Alphonse v. Milwaukee County Jail et al

Filing 71

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C Dries on 8/29/2024 GRANTING 51 Motion for Summary Judgment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court will enter judgment accordingly. (cc: all counsel and mailed to pro se party)(amb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ANTOINE ALPHONSE, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 22-cv-125

ANTHONY MEDINA, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff Antoine Alphonse, Jr., who is representing himself and currently
confined at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, brings this lawsuit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Alphonse was allowed to proceed on a Fourteenth
Amendment conditions of confinement claim against defendant Anthony Medina for
failing to remove him from a cell flooding with feces. Alphonse was also allowed to
proceed on a claim against Milwaukee County pursuant to Monell v. Dept. of Social
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment. (ECF No. 51.) The motion is fully briefed and ready for a
decision. For the reasons stated below, the court grants the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.

PRELIMINARY MATTERS
The defendants argue that Alphonse failed to respond to their requests for
admission, so the court should deem them admitted under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 36(a)(3)(b). However, the court finds this unnecessary. As discussed below,
even when accepting the facts in a light most favorable to Alphonse based off his
declarations filed in support of his response to the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, the court finds that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the
defendants violated Alphonse’s constitutional rights.
FACTS
On January 18, 2022, Alphonse was assigned to Cell 10 on Pod 3C at the
Milwaukee County Jail. (ECF No. 53, ¶ 6.) Within two hours of moving into the cell,
Alphonse awoke from a nap to find his cell flooding with tissue and feces. (Id., ¶ 9.)
Alphonse used a blanket to make a path to the call button to alert Medina that his
cell was flooding and he needed out of the cell. (Id., ¶ 13.) Alphonse states that Medina
refused to let him out of his cell, even though he was allowing other prisoners out of
their cells. (ECF No. 63 at 5.) Medina asserts that several prisoners’ cells were
flooding, and they all were asking to be released from their cells. (ECF No. 53, ¶ 15.)
Because of safety and security concerns, Medina could not let all the prisoners out at
once. (Id., ¶¶ 22, 36.)
Medina also did not have the ability to stop the flooding and needed to wait for
the plumber to come and fix the situation. (ECF No. 53, ¶ 18.) Medina states that he
checked on all the prisoners and instructed them to protect their belongings. (Id., ¶
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19.) Alphonse states that Medina was ignoring all the prisoners and did not check in
on them. (ECF No. 63 at 3.) Alphonse went to sit on his bunk until the flood issue was
resolved. (ECF No. 53, ¶ 25.) A few hours later, it is unclear from the record exactly
when, a plumber came and fixed the issue. (Id., ¶ 31.) Three hours after the flooding
began, the bio-hazard team, which is composed of prisoners, came to clean up after
the flood. (Id., ¶ 32.) The team used disinfectant, bleach, and machines to clean up
the cells. (Id., ¶ 34.)
For safety and security reasons, prisoners were removed from their cell one at
a time to allow the bio-hazard team to clean the cell. (ECF No. 53, ¶ 36.) At one point,
at approximately 3:25 p.m., one of the bio-hazard team members got in a fight with a
prisoner on Pod 3C. (Id., ¶ 37.) This delayed the cleaning process. (Id.¸¶ 38)
Eventually, at 4:03 p.m., Alphonse was removed from his cell and the team cleaned
it. (Id., ¶ 39.) Once the bio-hazard team was finished, Alphonse told them that there
were areas that needed to be cleaned again, which they promptly did. (Id., ¶ 46.)
The next day, Alphonse was still dissatisfied with the condition of his cell and
requested cleaning supplies. (ECF No. 53, ¶ 48.) While the Jail was running low on
disinfectant, Alphonse was given an extra towel, a broom, and spray bottles. (Id., ¶¶
49, 57.) It is unclear from the record exactly why Alphonse was still dissatisfied with
the state of his cell; however, he was unhappy that he was not given bleach to clean
his cell. (Id., ¶ 54.) Alphonse also asserts that Pod 3C generally smelled bad for days
after the flood. (ECF No. 63 at 6.)

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Alphonse remained in Cell 10 for an additional four days, and then he was
moved to a different cell on in Pod 3C. (ECF No. 53, ¶ 58.) Alphonse alleges that the
Jail has a policy of withholding cleaning supplies to prisoners. (ECF No. 15 at 4.)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). “Material facts”
are those under the applicable substantive law that “might affect the outcome of the
suit.” See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute over a “material fact” is “genuine” if
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all
inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986). However, when the nonmovant is the party with the ultimate burden of proof
at trial, that party retains its burden of producing evidence which would support a
reasonable jury verdict. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. Evidence relied upon must be
of a type that would be admissible at trial. See Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985
(7th Cir. 2009). To survive summary judgment a party cannot just rely on his
pleadings but “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “In short, ‘summary judgment is appropriate if, on
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the record as a whole, a rational trier of fact could not find for the non-moving party.’”
Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Turner
v. J.V.D.B. & Assoc., Inc., 330 F.3d 991, 994 (7th Cir. 2003)).
ANALYSIS
Alphonse claims that the defendants violated his rights by leaving him in a
sewage-flooded cell. As a pretrial detainee, Alphonse’s rights derive from the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Smith v. Dart, 803 F. 3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015). To
sufficiently prove a conditions of confinement claim as a pretrial detainee, “the
plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the conditions in question are or were
objectively serious . . .; (2) the defendant acted purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly
with respect to the consequences of his actions; and (3) the defendant’s actions were
objectively unreasonable—that is ‘not rationally related to a legitimate governmental
objective . . .or excessive in relation to that purpose.” Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d
816, 827 (7th Cir. 2019) (Sykes, J., concurring) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576
U.S. 389, 398 (2015)).
Alphonse alleges that Medina purposely kept him in a sewage-flooded cell for
several hours. It is well established that a short-term exposure to sewage or feces
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Lindell v. Pollard, 558 F.
Supp.3d 734, 750 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 3, 2021). Where there is “exposure to significant
amounts of human feces along with other inhumane conditions, such as lack to access
to water, clogged sewage pipes, and exposure to frigid temperatures,” then there may
be a constitutional violation. (Id.) (citing Taylor v. Rojas, 592 U.S. 7, 7 (2020)). See
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also Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 720-721 (7th Cir. 2021) (finding a constitutional
violation where prisoner was confined in a cell with feces covered walls, no hot water,
dead flies in his bed, and a mattress covered in human waste); Vinning-El v. Long,
482 F.3d. 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding a constitutional violation where prisoner
was in a cell for several days with no working sink or toilet and walls smeared with
blood and feces).
Here, Alphonse was exposed to sewage for less than 5 hours. He does not allege
that he suffered any negative health effects from the exposure, other than the
unpleasant experience. His cell was promptly cleaned. He was able to sit on his bed.
He was also allowed to have the bio-hazard team reclean parts of his cell and given
cleaning supplies to clean it once again on his own. Alphonse does not provide
evidence that after both cleanings his cell was left in an objectively unsanitary
condition. At most, he asserts that the cell was not cleaned to his preferred standards.
There is also no evidence that, other than the flooding, Alphonse was exposed to
conditions that would rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Additionally, there was a legitimate governmental purpose for keeping
Alphonse in his flooded cell for a few hours. Medina decided to keep the prisoners in
Pod 3C in their cells for safety and security reasons. Allowing too many prisoners out
of their cell during a chaotic emergency situation could cause additional dangerous
situations. Indeed, a fight still happened despite allowing only one prisoner out of his
cell at a time to have the cell cleaned.

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No reasonable factfinder could conclude that Medina violated Alphonse’s
constitutional rights by keeping him in his flooded cell for a few hours while the
situation was remedied. Summary judgment is therefore granted in favor of Medina
on the conditions of confinement claim.
As to the claim against Milwaukee County under Monell, “a municipality
cannot be held liable under Monell where there is no underlying constitutional
violation by a municipal employee.” Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., 630 F.3d 499,
504 (7th Cir. 2010). Because, as a matter of law, Medina did not violate Alphonse’s
constitutional rights, Milwaukee County cannot also be held liable. Summary
judgment is granted in Milwaukee County’s favor.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The defendants also argued that they were entitled to qualified
immunity. Because the court grants summary judgment in their favor on the merits,
the court does not need to address the qualified immunity argument. Because there
are no remaining claims, the case is dismissed.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants’
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 51) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. The Clerk of
Court will enter judgment accordingly.

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This order and the judgment to follow are final. A dissatisfied party may appeal
this court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by filing in this
court a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure 3, 4. This court may extend this deadline if a party timely
requests an extension and shows good cause or excusable neglect for not being able
to meet the 30-day deadline. See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A).
Under certain circumstances a party may ask this court to alter or amend its
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or ask for relief from judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Any motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) must be filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment. The court
cannot extend this deadline. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2). Any motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) must be filed within a reasonable time,
generally no more than one year after the entry of the judgment. The court cannot
extend this deadline. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2).
A party is expected to closely review all applicable rules and determine what,
if any, further action is appropriate in a case.
Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 29th day of August, 2024.

STEPHEN DRIES
United States Magistrate Judge

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