Clark v. Doe #1 et al

Filing 59

ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 3/20/2020. 34 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Brittany McCutcheon and Nathan Haynes are DISMISSED with prejudice. Defendants Brittany McCutcheon and Nathan Haynes are DISMISSED from this action. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Shane Clark at Kettle Moraine Correctional Institution)(jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
SHANE CLARK,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATHAN HAYNES, CHRISTOPHER
WINTERS, KYLE DEMERS, PATRICK
MAHONEY, SERGEANT NATHAN
WOLF, LACEE SMELCER, COLETTE
HLYSTEK, JIMMY MUTCHIE, and
CO BRITTANY MCCUTCHEON,

Case No. 18-CV-809-JPS

ORDER

Defendants.
On October 26, 2018, the Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed on a
claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was denied
prescribed psychotropic medication while on suicide observation at
Waupun Correctional Institution (“WCI”). (Docket #23). Defendants are
Nathan Haynes (“Haynes”), Christopher Winters (“Winters”), Kyle
Demers (“Demers”), Patrick Mahoney (“Mahoney,”) Sergeant Nathan Wolf
(“Wolf”), Lacee Smelcer (“Smelcer”), Colette Hlystek (“Hlystek”), Jimmy
Mutchie (“Mutchie”), and Brittany Woda, née McCutcheon (“Woda”)
(collectively “Defendants”), who are all employees at WCI.1 Defendants
have filed a motion for summary judgment, which is now fully briefed.
Plaintiff named two other defendants, Officers Wood and Bilk, whose
names appear on the observation logs discussed below. Despite the fact that
Officers Wood and Bilk were employees at WCI during the relevant time, the
Wisconsin Department of Justice was unable to identify these defendants.
Accordingly, they were never served, and ultimately dismissed from the case
without prejudice. (Docket #27).
1

(Docket #34). The Court has considered the motion and will grant it in part
and deny it in part for the reasons explained below.
1.

LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the Court “shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir.
2016). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit” under
the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A dispute of fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The
Court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-movant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 815 F.3d
356, 360 (7th Cir. 2016). The Court must not weigh the evidence presented
or determine credibility of witnesses; the Seventh Circuit instructs that “we
leave those tasks to factfinders.” Berry v. Chi. Transit Auth., 618 F.3d 688, 691
(7th Cir. 2010). The party opposing summary judgment “need not match
the movant witness for witness, nor persuade the [C]ourt that [his] case is
convincing, [he] need only come forward with appropriate evidence
demonstrating that there is a pending dispute of material fact.” Waldridge
v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1994).2
Plaintiff has failed to oppose Defendants’ proposed statement of facts;
therefore, to the extent Defendants’ proposed facts are uncontroverted, those facts
will be admitted for summary judgment purposes only. Civ. L.R. 56(b)(4).
However, “a district court cannot properly act upon a motion for summary
judgment without giving the opposing party a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to submit
affidavits that contradict the affidavits submitted in support of the motion.” Ross
v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1985). Moreover, “when dealing with
summary judgment procedures[,] technical rigor is inappropriate where
2

Page 2 of 18

2.

RELEVANT FACTS
2.1

Background

In March 2017, Plaintiff had been prescribed Aripiprazole, an
antipsychotic; Hydroxyzine, an antihistamine that treats anxiety; and
Gabapentin, an anticonvulsant that treats pain. He was taking these
medications at regular intervals on a daily basis. See (Docket #45-1 at 1).
These medications are psychotropic pharmaceuticals that were used to treat
Plaintiff’s depression, anxiety, and mood disorder. On March 4, Plaintiff
submitted a medication refill request form seeking more Gabapentin,
Hydroxyzine, and Aripiprazole. (Docket #46-1 at 18). That same day, he
submitted a Health Services Request (“HSR”) for psychiatric assessment
and medication adjustment. Id. at 10. On March 8, he submitted another
HSR seeking a refill of Gabapentin, which was received by the Health
Services Unit (“HSU”) on March 9—the same day Plaintiff was placed
under observation for suicidal ideation. (Docket #43-2 at 9).
On March 9, Plaintiff submitted a Psychological Service Request for
evaluation in which he explained that he felt like “snapping.” (Docket #462 at 9). Before this request was received, id., Plaintiff told Woda, who was
conducting medication rounds, that he was experiencing suicidal ideation.
Woda escorted Plaintiff to a separate cell and drafted an incident report.
Woda informed Haynes, her supervisor, of the situation, and Haynes
requested that Plaintiff be evaluated by the Psychological Services Unit
(“PSU”). At the PSU’s recommendation, Plaintiff was placed under suicide

unresponsive and uninformed prisoners are involved.” Id. Therefore, if any of the
evidence that Plaintiff has filed in support of his opposition—including his
declaration—contradicts one of Defendants’ proposed facts, then that fact will be
considered in dispute.

Page 3 of 18

observation, and transferred to a specific unit known as the Restrictive
Housing Unit (“RHU”) for monitoring. Woda, who drafted the incident
report that prompted Plaintiff’s transfer to the RHU, does not recall Plaintiff
or any discussion involving his medication. This was the extent of Haynes’s
and Woda’s involvement in the situation.
Thereafter, Plaintiff was under clinical observation from the evening
of March 9 to the morning of March 13. On March 9, he submitted an HSR
stating that he had been moved to a different unit, and requested that his
medications be forwarded, too. (Docket #46-1 at 8). That HSR was received
on March 10, when an employee confirmed that “meds went to RHU on 39-17.” Id. However, Plaintiff did not receive them.
2.2

Observation

While under observation at the RHU, Plaintiff’s activity was
monitored every fifteen minutes by correctional officers who recorded his
activity in a designated observation log. The observation logs contain a box
for correctional officers to indicate if an inmate received or declined
medication. The observation logs for Plaintiff begin on March 9, 2017 at 9:15
p.m. and end on March 13, 2017 at 8:45 a.m. (Docket #43-3). The only
documentation in the observation logs regarding medication occurred on
March 11 at 6:15 a.m. and March 12 at 7:15 a.m., at which times Smelcer
observed Plaintiff accept medication. Id. at 10, 16. However, a
corresponding medication log, which tracks when prescribed medications
are distributed and whether the prisoner accepts or denies the medication,
indicates that medication was not distributed to Plaintiff on the morning of
March 11. (Docket #45-1 at 1). Curiously, the medication log also indicates
that medication was distributed the evenings of March 10 and 11, and

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throughout the day on March 12 and March 13. Id. In other words, the
observation logs and the medication log contradict one another.
It is WCI protocol for officers who receive any medical concerns from
inmates to contact the HSU and the on-duty nurse. No such concerns were
relayed to HSU regarding Plaintiff’s medication while he was under suicide
observation at the RHU. The officer defendants who monitored Plaintiff
while he was under confinement—i.e. Wolf, Demers, Mahoney, Hlystek,
Mutchie, Smelcer, and Winters—will be referred to, collectively, as the
“RHU officers.” Each officer’s interaction with Plaintiff will be described
below.
2.2.1

Defendant Wolf

Wolf was a sergeant who supervised the RHU during the afternoon
of March 10. He conducted one round on March 10, at 5:45 p.m. (Docket
#43-3 at 7). During this round, Plaintiff states that he told Wolf that he was
suffering from withdrawal and asked for his medication. According to
Plaintiff, Wolf told him that he was already aware of the situation, but it
was the nurse’s job to provide medication, not his. (Docket #50 at 4).
However, the inmate complaint examiner’s response to Plaintiff’s
subsequent complaint about this issue suggests that it actually was staff’s
responsibility to transfer medication information to the RHU. (Docket #491 at 15). There is no evidence that Wolf followed up with the nurse on duty,
or with other staff members regarding Plaintiff’s medication.
2.2.2

Defendant Demers

Demers conducted rounds in the afternoon and evening of March 10
and observed Plaintiff pacing in his cell and laying on the bed. (Docket #433 at 5). Plaintiff attests that around noon, Plaintiff told Demers he was
experiencing withdrawal and had vomited his breakfast, which he is
Page 5 of 18

recorded as having received at 10:30 a.m. Id.; (Docket #50 at 3). According
to Plaintiff, Demers told him to lay down and try to sleep. (Docket #50 at 3).
2.2.3

Defendant Mahoney

Mahoney conducted rounds during the afternoon and evening of
March 10. (Docket #43-3 at 6–7). Mahoney recorded Plaintiff lying in bed,
sitting on the bed, eating, and standing at the door. Id. At one point,
Plaintiff asked Mahoney a question about the PSU, but Mahoney does not
recall whether the question pertained to medication. See (Docket #43-3 at 7).
Plaintiff attests that at this time, he told Mahoney that he was two days
behind on his medication and was suffering withdrawal. (Docket #50 at 3–
4). According to Plaintiff, Mahoney responded that he would see if his meds
were available. Id. at 4. However, Plaintiff claims he did not receive
medication during the “meds pass” that evening, and when Plaintiff
complained about it, Mahoney told him to ask someone else. Id.
2.2.4

Defendant Hlystek

Hlystek conducted several rounds during the morning and early
afternoon of March 11. (Docket #43-3 at 10–12). She recorded Plaintiff laying
on his bed and pacing. Id. Plaintiff claims that he alerted Hlystek that he
was going through “several withdrawals. . .including profuse sweating,
hotflashes, vomiting, pins and needles type itching all over [his] body, and
[] suicidal ideation.” (Docket #50 at 5). Hlystek, in turn, did nothing to
address Plaintiff’s medical issue. Hlystek does not remember Plaintiff or
any issues with his medication or withdrawal symptoms. Nothing in the
observation logs document Plaintiff’s complaints.
2.2.5

Defendant Mutchie

Mutchie conducted rounds during the evening of March 11. (Docket
#43-3 at 13–14). Mutchie recorded Plaintiff laying on the bed, moving.
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Mutchie did not record anything else. Plaintiff claims that he told Mutchie
about his lack of medication two or three times, requesting a nurse and
medication. According to Plaintiff, Mutchie told defendant that “he would
have to wait and there is nothing they could do.” (Docket #50 at 5).
2.2.6

Defendant Smelcer

Smelcer and Hlystek conducted rounds the morning of March 11,
and Smelcer conducted rounds the morning of March 12. (Docket #43-3 at
10–17). Among other routine observations, Smelcer recorded that Plaintiff
received his medication on the morning of March 11, id. at 10, and again the
morning of March 12, id. at 16. According to Plaintiff, he alerted her
throughout her shift of the “severe withdrawals” he was going through
“including profuse sweating, hotflashes, vomiting, pins and needles type
itching all over my body, and the suicidal ideation.” (Docket #50 at 5). He
believes that she falsified her report that he received medication on the
mornings of March 11 and 12 in order to cover up the “severe withdrawal
symptoms” that he was experiencing while she passed out medication. Id.
at 4.
Smelcer’s observation logs are at odds with the medication logs. She
indicated that Plaintiff received medication the mornings of March 11,
(Docket #43-3 at 10), but the medication log suggest that that Plaintiff did
not receive medication on the morning of March 11, (Docket #45-1 at 1). She
also failed to record any receipt or denial of medication at noon on March
12, (Docket #43-3 at 17), even though Plaintiff’s medication logs suggest that
he did receive medication at noon on March 12, (Docket #45-1 at 1).
2.2.7

Defendant Winters

Winters conducted a round on the morning of March 10, and worked
with Hlystek to conduct rounds mid-day on March 11. (Docket #43-3 at 4,
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11–12). According to Plaintiff, on March 10, he told Winters that he had not
received his medication in two days and was going through withdrawal.
Winters told him that he would “see what he could do.” (Docket #50 at 3).
Plaintiff complained to Winters again on March 11. Id. at 5. Winters does
not recall any conversation with Plaintiff regarding his medication. There
is no evidence that Winters told HSU or the nurse on duty about Plaintiff’s
alleged complaints.
2.3

After Observation

Once released from observation, Plaintiff submitted a complaint
alleging that he had not received his prescribed medications while in the
RHU. See (Docket #49-1 at 15). The inmate complaint examiner affirmed the
complaint, and stated the following:
Inmate Clark was placed in Obs[ervation] on the morning on
3/9/17. It appears by the medication log that his medication
was not sent over to the RHU until later in the day on 3/10. At
that time he was offered and refused his late afternoon and
bedtime meds. He then was not offered any meds on first shift
3/11/17 and his late afternoon and bedtime meds he received.
RHU did not know why he did not receive his medication on
first shift.
Recommendation is to affirm that inmate did not receive his
medication on 3/9 or on first shift 3/10 and 3/11. A copy will
be sent to [prison staff] for the purposes of staff distributing
medication and the transfer of medication when an inmate is
taken to RHU.
Id. This finding contradicts the observation logs, which indicate that
Plaintiff actually did receive his medications the morning of March 11 and
March 12, but no other time. (Docket #43-3 at 10, 16). However, the finding
is consistent with the medication log, which indicates that Plaintiff missed

Page 8 of 18

some medication on March 9 and the mornings/afternoons of March 10 and
11, but was offered dosages in the evenings. (Docket #45-1 at 1).
On March 13, once released from the RHU, Plaintiff filed an HSR
asking why his dose of Aripiprazole was reduced and complaining that he
had been without the medication for over a week. (Docket #46-1 at 6). On
March 16, Plaintiff submitted another HSR in which he stated that he had
not received his Aripiprazole for two weeks and his Hydroxyzine for one
week. Id. at 4.
3.

ANALYSIS
The Eighth Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” standard

requires that (1) a prisoner suffered from an objectively serious medical
condition; (2) the government official subjectively knew of the condition
and was deliberately indifferent in treating it; and (3) this indifference
caused the prisoner’s injury. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994);
Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010).
There is no serious dispute as to whether Plaintiff’s need for
psychotropic medication constitutes a serious medical condition. “A
serious medical condition is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005);
Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding that a prisoner’s
schizoaffective diagnosis, symptoms, and “multiple prescriptions for
psychotropic medications firmly establish that he suffered from an
objectively serious medical condition.”). Defendants attempt to reframe the
serious medical risk as physical withdrawal symptoms, see (Docket #35 at
13–14), for which they were not on notice. But that is neither the crux of
Plaintiff’s complaint, see (Docket #20 at 1), nor how the Court framed the
issue at screening, see (Docket #23 at 1–2) (describing Plaintiff’s allegations
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and finding that the alleged “denial of his psychotropic medication” was
sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment). On this point, the
evidence is clear that while Plaintiff was under suicidal observation,
Defendants failed to administer his prescribed psychotropic medication.
The critical question is whether Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to the fact that Plaintiff had not received his prescribed
medication while he was on suicide observation. The deliberate
indifference inquiry has two components. “The official must have
subjective knowledge of the risk to the inmate’s health, and the official also
must disregard that risk.” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 620. Even if an official is aware
of the risk to the inmate’s health, he is not liable if he “responded reasonably
to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
844; Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir.
2000); Fisher v. Lovejoy, 414 F.3d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 2005).
Establishing deliberate indifference is a heavy burden; the Seventh
Circuit has emphasized that deliberate indifference “comprehends more
than mere negligence but less than the purposeful or knowing infliction of
harm.” Estate of Novack, 226 F.3d at 529; Peate v. McCann, 294 F.3d 879, 882
(7th Cir. 2002). Indeed, the Court of Appeals has characterized the required
showing “as ‘something approaching a total unconcern for [the prisoner’s]
welfare in the face of serious risks.’” Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 762 (7th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992)). The
operative inquiry is not whether the inmate believes some other course of
treatment would have been better. Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th
Cir. 1996); Reynolds v. Barnes, 84 F. App’x 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
Constitution does not mandate that a prisoner receive exactly the medical
treatment he desires.”). But while negligence and medical malpractice do
Page 10 of 18

not give way to constitutional liability, “to prevail on an Eighth
Amendment claim ‘a prisoner is not required to show that he was literally
ignored.’” Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653 (quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605,
611 (7th Cir. 2000)). With these principles in mind, the Court will analyze
each defendant’s responsibility in turn.
3.1

Defendant Woda

Plaintiff told Woda that he was having suicidal thoughts on the
evening of March 9. The evidence shows that Woda responded to Plaintiff’s
complaints by promptly taking him away from his cell, informing her
supervisor, and drafting an incident report that was forwarded to the PSU,
HSU, and the RHU. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (no liability if a person
“respond[s] reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not
averted.”). As a result of Woda’s actions, Plaintiff was placed under
observation.
There is some dispute as to whether Woda knew about Plaintiff’s
lapse in medication. However, even if Woda did know that Plaintiff was
suffering from missed medication, her response to the situation—which
entailed notifying her supervisor, the PSU, and the HSU, and removing
Plaintiff to a place where his symptoms would have less dire
consequences—all furthered Plaintiff’s care. There is no evidence that
Woda acted intentionally in failing to ensure that Plaintiff’s medication was
continued, nor is there any evidence that Woda perceived the risk of failing
to medicate Plaintiff and consciously ignored it. Rather, the evidence
demonstrates that Woda took the appropriate steps to ensure that Plaintiff
received psychiatric services and monitoring in a timely fashion. It is true
that Woda did not indicate that Plaintiff was suffering from a lapse in
medication on her incident report, nor did she share this information with
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Haynes. If she knew that Plaintiff was suffering from a lapse in medication,
then this failure would reflect negligence. But as this Court has said before,
constitutional liability does not flow from negligence. Berry v. Peterman, 604
F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Neither medical malpractice nor mere
disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment is enough to prove
deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”).
Accordingly, the claim against Woda must be dismissed.
3.2

Defendant Haynes

Haynes learned that Plaintiff had suicidal thoughts from Woda. In
response to this information, Haynes ordered that Plaintiff be evaluated by
the PSU. Based on the PSU’s recommendation, Plaintiff was placed under
suicide observation. This was the extent of Haynes’ involvement in the
situation.
Like Woda, Haynes responded reasonably to the risk that Plaintiff’s
mental health condition posed by ordering a psychiatric evaluation, which
resulted in Plaintiff being placed under observation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
If Haynes knew that Plaintiff was in need of medication and was suffering
from withdrawal, this was a reasonable response. However, also like Woda,
Haynes did not take any steps to ensure that Plaintiff’s medication would
be continued during this mentally precarious time—a failure that reflects
serious negligence, possibly even gross negligence. This is particularly true
because Plaintiff had already submitted a medication refill request, which
presumably should have been communicated with the PSU. Yet negligence
is not enough for constitutional liability. Berry, 604 F.3d at 441. There is no
evidence that Haynes intentionally avoided giving Plaintiff’s access to
medication, or that he was aware that Plaintiff had not been receiving his

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medication and consciously ignored the risk that posed. Accordingly, the
claim against Haynes must be dismissed.
3.3

RHU Officer Defendants

Demers, Wolf, Hlystek, Mutchie, Smelcer, Mahoney, and Winters
were all correctional officers who worked in WCI’s RHU unit between
March 9 and March 13. Each of these officers participated in monitoring
Plaintiff’s activities in fifteen-minute intervals in order to ensure that he did
not harm himself. Each profess not to recall any issue involving Plaintiff’s
medication. Each claim that they observed no withdrawal symptoms.
The observation logs indicate that the RHU officers were assigned
the same task and sometimes acted in concert during their shifts. Each
officer recorded Plaintiff at the appropriate dates and times, and included
a short phrase documenting what Plaintiff was seen doing at the time of the
observation. None of the RHU officers observed Plaintiff engaging in any
activity that would suggest withdrawal, and none of the RHU officers recall
speaking with Plaintiff about his medication.
For his part, Plaintiff attests that he informed each officer that he was
suffering from a lapse in medication or withdrawal and requested his
medication. There is no evidence that any officer did anything in response
to these complaints. For example, there is no evidence that the officers
informed the HSU, filled out an incident report, or called for a nurse, as
protocol might suggest. Defendants submit that had they known Plaintiff
needed medication, they would have done one or all of these things—and
the fact that they did not proves that Plaintiff is lying.
However, it is not as simple as that. While the RHU officers have
provided evidence—in the form of their own testimonies and the
observation logs—that they conducted their rounds diligently and
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observed nothing out of the ordinary, Plaintiff has risen to the task of
creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they knew that he
had not received his psychotropic medication and were deliberately
indifferent to the risk that posed. To begin with, the evidence demonstrates
that Plaintiff did not receive his prescribed psychotropic medication for at
least two days, possibly more. Plaintiff was admitted to the PSU after a day
of not receiving his medication because he felt suicidal. The day that he was
transferred to the RHU for observation, he submitted a form to the HSU to
inform them that his cell had changed. While at the RHU, Plaintiff claims
that he requested his medication several times to the RHU officers when
they conducted rounds, which occurred every fifteen minutes. The officer
defendants claim that they have no recollection of this happening, and there
is scant record of these requests. There is one recorded instance in which
Plaintiff asked Mahoney about the PSU, but Mahoney does not remember
the substance of the conversation. However, the observation logs and the
medication log contradict each other, making it unclear when or whether
Plaintiff began receiving his medication again. Finally, when Plaintiff
emerged from the RHU, he submitted another inmate complaint form
regarding his lack of medication, which was affirmed.
If a jury believes Plaintiff’s testimony that he told the RHU officers
when they conducted rounds that he had not received his prescribed
medication and was suffering, then they could reasonably find that the
RHU officers were subjectively aware of the serious medical need.
Defendants’ argument that the observation logs are generally silent on the
issue is not dispositive, as the logs’ accuracy is cast into doubt by the
contradictory entries in the medication log. Moreover, nothing in the record
indicates that the RHU officers attempted to respond to the risk in any
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manner whatsoever, such as by speaking with a nurse or informing the
HSU. Nor is there any evidence that the officers were acting under orders
from a medical professional not to medicate Plaintiff. Thus, if a jury finds
Plaintiff credible, they might also conclude that the officers were
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical need in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
3.4

Causation and Injury

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not established an issue of
material fact as to whether Defendants’ conduct caused Plaintiff’s injury or
if, in fact, there was any injury at all. Causation is generally a question of
fact for the jury to decide. Shick v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 307 F.3d 605,
615 (7th Cir. 2002) (“While generally the issue of proximate cause is a jury
question, in extreme circumstances ... the question of proximate cause is an
issue of law properly resolved by a court.”); Gayton, 593 F.3d at 624 (in
addressing a claim for deliberate indifference to an inmate's medical needs
under the Eighth Amendment, “[p]roximate cause is a question to be
decided by a jury, and only in the rare instance that a plaintiff can proffer
no evidence that a delay in medical treatment exacerbated an injury should
summary judgment be granted on the issue of causation.”). The issue may
only be resolved on summary judgment “when there is no evidence from
which a jury could reasonably find the required proximate, causal nexus
between the careless act and the resulting injuries.” Johnson v. City of
Philadelphia, 837 F.3d 343, 352 (3d Cir. 2016). The Court is satisfied that a
reasonable jury could find causation between the officers’ ignoring
Plaintiff’s alleged requests for medication and his subsequent mental
distress.

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As to Plaintiff’s alleged injury, “[n]ominal damages may be awarded
when the Eighth Amendment has been violated but no actual injury is
established.” Tate v. Troutman, 683 F. Supp. 2d 897, 908 (E.D. Wis. 2010)
(citing Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 941–42 (7th Cir. 2003)). In this case,
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for the physical, mental, and
emotional injuries he suffered, as well as punitive damages. (Docket #20 at
5). While there does not appear to be evidence of physical injuries
associated with the lapsed medication, Plaintiff also claims mental distress
and suicidal ideation—injuries to which only he is a witness. It is for the
jury to determine whether he is credible, and whether any injuries merit
compensation.
3.5

Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity shields officials from the civil consequences of
their constitutional violations when the law did not put the officials on clear
notice that their conduct would be unlawful. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
202 (2001); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that
the doctrine protects officials from civil liability when they perform
discretionary functions “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.”). “Put simply,” says the Supreme Court, “qualified
immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
The test for qualified immunity is (1) whether the defendants’
alleged actions violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (2)
“whether the implicated right was clearly established at the time.” Jones v.
Wilhelm, 425 F.3d 455, 461 (7th Cir. 2005). Once the defense is raised, the
Page 16 of 18

plaintiff bears the burden to defeat it. Weinmann v. McClone, 787 F.3d 444,
450 (7th Cir. 2015). To overcome an assertion of qualified immunity,
Plaintiff must proffer facts which, if believed, would amount to a violation
of his constitutional rights. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201. As the discussion above
shows, Plaintiff has done this. Next, Plaintiff must show that the violation
of his constitutional rights was “clearly established under applicable law at
the time and under the circumstances that the defendant official acted.”
Easterling v. Pollard, 528 Fed. App’x 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2013).
A right is clearly established if “a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Factually identical precedent is not necessary; the
guiding question is whether the official would have had “fair warning” that
the conduct was unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
“Deliberately ignoring a request for medical assistance has long been held
to be a form of cruel and unusual punishment.” Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914,
916 (7th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, if each of these officers knew that Plaintiff
was not receiving his prescribed psychotropic medication while at the RHU
but ignored his requests for medical assistance and/or falsified the logs,
then qualified immunity would not apply.
4.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s claims for deliberate

indifference against Woda and Haynes must be dismissed; the evidence
does not suggest that they consciously disregarded a serious medical risk.
However, the correctional officers that monitored Plaintiff in the RHU are
a different story. The evidence creates a genuine issue of fact as to whether
each of them knew that Plaintiff had suffered a lapse in medication, heard
Plaintiff’s request for medication, and ignored his pleas. Most of the
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evidence comes down to testimony from either side, but the inconsistent
observation logs and medication log contributes to the lack of clarity
surrounding when and whether Plaintiff began receiving his medication
again. These inconsistencies bear on whether the RHU officers acted
willfully in ignoring Plaintiff’s requests for medication. This is not a case in
which Plaintiff claims constitutional injury, yet the overwhelming weight
of evidence demonstrates that what he claims could not have happened.
Rather, this is a case in which testimony must be weighed, and
contradictory evidence must be considered. This is a case for the jury.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion (Docket #34) be and the
same is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Eighth Amendment claims
against Defendants Brittany Woda, née McCutcheon, and Nathan Haynes
be and the same are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Brittany Woda, née
McCutcheon, and Nathan Haynes be and the same are hereby DISMISSED
from the action.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 20th day of March, 2020.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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