Morisse v. Carter et al

Filing 6

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 10/17/2017: GRANTING 2 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed Without Prepayment of the Filing Fee; DISMISSING CASE AS FRIVOLOUS pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2)(B); and CERTIFYING that any appeal from this matter would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) unless Plaintiff offers bona fide arguments supporting his appeal. (cc: all counsel, via mail to William R. Morisse)(jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
WILLIAM R. MORISSE,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 17-CV-1359-JPS

PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER,
PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN,
PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON,
PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, SR.,
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH,
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, and
MILWAUKEE OUTLAWS,

ORDER

Defendants.
Plaintiff William R. Morisse (“Morisse”), proceeding pro se, filed a
complaint in this matter and a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
(Docket #2). In order to allow a plaintiff to proceed without paying the filing
fee, the Court must first decide whether the plaintiff has the ability to pay
the filing fee and, if not, whether the lawsuit is frivolous. 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(a), (e)(2)(B)(I).
On the first question, Plaintiff avers that he is unmarried and has no
dependents. (Docket #2 at 1). He appears to earn $1,350 per month in Social
Security supplemental income. Id. at 2. He claims his expenses include
$1,350 per month in rent and $15 in other household expenses. Id. at 2–3.
While Plaintiff’s motion is somewhat incoherent, because it appears that his
expenses exceed his income, and because the case must be dismissed on
other grounds in any event, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated
that he cannot pay the $350 filing fee and $50 administrative fee.

However, notwithstanding any filing fee, the Court must dismiss a
complaint or portion thereof if it has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31
(1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Hutchinson ex rel. Baker
v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997). The Court may dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or
where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system,
a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It is not
necessary to plead specific facts; rather, the plaintiff’s statement need only
“give the defendant fair notice of what the…claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, a complaint that offers
“labels and conclusions” or “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To state a claim, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on its face.” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint allegations “must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(citation omitted).
Page 2 of 5

Plaintiff’s 40-page complaint is, put generously, hard to parse.
Realistically, it is no more than a series of incoherent, paranoid, fantastical
ramblings. Much of the complaint consists of Plaintiff copying down
irrelevant federal and local rules. See, e.g., (Docket #1 at 6–11). On substance,
Plaintiff’s range of topics varies wildly from one sentence to the next. In one
instance, he appears to claim that he was raped by a woman—who appears
to be his ex-wife—thirty-four years ago, which he asserts was a violation of
his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 16. The next paragraph
alleges that Plaintiff was harassed and threatened by the Outlaws biker
gang five years ago. Id. at 16–17. Later on, he claims that former President
Barack Obama would not allow him to declare bankruptcy despite his
mounting debts. Id. at 17.
He then returns to the matter of his ex-wife, whom he alleges would
turn invisible and “hold a battery up to my nose,” making him ill. Id. at 17–
19. Indeed, he claims to have so many deleterious health conditions that, as
one item of relief, he requests that he be given a new, 21-year-old human
body to inhabit. Id. at 2, 19. Plaintiff next contends that the Outlaws gang
and the other Defendants—all former Presidents of the United States—have
stolen his identity and burglarized his apartment. Id. at 23–24. He appears
especially angry with President Obama, whom he claims not only
prevented him from declaring bankruptcy but also “took the top of my
skull off and imparted a prob[e] reader,” which would transmit a signal to
some unidentified person for an unknown reason. Id. at 31.
The Court need not catalog the remainder of the complaint’s
allegations. This snapshot suffices to show that it is unintelligible. Courts
may dismiss claims based on allegations that are “obviously and knowingly
false.” Gladney v. Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir. 2002);
Page 3 of 5

Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2007). Moreover, a suit may
be dismissed “because the facts alleged are so. . .unbelievable, even though
there has been no evidentiary hearing to determine their truth or falsity.”
Gladney, 302 F.3d at 774. “[N]o evidentiary hearing is required in a
prisoner’s case (or anyone else’s, for that matter) when the factual
allegations are incredible.” Id. Plaintiff’s allegations are undoubtedly
fantastic, delusional, and indecipherable. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33.
Consequently, this case may not proceed. Gladney, 302 F.3d at 775 (“[A]
frivolous suit does not engage the jurisdiction of the district court.”).
Moreover, this is not Plaintiff’s first foray into such deliria. He has
made nearly identical claims in two prior cases in this Court, and each case
was summarily dismissed. See Morisse v. Obama, 15-CV-1427-LA (E.D.
Wis.); Morisse v. Clinton, 16-CV-87-JPS (E.D. Wis.). In a case involving an
inmate’s paranoid fears of a prison-wide conspiracy to murder him, the
Seventh Circuit held that a district court was “entitled to draw upon its
familiarity with [the litigant’s] prior meritless litigation (again describing
sprawling conspiracies) to conclude that his complaint consisted only of
‘claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which
federal district judges are all too familiar.’” Walton v. Walker, 364 F. App’x
256, 257 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989)).
So too, here, it should come as no surprise to Plaintiff that his preposterous
claims about invisible people and Presidents breaking and entering his
home should be rejected yet again.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (Docket #2) be and the same is hereby GRANTED;

Page 4 of 5

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same is
hereby DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous; and
THE COURT FURTHER CERTIFIES that any appeal from this
matter would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
unless Plaintiff offers bona fide arguments supporting his appeal.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 17th day of October, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

____________________________________
J. P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

Page 5 of 5