Urquhart v. Roeseler et al

Filing 59

ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 9/11/2019: GRANTING 43 Defendant Advanced Correctional Healthcare's Motion for Summary Judgment; GRANTING 49 Defendant Cory Roeseler's Motion for Summary Judgment; DENYING as moot 26 Defendant Cory Roeseler's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; and DISMISSING CASE with prejudice. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Bryan Urquhart at Fox Lake Correctional Institution) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
BRYAN URQUHART,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 18-CV-879-JPS-JPS

CORY ROESELER and ADVANCED
CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE,

ORDER

Defendants.
Plaintiff, Bryan Urquhart, alleges that he suffered a heart attack
while detained at the Sheboygan County Detention Center (“SCDC”) in
June 2017. (Docket #1 at 2–3). He complains that he did not receive adequate
healthcare for this condition at SCDC, in large measure because he was seen
by nurses rather than doctors. Id. Plaintiff maintains that he was properly
attended to only once he was transferred to Dodge Correctional Institution.
Id. at 3. Plaintiff’s complaint states that he “is asking the courts to order a
change in procedure” for the healthcare services at SCDC, in that he does
not want nurses to be used as a buffer between the inmates and the
physicians. Id. at 4. Plaintiff also requests monetary damages. Id.
Nowhere in Plaintiff’s complaint does he attempt to state a claim
against any of the individuals directly responsible for his healthcare. See
generally id. Instead, Plaintiff sues Defendant Cory Roeseler (“Roeseler”),
the Sheboygan County Sheriff, and Advanced Correctional Healthcare
(“ACH”), a private company contracted to provide medical services at
SCDC. Id. at 1–2. Plaintiff was allowed to proceed against both defendants

on the theory that their policies and practices led to the violation of his
Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. (Docket #8 at 5–6).1
The legal basis for this theory of liability originates from Monell v.
Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). There,
the Supreme Court held that local government entities, such as
municipalities and counties, cannot be held vicariously liable for
constitutional violations committed by their employees. Id. at 690. Such
entities can, nevertheless, be liable under Section 1983 if “the
unconstitutional act complained of is caused by: (1) an official policy
adopted and promulgated by its officers; (2) a governmental practice or
custom that, although not officially authorized, is widespread and well
settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.” Thomas v. Cook
Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Monell, 436 U.S.
at 690). Such a claim is colloquially referred to as a “Monell” claim. Monell
claims may be leveled against private companies as well, if the company
contracts to provide essential government services like inmate healthcare.
Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014).

Plaintiff never objected to the screening order’s interpretation of his
complaint as being restricted to these two policy claims, either in a separate motion
or in any of his later filings. The only mention of a potential issue with the
screening decision is found in one of Plaintiff’s briefs in opposition to summary
judgment, wherein he states: “‘ACH asserts the only cause of action is a ‘Monell’
claim. Plaintiff believes the magistrate judge believed there is potentially other
causes of action, and allows the Hon. Judge Stadtmueller will ultimately decide
whether there is cause/causes.” (Docket #53 at 2).
1

Plaintiff had ample time to object to the screening determination in this
matter and chose not to. The summary judgment stage is far too late to take issue
with screening concerns. In any event, Plaintiff’s offhand musing about additional
claims supplies no reasoned basis to alter the screening order.

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Both Defendants have filed motions for summary judgment seeking
dismissal of this action. (Docket #43 and #49). They deny that Plaintiff
suffered any heart attacks or that the care provided to him was
substandard. More important, however, is their contention that even if
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated, he lacks evidence that the
violation was caused by a policy of SCDC or ACH, as required for liability
to attach under Monell.
Plaintiff’s opposition to both of Defendants’ summary judgment
motions totals just thirty pages. (Docket #52 and #53). His submissions offer
absolutely no evidence to support his policy claims under the second or
third Monell variants. That is to say, Plaintiff supplies no proof that his
treatment was the result of a consistent, though unauthorized, practice of
ignoring inmates’ medical needs. Indeed, he appears to expressly disclaim
any desire to produce such evidence. See (Docket #53 at 5) (“Plaintiff asks,
is it necessary to show multiple policy, practice or custom resulting in
denial of medical treatment? One instance is 1 too many.”). Plaintiff also
fails to allege, or offer any evidence for, a theory that his alleged
mistreatment was done at the hands of an official with final policy-making
authority.
The Court is left, then, to assess whether Plaintiff could proceed to
trial on the first variant of a Monell claim: an official policy adopted by
Defendants that caused his constitutional rights to be violated. The policy
at issue—using nurses to assess inmates in person and then pass along
information to doctors—does appear to be an official policy. The problem
for Plaintiff is that he cites no legal authority for the proposition that using
nurses in a screening role violates the Eighth Amendment. To the contrary,
Defendants note that such policies have consistently passed constitutional
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muster. See Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 622 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although
mandating a doctor’s visit or constant prisoner checks would likely reduce
the number of illness-related deaths or injuries, it is neither economically
prudent nor feasible to put such policies in place.”); Adams v. Ingram, No.
12-CV-162, 2015 WL 1256442 at *5 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2015) (the “common
triage practice” of using nurses to screen complaints does not demonstrate
deliberate indifference to their medical needs, as it “allows inmates to
receive nurse-level medical treatment on demand but reserves higher level
treatment for cases that nurses, in their medical judgment, believe require
more medical expertise.”); Cook v. S. Health Partners, No. 4:08CV-P128-M,
2009 WL 1409713 at *2 (W.D. Ken. May 20, 2009) (“A prisoner is entitled to
medical care. This does not mean, however, that a prisoner is
constitutionally entitled to see a doctor every time he wishes. In many
instances, evaluation by a trained nurse prior to a doctor’s examination may
be sufficient medical treatment for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment.
A nurse or physician’s assistant may be able to effectively treat a prisoner
without requiring a doctor’s assistance. In this case, Southern Health
Partners’s policy did not deny Plaintiff all medical care in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Instead, Plaintiff simply alleges that the policy
deprived him of the ability to receive the type of care he deemed necessary
to treat his condition at that specific time. Mere disagreement with the
nature of one’s medical treatment is not sufficient, standing alone, to
constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.”).2
Defendants cited these and other decisions in their opening briefs. (Docket
#45 at 14–15; Docket #50 at 11–13). Plaintiff entirely failed to respond to
Defendants’ arguments on this point, much less cite other, more persuasive cases.
See generally (Docket #52 and #53). The Court could thus conclude that Plaintiff has
waived any argument in opposition to Defendants’ position. Lee v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l
2

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Moreover, Plaintiff not only needs to establish that the nursescreening policy was defective, but that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to the results of that defectiveness, namely that inmates were
consistently receiving inadequate healthcare because of the policy. Wilson
v. Cook Cty., 742 F.3d 775, 781 (7th Cir. 2014). As noted above, Plaintiff
supplies no evidence of this, other than his own single instance of allegedly
improper care. In sum, regardless of the circumstances of Plaintiff’s
particular interaction with the nursing staff at SCDC, he has not created a
triable issue as to whether the nurse-screening policy itself was the source
of a putative violation of his constitutional rights.
Plaintiff has thus failed to support any theory of Monell liability
against Defendants for their policy of nurse-screening. Defendants’ motions
for summary judgment must, therefore, be granted. The Court will also
deny as moot a prior motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by
Roeseler. (Docket #26).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motions for summary judgment
(Docket #43 and #49) be and the same are hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Cory Roeseler’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings (Docket #26) be and the same is hereby
DENIED as moot; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same is
hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Commuter R.R. Corp., 912 F.3d 1049, 1053–54 (7th Cir. 2019) (failure to address an
opposing party’s argument acts as a concession of the argument).

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Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 11th day of September, 2019.
BY THE COURT:

____________________________________
J. P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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