Jackson v. United States of America

Filing 2

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 5/23/2018: DENYING 1 Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to Section 2255; DISMISSING CASE with prejudice; and DENYING Certificate of Appealability. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Camron J. Jackson at Milan FCI)(jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
CAMRON J. JACKSON,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 18-CV-747-JPS
Crim. Case No. 14-CR-99-5-JPS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ORDER

Respondent.

Petitioner Camron J. Jackson (“Jackson”) pleaded guilty to one count
of Hobbs Act Robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2, and one
count of brandishing a firearm in connection with a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) & 2. United States v. Camron J.
Jackson, 14-CR-99-5-JPS (E.D. Wis.) (Jackson’s “Criminal Case”), (Docket
#329 at 1). On June 28, 2017, the Court sentenced him to 114 months’
imprisonment for those crimes. Id. at 2. Jackson did not appeal his
convictions or sentence. Jackson filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
to vacate his convictions on May 15, 2018. (Docket #1). That motion is now
before the Court for screening:
If it plainly appears from the motion, any attached
exhibits, and the record of the prior proceedings that the
moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss
the motion and direct the clerk to notify the moving party. If
the motion is not dismissed, the judge must order the United
States Attorney to file an answer, motion, or other response
within a fixed time, or to take other action the judge may
order.
Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings.

The Court begins by addressing the timeliness of Jackson’s motion.
Section 2255(f) provides that there is a one-year limitations period in which
to file a motion seeking Section 2255 relief. That limitations period runs
from the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. “[T]he
Supreme Court has held that in the context of postconviction relief, finality
attaches when the Supreme Court ‘affirms a conviction on the merits on
direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time
for filing a certiorari petition expires.’” Robinson v. United States, 416 F.3d
645, 647 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). Because Jackson did not
appeal, his conviction became final once the deadline for filing a notice of
appeal expired. Clarke v. United States, 703 F.3d 1098, 1100 (7th Cir. 2013).
The deadline expired on July 12, 2017, fourteen days after judgment was
entered. Thus, Jackson’s motion appears timely.
The Court turns next to procedural default. Section 2255 relief is
appropriate if the Court determines that “the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was
in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to
collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). However, this form of action is not a
substitute for a direct appeal. Varela v. United States, 481 F.3d 932, 935 (7th
Cir. 2007). Therefore, any claims that Jackson did not raise at trial or on
direct appeal are procedurally defaulted and he cannot raise them. See
Torzala v. United States, 545 F.3d 517, 522 (7th Cir. 2008).
There are two exceptions to this rule. First, claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel may be raised for the first time in a Section 2255
motion. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). Second, Jackson
may raise claims on which he otherwise procedurally defaulted if he
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demonstrates that there was cause for his failure to raise a claim earlier and
that the failure has actually prejudiced him. Torzala, 545 F.3d at 522 (citing
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998)).
Jackson raises four grounds for relief, all based on the alleged
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.1 First, Jackson says that his lawyer
“lied to [him] about the time [he] was going to receive” at sentencing.
(Docket #1 at 6). Second, Jackson claims that his lawyer did not file an
appeal, despite Jackson’s instruction to do so, because “the judge could
have given me lesser time according to the current law.” Id. at 7. Third,
Jackson alleges that his counsel did not fully explain the charges against
him “so [he] never fully understood what [he] was facing.” Id. at 8. Finally,
Jackson maintains that his trial counsel “did not put in a motion on my
behalf which I felt could have helped my case.” Id. The Court assumes
Jackson refers to a pre-trial motion, such as a motion to suppress. Because
each of these claims are for ineffective assistance of counsel, they are not
procedurally defaulted.
Each claim fails, however, because they are all plainly meritless. The
Court of Appeal’s Blake opinion neatly summarizes the standards
applicable to Jackson’s motion:
A party asserting ineffective assistance of counsel
bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that his trial
counsel's performance fell below objective standards for
reasonably effective representation, and (2) that counsel's
deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687–88 . . . (1984)[.]
To satisfy the first element of the Strickland test,
appellant must direct the Court to specific acts or omissions

Jackson had two different attorneys during the Criminal Case. He does
not identify which attorney is the target of each ground. Nevertheless, as
explained below, it does not matter.
1

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by his counsel. In that context, the Court considers whether in
light of all the circumstances counsel’s performance was
outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance. The Court’s assessment of counsel’s performance
is “highly deferential[,] . . . indulg[ing] a strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance[.]” [Id. at 689.]
...
To satisfy the second Strickland element, appellant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have
been different, such that the proceedings were fundamentally
unfair or unreliable. A reasonable probability is defined as
one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in an outcome.
Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878–79 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations and
quotations omitted).
A brief review of the docket of the Criminal Case reveals that Jackson
cannot satisfy the Strickland test as to any of his grounds for relief. With
respect to ground one, the plea agreement Jackson signed states the range
of penalties available for his crimes, and notes that he discussed the
applicable sentencing guidelines with his attorney. Criminal Case, (Docket
#282 at 3–5). Jackson also acknowledged that his ultimate sentence was in
the Court’s hands, not those of his attorney or the government. Id. at 7–8.
Each of these matters, as well as all of the considerations of pleading guilty,
were discussed with Jackson in detail by Magistrate Judge David E. Jones
at Jackson’s plea colloquy hearing. Criminal Case, (Docket #286). Thus,
Jackson cannot claim that his sentence was fundamentally unfair based on
any discussion with his lawyer.
As to ground two, the Court notified Jackson of his right of appeal
at the sentencing hearing. Criminal Case, (Docket #323 at 2, 4). The Court
instructed his attorney to discuss that right with Jackson, and if Jackson

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declined to file an appeal, his attorney should file a letter with the Court to
that effect. Id. Jackson’s lawyer did so the very day of the sentencing
hearing. Criminal Case, (Docket #324). The letter states that “I counseled
Mr. Jackson concerning his appeal rights. Mr. Jackson indicated that he does
not intend to appeal.” Id. Jackson’s attempt to revise history is unavailing.
The third ground is ill-defined. Jackson does not couch his desire to
“fully underst[and] what [he] was facing” in any particular constitutional
provision or time frame of the Criminal Case. (Docket #1 at 8). The Court
finds that this allegation would be most appropriate when Jackson pleaded
guilty. At that juncture, he did indeed have a right to know and understand
the charges against him. Like ground one, this claim for relief is
contradicted by the plea agreement and colloquy with Magistrate Jones.
The plea agreement states that Jackson “has read and fully understands the
charges contained in the indictment.” Criminal Case, (Docket #282 at 1).
Jackson further acknowledged that he “fully understands the nature and
elements of the crimes with which he has been charged, and those charges
and the terms and conditions of the plea agreement have been fully
explained to him by his attorney.” Id. These assertions were confirmed by
Magistrate Jones in the plea colloquy hearing. Criminal Case, (Docket #286).
If Jackson did not understand the charges against him, he should not have
signed the plea agreement or should have informed Magistrate Jones of that
fact.
Jackson’s final ground is not cognizable for two reasons. First, an
unconditional guilty plea, like that entered by Jackson, waives most defects
in a criminal proceeding which preceded the guilty plea (with exceptions
that are not relevant here). Gomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 2006).
Jackson therefore can no longer complain that his constitutional rights were
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potentially violated by the consideration of certain evidence. Second, and
more importantly, Jackson’s plea admitted guilt to the crimes of conviction.
Criminal Case, (Docket #282 at 1–3). No pre-trial motion could undermine
this concession. Jackson thus cannot claim any prejudice by his attorney’s
failure to file a pre-trial motion.2
Because Jackson is plainly not entitled to relief on the grounds
presented in his motion, the Court is compelled to deny the motion and
dismiss this action with prejudice. Under Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing
Section 2255 Cases, “the district court must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” To
obtain a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), Jackson
must make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”
by establishing that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that
matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
(2003) (internal citations omitted). No reasonable jurists could debate
whether Jackson’s assertions of ineffective assistance had merit. They are
all belied by the filings in his criminal case. As a consequence, the Court is
compelled to deny a certificate of appealability as to Jackson’s motion.

In addition to his plea agreement and plea colloquy hearing, Jackson’s
presentence report provides a thorough explanation for most of the matters he
raises in this habeas motion. Criminal Case, (Docket #315). The report details the
charges against him, Id. at 5–11, the sentencing guideline computations, Id. at 12–
16, 23–26, and the maximum and minimum penalties, Id. at 23–25. At his
sentencing hearing, Jackson told the Court that he had reviewed the report and
had no objections to it. Criminal Case, (Docket #323 at 1). Thus, the report supplies
yet another basis to dismiss Jackson’s instant claims as meritless.
2

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Finally, the Court closes with some information about the actions
that Jackson may take if he wishes to challenge the Court’s resolution of this
case. This order and the judgment to follow are final. A dissatisfied party
may appeal this Court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit by filing in this Court a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry
of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 3, 4. This Court may extend this deadline
if a party timely requests an extension and shows good cause or excusable
neglect for not being able to meet the 30-day deadline. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(5)(A). Moreover, under certain circumstances, a party may ask this
Court to alter or amend its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) or ask for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b). Any motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) must be filed
within 28 days of the entry of judgment. The Court cannot extend this
deadline. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). Any motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) must be filed within a reasonable time, generally no more
than one year after the entry of the judgment. The court cannot extend this
deadline. See id. A party is expected to closely review all applicable rules
and determine what, if any, further action is appropriate in a case.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence pursuant to Section 2255 (Docket #1) be and the same
is hereby DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same is
hereby DISMISSED with prejudice; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability be and
the same is hereby DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
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Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 23rd day of May, 2018.
BY THE COURT:

____________________________________
J. P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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