Fields v. Paluch et al

Filing 64

ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 11/15/18. IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to impose sanctions 59 is DENIED; plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 32 is DENIED; and that defendants' motion for summary judgment 37 is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. (cc: all counsel, plaintiff) (jad)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________
MAFAYETTE M. FIELDS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 17-C-1352

SGT. PALUCH, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Mafayette Fields, a state prisoner who is representing himself, filed a
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I allowed him to proceed on claims that (1) defendants
Jeremia Paluch and Christopher Johnson violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights
when they failed to intervene in plaintiff’s fight with another inmate; (2) defendants Dr.
Phillip Wheatley, Dr. Dilip Tannan, and Nurse Tera Banda were deliberately indifferent to
plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment when treating his
injured finger; (3) defendants John Litscher, James Greer, Dr. Ryan Holzacher, and Mary
Muse were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs when they cocreated a policy that prevented plaintiff from receiving adequate medical treatment for his
injured finger; and (4) that defendant Katherine Sabel was deliberately indifferent to
plaintiff’s safety when she placed him in a cell next to the inmate who fought with plaintiff 1.
Before me now are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Also, before me is
plaintiff’s motion to impose sanctions regarding defendants’ alleged deposition of inmate

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I originally allowed plaintiff to proceed on a retaliation claim against defendant Sabel.
(Docket No. 15). Plaintiff then moved to voluntary dismiss the retaliation claim and
instead proceed on the deliberate indifference claim. (Docket No. 16). I granted
plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the retaliation claim and proceed on the
deliberate indifference claim. (Docket No. 29).

Thomas Zollicoffer. I will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grant
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. I will also deny plaintiff’s motion to impose
sanctions.
I. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Because plaintiff’s motion to impose sanctions (Docket No. 59) implicates
evidence used at summary judgment, I will address this motion first. Plaintiff requests
that I impose sanctions on defendants for improperly deposing a witness without
providing notice. Id. at 1. Plaintiff submitted a declaration signed by Thomas Zollicoffer
(Docket No. 51-1) as an exhibit to Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s
Proposed Findings of Fact. Docket No. 51. Plaintiff states that after he filed this
declaration, Sarah Feltes, a “member of program services,” deposed Zollicoffer
regarding his declaration on July 26, 2018 without providing notice of the deposition.
Docket No. 59 at 1.
Defendants’ attorney, Michael D. Morris, states that he requested Feltes, who
was the litigation coordinator at Oshkosh Correctional Institution, to verify the
authenticity of Zollicoffer’s declaration. Docket No. 61 at ¶ 5. Morris did so because
plaintiff alleged that Zollicoffer was the inmate he fought with, and Morris found it “odd
that he would submit a declaration in aid of a former combatant.” Id. at ¶ 4. Morris
unequivocally states that he did not take Zollicoffer’s deposition, but that Ms. Feltes
asked Zollicoffer whether the signature on the declaration was his. Id. at ¶¶ 6,8.
As part of Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to
Impose Sanctions, Zollicoffer submitted another declaration, which actually corroborates
Morris’ version of the events. Docket No. 63. Zollicoffer’s declaration demonstrates that

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Feltes questioned him on July 26, 2018 regarding the authenticity of his signature. Id. at
¶¶ 1-6. It does not state a deposition took place.
I find that there is nothing to sanction in this instance. It does not appear based
on the record that Morris failed to notice a deposition of Zollicoffer in violation of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b). In fact, it does not appear that a deposition even took
place. Under the rules of Civil Procedure, defendants are allowed to have an informal
discussion with a non-party, like Zollicoffer. As a result, I deny plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2
A. Background
At all times relevant to this case, plaintiff was incarcerated at Oshkosh, Docket No.
47 at ¶ 1, and defendants were employed in the following capacities: Jeremia Paluch was
a Correctional Sergeant; Christopher Johnson was a Correctional Officer; Katherine
Sabel was a Corrections Unit Supervisor; Tera Banda was a Nurse; Dr. Phillip Wheatley
and Dr. Dilip Tannan were Physcians; John Litscher was the Secretary of the State of
Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC); Mary Muse was the Director of Nursing for
the DOC; Dr. Ryan Holzmacher was the Medical Director of the DOC Bureau of Health
Services; and James Greer was the Director of the DOC Bureau of Health Services.
Docket No. 39 at ¶ 2.

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The facts are primarily taken from Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact (Docket No.
34); Defendants Proposed Findings of Fact (Docket No. 39); Defendants’ Response to
Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact (Docket No. 47); and Plaintiff’s Response to
Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact (Docket No. 50).
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1. The January 30, 2017 Altercation
While the parties dispute the facts of the January 30, 2017 altercation, I have the
benefit of the surveillance video. The video demonstrates that at approximately 4:16 PM,
plaintiff enters the area known at the Open Center, removes his coat, and fights with
another inmate, whom both parties agree is Thomas Zollicoffer. Docket No. 39 at ¶ 5;
Docket No. 44-1 at 4:16:28; Docket No. 50 at ¶ 5. The parties dispute whether plaintiff or
Zollicoffer instigated the fight. The plaintiff maintains that Zollicoffer started the fight.
Docket No. 50 at ¶ 7. Defendants claim plaintiff instigated the fight. Docket No. 39 at ¶ 5.
The video shows that plaintiff was having a heated discussion with Zollicoffer as they
were walking into the Open Center, Zollicoffer threw the first punch, and plaintiff
vigorously responded by punching back. Docket No. 44-1 at 4:16:28.
Less than a minute later, the video shows defendants Paluch and Johnson
intervening in the fight, successfully separating and restraining plaintiff and Zollicoffer.
Docket 44-1 at 4:16:45. Both plaintiff and Zollicoffer appear to be fully restrained by
defendants Paluch and Johnson. Id.
2. The Subsequent Treatment of the Fractured Finger
On January 30, 2017, after the altercation, plaintiff went to the Health Services Unit
(HSU) for a cut lip and a finger injury resulting from the altercation. Docket No. 39 at ¶ 15.
Plaintiff saw defendants Dr. Wheatley and Nurse Banda. Docket No. 34 at ¶ 15. Dr.
Wheatley stitched up plaintiff’s lip and ordered an x-ray for his finger. Docket No. 34 at ¶
14; Docket No. 39 at ¶ 15. Dr. Wheatley taped plaintiff’s injured finger to another finger to
stabilize it (“buddy tape”). Docket No.34 at ¶ 17; Docket No. 39 at ¶ 15.

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Plaintiff had the x-ray on February 1, 2017. Docket No. 39 at ¶ 15. Dr. Tannen,
plaintiff’s usual doctor, reviewed plaintiff’s x-ray and agreed with Dr. Wheatley’s
recommendation. Docket No. 39 at ¶¶ 19, 31.
Plaintiff states that Dr. Wheatley initially recommended a splint for plaintiff’s finger
but defendant Nurse Banda informed Dr. Wheatley that per prison policy, splints were not
allowed in the restricted housing unit where plaintiff was housed. Docket No. 34 at ¶¶ 17,
22; Docket No. 50 at ¶ 15. While defendants do not dispute that Nurse Banda stated that
splints were not allowed in the restricted housing unit, they state that buddy taping is a
form of a splint, and Dr. Wheatley held the professional medical opinion that it was
appropriate treatment in this instance. Docket No. 47 at ¶ 23.
The parties also dispute what happened after plaintiff’s initial treatment on January
30, 2017. Defendants state that plaintiff refused assessment on February 3 and did not
complain about his finger when he visited the nurse for his lip wound on both February 6
and February 13. Docket No. 39 at ¶¶ 21-23. Defendants further state that he submitted
a Health Services Request (HSR) regarding the x-ray on February 14, and on February
28, he submitted an HSR complaining about his finger. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25. He was then seen
on March 1 by a nurse, and on March 10 by defendant Dr. Tannen. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. Dr.
Tannen noted a Mallet finger deformation and at that time provided plaintiff a plastic splint
to treat the issue. Id. at ¶ 28. Dr. Tannen followed up with plaintiff on April 7, 2017 and
the finger was healing appropriately. Id. at ¶ 29. When Dr. Tannen saw plaintiff in July
and August for unrelated issues, plaintiff made no mention of the finger. Id. at ¶ 30.
Plaintiff states that he repeatedly complained of his finger pain in February and
was ignored. He states that he refused an assessment for knee pain on February 3 and

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that had nothing to do with the finger injury. Docket No. 50 at ¶ 21. He also states that
when he got his stitches out on February 6, he complained to the nurse treating him, not
a named defendant, of finger pain. Id. at ¶ 22. He further states that when he filed his
HSR on February 14, he complained of pain to the nurse who took the HSR. Id. at ¶ 24.
Plaintiff does not dispute that Dr. Tannen provided him a plastic splint on March 10 or the
events of the April 7 visit with Dr. Tannen. Id. at ¶ 29.
3. The Policy related to the Splint
Plaintiff claims that he was denied a splint because, according to defendant Banda,
there is a policy prohibiting splints from the restricted housing unit. Docket No. 34 at ¶ 17;
Docket No. 52 at ¶ 3. Plaintiff claims that defendants Greer, Litscher, Holzmacher, and
Muse are the co-creators of that policy. Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 52-55. Defendants
acknowledge that there is a policy that generally prohibits metal objects from a restricted
housing unit, but state that no specific policy bans metal splints. Docket No. 39 at ¶ 35.
Defendants further state that if an inmate’s medical needs conflict with a housing unit
policy, the policy allows for accommodations to be made. Id. at ¶ 34.
4. Plaintiff’s Housing Assignment
Plaintiff claims that between March 22 and April 22, 2017, defendant Sabel housed
Zollicoffer in the cell next to plaintiff. Docket No. 34 at ¶ 21. Plaintiff claims that by housing
Zollicoffer next to plaintiff, defendant Sabel was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s safety.
Id. at ¶ 21, ¶28. Defendants state, and plaintiff does not dispute, that plaintiff did not
submit any offender complaints pursuant to the Inmate Complaint Review System (ICRS)
against defendant Sabel regarding the housing assignment. Docket No. 39 at ¶ 50;
Docket No. 50 at ¶ 50. It is also undisputed that plaintiff filed a complaint under the ICRS

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against defendants Paluch and Johnson for failure to protect. Docket No. 39 at ¶ 51;
Docket No. 50 at ¶ 51.
B. Analysis
1. Summary Judgment Standard
A party is entitled to summary judgment if it shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). To survive a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party must show that
sufficient evidence exists to allow a jury to return a verdict in its favor. Brummett v. Sinclair
Broad. Grp., Inc., 414 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2005). For the purposes of deciding the
parties’ cross-motions, I resolve all factual disputes and make all reasonable factual
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 483-84
(7th Cir. 2008).
2. Eighth Amendment Claim for Failure to Protect
Plaintiff claims that defendants Paluch and Johnson violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by failing to protect him during the January 30, 2017 altercation. To
demonstrate that a prison official failed to protect an inmate in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, plaintiff must show that “(1) ‘he is incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm,’ and (2) defendant-officials acted with ‘deliberate
indifference’ to that risk.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 909 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). Two things are required to prove
deliberate indifference: “[(1)] that the defendant knew of a substantial risk of serious injury
to [plaintiff] and [(2)] failed to protect him from that danger.” Shields v. Dart, 664 F.3d 178,
181 (7th Cir. 2011). For the first prong, defendants must have actual knowledge of the

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substantial risk. Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 2007). Where a fight
between inmates suddenly breaks out, and there is no evidence that defendants knew of
a history between the inmates, then there is not “sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to
conclude that [defendants] had actual knowledge of the risk of injury.” Id.
Even if defendants have actual knowledge, defendants “incur no liability if they
‘responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted, because
in that case, it cannot be said that they were deliberately indifferent.’” Id. at 857 (quoting
Peate v. McCann, 294 F. 3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2002)). Where prison officials delay in
breaking up a fight between inmates and are instead monitoring the situation and waiting
for back-up, courts have held that they respond reasonably. In both Guzman, 495 F.3d at
857-858, and Sheilds, 644 F.3d at 181-182, the court found that a trier of fact could
reasonably conclude that the defendant prison officials were not deliberately indifferent
where the fight broke out spontaneously, and the defendant prison officials waited for
other officers to respond before intervening and breaking up the fight.
Here, even when the evidence is taken in a light most favorable to plaintiff, a
reasonable trier of fact could not find that defendants Paluch and Johnson had actual
knowledge of a substantial risk or acted with deliberate indifference. Regarding the actual
knowledge prong, plaintiff has submitted no evidence that he even had a history with
Zollicoffer let alone evidence suggesting defendants knew he had a history with
Zollicoffer. When this lack of evidence is combined with the fact that the fight was
spontaneous, no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that defendants Paluch and
Johnson had actual knowledge of a substantial risk.

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Even if defendants Paluch and Johnson had actual knowledge, no reasonable
factfinder could conclude that they were deliberately indifferent to the risk. The officers in
this case did more than the officers in Guzman or Shields. When plaintiff’s fight with
Zollicoffer spontaneously broke out, defendants Paluch and Johnson successfully
intervened and broke up the fight in under a minute, as evidenced by the surveillance
video. Docket No. 44-1 at 4:16:28. Thus, I find in favor of defendants on plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment failure to protect claim.
3. Eighth Amendment Claim for Deliberate Indifference for Failing to
Treat Medical Needs
Plaintiff claims that defendants Dr. Wheatley, Dr. Tannan, and Nurse Banda were
deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment when treating his injured finger. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
Where prison officials act with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners,” their actions are an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Id. To determine whether the prison official’s actions violate the
Eighth Amendment, the court considers two questions: (1) “whether a plaintiff suffered
from an objectively serious medical condition,” and (2) whether the official “was
deliberately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir.
2016).
Defendants in their brief allow for the assumption that plaintiff suffered from an
objectively serious medical condition, Docket No. 38 at 15, so I turn to the question of
whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s injured finger. A reasonable

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jury could not find that defendants Dr. Wheatley, Dr. Tannen, and Nurse Banda were
deliberately indifferent towards plaintiff’s injured finger.
To succeed in proving that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference
towards an injury, “a plaintiff must provide evidence that an official actually knew of and
disregarded a substantial risk of harm.” Id. (emphasis in original). This requires more than
providing “mere evidence of malpractice.” Id. Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the defendant “possessed a sufficiently culpable mental state.” Zaya v. Sood, 836 F. 3d
800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016). To do so, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s treatment
was “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the decision on
such a judgment.” Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 262 (7th Cir. 1996).
A plaintiff merely disagreeing with a doctor’s medical judgment or course of treatment is
not enough to overcome summary judgment. Stallings v. Liping Zhang, 607 Fed. Appx.
591, 593 (7th Cir. 2015). If the defendant-doctor claims to have based his treatment
decision on professional judgment, he is then “effectively asserting that he lacked a
sufficiently culpable mental state, and if no reasonable jury could discredit that claim, the
doctor is entitled to summary judgment.” Zaya, 836 F. 3d at 805. Also, nurses can
generally defer to a doctor’s professional judgment unless it is apparent that the treatment
course or practice is inappropriate or questionable; then they have an obligation to
question it. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F. 3d 435, 443 (7th Cir. 2010).
Defendants Drs. Wheatley and Tannan claim that they made their decisions based
on professional judgment. Docket No. 50 at ¶¶ 23, 29. And plaintiff has offered no
evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to discredit their decisions. Regarding Dr.

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Wheatley, at most plaintiff alleges that Dr. Wheatley initially preferred a splint, but once
Dr. Wheatley learned of the purported ban on splints in restricted housing units, he chose
buddy tape instead—which he believed, in his professional medical opinion, to be
sufficient. Docket No. 34 at ¶ 17; Docket No. 39 at ¶ 15. Plaintiff offers no evidence
suggesting that choosing buddy tape over a physical splint, at that time, was a substantial
departure from accepted practices. There is also no evidence, then, that Nurse Banda
erred in deferring to Dr. Wheatley’s recommendation.
Regarding Dr. Tannen, even when the facts are taken in a light most favorable to
plaintiff, a reasonable factfinder could not determine that Dr. Tannen was deliberately
indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. While plaintiff alleges that various HSU
staff ignored his complaints of pain, Docket No. 50 at ¶¶ 21-24, those HSU staff members
are not named defendants. Plaintiff has not alleged anything suggesting that Dr. Tannen
ignored these complaints or acted with deliberate indifference as a result of those
complaints.
Nor could a reasonable factfinder determine that Dr. Tannen’s treatment was
deliberately indifferent because plaintiff offers no evidence that Dr. Tannen’s actions were
a substantial departure from acceptable practices. Dr. Tannen reviewed plaintiff’s x-ray
on February 1 and agreed, in his professional medical judgment, with Dr. Wheatley’s
choice to use the buddy tape. Docket No. 39 at ¶¶ 19, 31. Nothing in the record suggests
that Dr. Tannen was aware that plaintiff’s finger was not properly healing until plaintiff
made an HSR to see Dr. Tannen about the finger. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. And at the appointment
on March 10, Dr. Tannen immediately noticed that the finger was not healing as it should
and made another judgment call to change plaintiff’s course of treatment to a splint. Id. at

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¶ 28. At the follow-up appointment on April 7, plaintiff does not dispute that his finger was
healing properly. Docket No. 50 at ¶ 29. Plaintiff, then, fails to demonstrate that
defendants Dr. Wheatley, Dr. Tannen, and Nurse Banda acted with deliberate
indifference, and so I grant summary judgment in the favor of defendants.
4. Eighth Amendment Claim for Deliberate Indifference Because Policy
Prevented Treatment of Medical Needs
Plaintiff also claims that defendants Litscher, Greer, Holzacher, and Muse were
deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs when they co-created a policy
that prevented plaintiff from receiving adequate medical treatment for his injured finger.
To hold policy makers liable for a constitutional violation, plaintiff must demonstrate that
enforcing the policy “causes a constitutional deprivation.” Childress v. Walker, 787 F. 3d
433, 440 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F. 3d 1000, 1013 (7th Cir.
2000)). Plaintiff is arguing that the policy banning metal splints from restricted housing
units caused defendants to be deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.
The parties dispute whether such a policy even exists. Considering the facts in a
light most favorable to plaintiff, there is a policy that restricts the use of metal objects in
restricted housing units. However, this policy did not cause plaintiff a constitutional
deprivation. As discussed above, I find that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that
plaintiff’s treatment—specifically opting for buddy tape over a metal splint—was
reasonable and within the acceptable professional standards or practices. Defendants’
refusal to provide a metal splint pursuant to policy does not deprive plaintiff of his Eighth
Amendment rights and summary judgment in favor of defendants on this claim is
appropriate.
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5. Eighth Amendment Claim for Deliberate Indifference to Inmate’s
Safety
Plaintiff claims that defendant Sabel violated his Eighth Amendment rights
because housing him next to inmate Zollicoffer was deliberately indifferent to his safety.
Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted because plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies regarding this claim. Docket No. 39 at ¶¶ 50-51.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Housing
situations fall under the definition of prison conditions. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.
516, 532 (2002) (holding that “the PRLA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate
suits about prison life.”) Under the PRLA, a district court must dismiss suits filed by
prisoners if the prisoner has yet to exhaust his administrative remedies because “the
district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on the merits . . . .” Perez v. Wisc. Dept.
of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 1999).
Here, neither party disputes that with regards to plaintiff’s claim against defendant
Sabel for the housing assignment, plaintiff failed to file a complaint pursuant to ICRS.
Docket No. 39 at ¶ 50; Docket No. 50 at ¶ 50. Thus, I will grant the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on the claim against defendant Sabel on exhaustion grounds.

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C. Summary
I grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. A reasonable
trier of fact could not conclude that defendants Paluch and Johnson were deliberately
indifferent and failed to protect plaintiff during the January 30, 2017 altercation because
the evidence demonstrates they were not aware of the threat, and they intervened
immediately. Nor could a reasonable fact finder conclude that defendants Dr. Wheatley,
Dr. Tannan, and Nurse Banda were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs
because plaintiff fails to raise a question of material fact that the treatment plaintiff
received was not reasonable and not within acceptable medical standards. A
reasonable trier of fact then also could not conclude that defendants Litscher, Greer,
Holzacher, and Muse co-created a policy that caused defendants to be deliberately
indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Finally, there is no factual dispute as to
whether plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies as to his claim against
defendant Sabel, so I grant summary judgment for that claim on exhaustion grounds.
ORDER
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to impose sanctions (Docket
No. 59) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Docket
No. 32) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(Docket No. 37) is GRANTED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court will
enter judgment accordingly.
This order and the judgment to follow are final. A dissatisfied party may appeal this
court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by filing in this court a
notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 3, 4. This court may extend this deadline if a party timely requests an extension
and shows good cause or excusable neglect for not being able to meet the 30-day
deadline. See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A).
Under certain circumstances, a party may ask this court to alter or amend its
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or ask for relief from judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Any motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) must be filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment. The court cannot
extend this deadline. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2). Any motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) must be filed within a reasonable time, generally
no more than one year after the entry of the judgment. The court cannot extend this
deadline. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2).
A party is expected to closely review all applicable rules and determine, what, if
any, further action is appropriate in a case.
Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 15th day of November, 2018.

s/Lynn Adelman______________
LYNN ADELMAN
United States District Judge

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