Hasan v. Cree Inc

Filing 41

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 10/9/2018: GRANTING 21 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and DISMISSING CASE with prejudice. See Order. (cc: all counsel) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
TALIAH J. HASAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 17-CV-1433-JPS

CREE, INC.,
Defendant.

1.

INTRODUCTION
This litigation arises from the temporary employment of the

plaintiff, Taliah J. Hasan (“Hasan”), with the defendant, Cree, Inc. (“Cree”),
in 2015. Hasan contends that Cree terminated her temporary assignment in
violation of the discrimination and retaliation provisions of Title VII and in
violation of Wisconsin common law. Cree moved for summary judgment,
and that motion is now fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. (Docket #21).
For the reasons explained below, Cree’s motion will be granted and this
case will be dismissed.
2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states that the “court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016).
“Material facts” are those facts which “might affect the outcome of the suit,”
and “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is

‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). Thus, to demonstrate a genuine dispute about a material
fact, a party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Rather, the non-moving party “must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The Court construes
all facts and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 815 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir.
2016). In assessing the parties’ proposed facts, the Court must not weigh the
evidence or determine witness credibility; the Seventh Circuit instructs that
“we leave those tasks to factfinders.” Berry v. Chicago Transit Auth., 618 F.3d
688, 691 (7th Cir. 2010).
3.

RELEVANT FACTS
Consistent with the standard of review, the following facts are taken

from the evidence when viewed in a light most favorable to Hasan.
Cree is a worldwide manufacturer of lighting-class LEDs, lighting
products, and products for power and radio frequency applications. Its
many national and international facilities include a manufacturing plant in
Racine, Wisconsin. Cree has used the services of various staffing agencies
to help fill temporary positions when necessary. In 2015 at the Racine
facility, this included the staffing agency Goodwill TalentBridge
(“TalentBridge”). Upon receiving a request from Cree for an employee
placement, TalentBridge would identify a suitable candidate and offer that
person an assignment at Cree.

Page 2 of 19

Hasan applied for, was offered, and accepted employment with
TalentBridge in August 2015. In the late summer of that year, Cree sought
assistance from TalentBridge to temporarily assist its human resources
department with administrative tasks. TalentBridge identified Hasan as a
suitable candidate to fill the assignment. Cree’s recruiting specialist, Nina
Grimsic (“Grimsic”), reviewed Hasan’s credentials, interviewed her, and
requested that TalentBridge extend an offer. Hasan accepted and began her
temporary assignment at Cree on September 1, 2015. Hasan received
direction at Cree from Renee Solano (“Solano”), a human resources
manager.
3.1

Hasan’s Violations of the Attendance Rules

At the start of her employment with TalentBridge, Hasan signed an
acknowledgement form stating that she agreed to comply with
TalentBridge’s policies and procedures as laid out in the company’s
handbook, which included an expectation that employees be at their work
stations before the start of the shift and to be at work when scheduled. She
was informed in the handbook that excessive tardiness and absenteeism
would result in corrective action up to and including termination. Hasan
was instructed by Elizabeth Villalobos, TalentBridge’s supervisor of talent
acquisition, that if Hasan was going to be late to or absent from work, she
should call TalentBridge’s attendance phone line. In addition, Cree
required Hasan to complete weekly time sheets and submit them to Kiah
Ballard-Miles (“Ballard-Miles”), a human resources associate at Cree, who
then provided the time sheets to TalentBridge. On or around October 22,
2015, Cree modified its attendance policy as to certain employees, including
Hasan, such that employment would be terminated upon the sixth

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occurrence of a late arrival to work, early departure from work, or missed
day without supervisor approval.1
Hasan’s work schedule at Cree was Monday through Friday, with a
report time of no later than 9:30 a.m. each day. Her attendance during her
tenure at Cree was problematic. On September 28, 2015, she called in to
report that she would be absent due to car trouble. The next day, she called
in to report that she would miss nearly half of the work day while waiting
to have her car repaired. On October 19, 2015, Hasan was thirty minutes
late for her assigned shift. On that day, Grimsic emailed Moran and
Villalobos to inform them that Hasan was tardy and that Grimsic planned
to speak with Hasan regarding her attendance. That same day, Moran also
counseled Hasan about Cree’s attendance policy and advised Hasan that
she had accumulated two violations.2 On October 21, 2015, just two days

The parties disagree as to whether the modification also relieved Hasan of
her obligation to notify TalentBridge, in addition to Ballard-Miles, if she was going
to be tardy to or absent from work. See, e.g., (Docket #34 at 5). This dispute is not
material to the resolution of Hasan’s claims. Her termination was premised on
missed days at, and late arrivals to, her job at Cree, not on having failed to notify
the appropriate person of her tardiness and absenteeism. Further, there is no
evidence that notifying someone at either TalentBridge or Cree of an unapproved
late arrival to work would have excused the tardiness.
1

Hasan claims not to recall being counseled at that time, but TalentBridge’s
records confirm the counseling took place. See (Docket #34 at 18). Hasan also
generally claims not to recall ever being disciplined for attendance issues. Id.
However, she does not dispute that she was indeed absent or tardy on the
occasions Cree says she was. Hasan also implies that she had permission from
Solano to be late to work, but the evidence she cites does not support that
proposition. Specifically, Solano testified in her deposition that Hasan sometimes
arrived early to work when the department was busy with a big project, and that
this was permissible. (Docket #32-4 at 11). There is no evidence to suggest that
because Hasan was permitted to arrive early on some days, she was excused from
arriving late on other days.
2

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later, Hasan was late for a mandatory teambuilding meeting. Hasan was
late again for shifts on October 27, November 30, and December 1, 2015.
On December 14, 2015, Hasan was late a final time. She sent a text
message to Ballard-Miles at 8:30 a.m. explaining that she would be late.3 At
9:44 a.m. that day, Grimsic emailed TalentBridge to inquire whether Hasan
had called in to notify TalentBridge that she would be late or absent.
Villalobos responded by phone, saying they had not received a call-in from
Hasan. An hour and half passed with Hasan still not reporting for work.
Grimsic and Solano conferred and decided to terminate Hasan’s temporary
assignment due to Hasan’s violations of the attendance rules. To that end,
Grimsic sent an email to Villalobos requesting that TalentBridge end
Hasan’s assignment. When Hasan finally arrived to work, security
personnel asked for her badge and notified Solano, who then met Hasan in
the lobby with Hasan’s personal belongings. Solano told Hasan that Cree
had terminated her assignment because she was a no-call, no-show.4

Cree believes Hasan sent the text at 9:30 a.m. but admits for the purposes
of summary judgment that Hasan claims to have sent the text message at 9:30 a.m.
eastern standard time, which is 8:30 a.m. in the time zone where Cree is located.
(Docket #34 at 35). In any event, there is no evidence to suggest that texting
Ballard-Miles an hour before she was supposed to start her shift excused her tardy
arrival.
3

Hasan claims that Cree forgave some of her attendance violations but does
not present evidence confirming how many such violations were excused. See
(Docket #35 at 4). Solano testified that Cree forgave violations that Hasan had
accumulated prior to Cree establishing Hasan’s 9:30 a.m. start time in September
2015. (Docket #32-4 at 22). Regardless of any forgiven violations, Hasan agrees that
she was late or absent six times beginning in October 2015. Further, even if Hasan
had technically not accumulated enough attendance violations to warrant
termination under Cree’s policy, Hasan has not presented evidence to suggest that
those at Cree who decided to terminate her thought or knew that she was still
within the number of violations allowed before termination; it is their motive for
termination that is at issue.
4

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3.2

The Documentation Project

Several other events that took place during Hasan’s tenure at Cree
are relevant to this lawsuit. The first is a disagreement between Hasan and
her employer regarding a task she was assigned in mid-October 2015.
Hasan was instructed to perform an administrative task of correcting
certain personnel files that were missing pages. The files were associated
with certain employees who Cree had retained from Ruud Lighting
(“Ruud”) when Cree bought Ruud in 2011. Those individuals had signed a
confidentiality agreement upon their hire with Cree, and upon receiving
the executed agreements, Cree’s then-senior recruiter Lisa Fiorita (“Fiorita
“) had placed the signed signature pages, but not the preceding pages of
the agreement, into the employees’ personnel files.
Cree later learned of this problem, and to correct it, Solano instructed
Hasan to make a copy of the first four pages of the agreement, attach them
to the signature page for each employee who had received and signed the
agreement, and place the entire agreement in the employee’s personnel file.
Cree had not updated or changed the first four pages of the agreement since
2011, and accordingly the pages of the agreement provided to Hasan for
this project were identical to those provided to the employees who signed
the agreement in 2011.5
Hasan believes the agreement documentation project was “illegal”
because she was being asked to add contract terms to employees’ files

Hasan objects to Cree’s proposed fact that the first four pages of the
agreement were unchanged between 2011 and 2015 but offers no relevant evidence
or argument to create a genuine dispute. See (Docket #34 at 12).
5

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without their knowledge.6 She says that she expressed her concern about
this illegality to Grimsic, but apparently not in writing.7 Although Hasan
communicated by email with Solano several times regarding the
documentation project, she never objected to the assignment in writing or
stated in writing any belief that the assignment was somehow improper,
unethical, or illegal. Hasan did not file a formal complaint with Cree
regarding her concern. She completed the project in late November or early
December 2015.
3.3

Derogatory Comments about Muslims

During the week of December 7, 2015, Cree’s Racine human
resources department participated in an on-site training and team-building
program. On December 8, in conjunction with the program, the human
resources team, including Hasan, Solano, and recruiting specialist Lora
Joyce (“Joyce”), had lunch together.

Hasan now maintains that this belief is based in part on her understanding
from her co-workers that Fiorita had been fired because she handed out the
signature pages, but not the whole contract, to the Ruud employees. (Docket #34
at 13–15). At her deposition, she was asked about this belief, and she responded
that she heard Fiorita was fired for not doing her job, but she “can’t speculate” as
to whether one of Fiorita’s mistakes was simply failing to include three term pages
of the contract in employees’ files (as opposed to failing to show the employees
the term pages). (Docket #32-1 at 50). Cree counters that Hasan had no way of
knowing why Fiorita was fired. (Docket #34 at 13–15). Hasan’s belief that Fiorita
did not show the employees the term pages is premised on hearsay evidence, and
she has no personal knowledge about whether the employees saw the three term
pages of the contracts they signed.
6

Hasan claims that she also told Villalobos about her concern during a
meeting after her termination. (Docket #34 at 16). Cree objects to the evidence
Hasan cites in support of this proposition, but, even taking Hasan’s evidence into
account, the dispute is not material. Alerting Villalobos to a concern about a project
only after being terminated cannot have been the cause of Hasan’s termination.
7

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During the lunch, Solano asked Joyce if she intended to vote for
Donald Trump in the upcoming election, and Joyce responded
affirmatively. In response, Solano said, “But [Donald Trump] wants to send
all Hispanics back to Mexico.” (Docket #34 at 26). Joyce retorted with
something like, “Good, that’s where they belong.” Id. Solano responded by
reminding Joyce that her husband is Hispanic, and Joyce responded that
she knew. The discussion concluded with Solano telling Joyce that she
could not believe Joyce would vote for someone like Donald Trump.
Although Hasan was present during this conversation, she said nothing.
Later on December 8, Solano approached the human resources area
where Hasan, Grimsic, Joyce, and benefits analyst Lauren Nolan (“Nolan”)
were working and asked them for feedback regarding an applicant for a
vacant management position who was Muslim. In response, Joyce stated
that she would not feel comfortable working with a Muslim because she
believed Muslims are violent people. Nolan said she would also not feel
comfortable working with a Muslim, stating that “they do not belong here.”
Id. at 28. Hasan responded to the two women, expressing her displeasure
at the women’s remarks because she is a Muslim. Joyce said she had no idea
Hasan was Muslim, but that even still, she would not feel comfortable
working with the Muslim applicant. Nolan agreed. Hasan then left the
conversation and went back to her desk.
Following that episode, Solano informed Grimsic that she had
located a potential candidate for the vacant position. She asked whether she
could move forward with the application process in light of certain national
origin hiring restrictions to which Cree was subject because of its contract
work with the United States Department of Defense (“USDOD”). Grimsic
contacted Cree’s recruiting manager, Sean Brody (“Brody”), to obtain more
Page 8 of 19

information regarding Cree’s policy for hiring foreign nationals. Brody
informed Grimsic that the limitations only applied to positions that
included work on military or military-related contracts for the USDOD.
Because the applicant Grimsic had identified was not seeking work related
to military contracts, Cree continued to process the application.
On December 11, 2015, Hasan initiated a meeting with Solano to
discuss a matter unrelated to the December 8 discriminatory remarks. The
women discussed Hasan’s question, after which Solano broached the
subject of the racially-charged remarks described above. Solano said that if
Hasan was offended by those comments, Hasan should write a statement
saying as much.8 Hasan declined, stating that she should not have to write
a statement because Solano heard the remarks. Solano explained that a
statement from Hasan would be taken more seriously than only a report
from Solano, because Solano believed that some people at Cree thought
Solano had a vendetta against Joyce. Hasan did not provide a written
statement or complaint to either TalentBridge or Cree regarding the
December 8 comments.
4.

ANALYSIS
On these facts, Hasan brings three claims. First, Hasan claims that

Cree discriminated against her in violation of Title VII by terminating her
assignment on the basis of her religion. Second, Hasan claims that Cree
retaliated against her in violation of Title VII for complaining about the
mistreatment she experienced on the basis of her religion. Third, Hasan

Hasan claims that she understood Solano’s instruction to refer to Joyce,
who made offensive comments about Hispanic and Muslim people, but not any
other employee who made offensive remarks. (Docket #34 at 31). Whether this is
true is not material.
8

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claims that Cree wrongfully terminated her assignment, in violation of
Wisconsin common law, for voicing displeasure about performing the
documentation project that she believed constituted forgery. The Court will
address each claim in turn.
4.1

Count I: Religious Discrimination

Hasan first claims that Cree terminated her because of her religion
and that Cree’s proffered reason for her termination is pretext for
discrimination. Cree contends that it ended Hasan’s assignment because of
Hasan’s repeated attendance violations. Hasan seeks summary judgment
on the grounds that Hasan fails to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under McDonnell Douglas and, in any event, cannot show
that Cree’s reasons for firing her constitute pretext.
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees
on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a); see also Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2007).
In the Seventh Circuit, courts addressing Title VII claims consider all
relevant evidence “as a whole,” without separating “direct” and “indirect”
evidence. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., 834 F.3d 760, 763 (2016). The court asks
“whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude
that the plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor
caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Id. at 765.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ortiz did not, however, alter the
burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766. As a result, courts addressing
discrimination claims are to conduct the McDonnell Douglas analysis if the
parties present arguments “in those terms,” but also assess the plaintiff’s
evidence “cumulatively” to determine “whether it permits a reasonable
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factfinder” to conclude that the challenged employment action was
attributable to a proscribed factor. David v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No.
508, 846 F.3d 216, 224 (7th Cir. 2017).
A prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas
requires a plaintiff to show that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) at
the time of her termination, she was performing reasonably in accordance
with the defendant’s legitimate expectations; (3) despite her reasonable
performance, she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4)
similarly situated employees outside of her protected class received more
favorable treatment. See Andrews v. CBOCS W., Inc., 743 F.3d 230, 234 (7th
Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. If the plaintiff
states a prima facie case, then the defendant “must articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” for the termination, at which point the burden
reverts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s explanation is
pretextual. Id. An inquiry into pretext requires evaluating “the honesty of
the employer’s explanation, rather than its validity or reasonableness.”
O'Leary v. v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2007).
Hasan has failed to present evidence sufficient to satisfy at least two
of the McDonnell Douglas prongs—that she met Cree’s legitimate
expectations and that Cree treated similarly situated employees more
favorably.9 Cree had a legitimate expectation that its employees arrive to

The parties also dispute whether Hasan is a member of a protected class.
Cree argues that Hasan is not actually a practicing Muslim and that her only
connection to the faith is through her father, with whom she has not lived since
she was very young. (Docket #22 at 14–16). Hasan insists she is Muslim and
submits as evidence that she does not eat pork, celebrates Allah, kept her Muslim
last name, owns a Quran and prayer blanket, and uses Muslim greetings with her
father. (Docket #28 at 5). The Court need not opine on the sincerity of Hasan’s
9

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their shifts in a timely fashion and otherwise comply with Cree’s attendance
rules. Hasan does not credibly dispute this. Instead, Hasan argues that
because some of her violations had been forgiven, she had not reached the
threshold number of violations to warrant termination at the time she was
fired. But even accounting for some forgiven violations, the undisputed
evidence demonstrates that Hasan was tardy or absent six times when she
was terminated. Her repeated violation of Cree’s attendance rules
demonstrates that she was not meeting Cree’s legitimate expectations. See
Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff did not
meet employer’s legitimate expectations where, among other things,
plaintiff violated employer’s work attendance guidelines on no fewer than
eight occasions).
Hasan also has not presented evidence that similarly situated
employees outside her protected class were treated more favorably than she
was. She mentions not a single other comparator. Alexander v. Casino Queen,
Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 981 (7th Cir. 2014) (To survive summary judgement under
McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must show that “at least one similarly
situated employee, outside of their protected class, was treated more
favorably than they were.”). Hasan’s only attempt to satisfy this prong of
the McDonnell Douglas test is to argue that Cree has not identified any other
employee who it terminated in the lobby of the building, where Hasan
learned of her termination. This says nothing about whether Cree treated
non-Muslim employees more favorably than it treated Hasan. There is no
evidence in the record that Cree continued the assignments of any worker,

purported religiosity to resolve the pending motion. Hasan’s claims fail for several
other reasons, as described herein.

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regardless of religion, who repeatedly ignored attendance expectations. To
the contrary, Cree presented evidence that it terminated the employment of
79 temporary workers for attendance violations in 2015. (Docket #34 at 41).
Because Hasan has failed to show that she was meeting Cree’s
legitimate expectations and that Cree treated a similarly-situated employee
more favorably, she has failed to establish her prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas. See Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 331 (7th
Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the Court need not proceed to the pretext inquiry.
Id. at 326–27, 331. Hasan’s claim is doomed from the start.
This conclusion holds under the Ortiz holistic approach as well.
Under Ortiz, this Court must assess Hasan’s evidence cumulatively, and
ask whether it would permit a “reasonable factfinder to conclude” that her
religion caused her termination. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. Hasan’s evidence
raises no reasonable inference that improper motives drove Cree’s actions.
She does not credibly undermine Cree’s stated reason for terminating her,
and in fact admits that she was tardy or absent on many occasions. She
points to derogatory remarks made by Joyce and Nolan about Muslims, but
neither of those women were involved in the decision to terminate Hasan’s
employment. The only connection Hasan makes between one of the
decisionmakers—Solano—and her religion is that Solano told the
department she was unsure if Cree would hire a Muslim person for an open
position. Other evidence suggests that this comment was based on Cree’s
restrictions for hiring foreign nationals for certain positions and, in any
event, Hasan has presented no evidence connecting Solano’s alleged bias to
Hasan’s termination. In other words, Hasan has presented no evidence that
any of the decisionmakers involved in her termination acted upon any

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religious animus, and the events surrounding her termination do not show
a discriminatory reason for her firing.
4.2

Count II: Retaliation

Hasan next claims that Cree fired her because she engaged in
protected activity by complaining about her co-workers’ derogatory
remarks about Muslims. In addition to baring an employer’s discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, Title VII also bars
employers from retaliating against employees who engage in protected
activity by exercising their Title VII rights. See Poullard v. McDonald, 829
F.3d 844, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 53 (2006).
Because Ortiz applies to Title VII retaliation claims, see Williams v.
Office of Chief Judge of Cook Cnty., 839 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 2016), and the
parties again frame their arguments in accordance with the method of proof
outlined in McDonnell Douglas, the Court considers the evidence under that
framework before focusing upon the more general inquiry of whether a
reasonable jury could find that Cree terminated Hasan in retaliation for
protected activity. See David, 846 F.3d at 224. Therefore, to establish her
prima facie case, Hasan must demonstrate that (1) she engaged in protected
activity, (2) she suffered a materially adverse employment action, (3) she
was meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations, and (4) she was
treated less favorably than similarly-situated employees who did not
engage in protected activity. Harden v. Marion Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 799 F.3d
857, 862 (7th Cir. 2015).
As explained above, Hasan has failed to provide evidence sufficient
to show that she was meeting Cree’s legitimate expectations and that other

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similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably than she was.
For these reasons, her retaliation claim is also doomed.
Further, it is not clear that Hasan engaged in protected activity. The
evidence demonstrates that, in response to Solano’s inquiry about whether
Hasan found her co-workers’ comments about Muslims offensive, Hasan
responded affirmatively. But Hasan’s conversation with Solano did not
include an allegation that Hasan’s co-workers had discriminated against
her impermissibly. And Hasan declined to file a complaint or grievance. See
Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2006) (Filing an
official complaint with an employer may constitute statutorily protected
activity under Title VII if the complaint indicates that discrimination
occurred because of the complainant’s protected class). Hasan provided no
case law—indeed no citations to any legal authority—to support her
argument that her conversation with Solano amounted to protected
activity. Absent any effort from Hasan to support this element of her claim,
it fails.
Because Hasan has failed to raise a jury question as to three of the
prima facie elements of retaliation, her claim cannot succeed. For the sake of
completeness, the Court also considers the evidence holistically, pursuant
to Ortiz, to determine if a jury could reasonably find that Cree terminated
Hasan in retaliation for protected activity. For all of the reasons stated
above, and for the additional reason that Hasan has not presented causation
evidence connecting her complaint to her termination, see Carlson v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 828 (7th Cir. 2014), no reasonable jury could
decide in Hasan’s favor.

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4.3

Count III: Wrongful Discharge

Finally, Hasan claims that Cree terminated her employment in
violation of Wisconsin common law. Under the doctrine of employment-atwill, which has been adopted in Wisconsin, an employer may discharge an
at-will employee “for good cause, for no cause and even for cause morally
wrong” without liability. Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 217,
223–24 (Wis. 1998). In Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, however, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a “narrow” public policy exception to
this rule, holding that “an employee has a cause of action for wrongful
discharge when the discharge is contrary to a fundamental and welldefined public policy as evidenced by existing law.” 335 N.W.2d 834, 840
(Wis. 1983).
To state a claim for wrongful discharge under Brockmeyer, the
plaintiff “must identify a constitutional, statutory, or administrative
provision that clearly articulates a fundamental and well-defined public
policy.” Bammert v. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Wis. 2002).
If she identifies a public policy sufficient to trigger the exception, and
further demonstrates that her termination violated that public policy, the
burden shifts to the employer to show “just cause” for the termination. Id.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court “caution[s] against interpreting the public
policy exception too broadly.” Id.
Hasan contends that her termination violated the public policy
embodied in the Wisconsin statute forbidding forgery. That statute
provides, in relevant part:
(1) Whoever with intent to defraud falsely makes or alters
a writing or object of any of the following kinds so that
it purports to have been made by another, or at another
time, or with different provisions, or by authority of
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one who did not give such authority, is guilty of a Class
H felony:
(a) A writing or object whereby legal rights or
obligations are created, terminated or
transferred, or any writing commonly relied
upon in business or commercial transactions as
evidence of debt or property rights[.]
Wis. Stat. § 943.38(1)(a) (Forgery).
Cree seeks summary judgment on this claim for several reasons.
First, Cree contends that temporary workers like Hasan are not entitled to
the protections of the public policy exception to Wisconsin’s employmentat-will doctrine. Cree also contends that an employee can invoke the public
policy exception only if she refuses to engage in illegal conduct at the
employer’s direction, and Hasan never refused a project assigned to her.
The Court need not wade into these more nuanced questions of Wisconsin
common law because Hasan’s claim fails for two other more obvious
reasons.
First, as Cree points out, Hasan has not presented sufficient evidence
to demonstrate that Cree asked her to forge anything. Hasan believes that
the documentation project involved forgery because she was asked to place
four pages of an agreement into employees’ files that contained only
signature pages. But apart from Hasan’s uncorroborated suspicion, there is
no evidence in the record before the Court to suggest that the employees
who executed the signature pages did not see and agree to the terms of the
agreement included on the missing four pages. Hasan concedes, for
example, that the agreements were executed years before she began her
employment at Cree, and therefore she has no firsthand knowledge of the
terms to which the employees agreed. She also did not reach out to any of

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those employees to confirm her suspicion, either at the time or in
preparation for this litigation. Her suspicion about the documentation
project is not enough to survive summary judgment. See Brockmeyer v. Dun
& Bradstreet, 325 N.W.2d 70, 73 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 335 N.W.2d 834
(Wis. 1983) (“A wrongful discharge claim cannot be based on such
speculation”).
Second, Cree had just cause for terminating Hasan. As explained at
length above, Hasan did not meet Cree’s legitimate attendance
expectations, and she was terminated for her attendance violations on a day
when she arrived to work several hours late. The evidence presented to the
Court on summary judgment amply demonstrates this was the reason for
Hasan’s termination. No evidence ties Hasan’s concern about forgery to her
termination.
For these reasons, Hasan’s wrongful discharge claim fails.
5.

CONCLUSION
Hasan has not raised a triable issue as to any of her claims. Instead,

on the record before the Court and under the controlling law, Cree is
entitled to summary judgment in its favor on all claims. Therefore, Cree’s
motion for summary judgment will be granted and this case will be
dismissed in its entirety.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Cree, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment
(Docket #21) be and the same is hereby GRANTED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case be and the same is hereby
DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

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Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 9th day of October, 2018.
BY THE COURT:

_____________________________
J. P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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