Ward v. Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee

Filing 4

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 12/21/2017 GRANTING 1 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed Without Prepayment of the Filing Fee. (cc: all counsel) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
CHRISTINE WARD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 17-CV-1575-JPS

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY
OF MILWAUKEE,

ORDER

Defendant.
On November 13, 2017, the plaintiff, Christine Ward (“Ward”), filed
a complaint challenging a policy of the Housing Authority of the City of
Milwaukee (the “Housing Authority”) to summarily reject all applicants for
public housing who have unpaid post-eviction money judgments pending
against them. (Docket #2 at 1). This matter comes before the Court on the
plaintiff’s petition to proceed in forma pauperis. (Docket #1).
In order to allow a plaintiff to proceed without paying the filing fee,
the Court must first decide whether the plaintiff has the ability to pay the
filing fee and, if not, whether the lawsuit is frivolous. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a),
(e)(2)(B)(I). On the first question, Ward avers in her motion that she is
unemployed, unmarried, and has no assets. (Docket #1 at 1, 3-4). Her only
income is social security payments, which total $9,600 annually (or $800 per
month). Id. at 2. Ward’s monthly expenses, detailed in her motion, total
$862. Id. at 2-3. On these averments, the Court finds that Ward has
demonstrated that she cannot pay the filing fee.
However, notwithstanding any filing fee, the Court must dismiss a
complaint or portion thereof if it has raised claims that are legally “frivolous

or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a cognizable claim under the federal
notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead specific facts and his
statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the…claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007). However, a complaint that offers “labels and conclusions”
or “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state a claim, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on its
face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
According to Ward’s complaint, she is an elderly black woman living
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In 2005, she was evicted and judgment was
entered against her in the amount of $540.98. (Docket #2 at 2). In 2016, Ward
applied for public housing through the Housing Authority. Id. On June 7,
2016, the Housing Authority informed Ward that her application would be
withdrawn unless she provided proof that she had satisfied the 2005 posteviction judgment. Id. Because of her low income, Ward had not paid the
judgment. Id.
Ward presumed that her application for public housing had been
withdrawn and, therefore, denied. Id. at 3. She requested an informal
hearing with the Housing Authority, but the Housing Authority declined
to provide one, instead instructing Ward to reapply. Id. Ward reapplied.
The Housing Authority again sent notice indicating that in order to
complete her application, Ward was required to provide proof that she
Page 2 of 4

satisfied the 2005 judgment. Id. Ward did not provide such proof. Id. The
Housing Authority did not offer Ward public housing, a place on a waiting
list, or an informal hearing. Id. Instead, the Housing Authority instructed
Ward to again reapply because her application expired without all required
verification. Id.
Based on these facts, Ward brings claims under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”),
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31. Id. at 3-7.
For her due process claim, Ward contends that applicants for public
housing have a right to an individualized determination of eligibility, and
that if the Housing Authority denies an application, the agency must
provide the applicant with an opportunity to attend an informal hearing.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(c)(3) and 24 C.F.R. § 960.208). Ward claims that
by withdrawing her application based only on her failure to prove she had
satisfied an outstanding post-eviction judgment, the Housing Authority
denied Ward her “due process rights to have her application fully and fairly
considered, an individualized determination of her suitability for public
housing, and an informal hearing.” Id. at 4.
For her FHA claim, Ward contends that the Housing Authority’s
policy regarding applicants with outstanding post-eviction judgments has
a discriminatory impact on “protected classes” of people, including black
people, women, and people with children. Id. at 4-7. Under the FHA, it is
unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or
to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a); see also Texas Dep't of
Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
Page 3 of 4

2525 (2015) (holding that “disparate-impact” claims are cognizable under
the FHA). “[A] plaintiff bringing a disparate-impact claim challenges
practices that have a ‘disproportionately adverse effect on minorities’ and
are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale.” Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2513 (citation omitted).
Ward’s allegations, drafted with the aid of counsel, are detailed,
describing the timeline of relevant events and connecting those facts to her
claims. Given the exceedingly lenient standard of review applied at
screening, the Court finds that Ward’s claims are not frivolous. As a result,
the Court will grant Ward leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Finally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3) provides that the
Court must order service by the U.S. Marshal, or a person specially
appointed by the court, if the plaintiff is authorized, as she is in this case, to
proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Williams v. Werlinger,
795 F.3d 759, 760 (7th Cir. 2015). Because Ward is represented by counsel,
the Court will withhold ordering service at this time. If, after consulting
with counsel, Ward wishes that service be effected by the U.S. Marshal, she
may move the Court for an appropriate order.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (Docket #1) be and the same is hereby GRANTED.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 21st day of December, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

Page 4 of 4