Pierce v. Calumet County et al

Filing 79

DECISION AND ORDER DENYING 72 Motion for Reconsideration filed by Angela Pierce, signed by Judge William C Griesbach on 01/18/2023. (cc: all counsel)(Griesbach, William)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
ANGELA PIERCE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 21-C-354

CALUMET COUNTY, BRETT J. BOWE,
JULIE HOERNING, BRIAN POST,
JOSEPH TENOR, JORDAN FICKEL, and
DR. MANUEL MENDOZA,
Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Angela Pierce, as a pretrial detainee at the Calumet County Jail (CCJ), was
subjected to a body cavity search by a doctor at a local hospital. The search was conducted at the
request of CCJ officials who suspected—following a report of an electronic body scan performed
on Pierce at the Winnebago County Jail (WCJ)—that she might have contraband hidden in her
pelvic region. Pierce filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the CCJ officials who
authorized the search, the officers who escorted her to the hospital, and Manuel Mendoza, M.D.,
the doctor who performed the examination, alleging that they violated her constitutional rights
when they ordered, facilitated, and subjected her to a warrantless body cavity search. Dkt. No. 1.
In particular, Pierce alleged that Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, conspired to deprive her of her Fourth Amendment rights, and
failed to intervene to prevent the violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Id. She sought
compensatory and punitive damages under § 1983; attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and indemnification for the liability of its employees from Calumet County

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pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.46. Id. at 11. Defendants moved for summary judgment. On
November 8, 2022, the court granted Defendants’ motions and dismissed Pierce’s claims with
prejudice, holding that the search was lawful. Dkt. No. 66. Judgment was subsequently entered.
Dkt. No. 67. This matter comes before the court on Pierce’s motion to alter or amend the judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). For the following reasons, Pierce’s motion will be
denied.
A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) serves a very limited purpose in federal
civil litigation; it should be used only “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.” Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir.
1987) (quoting Keene Corp. v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 656, 665–66 (N.D. Ill.
1976), aff’d 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984)). “A ‘manifest error’ is not demonstrated by the
disappointment of the losing party. It is the ‘wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to
recognize controlling precedent.’” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir.
2000) (quoting Sedrak v. Callahan, 987 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1997)). The purpose of a
Rule 59(e) motion is to enable a district court to correct its own errors, thereby avoiding
unnecessary appellate procedures. See Charles v. Daley, 799 F.2d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 1986). Relief
under Rule 59(e) is an “extraordinary remedy.” See Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir.
2008). Consequently, it should only be granted in “rare” cases. See Bank of Waunakee v.
Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Under Rule
59(e), the movant must “clearly establish” the alleged grounds for relief. Harrington v. City of
Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006). Whether to grant a Rule 59(e) motion “is entrusted
to the sound judgment of the district court.” Matter of Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996).

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Pierce has not demonstrated that this court made any manifest errors of law or fact.
Rothwell Cotton Co., 827 F.2d at 251. She cites no controlling precedent which this court has
disregarded, misapplied, or failed to recognize, Oto, 224 F.3d at 606, or material facts that would
change the court’s analysis. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment.”).
As to whether the court made manifest legal errors entitling her to relief from the judgment,
Pierce argues that the court failed to use the proper standard to assess the search’s lawfulness. The
basis for the court’s decision on summary judgment was straightforward: “Although Pierce has
asserted five separate claims against seven defendants, all of her claims rise or fall on a single
question: Was the body cavity search conducted by Dr. Mendoza lawful? That is, was the search
legally justified and conducted in a reasonable manner?” Dkt. No. 66 at 5. Relying on the Seventh
Circuit’s recent opinion in Brown v. Polk County, 965 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 1304 (2021), the court found that the search was conducted reasonably in terms of its scope,
the manner in which it was conducted, and where it was conducted. Pierce makes little attempt to
distinguish or undermine Brown. In short, Pierce has not clearly established that the court made a
manifest error of law entitling her to relief under Rule 59(e).
As to whether the court made manifest factual errors entitling her to relief, Pierce argues
that the court improperly accepted (1) Defendants’ conclusion that the electronic scans suggested
the presence of contraband inside of Pierce and (2) the credibility of Defendants’ factual assertions
about whether there was a medical need for Pierce to be seen and searched by Dr. Mendoza. In
essence, Pierce asserts that the court should alter or amend the judgment because “consideration
of the totality of the facts taken in the light most favorable to [her] could lead a reasonable jury to

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find that Defendants lacked reasonable suspicion” for the search. Pl.’s Reply Br. at 1, Dkt. No.
78.
The material facts relevant to whether the search was lawful are that Pierce was subject to
two electronic scans at the WCJ, the results of the electronic scans caused WCJ officials to reject
her intake, and Pierce was subsequently taken to a doctor to determine whether there was any
contraband inside of her. Those facts are not in dispute. WCJ officials notified CCJ officials that
they would not admit Pierce as an inmate in the WCJ because there was something on the scan.
Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact ¶ 21, Dkt. No. 61. Scans are performed by WCJ staff to determine
if an inmate has contraband secreted in a body cavity. The reasonable inference that WCJ and
CCJ officials drew from the presence of a shadow on the scan is that there was a foreign object
inside Pierce that required further investigation. That is the reason the WCJ rejected her as an
inmate.
Pierce suggests that it was improper for CCJ officials to rely upon information provided by
WCJ staff. But under the collective-knowledge doctrine, such reliance was reasonable. Under the
collective-knowledge doctrine, knowledge on the part of one law enforcement officer who is
cooperating in an investigation is presumed shared by all. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771
n.5 (1983). “Collective knowledge also applies to information that an officer receives from those
with the ‘training, responsibility or authority to make a determination of reasonable suspicion.’”
United States v. Eymann, 962 F.3d 273, 284 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Colon, 250
F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2001)).
As discussed above, these facts provided reasonable suspicion to conduct the search. See
Dkt. No. 66 at 6–8 (discussing and applying Brown to the facts of this case). Pierce has not shown
that WCJ officials acted improperly or misled CCJ officials about the results of the scans, nor has

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she proffered evidence that the body scans themselves were faulty or somehow unreliable. Thus,
Pierce has not raised a genuine issue of material fact, which was necessary for her to defeat
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (stating that “[o]nly
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment”). Pierce has not succeeded in clearly establishing that
the court made manifest errors of fact entitling her to relief under Rule 59(e).
In sum, Pierce has not carried her burden of showing that the court committed a manifest
error of law or fact in granting Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, Pierce’s
motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) (Dkt. No. 72) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED at Green Bay, Wisconsin this 18th day of January, 2023.
s/ William C. Griesbach
William C. Griesbach
United States District Judge

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