Tyson v. United States of America

Filing 23

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 2/21/2018 DENYING 18 Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's 1/30/2018 Order and Judgment. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Jason J. Tyson at Allenwood FCI) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
JASON J. TYSON,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Case No. 17-CV-1274-JPS

ORDER

Respondent.

On September 21, 2017, Jason J. Tyson (“Tyson”), a federal prisoner,
filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255, asserting that his conviction and sentence were imposed in
violation of the Constitution. (Docket #1). After receiving briefing from the
parties, the Court denied the motion and dismissed this action in an order
dated January 30, 2018. (Docket #16, #17). Tyson filed a notice of appeal on
February 16, 2018, (Docket #19), and simultaneously filed a motion
addressed to this Court requesting reconsideration of the dismissal order
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), (Docket #18). The Court
will deny that motion.
Rule 59(e) empowers a court to alter or amend a judgment on motion
by a party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The party seeking relief under this Rule
must establish “a manifest error of law or present newly discovered
evidence.” Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 2008). “Motions
under Rule 59(e) cannot be used to present evidence that could have been
presented before judgment was entered.” Id. Whether to grant a motion to
amend a judgment “is entrusted to the sound judgment of the district
court,” In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996), but the movant must

first “clearly establish” his right to relief, Romo v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 250
F.3d 1119, 1122 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001).1
As another branch of this Court has noted, a “manifest error of law”
must be “egregious” to warrant relief under this Rule. Stelter v. Meli, Case
No. 14–cv–904–pp, 2017 WL 663546, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 17, 2017). “Appeal,
not reconsideration, is the time to deal with the majority of legal errors,”
and so only “manifest errors. . .so obvious that no additional explanation is
needed or possible” are proper subjects of a Rule 59 motion. Burney v. Thorn
Ams., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 668, 671 (E.D. Wis. 1997). Such error “is not
demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party” but instead “the
‘wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling
precedent.’” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Sedrak v. Callahan, 987 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1997)).
Tyson’s motion presents no more than his disagreement with the
Court’s conclusions. This is not a proper basis for reconsideration. First, he
suggests that his lawyer’s failure to object to Magistrate Duffin’s report and
recommendation on his motion to suppress violated the rule of Roe v. FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). (Docket #18 at 2). He is incorrect for the reasons
explained in the Court’s prior order. (Docket #16 at 15). Rule 59(e) does not
afford the losing party a second bite at the apple. See Banks v. Chicago Bd. of
In construing pro se filings generously, the Court is required to consider
what grounds for post-judgment relief might be appropriate, regardless of the
authorizing Rule the litigant actually cited. See Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489,
493 (7th Cir. 2008). Because Tyson identifies only purported legal errors the Court
committed, Rule 59 is the appropriate starting point for his motion, and other
rules, like Rule 60(b), are not. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). This is true although
Tyson at times accuses the Court of getting the facts wrong, for his objections are
in substance only legal.
1

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Educ., 750 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2014) (allegations of simple legal or factual
errors do not warrant, much less require, reconsideration).
Likewise, Tyson’s assertion that the Court was required to convene
an evidentiary hearing is without merit. (Docket #18 at 2). Although it
seemed that he and the government were in agreement on this issue, the
Court’s time and resources are ever more thinly stretched and the burden
of an evidentiary hearing is not lightly undertaken. The mere agreement of
the parties is never enough, standing alone, to compel such a proceeding.
Moreover, the Court’s finding that Tyson’s case is distinguishable from
Flores-Ortega meant that no presumption of prejudice to Tyson arose from
his counsel’s actions, and a hearing to probe the reasons for those actions
was therefore unnecessary. See (Docket #16 at 15).
Finally, Tyson unsuccessfully reargues the merits of his potential
objections to the magistrate’s report and recommendation under the guise
of reconsideration. He reiterates his views of the Fourth Amendment and
Terry but does not identify unmistakable errors of law or fact in the Court’s
order. (Docket #16 at 5). Indeed, although he focuses his energy on his claim
about a police officer peering into his van, it is worth noting that the Court
found the claim was not only meritless but waived. (Docket #16 at 13).
Again, the fact that Tyson is unhappy with the Court’s decision is not a
reason for reconsideration. Tyson may address his concerns to the Court of
Appeals. Because his arguments fall well short of “clearly establish[ing]”
that Rule 59 relief is warranted, Romo, 250 F.3d at 1122 n.3, the Court will
deny his motion.

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Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to alter or amend the
Court’s order and judgment of January 30, 2018 (Docket #18) be and the
same is hereby DENIED.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 21st day of February, 2018.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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