Louis-Brux v. Berryhill

Filing 33

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph on 8/26/2020 granting 30 Motion for Attorney Fees. (cc: all counsel) (llc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
WILLIAM LOUIS-BRUX,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 18-CV-826

ANDREW M. SAUL,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER APPROVING AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES
PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)
On April 5, 2019, I reversed the Social Security Commissioner’s decision denying
William Louis-Brux’s claim for disability insurance benefits and remanded the case for
further proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), sentence four. (Docket # 19.) I granted
Louis-Brux’s request for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) on
July 18, 2019 and awarded $6,900.00 in fees, (Docket # 27), however, the $6,900.00 in
EAJA fees was applied to a delinquent debt, pursuant to Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586
(2010), that Louis-Brux owed to the government (Docket # 30-4). On remand, Louis-Brux
appeared before an Administrative Law Judge who approved his claim for disability
insurance benefits. (Docket # 30 at 2.) The Social Security Administration issued a Notice
of Award letter dated July 19, 2020, stating that the Administration was withholding
$16,477.50, which amounts to 25% of his past due benefits, to pay his attorney. (Docket #
30-2.)
Louis-Brux agreed to pay his attorney 25% of his past-due benefits award. (Docket #

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30-1.) Again, the Administration withheld $16,477.50 from his past-due benefits to pay his
representative. (Docket # 30-2 at 3.) Louis-Brux’s counsel, Attorney Dana Duncan, requests
the court award him $16,477.50 in fees, which represents twenty-five percent of the past-due
disability insurance benefits. While an award under § 406(b) is normally offset by the
previously awarded EAJA fees, see Hanrahan v. Shalala, 831 F. Supp. 1440, 1452 (E.D. Wis.
1993) (stating that “when attorney’s fees are awarded under both the SSA and the EAJA for
the same services, an attorney is entitled to keep the larger fee but must return the smaller
fee to the claimant”), because counsel did not receive the EAJA fees due to the Ratliff offset,
counsel requests the entirety of the $16,477.50 withheld. The Commissioner does not object
to the fee request. (Docket # 32.)
The court must approve any fee under § 406(b). Congress intended such review not
to override the claimant and counsel’s fee arrangement but rather to act as an “independent
check” to ensure that the arrangement yielded a reasonable result in the particular case.
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). “Congress has provided one boundary line:
Agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent
of the past-due benefits.” Id. Within the 25% boundary, the attorney for the successful
claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered. Id. In making
this determination, the court may consider the character of the representation and the results
obtained, reducing an award if the attorney is responsible for delay in the proceeding that
had the effect of inflating past-due benefits, or if the fee is so large in comparison to the
amount of time counsel spent on the case that the fee would constitute a windfall to the
attorney. Id. at 808.
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As noted above, Louis-Brux entered into a 25% contingency fee agreement with
counsel. Twenty-five percent of his total past due benefits equals $16,477.50. Thus, counsel
has met the “one boundary line” of requesting a fee that does not exceed twenty-five percent
of the past-due benefits.
However, within the twenty-five percent boundary, Counsel must still show that the
fee sought is reasonable. Counsel contends that the requested fee is reasonable for the 34.70
hours of legal work spent in this case. (Docket # 31.) He argues that he has substantial
experience in handling disability claims in multiple federal courts. (Id. at 9–12.) Counsel
notes that he achieved a fully favorable result, with Louis-Brux being found disabled and
receiving back benefits to April 1, 2009—thus receiving more than ten years of additional
backpay and Medicare benefits eligibility since May 2010. (Id. at 7.)
Pursuant to Gisbrecht, I find the requested fee is reasonable. Counsel obtained a fully
favorable result for Louis-Brux, who was awarded disability insurance benefits and was
awarded back benefits to April 1, 2009. (Id.) I further find the fee does not constitute a
windfall to the attorney. The amount sought by counsel under § 406(b) is within the 25%
permitted by law and provided for in the fee agreement. The fee of $16,477.50 for 34.70
hours of work equates to an hourly fee of approximately $474.86/hour, and this is well
within the realm of reasonable fees approved by the courts in this circuit. See Koester v.
Astrue, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1081 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (approving hourly rate of $580.67 per
hour for 38.80 hours of work); Stemper v. Astrue, No. 04-CV-838, 2008 WL 2810589, *1
(W.D. Wis. July 14, 2008) (approving rate hourly rate of $666 per hour).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for an
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award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Docket # 30) is hereby
GRANTED. Attorney Dana Duncan is awarded fees in the amount of $16,477.50.

Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 26th day of August, 2020.

BY THE COURT
RT
RT

__________________________
__________________________
__
______
JOSEPH
NANCY JOSEPH
EP
United States Magistrate Judge

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