Winzer v. Sauvey et al
Filing
29
ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 12/15/18 granting 17 Motion for Summary Judgment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants John Doe and Dawn Atkinson are DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. (cc: all counsel, plaintiff) (jad)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________
BRANDON WINZER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 17-C-1697
MARY SAUVEY, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Brandon Winzer, a Wisconsin state prisoner who is representing himself,
filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I allowed him to proceed on a deliberateindifference claim against the defendants based on his allegations that, over the course
of eight years, they failed to address his complaints of stomach pain, which were caused
by a stomach tumor. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which I
address in this order. 1
I. BACKGROUND 2
The plaintiff is an inmate at Oshkosh Correctional Institution. Docket No. 19 at ¶
1. Defendants Dr. Mary Sauvey and Dr. Philip Wheatley were physicians at Oshkosh. Id.
at ¶ 2-3. According to the plaintiff, defendants Jon Litscher, James Greer, Dr. Ryan
Holzmacher, and Mary Muse were all “policy makers” who were responsible for creating
1
In my screening order, I allowed the plaintiff to proceed on a deliberate-indifference
claim against a John Doe defendant. The plaintiff never identified the Doe; therefore, I will
dismiss the Doe based on the plaintiff’s failure to diligently pursue his claim against him.
2
The facts are taken from “Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact”
(Docket No. 25), and Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact”
(Docket No. 28). The facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
policies that support the administration of adequate medical treatment to prisoners.
Docket No. 1 at 15; Docket No. 28 at ¶¶ 13-16, 24.
The plaintiff was transferred to Oshkosh on March 17, 2012. Docket No. 25 at ¶
14. Shortly after his transfer, Dr. Sauvey performed a chart review limited to the plaintiff’s
complaints of stomach pain. Id. at ¶ 17. She noted that, despite chronic, non-localized
pain, the plaintiff’s weight was stable. Id. From this, she concluded that his pain was
unlikely to be caused by a malignancy. Id. She also reviewed the radiologist’s report on
an x-ray that had been taken a couple days before his transfer. Id. at ¶ 18. The x-ray
showed no masses, calcification, or obstruction, leading the radiologist to conclude that
the results were unremarkable. Id. Based on her review of the records, Dr. Sauvey
ordered an ultrasound to determine the source of the plaintiff’s pain. Id. at ¶ 19.
The ultrasound occurred on April 23, 2012; Dr. Sauvey reviewed the report about
a week later. Id. at ¶ 20. The report indicated that the ultrasound was normal. Id. Given
the normal x-ray and ultrasound reports, the plaintiff’s history of intermittent pain, the
absence of weight loss, and prior normal exams, Dr. Sauvey concluded that the plaintiff’s
medical condition was not urgent. Id.
The plaintiff was examined by a nurse on June 7, 2012. Id. at ¶ 22. Dr. Sauvey
examined the plaintiff for the first time on August 10, 2012. Id. Dr. Sauvey explains that
she is not responsible for scheduling patients; scheduling is done by the Health Services
staff. Id. at ¶ 21. Dr. Sauvey never refused to see or treat the plaintiff. Id. After hearing
the plaintiff’s complaints, she treated him for a possible kidney stone. Id. at ¶ 22. She
noted that, while he complained of a lot of pain, his weight was unchanged, his chest was
clear, and his stomach was minimally tender. Id. at ¶ 23. She again concluded that his
2
condition was not urgent. Id. At this time, her working diagnoses included kidney stones
or inflammation of the appendix. Id. at ¶ 24. Accordingly, she ordered a test that could
detect blood in the plaintiff’s stool (which can occur with an inflamed appendix) and an
ultrasound to image his urinary system, colon, and appendix. Id.
The ultrasound occurred a couple of weeks later, and she reviewed the report the
next day. Id. at ¶ 25. The report was unremarkable. Id. A couple of weeks after the
ultrasound, on September 7, 2012, Dr. Sauvey saw the plaintiff again. Id. at ¶ 26.
Following her examination, she diagnosed kidney stones or chronic appendicitis. Id. at ¶
28. That same day, she submitted a request for a CT scan (which is performed off-site)
of the plaintiff’s stomach. Id. at ¶ 29.
Dr. Sauvey met with the plaintiff a week later, on September 14, 2012. Id. at ¶ 31.
She noted that the labs taken to date were normal and the plaintiff was not losing weight.
Id. The results of a test taken the day before supported a diagnosis of appendicitis, but
not kidney stones. Id. at ¶ 32. She made a plan to schedule the CT scan, which had been
approved. Id. at ¶ 34. She also ordered he be provided pain medication. Id.
The CT scan occurred on October 11, 2012, at Mercy Medical Center. Id. at ¶ 35.
The radiologist reported that the stomach and duodenum were negative, concluding, “No
significant abnormality identified.” Id. at ¶ 36. Dr. Sauvey did not have access to the CT
scan images; all imaging is done off-site. Id. at ¶ 37. Dr. Sauvey explains that the images
would not have been useful to her because she does not have the specialized training
required to read and interpret CT scans. Id. Accordingly, she relied on the radiologist’s
report. Id. Dr. Sauvey asserts that she had no reason to doubt the radiologist’s opinion
that the CT images showed no significant abnormalities. Id. at ¶ 39.
3
Based on the radiologist’s report, Dr. Sauvey ruled out kidney stones, abdominal
masses, and his appendix as the source of his pain. Id. at ¶ 40. Dr. Sauvey was unable
to give the plaintiff a diagnosis based on the test results, which were unremarkable, but
she did prescribe medication for his pain. Id.
Over the next several months, the plaintiff continued to complain of pain, and Dr.
Sauvey continued to order tests. Id. at ¶ 41. She next saw him in March 2013. Id. at ¶ 42.
She reviewed all of his previous tests and imaging, noting that they were all normal and
provided no clues about the source of his pain. Id. She decided to draw a celiac panel
and request approval for a colonoscopy. Id. at ¶ 44. The colonoscopy was approved on
March 19, 2013, the same day Dr. Sauvey requested it. Id. at ¶ 45. The colonoscopy
occurred about a month later. Id. at ¶ 47. The results revealed a polyp, which was later
determined to be benign, and therefore not the source of the plaintiff’s pain. Id. at ¶ 48.
Dr. Sauvey met with the plaintiff on June 11, 2013, to discuss the results of the
colonoscopy. Id. at ¶ 49. The plaintiff reported that the pain was better. Id. She made a
plan to recheck and proceed from there. Id. This was the last involvement Dr. Sauvey had
in the plaintiff’s care; she began to work at Green Bay Correctional Institution in October
2013, and she did not interact with the plaintiff again. Id. at ¶ 50. During the fifteen months
she treated the plaintiff, she interacted with the plaintiff’s case twenty times, including
seeing him and ordering/reviewing test results. Id. at ¶ 55.
Dr. Wheatly first examined the plaintiff for complaints of stomach pain and
cramping on November 10, 2014. 3 Id. at ¶ 56. He noted the plaintiff’s long history of pain
3
I allowed the plaintiff to proceed on a claim against Dr. Dawn Atkinson, who was a
contract employee employed by Maxim Healthcare Services. See Docket No. 10. She
apparently treated the plaintiff after Dr. Sauvey left Oshkosh, although the extent of her
4
complaints and numerous tests that were all negative. Id. The plaintiff told Dr. Wheatley
that his prescription of Dicyclomine, which a nurse practitioner had prescribed for possible
irritable bowel syndrome (IBS), provided only about an hour of relief. Id. Dr. Wheatley
assessed the plaintiff with probable IBS. Id. at ¶ 57. He increased the plaintiff’s
Dicyclomine prescription; however, because the plaintiff was already experiencing some
negative side effects, he made a note to consider a trial of Linzess if his IBS did not
improve. Id. at ¶ 58. Linzess is a newer medication that is used to treat IBS with chronic
constipation. Id. Dr. Wheatley also ordered stool and blood tests and set a follow-up
appointment for one month later. Id. at ¶ 59.
Dr. Wheatley next saw the plaintiff on December 15, 2014. Id. at ¶ 60. The plaintiff
said he experienced minor side effects with the medication, but his bowel movements
were regular. Id. Dr. Wheatley maintained his probable IBS diagnosis, but he noted that
a negative result on one of the tests he had ordered decreased the possibility of IBS being
the cause of the plaintiff’s stomach pain. Id. Dr. Wheatley decided to check the urinalysis
and follow up in six weeks. Id.
On January 26, 2015, Dr. Wheatley again saw the plaintiff. The plaintiff was still
experiencing stomach cramps; however, his suspected IBS was stable, so Dr. Wheatley
involvement is unclear. See Docket No. 28 at ¶¶ 12, 28. The Wisconsin Department of
Justice declined to accept service on her behalf because she was not a Department of
Corrections employee. Docket No. 10. She was not served with the plaintiff’s complaint.
I will dismiss her as a defendant for two reasons. First, the plaintiff did not diligently pursue
his claims against her. Second, the plaintiff’s only allegation against her is that she
diagnosed the plaintiff with irritable bowel syndrome in May 2014. Docket No. 28 at ¶ 28.
Accordingly, her treatment of the plaintiff appears to have been very limited, and, because
the undisputed evidence shows that the 2012 CT scan report did not mention the tumor,
the plaintiff’s claim against her would fail for the same reasons his claims against Drs.
Sauvey and Wheatley fail.
5
maintained the Dicyclomine prescription. Id. at ¶ 61. Dr. Wheatley next saw the plaintiff
on March 10, 2015. Id. at ¶ 62. It did not appear that the plaintiff’s condition had changed,
so Dr. Wheatley maintained his diagnosis of probable IBS. Id. He also made a plan to
order an ultrasound, take a blood test, and follow up in one to two weeks after the blood
test. Id.
The ultrasound of the plaintiff’s upper abdomen was done on March 23, 2015. Id.
at ¶ 63. The scan showed a small cyst on the plaintiff’s liver, which was of no clinical
significance; the scan was unremarkable otherwise. Id. No tumor was seen in the area.
Id. About a week later, after the plaintiff continued to complain of pain, Dr. Wheatley made
a plan to check his Hgb to evaluate for anemia. Id. at ¶ 64.
Dr. Wheatley next met with the plaintiff on July 4, 2015. Id. at ¶ 65. He noted that
the plaintiff’s symptoms seemed to be worsening: The medication was not helping, the
pain was often random, he was occasionally constipated, and he occasionally had
diarrhea. Id. Dr. Wheatley considered the possibility of Crohn’s Disease, which can cause
abdominal pain. Id. at ¶ 67. He submitted a request for an upper GI x-ray, which was
approved. Id. at ¶ 68.
The x-ray was completed on August 4, 2015. Id. at ¶ 69. The x-ray evaluated the
lining of the stomach, which (unknown at that time) is where the plaintiff’s tumor was
located; however, the report stated that “no mass or ulceration” was seen in the stomach.
Id. The plaintiff asserts that this report was edited by Dr. Wheatley, although he does not
explain why he believes Dr. Wheatley is the one who edited it, nor does he explain in
what way the report was edited. Id. Dr. Wheatley explains that he received only the report
of the x-ray reading, not the actual x-ray. Id. at ¶ 70. He explains that, had the report
6
mentioned an abnormality in the stomach, he would have pursued additional evaluation;
however, the report was of a normal stomach with no masses, so he did not recommend
further testing. Id.
Dr. Wheatley met with the plaintiff on September 4, 2015, and again on December
22, 2015. Id. at ¶¶ 71-72. The plaintiff continued to complain of stomach cramping on his
right side. Id. Dr. Wheatley continued to maintain his diagnosis of probable IBS. Id. at ¶
72. He ordered blood tests and requested a two-month trial of the medication Linzess,
which was approved on January 4, 2016. Id. at ¶ 73. Dr. Wheatley discontinued the
medication on March 21, 2016, because the plaintiff complained that it was giving him
diarrhea. Id. at ¶ 74.
In early May 2016, Dr. Wheatley ran labs to test the plaintiff’s stool for blood, and
in late May, Dr. Wheatley noted that test results suggested that the plaintiff may have an
allergy to soy. Id. at ¶ 76. Dr. Wheatley placed the plaintiff on a no-soy diet for two months
to see if that would improve his stomach pain. Id.
In July 2016, Dr. Wheatley again met with the plaintiff, who reported limited
improvement. Id. at ¶ 77. The plaintiff explained that the pain had decreased but the
cramps and gas had not. Id. The plaintiff had been on the no-soy diet for about a month;
Dr. Wheatley decided to continue with the diet and to order more labs. Id. During an
assessment in October 2016, the plaintiff reported he had increased gas and loose stool.
Id. at ¶ 78. Dr. Wheatley prescribed Imodium. Id.
In January 2017, the plaintiff complained that he was still in pain; he also said his
urine was dark and his groin hurt. Id. at ¶ 79. Dr. Wheatley ordered a urinalysis and told
the plaintiff that, if the pain persisted, he would consider another CT scan of the pelvis to
7
evaluate his liver and kidneys. Id. He continued to consider a possible soy allergy,
extending the plaintiff’s no-soy diet. Id.
In April 2017, Dr. Wheatley tried a new medication to address the plaintiff’s
complaints of cramping in case IBS was still a component of the plaintiff’s stomach pain.
Id. at ¶ 80. Dr. Wheatley met with the plaintiff at the end of May. Id. at ¶ 81. The plaintiff
reported that the medication had decreased his pain a little, so Dr. Wheatley continued
the prescription. Id. In July, the plaintiff reported that he still had occasional stomach
discomfort. Id. at ¶ 82. Dr. Wheatley continued the low-soy diet for a year, ordered blood
tests, and made a plan to follow up a week or two after the results came in. Id.
About a month later, on August 9, 2017, the plaintiff saw Dr. Murphy on a sick call,
which was scheduled after the plaintiff complained of chronic stomach pain, dark stool,
and dark material in his vomit. Id. at ¶ 83. The plaintiff explains that he passed out and
had to be lowered to the floor. Id.; Docket No. 28 at ¶ 5. Dr. Murphy assessed a possible
GI bleed and sent the plaintiff to the emergency room at Mercy Medical, where a CT scan
was performed. Docket No. 25 at ¶¶ 83-84. The scan showed a large mass in the plaintiff’s
stomach wall. Id. at ¶ 85. The report noted that the mass had not changed much since
2012; it acknowledged that the mass had not been reported in 2012. Id.; Docket No. 28
at ¶ 30. Mercy Medical determined the plaintiff had an upper GI bleed secondary to a
tumor. Docket No. 25 at ¶ 86. The plaintiff was transferred to the University Hospital and
Clinic for further treatment. Id.
A few days later, on August 13, 2017, an endoscopy and biopsy were performed.
Id. at ¶ 87. The biopsy showed that the tumor was more consistent with a benign tumor
than a malignant tumor. Id. The University Hospital and Clinic treated the ulcer bed over
8
the tumor with stapling and treated the tumor with embolization. Id. at ¶ 89. A doctor from
the University Hospital and Clinic recommended a resection of the tumor to prevent
further growth or bleeding. Id. at ¶ 90.
The plaintiff returned to Oshkosh on August 18, 2017, and he met with Dr. Wheatly
on August 21, 2017. Id. at ¶ 88. Dr. Wheatley noted that, although the tumor was visible
on the 2012 CT scan, it had not been mentioned in the report. It also was not in the 2015
x-ray report that Dr. Wheatley had reviewed. Id. at ¶ 89.
A couple of days after receiving the recommendation for a resection, Dr. Wheatley
submitted a request for a partial gastric resection of the tumor. Id. at ¶ 91. He explained
that the issue had been partially treated with vessel embolization, but a resection was
needed soon. Id. The request was approved, and the resection, which resulted in the
removal of about 25% of the plaintiff’s stomach, was performed on September 29, 2017.
Id. at ¶ 92; Docket No. 28 at ¶ 4. In December 2017, the plaintiff told Dr. Wheatley that
his stomach no longer hurt. Docket No. 25 at ¶ 94; Docket No. 28 at ¶ 23.
II. ANALYSIS
A party is entitled to summary judgment if it shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). To survive a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party must show that
sufficient evidence exists to allow a jury to return a verdict in its favor. Brummett v. Sinclair
Broad. Grp., Inc., 414 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2005). For the purposes of deciding
defendants’ motion, I resolve all factual disputes and make all reasonable factual
inferences in favor of the plaintiff, who is the non-moving party. Springer v. Durflinger,
518 F.3d 479, 483-84 (7th Cir. 2008).
9
“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To prove a deliberate-indifference
claim, a plaintiff must first show that he has “a medical condition ‘that has been diagnosed
by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would perceive the need for a doctor's attention.’” Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 83031(7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)). He must
then show “that the prison official[s] knew of ‘a substantial risk of harm to [him] and
disregarded the risk.’” Id. at 831 (first quoting Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653; and then citing
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).
Defendants do not dispute that the plaintiff’s chronic stomach pain was an
objectively serious medical condition, so my analysis will focus only on whether the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s condition.
I understand that the plaintiff is frustrated that he had to endure eight years of pain
before his condition was accurately diagnosed and treated. However, under the Eighth
Amendment, “a mistake in professional judgment cannot be deliberate indifference.”
Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2013). This is
because “an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to
constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at
105). To establish that a defendant was deliberately indifferent, a plaintiff must show that,
despite knowing about a risk of serious harm to the plaintiff, the defendant ignored the
risk, persisted in an ineffective course of treatment, or made treatment decisions that
10
radically departed from “from acceptable professional judgment, practice or standards.”
Id. (citations omitted). The plaintiff offers no such evidence.
The evidence shows that both Drs. Sauvey and Wheatley never stopped trying to
identify the source of the plaintiff’s pain. They ordered lab work, blood tests, and
urinalysis, prescribed medications to address various symptoms, and adjusted the
plaintiff’s diet. They assert that, while they were treating the plaintiff, they never found any
indication that a tumor was the source of the plaintiff’s stomach pain. Both doctors ordered
a number of tests, including a colonoscopy, x-rays, and CT scans. Because those tests
were done offsite, neither of the doctors had access to the actual imaging and/or x-ray
films. Their knowledge was limited to the information in the specialists’ reports. Prior to
2017, all of the reports indicated the results were normal. Further, the plaintiff exhibited
no warning signs of a tumor. His weight was stable, his blood count was normal, and
there was no bleeding until 2017, at which time he was immediately sent to the hospital
for further tests and treatment.
The plaintiff tries to contradict Drs. Sauvey’s and Wheatley’s assertions that there
was no evidence of a tumor until 2017 with two arguments. He first points to the radiology
report from the 2015 x-ray. Docket No. 20-1 at 356. The bottom of the report has the
following notation: “Edited Date: 08/04/2015 by PROVIDER.” Id. This notation does not
give rise to a reasonable inference that either defendant edited the document to remove
references to evidence of a tumor. The report does not indicate who “PROVIDER” is, nor
does it explain how the report was edited. The plaintiff’s assumption that Dr. Wheatley
edited the report to remove references to a tumor is mere speculation. Speculation,
conjecture, and assumptions are insufficient to withstand summary judgment, and they
11
are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Next, the plaintiff contends that the radiologist from Mercy who interpreted the CT
scans told him that he had informed Oshkosh Correctional Institution of the tumor in 2012.
In his response to the defendants’ proposed findings of fact, the plaintiff asserts that
“when the tumor was found that same Dr. stated that it was the same tumor from 2012
that he told OSCI HSU about.” (Resp. to Defs. PFOF ¶ 36.) He later asserts that “[t]he
doctor from the hospital stat[ed] that he informed Oshkosh [of] the tumor in 2012.” (Id.
¶ 96.) In support of these assertions, the plaintiff cites paragraph 86 of his verified
complaint. However, the complaint does not support either assertion. It alleges:
The doctor at Mercy medical center told plaintiff that this was the same
tumor from 2012 and nothing had been done about it. Either mercy medical
center failed to inform OSCI medical staff or OSCI medical staff failed to
adhere to the treating doctors recommendations. After a complete
discovery plaintiff may ask for leave of the court to file an amended
complaint.
(Compl. ¶ 86.) This paragraph does not allege that, in 2012, the radiologist told Oshkosh
Correctional Institution that the CT scan revealed a tumor. Instead, it alleges that either
the hospital failed to inform the correctional institution about the tumor or the correctional
institution failed to act on the information, and that the plaintiff would try to identify what
actually happened during discovery. According to the defendants’ evidence, the hospital
did not inform the correctional institution about the tumor. The plaintiff apparently was
unable to find any contrary evidence during discovery. Thus, the only reasonable
12
inference is that the hospital did not inform the correctional institution that the CT scan
revealed a tumor. 4
In short, no reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence that Drs. Sauvey or
Wheatley were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious medical condition.
Accordingly, they are entitled to summary judgment.
The plaintiff is also proceeding on a claim that Litscher, Greer, Holzmacher, and
Muse created a policy that resulted in a delay in the treatment of his tumor. The
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. The undisputed evidence
shows that the delay in treating the plaintiff’s tumor was a result of his doctors not knowing
about the tumor until 2017; the delay was not the result of any policy. Every treatment
request made by the plaintiff’s doctors was promptly granted, including the request for
surgery once the tumor was identified. Based on the evidence, no jury could reasonably
conclude that the plaintiff was injured by any institution policy.
ORDER
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(Docket No. 17) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants John Doe and Dawn Atkinson are
DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. The clerk’s office shall
enter judgment accordingly.
4
I also note that the plaintiff’s statements about what the radiologist told him are
inadmissible hearsay. For the radiologist’s statements to be admissible, the plaintiff would
have to submit an affidavit or other evidence from the radiologist.
13
This order and the judgment to follow are final. A dissatisfied party may appeal this
court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by filing in this court a
notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 3, 4. This court may extend this deadline if a party timely requests an extension
and shows good cause or excusable neglect for not being able to meet the 30-day
deadline. See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A).
Under limited circumstances, a party may ask this court to alter or amend its
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or ask for relief from judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Any motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) must be filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment. The court cannot
extend this deadline. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2). Any motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) must be filed within a reasonable time, generally
no more than one year after the entry of the judgment. The court cannot extend this
deadline. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2).
A party is expected to closely review all applicable rules and determine, what, if
any, further action is appropriate in a case.
Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 15th day of December, 2018.
s/Lynn Adelman______
LYNN ADELMAN
United States District Judge
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