McDaniel v. Waupun Correctional Institution

Filing 41

SCREENING ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph on 9/21/2018. IT IS ORDERED that under an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, the clerk's office shall electronically send copies of McDan iel's 35 complaint and this order to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for service on defendants C.O. Beahm, Sgt. Monuagey, and Dr. Gruber. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Ju stice and this court, defendants C.O. Beahm, Sgt. Monuagey, and Dr. Gruber shall file a responsive pleading to the complaint within sixty days of receiving electronic notice of this order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may not begin discovery until after the court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions. (cc: all counsel, via US mail to Plaintiff & Warden at Waupun Correctional)(blr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MILTON MCDANIEL,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 18-CV-208

C.O. BEAHM1,
DR. GRUBER, and
SGT. MONUAGEY,
Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER ON
SCREENING PLAINTIFF’S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
On June 19, 2018, I screened plaintiff Milton McDaniel’s second amended
complaint. In my review of the complaint as well as the twelve letters McDaniel’s had also
filed with the court, I allowed McDaniel to file a third amended complaint clearly
identifying his claim. Docket # 34. McDaniel’s took advantage of that opportunity and filed
a third amended complaint on June 22, 2018. Docket # 35.
Not all parties have had the opportunity to fully consent to magistrate judge
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Nonetheless, the court has jurisdiction to screen the
third amended complaint under the Wisconsin Department of Justice’s limited consent to
the exercise of magistrate judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandum of
Understanding between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court.

Although McDaniel lists a “C.O. Beahm” as a defendant while referencing a “Sgt.
Beahm” throughout his complaint, I will construe this to be the same individual and will
refer to him a “C.O. Beahm” in my order.
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Screening of the Third Amended Complaint
1.

Federal Screening Standard

Federal law requires that I screen complaints, including amended complaints,
brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). I must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner has
raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
To state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
“that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
The complaint’s allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
In considering whether a complaint states a claim, I follow the principles set forth in
Twombly by, first, “identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Legal conclusions must
be supported by factual allegations. Id. If there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court
must, second, “assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to
an entitlement to relief.” Id.
To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: 1) he
was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the
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deprivation was caused by the defendant acting under color of state law. Buchanan-Moore v.
County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Village of North Fond
du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
I am obliged to give the pro se plaintiff’s allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal
construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Here, McDaniel alleges that on December 26, 2017, after telling the defendants that
his liver was “messed up” due to his having swallowed a handful of pills and that he was
going to kill himself, the defendants placed him in observation. Docket # 35 at 2. While
being placed in observation, McDaniel states that C.O. Beahm broke his finger.
McDaniel further alleges that he later spoke with Dr. Gruber and explained to him
that he “was not alright,” that he “ha[s] a bad liver,” that he was “losing [his] mind,” and
that “Sgt. Beahm had brok[en] [his] finger.” Id. at 3. Dr. Gruber responded by “[letting]
them do what they did to [McDaniel],” which included C.O. Beahm and Sgt. Monuagey
bruising McDaniel’s arms and refusing to allow him medical treatment. Id.
McDaniel seeks injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages.
2.

Analysis

First, McDaniel seems to be alleging a claim of excessive force against defendants
C.O. Beahm and Sgt. Monuagey. Claims for excessive force fall under the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, which bars “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain,” particularly when “totally without penological justification.”
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2001). A prison official is liable for such a claim when he
inflicts an injury “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” See
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Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). McDaniel
asserts that C.O. Beahm broke his finger while placing him in observation and that both
C.O. Beahm and Sgt. Monuagey bruised his arms thereafter. He does not allege that the
officials’ actions were done for any other purpose than to harm him. Thus, I find that
McDaniel has sufficiently alleged and may proceed on a claim of excessive force against
C.O. Beahm and Sgt. Monuagey.
Next, McDaniel seems to be alleging a failure to protect claim against Dr. Gruber.
Such a claim also falls under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 909 (7th Cir. 2005). Prison officials have a “duty
to ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). “To state a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff-inmate
must allege that (1) ‘he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm,’ and (2) defendant-officials acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to that risk.” Id.
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). For screening purposes, I will presume that the acts
McDaniel alleges were committed against him by C.O. Beahm and Sgt. Monuagey posed a
substantial risk of serious harm. See Id. at 910-11 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) (“‘Being
violently assaulted in prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.’”).
Regarding the second prong of a failure to protect claim, an official acts with
deliberate indifference when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which an inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Id. at 913 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838). McDaniel alleges that he informed Dr. Gruber
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that C.O. Beahm had broken his finger to which Dr. Gruber responded by “[letting] them
do what they did to [McDaniel].” Docket # 35 at 3. That included both C.O. Beahm and
Sgt. Monuagey bruising McDaniel’s arms. Thus, I find that McDaniel has sufficiently
alleged and may proceed on a failure to protect claim against Dr. Gruber.
Lastly, McDaniel seems to be alleging a deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs claim against all of the defendants. Such a claim also constitutes “the ‘unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Wilson v. Adams, No.
16-1889, 2018 WL 4025060, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2018) (quoting Whiting v. Wexford
Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2016). To state a claim for deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs, an inmate “must establish that he suffered from ‘an
objectively serious medical condition’ and that the ‘defendant was deliberately indifferent to
that condition.’” Id. (quoting Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016). A serious
medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's
attention.” Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gutierrez v. Peters,
111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997)). McDaniel alleges that he suffered a broken finger and
a bruised arm. Thus, for screening purposes, I find that he has sufficiently alleged
objectively serious medical conditions.
As for the subjective prong, again, deliberate indifference requires that the official
know of the serious harm but disregard it. Brown, 398 F.3d at 913; Norfleet v. Webster, 439
F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir.
2002)) (A prison official has a sufficiently culpable state of mind when the official “knew of
a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and acted or failed to act in disregard of that risk.”).
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McDaniel alleges that Dr. Gruber was made aware of his broken finger but did nothing and
that C.O. Beahm and Sgt. Monuagey bruised his arm and refused to allow him medical
treatment. Therefore, I find that McDaniel has sufficiently alleged and may proceed on a
claim of deliberate indifference to his medical needs against C.O. Beahm, Sgt. Monuagey,
and Dr. Gruber.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that under an informal service agreement
between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, the clerk’s office shall
electronically send copies of McDaniel’s complaint and this order to the Wisconsin
Department of Justice for service on defendants C.O. Beahm, Sgt. Monuagey, and Dr.
Gruber.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under an informal service agreement between the
Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, defendants C.O. Beahm, Sgt. Monuagey,
and Dr. Gruber shall file a responsive pleading to the complaint within sixty days of
receiving electronic notice of this order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may not begin discovery until after
the court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under the Prisoner E-Filing Program, McDaniel
shall submit all correspondence and case filings to institution staff, who will scan and e-mail
documents to the court.2 If McDaniel is no longer incarcerated at a Prisoner E-Filing
institution, he will be required to submit all correspondence and legal material to:

The Prisoner E-Filing Program is mandatory for all inmates of Dodge Correctional
Institution, Green Bay Correctional Institution, Waupun Correctional Institution,
Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, Columbia Correctional Institution, and Oshkosh
Correctional Institution.
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2

Office of the Clerk
United States District Court
Eastern District of Wisconsin
362 United States Courthouse
517 E. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
PLEASE DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE JUDGE’S CHAMBERS. It
will only delay the processing of the case.
I advise McDaniel that, if he fails to file documents or take other required actions by
the deadlines the court sets, I may dismiss the case based on his failure to prosecute. The
parties must notify the clerk of court of any change of address. Failure to do so could result
in orders or other information not being timely delivered, thus affecting the legal rights of
the parties.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 21st day of September, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
s/Nancy Joseph ____________
NANCY JOSEPH
United States Magistrate Judge

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