Lukaszewski v. Hartman et al

Filing 44

ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 8/28/2024. Doe Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff's failure to prosecute. 42 Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time is DENIED. 26 Defendant Elisha Williams's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; CASE DISMISSED with prejudice. See Order. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Christopher L Lukaszewski at Green Bay Correctional Institution)(jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
CHRISTOPHER L. LUKASZEWSKI,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 22-CV-515-JPS

v.
ELISHA WILLIAMS and JOHN AND
JANE DOES,

ORDER

Defendants.

Plaintiff

Christopher

L.

Lukaszewski

(“Plaintiff”),

who

is

incarcerated at Green Bay Correctional Institution, proceeds in this matter
pro se. On December 19, 2022, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and
allowed Plaintiff to proceed on the following four claims: (1) Eighth
Amendment

excessive

force

against

Defendant

Elisha

Williams

(“Defendant” or “Williams”) for the improper use of restraints to cause
Plaintiff harm; (2) Excessive force against John/Jane Doe for intentionally
braking the transport van to cause Plaintiff harm; (3) Eighth Amendment
failure to intervene against John/Jane Doe for the failure to intervene
regarding Plaintiff’s restraints; and (4) Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim against Williams and John/Jane Doe for the failure to
provide access to a bathroom. ECF No. 9 at 7–8.
On April 4, 2023, the Court issued a scheduling order with discovery
to be completed by October 6, 2023, and summary judgment motions due
on or before November 13, 2023. ECF No. 22. The scheduling order
instructed Plaintiff that he had ninety days from the date of the order to
identify the Doe defendants and warned him that the failure to do so would
result in their dismissal without further notice. Id. at 2. That deadline has

long passed, and Plaintiff has not identified the Does or sought an extension
to do so. As such, the Court is obliged to dismiss the Does and the claims
against them without prejudice.
On September 28, 2023, Defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment. ECF No. 26. Plaintiff did not file any response. On June 18, 2024,
the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel and provided
Plaintiff a final opportunity to respond to the pending motion for summary
judgment. ECF No. 36. The Court warned Plaintiff that the failure to file
oppositional materials would result in the Court deciding the motion
without his input. Id. at 6. On July 26, 2024, the Court granted another
extension and warned Plaintiff that no further extensions would be granted.
ECF No. 39 at 2. On July 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a letter in response. ECF No.
40. On July 31, 2024, Defendant filed a reply letter. ECF No. 41. On August
5, 2024, Plaintiff filed yet another motion for an extension of time in order
to obtain counsel. ECF No. 42.
Given the prior warnings, the Court is obliged to deny the motion
for an extension. Here, Plaintiff’s initial deadline has long passed, and the
Court provided Plaintiff multiple opportunities to respond. No counsel has
appeared for Plaintiff and any new counsel at this juncture would delay the
case even further. As such, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for an
extension and finds that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is
ready for disposition. As discussed in detail below, the Court grants
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in full and will accordingly
dismiss this case with prejudice.
1.

LEGAL STANDARD — SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the “court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
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law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016). A
fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit” under the
applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A dispute of fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
The Court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in a light
most favorable to the nonmovant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 815
F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir. 2016). In assessing the parties’ proposed facts, the
Court must not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility; the
Seventh Circuit instructs that “we leave those tasks to factfinders.” Berry v.
Chi. Transit Auth., 618 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2010).
2.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In compliance with the Court’s scheduling order, Defendant

submitted a statement of joint proposed material facts. ECF No. 28. As such,
the following facts are taken directly from the parties’ joint statement of
material facts with only minor grammatical editing. Defendant also
included a list of disputed facts, ECF No. 29, which the Court will address
separately below.
On December 7, 2021, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Defendant and
Deputy Alyssa Knabenbauer (“Knabenbauer”) of the Oneida County
Sheriff’s Office conducted an adult transport of six individuals from the
Oneida

County

Jail

in

Rhinelander,

Wisconsin.

Defendant

and

Knabenbauer were transporting one individual to the Winnebago Mental
Health Institute in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, and the other five individuals,
including Plaintiff, to Dodge Correctional Institution in Waupun,
Wisconsin. Defendant and Knabenbauer prepared the six individuals for
transportation by placing each individual in handcuffs in front of their
person through a transport belt that was locked in the back and leg
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shackles. Defendant placed two individuals in handcuffs, including
Plaintiff. Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs and restraints at around 6:12 a.m.
While Defendant was handcuffing Plaintiff, she asked him how he
was doing and he responded, “good.” None of the individuals, including
Plaintiff voiced any concerns regarding their restraints. Defendant placed
Plaintiff in handcuffs at the front of his person, checked the handcuffs for
fit, and safely locked the handcuffs. Defendant then requested that Plaintiff
turn toward the bullpen of the Oneida County Jail for her to secure the
transport belt and lock it pursuant to standard protocol for transportation.
After the six individuals were secured, Defendant and Knabenbauer
guided them to the Sheriff’s Office transport van and loaded them onto the
van. The transport van has three separate and individual compartments:
two longer compartments in the back of the vehicle that seats inmates side
by side and a third separate compartment in front of the two rear
compartments. The transport van is equipped with live streaming cameras
so that deputies can monitor the inmates in the transport compartments
during transport.1 Plaintiff and one other inmate were loaded into one of
the two rear compartments.
The transport van left the Oneida County Jail at 6:15 a.m. and arrived
at the Winnebago Mental Health Institute at approximately 8:58 a.m.
Defendant drove the transport van and Knabenbauer rode in the front
passenger seat and they both observed the live video stream. There were
no issues with any of the inmates on the way to the Winnebago Mental
Health Institute.
When the transport van arrived at the Winnebago Mental Health
Institute, Knabenbauer escorted one inmate from the van to the facility and
initiated the intake procedures and Defendant remained inside the van.

These cameras do not have recording capability.

1

Page 4 of 17

Plaintiff was seated in the secure area of the transport van closest to the
interior of the transport vehicle and camera. While Knabenbauer was at the
facility, Plaintiff pounded on the walls of the transport vehicle and yelled
to Defendant that he had to urinate. Defendant responded to Plaintiff that
it was an approximately forty-five-minute drive to Dodge Correctional
Institution from their current location, that the transport van was currently
parked, and that he would be able to urinate upon arrival at Dodge
Correctional Institution. Defendant and Knabenbauer did not use the
restroom during this transport or allow any other inmates to use the
restroom while stopped at the Winnebago Mental Health Institute.
After being told that he could not use the bathroom, Plaintiff became
upset and said to Defendant that she incorrectly put his handcuffs on by
placing them on the incorrect wrists and that he needed the handcuffs
removed. At this point, the other inmate in Plaintiff’s compartment was
facing the back exit door of the secured portion of the transport vehicle and
appeared to be doing something with the door, but Defendant could not
identify what he was doing.
After Knabenbauer returned to the van, Plaintiff stood up and put
his handcuffs in view of the camera and announced again that his handcuffs
had been put on incorrectly. Defendant instructed Plaintiff to sit down and
advised that he would be removed from his compartment within the
transport van upon arrival at Dodge Correctional Institution. In response,
Plaintiff began “flipping off” the camera with his middle finger and
shouted profanities toward Defendant, including saying, “Fuck you.”
Plaintiff continued shouting profanities towards Defendant, and he
appeared upset that she would not let him outside of the transport van.
Plaintiff then moved to the back of the compartment, pushing past
the other inmate, where he had his back to the camera and appeared to be
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doing something with the back door of the transport vehicle. Based on
Plaintiff’s behavior, including his movements outside of the view of the
camera and aggressive striking of the walls within the transport van,
Defendant and Knabenbauer determined that it would not be safe to open
the door at that time and Defendant advised Plaintiff that she would not be
opening the door of the van for him to exit. Both deputies determined that
it would have been a security risk to remove Plaintiff from the vehicle in his
agitated state.
Defendant observed in her camera feed that when Plaintiff was
facing the camera, he was able to move his hands and wrists. Because
Plaintiff could move his hands and wrists, Defendant had no concerns that
Plaintiff’s circulation was being cut off or that there were other medical
concerns associated with placement of the handcuffs. Defendant
specifically recalled being inside the Oneida County Jail while placing
handcuffs on Plaintiff and knew that the handcuff locks had been placed on
the top side of both of his wrists, the required posture for properly applying
cuffs. She also knew that there was no variation in the chain which would
have indicated the handcuffs were tight. Defendant also placed a finger
inside Plaintiff’s handcuffs upon tightening them and asked Plaintiff if the
handcuffs were too tight to which he replied, “no.”
At approximately 9:24 a.m., Defendant and Knabenbauer left the
Winnebago Mental Health Institute in route for Dodge Correctional
Institution with the remaining five inmates. Immediately after Defendant
began driving in the direction of Dodge Correctional Institution, Plaintiff
stood up and began to scream expletives at Defendant, including “You
fucking cunt” and “Dyke bitch.” Plaintiff repeated that his handcuffs were
on “fucked up” and needed them off and continued to violently pound on
the walls of the transport vehicle while standing.
Page 6 of 17

Plaintiff was standing while the van was in motion and about to
enter the highway going towards Waupun and Dodge Correctional
Institution. Defendant loudly ordered Plaintiff to sit down but Plaintiff
responded: “Fuck you” and “I can do this all day Sarge.” Plaintiff’s choice
to stand in the van created a major concern for Defendant because the roads
had been slippery due to wintery conditions throughout the transport and
Plaintiff or the other inmates could be significantly injured if Plaintiff
remained standing. Plaintiff’s actions were also distracting Defendant and
Knabenbauer, and this increased the potential for a motor vehicle accident.
Plaintiff continued to call Defendant a “cunt bitch” and faced the back of
the compartment, refused to sit, and when Defendant again loudly ordered
Plaintiff to sit, he responded by pounding on the transport van and moving
his handcuffs around his wrists while remaining standing.
Due to the security risks and safety concerns for Plaintiff and other
inmates associated with Plaintiff standing in the vehicle, Defendant
decided to conduct a controlled brake maneuver. During a controlled brake
maneuver, the vehicle brakes are quickly and firmly engaged for the
purpose of causing a standing inmate to slide onto the padded seat of the
transport vehicle. After the controlled brake maneuver, Plaintiff
immediately stood back up and shouted profanities but a short time later
when the transport vehicle entered the highway and returned to highway
speeds, Plaintiff sat down.
Once Plaintiff returned to sitting, he stopped physically moving
about the van but remained verbally belligerent during the transport,
including screaming through the duration of the transport. Plaintiff
shouted profanities and banged on the walls of the vehicle, including
calling Defendant a “Dyke cunt” and making sexually suggestive
comments about Defendant and other insulting remarks. Defendant and
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Knabenbauer observed Plaintiff turning his back towards the transport
away from the camera. Defendant and Knabenbauer also observed Plaintiff
continually yelling. Plaintiff’s actions of twisting his handcuffs on his wrists
was photographed by Knabenbauer.
The transport van arrived at Dodge Correctional Institution at
approximately 10:15 a.m. After they arrived at Dodge Correctional
Institution and while waiting outside of the facility, Plaintiff continued to
shout profanities and grind his wrists into the handcuffs. After arrival at
Dodge Correctional Institution, the transport vehicle was searched by
correctional officers. Defendant and Knabenbauer proceeded into the
intake portion of the facility. Plaintiff was removed from the transport van
at approximately 10:50 a.m. and escorted to intake.
When he walked past Defendant, Plaintiff raised his hands towards
her face. Upon entering the intake facility at Dodge Correctional Institution,
Plaintiff advised the on-duty correctional supervisor that his handcuffs
were too tight and demanded to be seen by medical staff. The corrections
sergeant walked over to Plaintiff and advised him that there was obvious
circulation in his hands and wrists and the handcuffs did not appear too
tight. It appeared that Plaintiff’s handcuffs were tangled as a result of his
own actions during the transport. Plaintiff did not exhibit any signs of
distress while going through intake at Dodge Correctional Institution.
Defendant and Deputy Knabenbauer observed that there were red
marks and slight swelling on Plaintiff’s wrist area which was consistent
with his actions inside the van of continuously turning the handcuffs
around and rubbing them during the duration of the trip from Oshkosh to
Waupun. Plaintiff did not state that he sustained any other injuries. He
stated that he wished to see the prison nurse for the problems he caused to
his wrists. Defendant believed that during the transport, Plaintiff was
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attempting to rotate the handcuff chain and pull on it in a possible attempt
break the handcuff chain. None of the other inmates being transported
made any complaints or had handcuffs that were twisted in the manner that
Plaintiff’s handcuffs were, and Plaintiff was the only inmate who stood up
during the transport. There were no other medical or security concerns
made by any of the other inmates during the transport.
3.

ANALYSIS
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment seeks dismissal of all

claims in the case. First, Defendant argues she is entitled to summary
judgment on the excessive force claim because the undisputed facts show
she did not use excessive force in placing the handcuffs on Plaintiff or by
braking the vehicle during Plaintiff’s transport. ECF No. 27 at 2–7. Second,
Defendant argues that restricting Plaintiff’s bathroom access during the
transport did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 7–9.
Prior to its analysis, however, the Court must address the elephant
in the room at this stage in the case. Plaintiff has presented no evidence in
support of his claims, and such a failure is often determinative at the
summary judgment stage. See Brown v. CACH, LLC, 94 F.4th 665, 667 (7th
Cir. 2024) (“Summary judgment is the ‘put up or shut up’ time in
litigation.”). After multiple opportunities to do so, Plaintiff has submitted
only a letter in response to Defendant’s summary judgment materials. See
ECF No. 40. This letter, which is not sworn and verified, is not evidence for
the purposes of summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Further,
Plaintiff’s complaint is also not sworn and verified, so the Court may not
consider it as evidence either. See Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir.
2017) (“[T]there is a distinction between an ordinary complaint that serves
as a pleading, and a verified complaint.); see also Shaul v. Hibbard, No. 119CV-3962-JMS-TAB, 2022 WL 1045013, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 7, 2022) (“The
Page 9 of 17

unverified amended complaint is not evidence and thus, statements made
in the amended complaint are not considered in resolving the pending
motion for summary judgment.”) (citing James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 314 (7th
Cir. 2020)).
As such, the Court is left to decide summary judgment based on the
undisputed facts that have been properly submitted into evidence. The
Court takes seriously its obligation to liberally construe pro se filings and
to construe all facts and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to
the nonmovant at the summary judgment stage. However, liberally
construing filings is not the functional equivalent of allowing pro se parties
to disregard the rules of civil procedure and this Court’s summary
judgment protocols. Even pro se litigants are obliged to follow procedural
rules. See McCurry v. Kenco Logs. Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 787 n.2 (7th Cir.
2019) (courts may “strictly enforce local summary-judgment rules” even
against pro se litigants); Rivera v. Guevara, 319 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1020 (N.D.
Ill. 2018) (disregarding portions of plaintiff’s proffered facts on summary
judgment for failure to comply with local rule). As such, and for the reasons
explained below, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and will dismiss this case with prejudice.
3.1

Excessive Force

The parties agree that Defendant placed handcuffs on Plaintiff prior
to his transport to another institution. The parties further agree that
Defendant braked the vehicle at some point during the transport. As noted
by the parties’ statement of disputed facts, the parties disagree, however,
on whether the handcuffs were put on too tightly and whether the braking
maneuver constituted excessive force. ECF No. 29 at 1.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain” on prisoners. Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th
Page 10 of 17

Cir. 2001). When a correctional officer is accused of using excessive force,
the core inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d
749, 757 (7th Cir. 2010). Several factors are relevant to this determination,
including the need for force, the amount of force applied, the threat the
officer reasonably perceived, the effort made to temper the severity of the
force used, and the extent of the injury caused to the prisoner. Hudson, 503
U.S. at 7; Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 2004). Summary
judgment rarely is appropriate for excessive force cases because material
factual disputes exist. See Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 773 (7th
Cir. 2005). However, even at summary judgment, courts need not “indulge
stories clearly contradicted by [video] footage” that “firmly settles a factual
issue.” Horton, 883 F.3d at 944. Thus, “‘[a] conclusive video allows a court
to know what happened and decide the legal consequences,’ but a video
that is ambiguous or ‘not wholly clear’ can be relied on only for those facts
that can be established ‘with confidence’ and ‘beyond reasonable
question.’” Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Johnson
v. Rogers, 944 F.3d 966, 967, 969 (7th Cir. 2019)).
Here, as to Defendant’s use of handcuffs, the Court does not find that
her conduct constitutes excessive force under the Eighth Amendment. The
undisputed facts show that Defendant placed handcuffs on Plaintiff in
preparation for transport to another facility. While Defendant was
handcuffing Plaintiff, she asked him how he was doing and he responded,
“good.” Defendant placed Plaintiff in handcuffs at the front of his person,
checked the handcuffs for fit, and safely locked the handcuffs. The transport
van left the Oneida County Jail at 6:15 a.m. and arrived at the Winnebago
Mental Health Institute at approximately 8:58 a.m. After being told that he
Page 11 of 17

could not use the bathroom, Plaintiff became upset and at that point said to
Defendant that she incorrectly put his handcuffs on by placing them on the
incorrect wrists and that he needed the handcuffs removed. Defendant and
Knabenbauer determined that it would have been a security risk to remove
Plaintiff from the vehicle in his agitated state at that time. Defendant
observed in her camera feed that when Plaintiff was facing the camera, he
was able to move his hands and wrists. Because Plaintiff could move his
hands and wrists, Defendant had no concerns that Plaintiff’s circulation
was being cut of or that there were other medical concerns associated with
placement of the handcuffs.
Despite the parties’ generalized dispute about whether the
handcuffs were initially put on too tightly, the video evidence supports
Defendant’s version of facts. Plaintiff appears to be calm in the video and
in no distress while Defendant placed the handcuffs on him. Further, as
indicated above, Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to contradict
Defendant’s version and no facts suggest, even if the handcuffs were in fact
placed too tightly, that Defendant was aware of that fact and acted
maliciously or sadistically to cause harm. As such, the Court finds that on
this record no reasonable jury could find that Defendant used excessive
force in regard to the handcuffs.
Similarly, the Court does not find that Defendant used excessive
force in braking the vehicle during transport.2 Plaintiff’s disputes,

The Court notes that the screening order allowed this claim to proceed
against a Doe defendant as Plaintiff’s allegations, as understood by the Court, did
not suggest that Defendant performed this action. See ECF No. 9 at 4 (“Similarly,
Plaintiff’s allegation against the John/Jane Doe deputy for intentionally braking
the transport vehicle to injure him is sufficient to constitute excessive force.”)
Plaintiff never identified Defendant as the Doe regarding this claim, and,
accordingly, there technically is no claim proceeding against Defendant for this
action. However, in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and the fact that Defendant
herself identifies as the actor, the Court addresses the merits of the claim.
2

Page 12 of 17

regardless of having no support in the record, still do not create a genuine
issue of material fact. As provided in the parties’ disputed facts, Plaintiff
disputes that he slid onto the padded seat of the transport vehicle during
the controlled break maneuver. Plaintiff also disputes that none of the other
inmates moved from their position during the maneuver. Plaintiff does not,
however, dispute his aggressive behavior prior to the brake maneuver or
the fact that he was standing in the vehicle and refusing to obey orders to
sit.
The undisputed facts show that Plaintiff’s choice to stand in the
transport vehicle created a major concern for Defendant because of the
wintery conditions and slippery roads; Defendant was concerned that
Plaintiff or other inmates could have been significantly injured if Plaintiff
remained standing. In order to manage this situation, Defendant chose to
perform a controlled brake maneuver. Defendant explains that during this
maneuver, the vehicle brakes are quickly and firmly engaged for the
purpose of causing a standing inmate to slide onto the padded seat of the
transport vehicle. Nothing in the record indicates that Defendant acted
maliciously or sadistically to cause harm when braking the vehicle. Given
the safety risk of an inmate standing in these conditions, the record
supports that the use of force here was in a good-faith effort to restore
discipline and to protect other prisoners. As such, the Court finds that no
reasonable jury could find that Defendant used excessive force in regard to
the controlled brake maneuver. The Court will accordingly grant
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the excessive force claim.
3.2

Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on an Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claim against Defendant for allegedly denying
him access to a bathroom for a period of over four hours. ECF No. 9 at 6. A
Page 13 of 17

prisoner’s claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement is analyzed
under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 832, 834 (1994). A prisoner is entitled to live in
conditions that do not amount to “punishment.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
535 (1979). Detainees are entitled to be confined under humane conditions
that provide for their “basic human needs.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
347 (1981). “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but
neither does it permit inhumane ones[.]” Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590
(7th Cir. 1996). To establish a constitutional violation with respect to an
inmate’s living conditions, he must be able to demonstrate both: (1) the
conditions were objectively so adverse that they deprived him “of the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,”; and (2) the defendants
acted with deliberate indifference with respect to the conditions. Townsend
v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
“Life’s necessities include shelter, heat, clothing, sanitation, and hygiene
items.” Woods v. Schmeltz, No. 14‐CV‐1336, 2014 WL 7005094, at *1 (C.D. Ill.
Dec. 11, 2014) (citing Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006)); see
also Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2013).
“Adequate facilities to wash and use the toilet are among the
‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” See Jaros v. Ill. Dep't of
Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “But ‘adequate’
does not mean on-demand access. The Constitution does not require
anytime-anywhere access to the bathroom.” Diaz v. Truit, No. 23-CV-2845,
2023 WL 6784411, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2023). In White v. Knight, 710 F.
App’x 260, 262 (7th Cir. 2018), the Seventh Circuit found that “no decision
. . . known to us suggests that . . . a once-every-two-hours limit on the use
of a toilet violates society’s minimum standards of decency.” Courts have
found that as much as a four-hour denial of access to a bathroom did not
Page 14 of 17

violate the Eighth Amendment. See Castro v. Atchison, No. 313-CV00303JPG-PMF, 2015 WL 7184816, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2015) (“[N]either
the Seventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court have held that denial of toilet
access for a four hour period, by itself, violates the Eighth Amendment.”).
Here, the Court does not find that the conditions present in this case
objectively rose to the level of depriving Plaintiff of the minimalized
necessities of life, and therefore it fails the first prong of the test. The
undisputed facts in the record show that Defendant became aware of
Plaintiff’s need to urinate at approximately 8:58 a.m.3 Due to security
concerns, the prison officials determined that the prisoners would not be let
out at the first stop at the Winnebago Mental Health Institute. The transport
van arrived at Dodge Correctional Institution at 10:15 a.m., and after the
van was searched, Plaintiff was escorted off the van at approximately 10:50
a.m.4 Given this timeline, Plaintiff was deprived of bathroom facilities for
approximately two hours, and nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiff
had special circumstances, medical or otherwise, requiring more frequent
access to a bathroom. As shown above, courts have routinely found that
this relatively short length of time does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
See id. (finding no Eighth Amendment violation where Plaintiff “was
denied a toilet for four hours and he sat in his own urine for the last three

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he notified
Defendant while in booking at the Oneida County Jail and that Defendant replied,
“It’s too late I’m not redoing the cuffs.” See ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff’s allegations
suggested that the deprivation lasted for over four hours. However, as noted
above, the complaint is not verified and therefore cannot be considered evidence
at the summary judgment stage. See Beal, 847 F.3d at 901.
3

The Court notes that the record is not clear as to exactly what time Plaintiff
accessed a bathroom. For the purposes of this motion, and based on the record
before it, the Court presumes it was at approximately 10:50 a.m. during intake
procedures. Plaintiff has never alleged or presented facts to suggest the delay went
past arrival at Dodge Correctional Institution intake.
4

Page 15 of 17

hours of the trip”). The Court therefore finds that the conditions here did
not objectively deprive Plaintiff of the minimalized necessities of life.
The Court wishes to emphasize that this finding does not “mean to
minimize the discomfort, pain, or embarrassment that even slight limits on
toilet access can cause.” White, 710 F. App’x at 262. Certainly, the Court
recognizes that these conditions likely caused Plaintiff discomfort and
perhaps pain. However, given the inherent limitations of prison
environments, prison officials may place reasonable limits on access to a
bathroom. The restriction in this case was not “so degrading or dangerous
that it meets the standard for an Eighth Amendment violation[.]” Id. As
such, the Court will accordingly grant Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to the conditions of confinement claim.
4.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court finds that the undisputed

facts show that Defendant did not use excessive force on Plaintiff in
violation of the Eighth Amendment and did not violate the Eighth
Amendment by limiting his access to the bathroom for approximately two
hours. The Court will accordingly grant Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to all claims and will dismiss this case with prejudice.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Doe defendants be and the same are
hereby DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for an extension
of time, ECF No. 42, be and the same is hereby DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Elisha Williams’s
motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 26, be and the same is hereby
GRANTED; and

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same is
hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 28th day of August 2024.
BY THE COURT:

__________________________________
J. P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

This Order and the judgment to follow are final. A dissatisfied party may
appeal this Court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit by filing in this Court a notice of appeal within thirty (30) days of
the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 3, 4. This Court may extend
this deadline if a party timely requests an extension and shows good
cause or excusable neglect for not being able to meet the thirty-day
deadline. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A). Moreover, under certain
circumstances, a party may ask this Court to alter or amend its judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or ask for relief from
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Any motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) must be filed within twentyeight (28) days of the entry of judgment. The Court cannot extend this
deadline. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). Any motion under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) must be filed within a reasonable time, generally
no more than one year after the entry of the judgment. The Court cannot
extend this deadline. See id. A party is expected to closely review all
applicable rules and determine what, if any, further action is appropriate
in a case.

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