiff says that when Pagels asked him why he’d cut himself, he said,
“Because I can not take being confined to a cell 24 hours per day, seven days a
week [] without day room, visits, recreation, phone calls, religious material . . .
or services provided [] [a]nd without having any meaningful treatment for my
psychological (mental) treatment.” Dkt. No. 38 at ¶43.
The plaintiff says that when Pagels told him she’d clean and dress the
wound and come back later, he said, “You can’t punish me for being suicidal. I
need stitches!” Id. at ¶46. He indicates that the gauze Pagels put on his wound
“dried and got stuck in the blood.” Id. at ¶47. The plaintiff alleges that Pagels
ripped the gauze off, causing the wound to bleed again, then sprayed it and
6

applied some cream. Id. He indicates that he reiterated that he needed stitches,
and that what Pagels was doing was “wrong” and was causing him more pain.
Id. The plaintiff says he told Pagels that he didn’t want a bandage or gauze,
that she responded by grabbing his arm, and he told her not to touch him and
to leave him alone. Id. at ¶48. He says that a Nurse Blozinski (not a defendant)
cleaned and dressed the wound. Id. Blozinski made notes on July 30, 2016,
stating that there was “no redness to area; dry blood scabbed over area of
wound. . . . Patient tolerated cleaning well and no other concerns at this time.”
Dkt. No. 46-8 at 34. The plaintiff says that Blozinski saw him on July 31,
2016, and he told her how Pagels had put gauze on the wound. Dkt. No. 38 at
¶48. He claims that Blozinski told him that Pagels should not have put gauze
on an open wound because the blood would dry and cause the gauze to get
stuck. Id. According to the defendants, the wound was “monitored, cleaned,
and treated with antibiotic ointment on July 30, 2016; July 31, 2016; and
August 4, 2016.” Dkt. No. 45 at ¶89. On July 31, 2016, he was given ibuprofen
for the pain, and on August 4, 2016, he got a packet of antibiotic ointment that
he could apply himself. Id. Blozinski saw the plaintiff a week later, on August
6, and her notes make no mention of the cut. Dkt. No. 46-8 at 59. There is no
further discussion of the cut in subsequent medical treatment notes.
The plaintiff asserts that because of the wound and Pagels’s alleged
improper treatment, he had pain and discomfort “well into 2018.” Dkt. No. 38
at ¶51. He says that on March 30, 2018—almost two years after the incident—
he was taken to U.W. Health for “follow up 1 week status post open septorhinoplasty with placement of spreader grafts, columellar struts as well as
excisions and primary closure of a right forearm scar.” Id. Hospital records
7

show that in March 2018, the plaintiff had nasal surgery to repair his deviated
septum, and that he also had “a painful scar on his right forearm,” which the
doctors planned to “excise.” Dkt. No. 40-1 at 20-27 (quotes from p. 27).
The plaintiff’s First Amendment claim stems from his allegations that the
Chaplain told him that she had sent him some religious books and songs that
he’d never received, and that he’d come to learn that other inmates at the jail
also had not received religious materials. Dkt. No. 14 at 8. On July 29, 2016—
the same day as the self-harming incident—the plaintiff filed a grievance
indicating that he had not received the religious materials from the Chaplain.
Dkt. No. 68-1 at 5. The defendants indicate that the individual who
investigated the grievance found no evidence to support it, and that the
grievance was closed August 3, 2016. Dkt. No. 45 at ¶¶92-93. Chaplain Karen
Konrad indicates that she has no reason to believe that any jail staff ever have
withheld materials from inmates who are entitled to them, and it is her
experience that the jail administration has been supportive of inmate religious
practices. Dkt. No. 56 at ¶¶6-7. The defendants explain why Fox Pod inmates
are allowed only one religious book at a time—to keep them from tearing out
pages and covering their cell windows or using the pages to clog drains to flood
their cells. Dkt. No. 45 at ¶¶101-103. The plaintiff alleges only that “there had
been a systemic practice of denying prisoners religious materials prior to the
plaintiff coming to [the jail].” Dkt. No. 38 at ¶50.
II.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The plaintiff has asked for summary judgment, dkt. no. 36, as have

defendants Brown County, Dequaine, Higgins, Kozak and Rhode, dkt. no. 43.
The court will deny the plaintiff’s motion and grant the defendants’ motion.
8

A.

Defendants Higgins, Kozak, Dequaine and Rhode—Deliberate
Indifference
1.

Summary Judgment Standard

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
324 (1986). “Material facts” are those under the applicable substantive law that
“might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute
over a “material fact” is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
2.

Analysis
a.

Preliminary Issues

The plaintiff’s response to the defendants’ proposed findings of fact
objects to many the proposed findings on the ground that they are not
supported by “admissible evidence.” Dkt. No. 64 at ¶¶59, 63-67, 85-86. For
example, the plaintiff disputes that Kozak served him dinner and later collected
the dinner tray, finding the plaintiff behaving normally. Id. at ¶¶64, 65. He
disputes that Kozak checked on him in half-hour increments. Id. at ¶67. The
plaintiff’s response/reply brief asserts that the incident reports defendants the
defendants submitted are inadmissible. Dkt. No. 63 at 19-23. But the
defendants’ proposed findings, and the underlying incident reports, are based
on the defendants’ own eyewitness perceptions of events; the defendants
personally witnessed or participated in the events they recounted in the
findings and incident reports. If they came into court, they would testify that
they saw and heard the things they described in the findings and incident
9

reports. First-hand, eyewitness testimony is direct evidence that something
happened, and the reports are direct evidence that is relevant to the plaintiff’s
claims. The plaintiff states some of the allegedly inadmissible facts in his own
amended complaint, see, e.g., Dkt. No. 13 at ¶¶25, 26, so it is unclear why he
believes they are inadmissible if they come from the defendants.
The plaintiff objects to Pagel’s description of his cut as a “superficial cut
or scrape,” arguing that there is “no reliable or admissible evidence to support”
the defendants’ proposed finding of fact on that issue. Dkt. No. 64 at ¶86. In
support of their reply brief, the defendants included a photo of the cut; the
court would not describe the cut in that photo as “superficial.” Dkt. 70-2 at 4.
But the defendants do not dispute the seriousness of the plaintiff’s injury, so
regardless of how Pagels might have characterized the cut, the court assumes
that it was serious.
In his reply brief, the plaintiff alleges that Kozak and Dequaine submitted
“falsified self-serving, after the fact ‘incident reports.’” Dkt. No. 63 at 19. He
implies that because a document he received later in the case is not identical to
an incident report he received in discovery, it is fabricated. Inconsistency does
not equal fabrication. The plaintiff has had the opportunity to argue the
inconsistency.
The defendants assert that the plaintiff “habitually claims to be feeling
suicidal or threatens to engage in self-harm when he does not get something he
wants and then retracts those threats if staff later acquiesces to his demands.”
Dkt. No. 45 at ¶40. The plaintiff responds that the defendants lack “clinical or
psychiatric qualifications . . . to conclude if plaintiff . . . is feeling suicidal.”
Dkt. No. 64 at ¶40. The court will accept the plaintiff’s objection at face value;
10

none of the defendants claim to have “clinical or psychiatric” qualifications. But
the defendants do not need a medical degree to notice if an inmate has a
pattern of threatening suicide or self-harm whenever he does not get what he
wants. The plaintiff has not raised a dispute as to an issue of material fact
regarding the defendants’ proposed finding that the plaintiff regularly makes
suicide threats as a means of getting what he wants.
The court acknowledges that the record contains evidence that the
plaintiff has done more than threaten self-harm. The defendants provided staff
notes from the plaintiff’s “inmate notebook” in support of their motion. Dkt. No.
46-6. Those notes indicate that on April 23, 2016, the plaintiff reported to the
health services unit (“HSU”) that he was “urinating blood and semen because
he put something up his penis.” Id. at 4. On July 21, 2016—a week before the
incident in this case—he reported that he had “stuck a paperclip in his penis”
at a prior facility. Id. at 11. In their brief in support of summary judgment, the
defendants referred the court to another federal case the plaintiff several years
ago, in which he sued staff that the jail for events that occurred when he was
there in May of 2014. Dkt. No. 44 at 18 (citing Sierra-Lopez v. Fatoki, Case No.
14-C-1480, 2017 WL 3172538 (E.D. Wis. July 26, 2017)). In that case, after
the plaintiff told jail officers that he was suicidal, an officer saw him smearing
blood on his cell door window; when the extraction team removed the plaintiff
from the cell, staff determined that he had cut himself. Fatoki, 2017 WL
3172538 at *4.
Having said that, the record also references the fact that plaintiff
discussed with staff the things he could do—including self-harm—if he did not
get more privileges. Dkt. No. 46-6 at 11. In response to a report that the
11

plaintiff had a pill in his cell, a staff member went to see him; the plaintiff
allegedly told the staff member that he “simply wanted to warn HSU that he
gets various privileges because he is a nuisance at the jail and if not treated
properly he will make everyone ‘work harder.’” Id. On another occasion, a
member of the staff told the plaintiff that the jail staff “will not likely be inclined
to award him any additional freedoms or privileges if he continues to engage in
negative Bx such as threatening to break his bones . . . .” Id. at 9. In the 2014
federal case referenced by the defendants, the plaintiff once told officers that he
was suicidal; when a staff member appeared, he used the opportunity to
complain about a finger splint. Fatoki, 2017 WL 3172538 at *4. On another
occasion, the cold water in the plaintiff’s cell stopped working. “When he
became frustrated with the officers’ attempts to solve the problem, he
responded, ‘Fuck that, I’m suicidal’ and had to be transferred to an observation
cell.” Id. at *6.
The court observes that several factual disputes between the parties are
not material to the plaintiff’s claims. For example, the plaintiff says that he
covered his window with paper after speaking with Kozak, while the defendants
state that Kozak was able to see the plaintiff through the cell window, cutting
himself, when Kozak arrived after the emergency call. Dkt. No. 64 at ¶54. The
plaintiff’s version of events contradicts his claim about covering up his window.
He alleges that when staff arrived in response to the alarm, he held some pills
up to show to jail staff before ingesting them. Dkt. No. 38 at ¶41. Had his
window been covered, jail staff would not have been able to see him. Dkt. No.
53 at ¶41. In any event, whether the window was covered or not is not relevant
to whether any of the defendants were deliberately indifferent. Perhaps it would
12

have been relevant if the evidence showed that the plaintiff had covered his
window hours earlier—an obvious warning sign—and the defendants had
disregarded the covered window by not checking on him. Sanville v.
McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 739 (7th Cir. 2001) (“In the five hours during
which Matt's cell window was covered with toilet paper, there was no apparent
attempt to discern whether he was stable.”) There is no such evidence here—
only the plaintiff’s unsupported allegation that he covered the window after
speaking with Kozak. This factual dispute is not material to the question of
deliberate indifference.
The plaintiff asserts that he told Kozak he wanted to commit suicide and
cut himself, while Kozak says that the plaintiff mentioned only suicide, not
cutting. Dkt. No. 53 at ¶30. It is conceivable that the specificity of a threat of
self-harm (e.g., cutting oneself) could make a threat more credible. “[H]earing
that an inmate plans to cut himself with a sharp object might, depending on
the circumstances, put prison staff on notice that a plaintiff intended to injure
himself.” Rivers v. Johnson, No. 17-CV-1496-PP, 2019 WL 2411775, at *6 (E.D.
Wis. June 6, 2019.) The court can’t resolve this factual dispute at the summary
judgment stage, so for purposes of the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment the court will take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and proceed as though the plaintiff did tell Kozak both that he felt suicidal and
that he was going to cut himself.
Finally, the court allowed the plaintiff to proceed against Kozak,
Dequaine, Higgins and Rhode. Dkt. No. 14 at 12. In the amended complaint,
the plaintiff alleged that he told Kozak and Higgins that he felt like harming
himself, and that neither of them notified the clinical or psychological services
13

unit. Dkt. No. 13 at ¶¶18-19. In his proposed findings of fact, the plaintiff said
that he informed Kozak and Higgins that he felt like committing suicide and
self-harm, then covered his cell window with paper. Dkt. Nos. 38 at ¶29, 66 at
¶29. These are allegations only—the plaintiff has provided no evidence that
Higgins was involved in what happened on July 29, 2016. Higgins has provided
a declaration that while he was assigned to Fox Pod that day, he does not recall
having any interaction with the plaintiff. Dkt. No. 58 at ¶¶10, 11. Kozak makes
no mention of Higgins in his declaration. Dkt. No. 54. The court will grant
summary judgment in favor of Higgins without further analysis.
b.

Deliberate Indifference to Risk of Self-Harm/Suicide

The facts that are relevant to the plaintiff’s claim of deliberate
indifference are these: the plaintiff informed Kozak at 4:00 that he was suicidal
and thinking about cutting himself. Kozak believed that the plaintiff had made
similar threats before as a means of trying to get what he wanted. The plaintiff
also had a significant mental health history, had reported past attempts to
harm himself and had harmed himself at the jail before. Kozak informed
Dequaine about the suicide threat, and Dequaine informed Rhode. Dequaine
instructed Kozak to monitor the plaintiff. On at least two occasions between
4:00 and 5:30, Kozak observed the plaintiff sitting in his cell, working on what
appeared to be legal work. He says he served the plaintiff dinner, and later
retrieved the meal tray, without incident. A nurse visited the plaintiff at roughly
4:35 to administer medication, again without incident. Dequaine stopped by
the pod around 5:05, at which time Kozak reported that the plaintiff was
working on paperwork in his cell. Kozak left the pod to transport another
inmate, returning at 5:30. He heard an intercom call that the defendant was
14

suicidal and went to the plaintiff’s cell door, where he saw the plaintiff cutting
himself with what appeared to be a pencil. He ordered the plaintiff to stop and
radioed for backup. Other officers arrived and were able to coax the plaintiff
out of his cell. The plaintiff received treatment for the wound.
The plaintiff was a convicted inmate at the time of these events, so the
court analyzes his claims under the Eighth Amendment. Cavalieri v. Shepard,
321 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2003). A plaintiff who claims that a prison official
exhibited deliberate indifference by denying him medical care must meet both
an objective and a subjective component. Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Cty. of
Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2014). First, he must show that
his medical condition was objectively serious. Second, he must show that the
officials had a sufficiently culpable state of mind—that their “acts or omissions
[were] sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference” to his serious
medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A prison official
shows deliberate indifference to a risk of suicide or self-harm when the official
is subjectively “aware of the significant likelihood that an inmate may
imminently seek to take his own life” yet “fail[s] to take reasonable steps to
prevent the inmate from performing the act.” Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757,
761 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cty. of Wood, 226
F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2000)). The official must be “aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists”
and the official “must also draw the inference.” Higgins v. Corr. Med. Servs. of
Ill., Inc., 178 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).

15

i.

Serious Medical Need

As to the objective component, the defendants have conceded that
“suicide is a serious harm,” dkt. no. 44 at 13, and they state that the objective
harm element has been met. The court agrees that suicide is a serious harm,
although some courts in this district have questioned whether a person who
threatens suicide but doesn’t cause himself serious harm faced an objectively
serious risk. In Phillips v. Diedrick, No. 18-C-56, 2019 WL 318403, at *3 (E.D.
Wis. Jan. 24, 2019), the court found that the inmate “did not engage in selfharm that caused a serious injury or present a serious risk of suicide. Instead,
he used a small razor to make superficial cuts on his arm.” And in Davis v.
Gee, the plaintiff threatened suicide but ingested a non-toxic amount of
Tylenol, which caused no distress. Davis v. Gee, Case No. 14-cv-617-WMC,
2017 WL 2880869, at *6 (W.D. Wis. July 6, 2017) (finding no serious harm).
These courts concluded that the utterance of a suicide threat does not
constitute “serious medical need” if what the plaintiff did to himself didn’t look
like a serious attempt at self-harm.
In this case, the court has concluded that based on the photo the
defendants submitted, the cut on the plaintiff’s arm appears to have been more
than superficial. Perhaps one can imagine a case in which a plaintiff threatens
to harm himself, and then does something so silly that it is obvious he didn’t
really mean it and that he was at no risk. This is not that case, and the
defendants have conceded that the “serious medical need” objective component
has been met. The court will move on to the subjective component—whether
the defendants were subjectively aware of the significant likelihood that the

16

plaintiff might seek to take his life but failed to take reasonable steps to
prevent him from doing so.
ii.

The Defendants’ State of Mind

The court next considers whether the defendants were aware that there
was a substantial risk that the plaintiff would seriously injure himself. Higgins,
178 F.3d at 511. The jail officer defendants all have stated that they believed
that the plaintiff had a history of threatening to harm himself in order to
manipulate staff. The evidence on the record provides support for that belief.
Jail staff notes indicate, for example, that only a week earlier, while
complaining to a staff member about his desire for more privileges, the plaintiff
had discussed “things he could hypothetically do behaviorally or self-harming if
he doesn't get his way regarding certain matters.” Dkt. No. 46-6 at 11. The
officers also appear to have known, however, that the plaintiff had a history of
mental illness. (As the court also has observed, the record shows that the
plaintiff had harmed himself in the past, although it does not indicate whether
these jail officers knew that.)
The defendants point out that Kozak and Dequaine observed the plaintiff
behaving “normally” in the one and one-half hours that followed his suicide
threat—sitting in his cell doing paperwork, eating his dinner, taking his
medication. The defendants assert that given the plaintiff’s history of making
false threats, it would have been reasonable for them to conclude that any
threat the plaintiff made ninety minutes earlier, in the wake of his
disappointment about being denied another opportunity to shower, was an
attempt to manipulate them, not a real threat.

17

The defendants rely on Collins to argue that even if the defendants had a
subjective awareness of an imminent threat to the plaintiff’s safety, by the time
the plaintiff cut himself, the threat had abated. Collins, 462 F.3d at 762. In
Collins, the plaintiff told an officer he was suicidal, but “just a few minutes
later he told the officer he would be all right until the crisis counselor arrived.”
Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded that even though Collins had told the officer
that he was feeling suicidal—providing the officer with a subjective awareness
of an imminent threat to Collins’s safety—“that threat had substantially abated
fifteen minutes later when Collins assured [the officer] he would be all right
until the counselor arrived.” Id. at 791. The defendants argue that Kozak’s
observations of the plaintiff after the suicide threat—seeing him working in his
cell, serving him dinner, seeing him with the nurse—gave Kozak reason to
believe that any threat of imminent harm had abated. Dkt. No. 44 at 16. The
plaintiff responds that unlike Collins, he never told anyone he would be “all
right.” He remained silent in response to Officer Kozak’s inquiries about
whether he was suicidal or was thinking of harming himself. Dkt. No. 45 at
¶¶56-58.
One might read some of the plaintiff’s assertions as admitting that Kozak
and Dequaine did not have a subjective awareness that the plaintiff faced an
imminent risk of harm. In his reply brief, the plaintiff states that Dequaine
“had already concluded that plaintiff was lying and trying to manipulate staff
into giving him another shower. And this also explain[s] why def. N. Dequaine
and def. D. Kozak fabricated their incident reports . . . to cover-up the failed
preventative actions that they could have took but refused to do so.” Dkt. No.
63 at 22. If, as the plaintiff indicates, Dequaine and Kozak believe that the
18

plaintiff was “lying” about being suicidal, they could not have been subjectively
aware that he was at serious risk of harming himself.
The court believes it unlikely that a reasonable jury would conclude on
the evidence in the record that the defendants had a subjective awareness that
the plaintiff faced an imminent risk of harm. But even if a reasonable jury
might reach that conclusion, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the
defendants failed to take reasonable steps to protect him.
iii.

The Defendants’ Actions

The evidence shows that far from ignoring the plaintiff’s threat, the
defendants took numerous steps to protect the plaintiff from a risk of harm.
Kozak reacted to the threat immediately by talking with the plaintiff, calming
him and asking him questions about whether he still felt suicidal or was
thinking of harming himself. Kozak reported the threat to Dequaine, who
instructed Kozak to monitor the plaintiff. Kozak then observed the plaintiff at
least twice during the 4:00 hour. He watched the plaintiff take his medications.
Dequaine reported the threat to Rhode, and Dequaine himself came by the pod
to ask about the plaintiff at about 5:05. Kozak reported that the plaintiff was
quiet, behaving normally, and doing legal work.
The plaintiff complains that Kozak, Dequaine and Rhode did not tell any
medical or psychological staff about the plaintiff’s threat. It appears that this is
true. But the law does not require a defendant who knows about a risk to “take
perfect action or even reasonable action[,] . . . his action must be reckless
before § 1983 liability can be found.” Cavalieri, 321 F.3d at 622. It was not
reckless for Kozak to talk with the plaintiff, report the threat to Dequaine and
monitor the plaintiff for the better part of an hour and a half. It was not
19

reckless for Dequaine to instruct Kozak to monitor the plaintiff, and to check
on the plaintiff himself. It was not reckless for Rhode to accept Dequaine’s
representation that although the plaintiff had made a threat, Kozak since had
observed him working in his cell.
In this way, the facts here do resemble those in Collins. The guards in
Collins did not place the plaintiff on a formal suicide watch after his threat,
instead subjecting him to additional monitoring. Collins, 462 F.3d at 759
(“Correctional officers checked on Collins twice more in the intervening thirty
minutes and nothing was amiss.”) The plaintiff hung himself with his bedsheet
between these checks. The Seventh Circuit found that the guard did not “sit
idle,” visiting the inmate’s cell three times. Id.; cf. Sanville, 266 F.3d at 739 (“In
the five hours during which Matt's cell window was covered with toilet paper,
there was no apparent attempt to discern whether he was stable. The guards
did not use the video camera to check on Matt, nor did anyone take any action
until approximately 3:00 p.m.”).
At 5:30, when Kozak returned to the pod and heard the intercom call
that the plaintiff was suicidal, he went straight to the plaintiff’s cell. When he
saw the plaintiff cutting himself, he ordered the plaintiff to stop and
immediately called for backup. Several officers came, including Rhode (who,
according to Kozak, helped talk the plaintiff out of his cell, dkt. no. 55 at ¶¶21,
23). Again, the defendants did not sit idly by. They reacted.
Arguably, the only way to prevent a determined inmate from harming
himself would be to place him in restraints twenty-four hours a day. Even in a
bare cell, with continuous monitoring, an inmate could bang his head against
walls or doors, or use his own teeth and fingernails to cause serious self-injury
20

before the guards observing him have time to intervene. (The inmate notes
reflect that the plaintiff had mentioned the length of his nails to staff on at
least one occasion.) Short of twenty-four/seven restraint, prison staff cannot
guarantee that an inmate will not harm himself. This is why cases finding
liability, or even allowing a plaintiff to proceed to trial on liability, generally are
limited to those situations in which the guards were essentially asleep at the
switch or acted recklessly: “A state officer is deliberately indifferent when he
does nothing . . . or when he takes action that is so ineffectual under the
circumstances that deliberate indifference can be inferred.” Figgs v. Dawson,
829 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). The plaintiff
must show “something approaching a total unconcern” for the inmate’s safety.
Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Cf.
Vann v. Vandenbrook, No. 09-CV-007-BBC, 2010 WL 148396, at *1 (W.D. Wis.
Jan. 12, 2010) (“Plaintiff told Bittelman that he was feeling suicidal, and
Bittelman responded by saying, ‘You're not the only one,’ and handed plaintiff a
razor. Plaintiff used the razor to cut his arms 133 times.”) The plaintiff has
made no such showing here. No reasonable jury could conclude on the
evidence in this record that the defendants failed to take steps to protect the
plaintiff. “The most that [could] be said . . . is that [the defendants] were
negligent in failing to keep a closer eye on [the plaintiff] than they did.” Mathis
v. Fairman, 120 F.3d 88, 92 (7th Cir. 1997). That does not suffice to show
deliberate indifference.
3.

Qualified Immunity

The defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Where the defendant “wins on the facts, [he] does not need qualified
21

immunity.” Viero v. Bufano, 925 F. Supp. 1374, 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1996);
Antepenko v. Domrois, No. 17-CV-1211, 2018 WL 6065347, at *6 (E.D. Wis.
Nov. 20, 2018) (“Because the court grants summary judgment on the merits,
the court does not need to address the qualified immunity argument.”) The
court need not address whether the defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity, because the court is granting judgment in their favor on the merits
of the claim.
B.

Defendant Pagels—Deliberate Indifference in Treating
Wound/Default Judgment

The plaintiff filed a motion asking the court to award him default
judgment against Nurse Pagels, a non-county employee. Dkt. No. 41. The
process receipt and return on file shows that the U.S. Marshal served Pagels on
October 22, 2018. Dkt. No. 31. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i), Pagels had
twenty-one days to answer or otherwise respond; she has not done so. But the
plaintiff is not entitled to default judgment, for two reasons.
First, the plaintiff did not comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.
55. There are two parts to the default judgment process. Rule 55(a) requires
that the plaintiff first must ask the Clerk of Court to enter default. Only after
the clerk has entered default may the plaintiff ask the judge to award default
judgment in his favor under Rule 55(b). The plaintiff did not first ask the clerk
to enter default. The court understands that the plaintiff is not a lawyer, but he
must follow the rules like anyone else. He did not do so here.
Second, there is more to obtaining a default judgment than showing that
the defendant did not respond to the plaintiff’s allegations. Once a clerk enters
default, “[a] defendant admits all of the ‘well-pleaded’ factual allegations in the
complaint against him . . . , with the exception of those factual allegations
22

relating to damages.” DirecTV, Inc. v. Ouimette, Case No. 03-cv-1337, 2005 WL
8163010, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 23, 2005) (quoting Dundee Cement Co. v.
Howard Pipe & Concrete Prods., Inc., 722 F.2d 1319, 1322 (7th Cir. 1983)).
“Factual allegations are well-pleaded if they are “susceptible of proof by
legitimate evidence and are not contradicted by other allegations in the
complaint or facts in which the court may take judicial notice.” Id.
The amended complaint alleges that after officers removed him from his
cell, Pagels asked him why he’d cut himself, and he told her it was because he
couldn’t take the deprivations of confinement any longer. Dkt. No. 13 at ¶32.
The amended complaint says the plaintiff told Pagels that he’d informed staff of
his intent to commit suicide or harm himself and staff hadn’t acted to stop
him. Id. at ¶33. It says that Pagels told the plaintiff that she’d wipe his wound
and put gauze on it, then come back after medications pass. Id. at ¶34. The
amended complaint asserts that the plaintiff told Pagels he needed stitches,
but that she left the area. Id. at ¶35. It appears that later that evening—after
the plaintiff spoke with the Chaplain and the pastor at 7:15—the gauze that
Pagels had put on the wound got stuck as the blood dried. Id. at ¶36. It says
that Pagels ripped the gauze off, which caused the wound to start bleeding
again. Id. The complaint asserts that Pagels then sprayed the wound “with
something” and put cream on it. Id. at ¶38. It says that at this point, the
plaintiff told Pagels that he needed stitches, and that she wasn’t treating the
wound correctly; Pagels responded that she would not give the plaintiff
stitches. Id. The amended complaint says the plaintiff responded by telling
Pagels that he didn’t want a bandage or gauze, and that he told Pagels to leave
him alone. Id. at ¶39.
23

Even if the Clerk of Court had entered default at the plaintiff’s request,
and even if the court were to assume that Pagels admitted all the facts
recounted above, the plaintiff would not be entitled to default judgment,
because he has not established that he is entitled to judgment under the law.
“Once the default is established, and thus liability, the plaintiff still must
establish his entitlement to the relief he seeks.” In re Catt, 368 F.3d 789, 793
(7th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff’s own complaint proves that Pagels gave the
plaintiff medical treatment. Right after the officers removed the plaintiff from
his cell, Pagels cleaned the wound and put gauze on it. Later that evening, it
appears that she came back, removed the gauze (although that made the
bleeding start again), sprayed the wound and put ointment on it. She was going
to cover the wound, but the plaintiff said he didn’t want a bandage or gauze
and told her to leave him alone. This is not deliberate indifference. This is not
refusing to take steps to address the plaintiff’s serious medical need.
The plaintiff disagrees with the treatment Pagels provided. He believes
that instead of cleaning and dressing the wound, Pagels should have stitched
it, or had someone else stitch it. But Pagels, as a nurse, is a medical
professional. “When a medical professional acts in [her] professional capacity,
[she] ‘may be held to have displayed deliberate indifference only if the decision
by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” McGee v.
Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 481 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843,
857 (7th Cir. 2011)). “[N]either medical malpractice nor a mere disagreement
with a [medical professional’s] medical judgment amounts to deliberate
24

indifference.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The plaintiff has pled only a disagreement
with Pagel’s treatment decisions.
The court notes that the plaintiff asks the court to award $610,000 for
pain and suffering and punitive and compensatory damages, which he
describes as $1,000 for each day that he has “had to endure the pain and
suffering from the failure of def. Nurse Pagels to provide adequate treatment to
a laceration on” his right arm. Dkt. No. 41. The plaintiff has presented no
evidence in support of these claimed damages, and even in a default situation,
the court does not treat a plaintiff’s allegations as to damages as admitted.
The court will deny the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment as to
Pagels, and dismiss the case as to Pagels because the facts in the amended
complaint are not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to judgment under the law.
C.

Brown County—Failure to Train

At the time the court screened the amended complaint, the court allowed
the plaintiff to proceed against Brown County because he alleged that it had
failed to train its employees to detect and prevent the plaintiff’s self-harm. Dkt.
No. 14 at 13. Because the court has found that the county employees were not
deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious medical need, however, the
court must dismiss the failure-to-train claim. Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d
482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007) (“there can be no liability under Monell for failure to
train when there has been no violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.”)
D.

Brown County—First Amendment

The court also allowed the plaintiff to proceed on a Monell claim against
Brown County because the amended complaint alleged that the jail had a
25

policy, custom or practice of denying religious materials to inmates in the
restricted housing unit. Dkt. No. 14 at 15-16 (citing Monell v. New York City
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). The court must consider whether
such a policy, custom or practice existed, and if so, whether it caused the
constitutional deprivation. Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 379
(7th Cir. 2017).
There are at least two problems with the plaintiff’s First Amendment
claim. First, he asserts that he did not receive “religious materials;” his
summary judgment materials explain that these materials included books,
songs and prayers. Dkt. No. 38 at ¶49; Dkt. No. 37 at 16. The plaintiff has not
explained why he needed these materials to practice his religion. He does not
identify his religious affiliation. He does not allege that he could not practice
his faith without these materials. He simply states that he was denied these
items on one or two occasions. Even if a county employee had denied the
plaintiff these materials, he has not provided evidence that this denial denied
him his right to practice his religion under the First Amendment.
Second, the only evidence the plaintiff provides to support his claim that
there was a custom, policy or practice of denying religious materials to inmates
in the restricted housing unit is a single communication by a jail complaint
examiner. On July 29, 2016 (the same date as the cutting incident), the
plaintiff filed a grievance alleging that his religious materials requests were
being denied. Dkt. No. 68-1 at 5. He stated that he had spoken to the
Chaplain, who told him that on more than one occasion she had sent him
religious books and songs, but that the plaintiff had not received those items.
Id. The complaint then said, “As this is no where to be found: this felt in to
26

(retaliation) (violating my right to practice my religion) as well (violating the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment about my religion). Id. The complaint
examiner responded to the complaint:
The Chaplain verified that she sent materials for you. She also
stated that it has been a regular occurrence for items she
sends down to either be sent back to her or for inmates to tell
her they’ve never received them. Your grievance is founded on
the complaint that religious materials were not delivered to
you. Considering this is an issue has been affecting inmates
other than you and has been going on longer than you have
been here, your claims that this is for retaliation are
unsubstantiated and are deemed unfounded.
Dkt. 70-1 at 6. The court reads this response to mean that the examiner
believed that because other inmates were complaining about not receiving
materials, the fact that the plaintiff hadn’t received materials was not the result
of jail staff retaliating against the plaintiff personally. On that basis, the
examiner dismissed the complaint.
The plaintiff sees this one statement as conclusive evidence that the
county had a policy or practice of denying religious materials to inmates. To
prove the existence of a policy or practice—even an unwritten one—a plaintiff
must do more than cite evidence that something has happened more than
once, or to more than one individual. The examiner stated that “this is an issue
[that] has been affecting inmates other than you and has been going on longer
than you have been here.” Id. The examiner did not say that jail staff routinely
refused to provide religious materials to inmates. The examiner did not say that
jail staff refused religious materials only to inmates in restricted housing. The
examiner did not say how many inmates had not received materials, or under
what circumstances, or how long the problem had existed.
27

The defendants agree that there are restrictions on how many books and
other items inmates in restricted housing may have. They have stated
legitimate security reasons for the restrictions. Inmates may deface books, or
tear out the pages and use them to clog drains or to block their cell windows.
Dkt. No. 45 at ¶¶101-105; Dkt. No. 64 at ¶¶101-105. The complaint examiner
said only that other inmates had not received religious materials they
requested, without explaining whether those inmates were subject to the
legitimate security restrictions the defendants described. An inmate in
restricted housing may have one religious book; the complaint examiner’s
statement didn’t indicate whether any of the complaining inmates were in
restricted housing and already had their one, allowed religious book.
Even if the complaint examiner’s statement was enough to show that
there is a long-standing problem with inmates not receiving religious materials,
that does not, by itself, show that the problem is the result of a policy, custom
or practice. Inmates might not receive materials because request forms get lost,
or because the Chaplain or the prison library does not have the books or
materials, or because another inmate intercepts the materials. “A person who
wants to impose liability on a municipality for a constitutional tort must show
that the tort was committed (that is, authorized or directed) at the
policymaking level of government . . . .” Vodak v. City of Chi., 639 F.3d 738,
747 (7th Cir. 2011). The Chaplain has stated that she has no reason to believe
there is such a policy, and that her “overall experience has been that the [jail]
administration has always been very supportive of inmates receiving religious
materials and practicing their religion while incarcerated.” Dkt. No. 47 at ¶7.

28

The plaintiff responded by citing the examiner’s response to his complaint. Dkt.
No. 64 at ¶97.
The plaintiff has not raised a genuine dispute as to an issue of material
fact on his First Amendment claim, and the court will grant judgment in favor
of Brown County on that claim.
III.

MOTION TO INTERVENE (DKT. NO. 77)
The plaintiff’s jailhouse “legal coordinator,” Glenn Turner, filed a motion

asking the court to allow him to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(c). Dkt.
No. 77. He asks to intervene because he has put substantial work into the
case, because the plaintiff suffers from mental illness and because he wants to
protect “his interest” and keep the plaintiff up-to-date on the case in case the
plaintiff gets transferred to another facility. Id. at 1-2.
The court will deny Mr. Turner’s motion. Rule 24(b)(1)(B) says that a
court may allow an individual to intervene in another person’s lawsuit when
the person seeking to intervene “has a claim or defense that shares with the
main action a common question of law or fact.” Mr. Turner has stated no such
claim or defense. The plaintiff’s suit is based on the events that surrounding
his threat to harm himself; the court cannot see how Mr. Turner could have a
claim or defense that he shares with the plaintiff. Even if he did, the court is
dismissing the plaintiff’s case on the grounds explained above, so there will be
no future litigation in which Mr. Turner could participate.
IV.

MOTION TO SEEK AN ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTION UNDER CIVIL
L.R. 16.4 (DKT. NO. 80)
The plaintiff has asked the court and defense counsel to agree “to seek

an alternative dispute resolution” under this court’s local rules. Dkt. No. 80. He
says the court never gave him the opportunity for alternative dispute
29

resolution, which he says is required by the local rule. He also indicates that he
is “about to leave the custody of the Department of Corrections to possibly be
turned over to Immigration, officials,” which would make it hard for him to
litigate the case. Id.
The court believes the plaintiff is referring to Civil L.R. 16(d), which gives
judges in this district the discretion to conduct an alternative dispute
resolution evaluation conference early in a case to decide whether the case is
appropriate for alternative dispute resolution. Contrary to what the plaintiff
states, the rule does not require the court to offer parties the opportunity to
participate in alternative dispute resolution.
The court does often offer parties the opportunity to participate in
mediation if the case survives summary judgment. Because the court is
dismissing the case, it will deny the plaintiff’s motion for alternative dispute
resolution.
V.

CONCLUSION
The court DENIES the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Dkt.

No. 36.
The court DENIES the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. Dkt. No.
41.
The court GRANTS the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt.
No. 43.
The court DENIES the motion to intervene. Dkt. No. 77.
The court DENIES the motion for alternative dispute resolution. Dkt. No.
80.
The court ORDERS that this case is DISMISSED.
30

The court will enter judgment accordingly.
This order and the judgment to follow are final. A dissatisfied party may
appeal this court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by
filing in this court a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of judgment.
See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, 4. This court may extend this
deadline if a party timely requests an extension and shows good cause or
excusable neglect for not being able to meet the 30-day deadline. See Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A).
Under certain circumstances, a party may ask this court to alter or
amend its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or ask for relief
from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Any motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) must be filed within 28 days of the entry
of judgment. The court cannot extend this deadline. See Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 6(b)(2). Any motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) must
be filed within a reasonable time, generally no more than one year after the
entry of the judgment. The court cannot extend this deadline. See Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2).
The court expects parties to closely review all applicable rules and
determine, what, if any, further action is appropriate in a case.
Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 31st day of July, 2019.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________________
HON. PAMELA PEPPER
United States District Judge

31