The Goat LLC et al v. Advanced Wholesale LLC et al

Filing 30

ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 3/7/2025. 16 Defendants' Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction is GRANTED, contingent upon Defendants' payment of Plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys' fee as speci fied. Within 30 days of this Order, Plaintiffs to FILE a statement of reasonable attorneys' fees as provided. Plaintiffs' deadline to serve Defendants is RESET to 60 days from the date the judgment is vacated. See Order. (cc: all counsel)(jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
THE GOAT LLC, DANIEL WEBSTER,
and GARY GRAVES,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 23-CV-1526-JPS

v.

ORDER

ADVANCED WHOLESALE LLC and
NIKOLAS NEWGARD,
Defendants.

In April 2024, the Court granted Plaintiffs The Goat LLC, Daniel
Webster, and Gary Graves’s (“Graves”) (together, “Plaintiffs”) motion for
default

judgment

against

Defendants

Advanced

Wholesale

LLC

(“Advanced Wholesale”)1 and Nikolas Newgard (“Newgard”) (together,
“Defendants”). ECF No. 11. As a result, the Court entered both a permanent
injunction and a default judgment against Defendants. ECF Nos. 12, 13.
In May 2024, Defendants moved to vacate the default judgment and
the permanent injunction. ECF No. 16; ECF No. 17 at 16. The motion is now
fully briefed. ECF Nos. 17, 20, 22. After considering the parties’ briefs and
relevant deposition testimony, and for the reasons set forth below,

Certain testimony has called into question whether Advanced Wholesale
is currently a legal entity—see ECF No. 27-1 at 6–7 (Nikolas Newgard confirming
that he is aware that Wisconsin lists Advanced Wholesale as being dissolved in
May 2024)—but because this case was brought before that dissolution occurred
and because that same testimony reflects that Advanced Wholesale is or soon will
likely be in the process of reinstatement, the Court will not address the issue at this
juncture. The parties should provide additional information to the Court if they
become aware of a jurisdictional concern.
1

Defendants’ motion to vacate will be granted, contingent upon their
payment of certain of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, and Plaintiffs will be
allowed sixty (60) days from the date the judgement is vacated in which to
properly effectuate service of process.
1.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prior to filing the complaint, Plaintiffs “attempted to communicate

with . . . Defendants by certified mail” to Defendants’ Deerfield, Wisconsin
address, “which is listed with the Secretary of State as the registered
address for Advance[d] Wholesale LLC.” ECF No. 9 at 1. Plaintiffs then
filed this action on November 14, 2023. ECF No. 1. According to Plaintiffs,
Newgard called them on December 8, 2023, after this action had been filed
but before service of process, to “den[y] that any infringement occurred.”
ECF No. 9 at 2; ECF No. 20 at 1–2.
Thereafter, Plaintiffs hired a private investigator and process server
to locate and serve Defendants with the complaint and summonses. ECF
No. 9 at 1. Plaintiffs “determined that Defendants had abandoned their
affiliation with the Deerfield, Wisconsin address.” ECF No. 8 at 2. After
expending “substantial effort,” the private investigator and process server
located Newgard at an address in Baldwin, Wisconsin. Id. According to the
process server’s affidavits, signed under penalty of perjury, the process
server, Erika Maghakian (“Maghakian”), personally served Newgard at the
Baldwin, Wisconsin address on December 27, 2023. ECF No. 5 (“Made
contact with Ni[k]olas Newgard at the front door and signa[l]ed to meet in
the garage where he was served.”); ECF No. 21 at 3 (“Made contact with
Nik Newgard at the front door as he sat at a computer desk. He met me in
the garage.”); id. at 5 (“Made contact with Nik Newgard at the front door,

Page 2 of 28

as he asked me to meet him in garage as he sat at his desk in the office. We
met in the garage.”).2
If Defendants were served, as Maghakian’s affidavit suggests, their
response to the complaint was due by January 17, 2024. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(1)(A)(i). On January 23, 2024, given the lack of a timely responsive
pleading from Defendants, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to either request
entry of default or to update the Court as to the status of the case. Jan. 23,
2024 text order. On February 6, 2024, Plaintiffs requested entry of default.
ECF No. 7. The Clerk of Court entered default on February 7, 2024. Feb. 7,
2024 Docket Entry. Plaintiffs also simultaneously moved for default
judgment and represented that they had served the motion and

Defendants do not dispute that Advanced Wholesale may be served
through service on Newgard. In the interest of completeness, the Court reproduces
its analysis from its order on the motion for default judgment on this point:
2

Plaintiffs plead that Newgard is the “founder and principal officer”
of Advanced Wholesale. ECF No. 1 at 2. The Court takes judicial
notice of the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions public
database, which confirms that Newgard is the registered agent of
Advanced Wholesale. Wis. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., available at
https://perma.cc/84ZZ-8SW7 (last visited Apr. 12, 2024); Ambrosetti
v. Or. Cath. Press, 458 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1016 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 2020)
(“[T]he Court may take judicial notice of public record information
obtained from an official government website.”) (citing Betz v.
Greenville Corr. Inst., No. 14-cv-104-MJR, 2014 WL 812403, at *1 (S.D.
Ill. Mar. 3, 2014); Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2003);
and Laborer's Pension Fund v. Blackmore Sewer Constr., Inc., 298 F.3d
600, 607 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Advanced Wholesale may therefore be served by, as here, service
of the summons and complaint on Newgard. See Krispy Krunchy
Foods LLC v. Silco LLC, No. 20-CV-293-PP, 2023 WL 2465881, at *2
(E.D. Wis. Mar. 10, 2023) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A) and (e)(1),
and Wis. Stat. § 801.11(5)(a)); see also Wis. Stat. § 183.0119.
ECF No. 11 at 2 n.2.

Page 3 of 28

accompanying papers on Defendants by mail at the same Baldwin,
Wisconsin address where Defendants were personally served. ECF No. 7 at
2; see also ECF No. 5.
On February 21, 2024, while the motion for default judgment was
pending, the Clerk of Court docketed a letter from Newgard dated
February 15, 2024. ECF No. 10. Therein, Newgard informed the Court that
“[o]n February 13, 2024, [he] returned from vacation” to find Plaintiffs’
mailing containing the motion for default judgment papers. Id. at 1.
Newgard argued that despite Plaintiffs’ statement in the motion that
Defendants had been served with the complaint and summonses on
December 27, 2023, neither “[he] nor any other representative for Advanced
Wholesale ha[d] been served.” Id. Newgard requested “an appropriate and
reasonable amount of time to seek counsel and properly defend Advanced
Wholesale LLC within this case.” Id.
The Court held the motion for default judgment in abeyance for over
seven weeks after receiving Newgard’s letter. ECF No. 11 at 3. In that time,
the Court received no further contact from Newgard, and no attorney
appeared on behalf of either Newgard or Advanced Wholesale. Id.3
Consequently, the Court proceeded to consider the motion for default
judgment. In its order on that motion, the Court liberally construed
Newgard’s letter as a Rule 55(c) motion to set aside default. Id. Even
construing the letter as such, the Court held that the entry of default would
stand. Id. at 3–5.

As the Court previously noted, “[o]nly Newgard could have appeared
without counsel because ‘limited liability companies may not appear pro se.’” ECF
No. 11 at 3 n.2 (quoting Ghetto Dope Recordzs LLC v. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 22CV-0229-BHL, 2022 WL 4273173, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 15, 2022)).
3

Page 4 of 28

The Court so held for two reasons. First, although Newgard
“ostensibly took quick action—following receipt of the motion for default
judgment papers—to mail his letter to the Court requesting time to seek
counsel, his conduct before that and since then ha[d] been dilatory and
exhibited a willful choice to avoid this litigation.” Id. at 4 (citing Koala Corp.
v. Wizard Works Prod. Dev. Co., No. 03-C-0429-C, 2003 WL 23218094, at *1
(W.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2003)). Second, the Court found that the over seven-week
lapse that Newgard allowed to pass after he sent his letter—which could
very well have continued indefinitely had the Court not proceeded to
adjudicate the motion—was “bolstered both by Plaintiffs’ representation
that Newgard called them regarding the allegations set forth in this suit
after it was filed, as well as the process server’s signed return of service
stating that Newgard was personally served with the summons and
complaint on December 27, 2023 at the same address where he claims to
have received the default judgment motion papers.” Id. (citing ECF No. 9 at
2; ECF No. 5; and collecting cases). After holding that the entry of default
stood, the Court proceeded to the merits of the motion for default judgment
and granted the motion, entering both default judgment and a permanent
injunction accordingly. ECF Nos. 11, 12, 13.
Approximately five weeks later, on May 20, 2024, counsel appeared
on behalf of Defendants and filed the instant motion to vacate the default
judgment and permanent injunction. ECF Nos. 15, 16.

Page 5 of 28

2.

TESTIMONY REGARDING SERVICE OF PROCESS4
In considering the parties’ briefs regarding the motion to vacate, ECF

Nos. 17, 20, 22, the Court determined that an evidentiary hearing was
required due to conflicting declarations about whether service of process
was completed, ECF No. 23 at 2–3 (collecting cases). The Court scheduled
an in-person evidentiary hearing, July 23, 2024 notice of hearing, but the
parties jointly moved to adjourn the hearing and proposed replacing it with
submissions of video depositions on the issue of service. ECF Nos. 24, 25;
see also Sept. 25, 2024 text order. The Court granted the motion to adjourn
and authorized the parties to proceed with video depositions as proposed.
Nov. 7, 2024 text order. The parties submitted video depositions and
corresponding transcripts for Newgard and Maghakian in December 2024.
The following is a summary of the key testimony provided by Newgard
and Maghakian.
Newgard testified that he is the owner, sole employee, and
registered agent of Advanced Wholesale. ECF No. 27-1 at 5. Newgard also
testified about the various addresses and headquarters associated with
Advanced Wholesale going back several years. See id. at 7–11 (describing
numerous of Newgard’s addresses that, at times, corresponded and, at
other times, did not correspond with Advance Wholesale’s address); see also
id. at 10 (admitting that in December 2023, Advanced Wholesale “didn’t
have an established address); see also id. at 20–21 (describing that the only
way to physically correspond with Advanced Wholesale in December 2023
was through its P.O. box, but that P.O. box was not listed with Wisconsin’s

Facts within this section contain cites to the record. Where these facts are
subsequently relied upon in the Order, citations are omitted.
4

Page 6 of 28

Department of Financial Institutions); compare ECF No. 18 at 2 (Newgard
averring that the registered agent address for Advanced Wholesale as of
May 2024 was 424 Pheasant Ct., Deerfield, WI) with ECF No. 27-1 at 8
(Newgard testifying that Advance Wholesale moved from 424 Pheasant
Court in mid or late 2020 and that it has not been associated with that
address since).
In December 2023, Maghakian worked as an independent contractor
as a process server. ECF No. 28-1 at 7–8. Maghakian and Newgard agree on
several aspects of what occurred on December 27, 2023. Newgard’s address
at that time—2221 County Road DD, Deerfield, WI—was under
construction. ECF No. 27-1 at 14; ECF No. 28-1 at 11. On December 27,
Newgard saw a woman, who we now know was Maghakian, knocking on
a front window of his residence at 2221 County Road DD. ECF 27-1 at 16;
ECF No. 28-1 at 11. Maghakian adds the detail that Newgard was sitting at
a desk in view of the front windows when she knocked. ECF No. 28-1 at 11.
In response to Maghakian’s tapping, Newgard indicated to her to meet him
in the garage. ECF 27-1 at 16–17; ECF No. 28-1 at 11. Newgard adds the
detail that the garage was attached to the dwelling. ECF No. 27-1 at 14–15.
Newgard then met Maghakian in his garage.5 Id. at 17. Maghakian was
holding an envelope at that time. Id. at 22. Newgard and Maghakian then
had a brief conversation, but here their testimony diverges.

Newgard’s declaration about service indicated that he met Maghakian in
his “driveway,” see ECF No. 18 at 2, but his deposition testimony is inconsistent as
to where he met her, compare ECF No. 27-1 at 17 (indicating that he met Maghakian
in his garage) with id. at 18 (denying that he was in the garage when meeting
Maghakian and that she was not in the garage either). Maghakian similarly
seemed uncertain about where the conversation occurred, saying that Newgard
was not served in the garage, but that at some point during their conversation they
entered the structure of the garage. ECF No. 28-1 at 11, 14.
5

Page 7 of 28

According to Newgard, Maghakian asked whether the address was
2221 County Road DD, which he confirmed, and she also asked him if their
location was the headquarters of Advanced Wholesale, which he denied.
Id. at 18, 20. Newgard denies or cannot recall any other parts of their
conversation. Id. at 19, 22. According to Newgard, Maghakian then walked
back to her car and drove away, at which point he and his wife went for a
walk. Id. at 22–23. Newgard testified that he did not recall when he returned
from that walk. Id. at 23. Newgard denies knowing that Maghakian
returned to his property after he left for a walk and denies having heard
any statements from Maghakian after their initial conversation. Id. at 24–25,
27. Newgard further testified that he did not notice any complaint left at his
residence, though he did not search for one in his home or his truck. Id. at
27–28, 30.
In contrast, Maghakian testified that she first asked Newgard if she
was at the right address (presumably 2221 County Road DD), which he
confirmed. ECF No. 28-1 at 11–12. Then she asked if Newgard was Nikolas
Newgard, and he responded, “No.” Id. at 12. Maghakian then asked if
Newgard knew a Nikolas Newgard, to which he responded, “Never heard
of him.” Id. Maghakian then asked him about Advanced Wholesale, which
he also denied knowing. Id. Maghakian apologized for bothering him and
“[w]ent on [her] way.” Id. Maghakian also testified that Newgard was
acting aggressively during this conversation and giving her the impression
that he did not want to speak with her. Id. at 33–34. Maghakian further
stated that she had the legal documentation she needed to serve in her
hands when she was talking with Newgard, and that she was pointing to it
while asking him questions. Id. at 35. However, nothing in her testimony

Page 8 of 28

suggests that she ever informed Newgard what the documents were. See
generally ECF No. 28-1.
While still on Newgard’s “long” driveway, Maghakian called her
boss—private investigator, Tim Browne (“Browne”)—to inform him about
the “strange” situation whereby the address was correct but the individual
she spoke with ostensibly did not know of either party that needed to be
served. Id. at 12. Browne then sent her a photo of Newgard’s picture ID and
she confirmed that the person she had spoken to, who had denied being
Nikolas Newgard, was, in fact, Newgard. Id. She then “immediately turned
around.” Id. After being gone for no more than two minutes, Maghakian
returned to the property and looked for Newgard but could not find him.
Id. at 12–13. She spent five to ten minutes knocking on windows and calling
out Newgard’s name, but she did not find him. Id. at 13. Maghakian then
put the legal documentation—the complaint and the summonses—in
between the handle and door of Newgard’s registered truck in his
driveway. Id. at 13–15. Maghakian also took a picture of Newgard’s truck
and where she left the paperwork. Id. at 26–28 (citing ECF Nos. 28-5 and 286). Before she left, Maghakian announced that she left paperwork for him
in his truck handle. Id. at 25–26. At no point did Maghakian hand Newgard
the summons and complaint, nor did she leave them in his physical
proximity. Id. at 15.
As to additional details, Newgard testified that there were multiple
vehicles parked at 2221 County Road DD on December 27, 2023. ECF No.
27-1 at 25, 30. Newgard’s personal Ford pickup truck was also parked in his
driveway on that day. Id. at 25. Maghakian testified, however, that she only
witnessed one vehicle on the property at the time she attempted to serve
Newgard, and that was his truck. ECF No. 28-1 at 15–16.
Page 9 of 28

Newgard also gave the following explanation for the phone call he
had with Graves, named Plaintiff and co-founder of additional Plaintiff The
Goat LLC, on December 8, 2023. He testified that he recalls calling Graves
that day but does not recall their actual conversation. Id. at 32, 35. When
asked why he reached out to Graves, Newgard stated that it was “[t]o
inquire on what [he] had read on Goggle [sic] online,” further explaining
that he had read “kind of the headline of Advanced Wholesale and The
Goat.” Id. at 33. Newgard testified that he could not recall what the headline
stated nor what the article was about. Id. He supposedly was prompted to
perform a Google search of his name because there was a “suspicious
person,” whom he never spoke to, in his driveway. Id. at 34. When asked
“what about that suspicious person in the driveway caused [him] to”
perform the Google search, he responded, “I don’t know. Just to see if
anything was out there.” Id. Newgard said he could not recall whether,
during that December 8 conversation, Graves mentioned anything about
legal proceedings against Advanced Wholesale and himself. Id. at 36–38.
He further stated that he “wasn’t aware [of legal proceedings by The Goat
LLC against Advanced Wholesale and himself] but that title [he] read
suggested something, and [he] believe[s] that is why [he] called Gary,”
referring to the article that came up when he performed a Google search of
his name. Id. Newgard admitted, however, that at the time of his December
8 phone call with Graves, he had “a suspicion that there were legal
proceedings pending against Advanced Wholesale” and himself. Id. at 38–
39.
Maghakian further testified that, had Newgard been honest about
his identity when she asked him during their encounter, she “would have
then taken [the legal] documentation and put it in his hand.” ECF No. 28-1
Page 10 of 28

at 30; see also id. at 15 (“Q: Did you leave the papers in [Newgard’s] physical
proximity? A: “I did not because he denied his identity.”).
3.

FINDINGS AS TO CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS TESTIMONY
Based on the video depositions of Newgard and Maghakian, the

Court, having weighed their credibility and testimony, finds that the
following occurred. First, the Court credits Plaintiffs’ account that they
expended substantial effort in locating an address where they could serve
Defendants in this action. Whether willfully or unintentionally, Advanced
Wholesale was effectively unreachable by mail in December 2023, as
Newgard testified that Advanced Wholesale “didn’t have an established
address” at that time. ECF No. 27-1 at 10. Newgard admitted that the only
way to physically correspond with Advanced Wholesale in December 2023
was through its P.O. box, but that P.O. box was not listed with Wisconsin’s
Department of Financial Institutions. Newgard further stated that the
registered agent address for Advanced Wholesale as of May 2024 was 424
Pheasant Ct., Deerfield, but he also testified that Advance Wholesale
moved from 424 Pheasant Ct. in mid or late 2020. It is understandable, then,
why Plaintiffs resorted to hiring a private investigator to serve Defendants.
Pertaining to the dispositive facts of what happened at 2221 County
Road DD on December 27, 2023, the Court finds that Maghakian and
Newgard exchanged a conversation, during which Maghakian asked
Newgard to confirm the address, which he did. Maghakian then asked
Newgard if he was Nikolas Newgard or knew of him, and he lied,
responding no. Newgard further lied by denying knowledge of Advanced
Wholesale. Maghakian then apologized and left. At no point during this
conversation

did

Maghakian

explicitly

Page 11 of 28

say

that

she

had

legal

documentation for Newgard or Advanced Wholesale, though she did point
to the paperwork in her hands. See ECF No. 28-1 at 35.
Shortly after driving away from Newgard’s home, Maghakian
returned because her boss, Brown, helped her confirm Newgard’s identity
using photo identification. When she returned, however, Newgard could
not be found. She spent several minutes looking for him and yelling to get
his attention but could not find him. At that point, Maghakian announced
that she was leaving legal documentation for Newgard and Advanced
Wholesale, wedged the documentation between the mirror and door of
Newgard’s truck, took photos of his truck and the paperwork, and left. She
thereafter filled out an affidavit of service, swearing that she had personally
served Newgard and Advanced Wholesale. ECF No. 5; see also ECF No. 281 at 9 (referring to ECF No. 28-2). There is no evidence that Plaintiffs again
attempted to serve Defendants either personally or via alternative means,
nor did they seek leave from the Court regarding service.
The Court further finds that Defendants had actual notice of the suit
against them by no later than December 8, 2023. This conclusion is bolstered
by the incomprehensible explanation Newgard provided surrounding the
context of his December 8 call to Graves. The Court does not find credible
Newgard’s explanation that he saw a suspicious individual in his driveway
that somehow prompted him to search his name on Google, after which
point he saw an article’s headline—which he cannot now remember in any
substantive detail—that further prompted him to call Graves, but that he
cannot remember any of the substance of that call. The Court further takes
issue with his assertions that he wasn’t aware of legal proceedings against
him but instead was merely suspicious of that possibility. The Court finds
Plaintiffs’ explanation more credible: Newgard learned of the pending suit
Page 12 of 28

against himself and Advanced Wholesale and called Graves on December
8, 2023 to discuss it. See ECF No. 9 at 2; ECF No. 20 at 1–2.
4.

LEGAL STANDARD, ARGUMENTS, AND ANALYSIS
The Court “may set aside a final default judgment under Rule 60(b).”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). “[R]ule 60(b) relief is an extraordinary remedy and is
granted only in exceptional circumstances.” C.K.S. Eng’rs, Inc., 726 F.2d at
1205 (citations omitted). In the default judgment context, Rule 60(b) “is
applied liberally . . . only in the exceptional circumstance where the events
contributing to the default judgment have not been within the meaningful
control of the defaulting party, or its attorney.” Id. at 1206. Seventh Circuit
decisions “reflect the notion that the district court must have the default
judgment readily available within its arsenal of sanctions ‘in order to ensure
that litigants who are vigorously pursuing their cases are not hindered by
those who are not.’” Id. (quoting Stevens v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 710 F.2d
1224, 1230 (7th Cir. 1983)).
In their motion to vacate, Defendants proffer several arguments.
They contend that Newgard “was never served or even handed or provided
a copy of the Complaint and summons as certified by Plaintiff[s’] proof of
service or otherwise.” ECF No. 17 at 2 (citing ECF No. 18 at 2). They filed a
declaration, signed by Newgard under penalty of perjury, attesting to the
same. ECF No. 18 at 2. According to Defendants, the affidavits of service
submitted by the process server and private investigator “completely
contradict[]” one another because “[t]he server necessarily could have not
made contact with . . . Newgard at the front door as he sat at his desk in the
office . . . .” ECF No. 22 at 3. Defendants also argue that the process server
and private investigator’s affidavits do not indicate “how, exactly, [she]
served the Defendants.” Id. Newgard supports this statement by asserting
Page 13 of 28

that, on or about December 27, 2023, “a woman came via car to” the
Baldwin, Wisconsin address where he lives and met Newgard in the
driveway. ECF No. 18 at 2. Newgard swears that the woman asked him
about the address, Newgard responded, and the woman “walked back to
her car and drove away,” without handing Newgard the complaint and
summons. Id. He avers as well that she did not leave a copy of the complaint
and summons at the location and that the first time he “became aware of
this case” was in February 2024 when he received the default judgment
motion papers in the mail. Id.
Alternatively, Defendants argue that the default judgment and
associated permanent injunction should be set aside due to Defendants’
excusable neglect. ECF No. 17 at 6. Defendants assert that there is good
cause for the default because they were never properly served, Defendants
did not intend to avoid the lawsuit as Newgard only became aware of it in
February 2024, and they “expected to hear back from the court on an
approval or denial of the extension letter.” Id. at 7–8. Defendants also
contend that even if there is no good excuse for their default, good cause
exists for the Court to vacate the default because the damages awarded are
disproportionate to the wrong. Id. at 9 (citing Sims v. EGA Prod., Inc., 475
F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2007)). Defendants argue that they responded in a timely
and reasonable manner to address the default judgment, id. at 10–12, and
that they have meritorious defenses to Plaintiffs’ claims, id. at 12–16.
Tracking their above-summarized arguments, Defendants move to
vacate the default judgment and permanent injunction under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) and 60(b)(1). ECF No. 17 at 2–4. The Court takes
up each in turn.

Page 14 of 28

4.1

Rule 60(b)(4): Service of Process

Rule 60(b)(4) provides that the Court may relieve a party from a final
judgment if “the judgment is void.” Under Rule 60(b)(4), “a default
judgment entered against a defendant is void if the plaintiff did not
properly serve the defendant.” Fed. Equip. Corp. v. Puma Indus. Co., 182
F.R.D. 565, 567 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing Fleet Mortg. Corp. v. Wise, No. 92 C
1102, 1997 WL 305319, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1997)). “The burden is on the
defendant to show that the judgment is void for lack of service of process.”
Id. (citing Trs. of Cent. Laborers' Welfare Fund v. Lowery, 924 F.2d 731, 732 n.2
(7th Cir. 1991) and Bally Export Corp. v. Balicar, Ltd., 804 F.2d 398, 404 (7th
Cir. 1986)); see Krahenbuhl v. Ostrich Ranchers Ltd. P’ship, No. 96-C-246, 2007
WL 3012712, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 12, 2007) (citing Emery v. Emery, 369
N.W.3d 728 (Wis. 1985)). Defendants argue under Rule 60(b)(4) that the
default judgment, as well as the associated permanent injunction, are void
because Newgard was not properly served with process. ECF No. 17 at 4–
6.
“A signed return of service constitutes prima facie evidence of valid
service ‘which can be overcome only by strong and convincing evidence.’”
O’Brien v. R.J. O’Brien & Assocs., Inc., 998 F.2d 1394, 1398 (7th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410, 414 (8th Cir. 1955) and citing Taft
v. Donellan Jerome, Inc., 407 F.2d 807, 808–09 (7th Cir. 1969)). The
presumption applies with greatest force where, as here, the “address [and]
receiving individual [are] specified on the return of service,” and where the
return of service indicates the method of service. Homer v. Jones-Bey, 415
F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2005).
Service on an individual within the United States is governed by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e). Rule 4(e)(1) permits service of process
Page 15 of 28

by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in
courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located
or where service is made.” Here, both the service attempt and the district
court are in Wisconsin, so Plaintiffs were permitted to follow Wisconsin’s
service laws, which are stated in WIS. STAT. § 801.11. Wisconsin requires a
plaintiff to exercise reasonable diligence at personal service in the first
instance. WIS. STAT. § 801.11(1)(a). Only if that is not successful may a
plaintiff attempt to serve a defendant by leaving the summons at the
defendant’s usual place of abode with a competent adult or member of the
defendant’s family who is informed of the summons’ contents. WIS. STAT.
§ 801.11(1)(b). Only when a plaintiff’s reasonable diligence under both
methods fails may it then serve a defendant via publication. WIS. STAT.
§ 801.11(1)(c). Rule 4(e)(2) also permits an individual to be served by
(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to
the individual personally; (B) leaving a copy of each at the
individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone
of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or
(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process.
Service on an LLC is governed by Rule 4(h), which permits service
“in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an individual” or “by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to . . . any . . . agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive services of process.” The
parties agree that Newgard was an agent for Advanced Wholesale for the
purposes of service, see supra note 2, so the Court will accordingly address
whether service upon Newgard was effectuated under Rule 4(e).
First, the deposition testimony of Maghakian overcomes the
presumption of proper service from the signed return of service, ECF No.

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5, by “strong and convincing evidence.” O’Brien, 998 F.2d at 1398 (quoting
Hicklin, 226 F.2d at 414 and citing Taft, 407 F.2d at 808–09). To comply with
Rule 4(e)(2), Plaintiffs must have either (1) “deliver[ed] a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to the individual personally;” (2) “le[ft] a
copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with
someone of suitable age and discretion who reside[d] there; or”
(3) “deliver[ed] a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(A)–(C). Maghakian
did none of the three. She did not hand the summons and complaint to
Newgard or to any person, nor did she leave them in an individual’s
physical proximity. Instead, she wedged them between the mirror and door
of Newgard’s truck when—based upon her testimony—no one was
around. That does not meet the requirements of service under Rule 4(e)(2).
Nor did Maghakian’s actions meet Wisconsin’s service requirements
under WIS. STAT. 801.11, as permitted by Rule 4(e)(1), because Plaintiffs’ one
attempt at service, via Maghakian, does not establish that they exercised
reasonable diligence. While “[r]easonable diligence does not require ‘all
possible diligence which may be conceived,’ . . . it does require a plaintiff to
‘exhaust . . . any leads or information reasonably calculated to make
personal service possible.’” Wis. Laborers Health Fund v. Sup. Sewer & Water,
Inc., No. 21-CV-193-JDP, 2021 WL 6333911, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 7, 2021)
(first quoting Haselow v. Gauthier, 569 N.W.2d 97, 101 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)
then quoting Cunningham v. Montes, No. 16-cv-761-jdp, 2018 WL 2390118,
at *2 (W.D. Wis. May 25, 2018) and then citing West v. West, 262 N.W.2d 87,
89 (Wis. 1978)). It is unclear to the Court whether the lack of diligence was
made known to Plaintiffs, or whether the process server communicated that
process was effectuated without further details.
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Either way, “[c]ounsel are responsible for supervising their process
servers,” Sullivan v. Mitchell, 151 F.R.D. 331, 334 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (citations
omitted), and after the failed attempt at process on December 27, 2023,
Plaintiffs and the process server did nothing. They did not again attempt to
serve Newgard at his residence, even though they had just confirmed his
address and identity, which are certainly “lead[s] . . . calculated to make
personal service possible.” Cunningham, 2018 WL 2390118, at *2 (citation
omitted). Nor did they move the Court for leave to serve Defendants via
alternative means. See Cunningham v. Montes, 883 F.3d 688, 689 (7th Cir.
2018) (“[W]hen reasonable diligence has not succeeded in producing
service in hand, then a court may authorize service by publication” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). “[A] defendant’s attempts to evade service do
not absolve a plaintiff of the requirement to exercise reasonable diligence in
attempting to serve the defendant . . . .” Wis. Laborers Health Fund, 2021 WL
6333911, at *2 (quoting Cunningham, 2018 WL 2390118, at *2 and citing Keefe
v. Arthur, No. 00-0016-C, 2003 WL 23109616, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 20,
2003)); see Russell v. PS 27 Fam. Ltd. P’ship, No. 1:23-cv-00405-HAB-SLC,
2024 WL 478208, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 17, 2024) (finding that service was
improper despite defendant’s evasion of service). And this is not a case
where Plaintiffs repeatedly tried to serve Defendants over the course of
several months, with Defendants continually evading service. See
Krahenbuhl, 2007 WL 3012712, at *2–3. The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ single
attempt at service is inadequate to establish that they were reasonably
diligent in attempting to serve Defendants. See Wis. Laborers Health Fund,
2021 WL 6333911, at *2. (“[T]he court isn’t persuaded that a single attempt
of service at two locations qualifies as making a reasonably diligent effort
under the circumstances of this case.” (citing Ass’n of Egyptian-Am. Scholars,
Page 18 of 28

Inc. v. Geriesh, No. 09-cv-772-bbc, 2010 WL 3666996, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Sept.
15, 2010) and Haselow, 569 N.W.2d at 99)).
The Court notes that dicta in various cases suggests that a defendant
may not evade service and then challenge whether service of process was
proper. See Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711, 721 (7th Cir. 1996) (default is
warranted when a defendant shows a continued “effort to avoid service of
process and frustrate the efficient administration of justice” (citing United
States v. DiMucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1493 (7th Cir. 1989)); Credit All. Corp. v.
Campbell, 845 F.2d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 1988) (the defendant “cannot now
complain about the plaintiff’s failure to notify her of the lawsuit when the
failure was a result of defendant’s own actions”); Welty v. Heggy, 369
N.W.2d 763, 771 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming a trial court denying a
motion to vacate a judgment where the “defendant purposely avoided
service, and had actual notice of the action”); Nikwei v. Ross Sch. of Aviation,
Inc., 822 F.2d 939, 946 (10th Cir. 1987) (“[A] defendant cannot refuse or
avoid service on a technical ground, and then exclaim he has not been
correctly served.”). However, Plaintiffs have not pointed the Court to a
single case in which the plaintiff made only one failed attempt at service and
nevertheless the court held that it had personal jurisdiction because the
defendant evaded that single attempt at service. Rather, in each of the cases
that suggest that evasion may deprive a defendant of a jurisdictional
defense, courts noted plaintiffs’ repeated attempts to comply with service
requirements, their successful service via alternative means, that the failure
to effectuate service was merely due to a technical ground, or that the
defendant waived their argument in some way. See Swaim, 73 F.3d at 717,
721 (noting that plaintiff made three separate attempts at service and that
defendant forfeited its jurisdictional argument by failing to raise it in its
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Rule 60(b) motion); Credit All., 845 F.2d at 730 (discussing how defendant
could not insist upon receiving personal service of process when she had
waived it); Welty, 369 N.W.2d at 768–69 (finding that plaintiffs exercised
reasonable diligence in their repeated and varied attempts to serve the
defendant); Nikwei, 822 F.2d at 944–45 (defendant was not permitted to
“evade [Oklahoma’s] notice statue on highly technical grounds by his acts
of avoidance”); see also Mid-Continent Wood Prods., Inc. v. Harris, 936 F.2d
297, 301–02 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a district court’s decision to deny a
motion to vacate default judgment due to improper service of process and
stating that any “substantial compliance” with service rules may only cure
a “purely technical error in the form of the documents under Rule 4” related
to “an otherwise proper and successful delivery of process”); id. at 302
(“[T]he extent to which the plaintiff ‘tried’ to serve process should not be a
factor as to whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a
defendant. Rather, the requirements of Rule 4 are satisfied only when the
plaintiff is successful in serving the complaint and summons on the
defendant”).6 The Court accordingly finds that it has no personal
jurisdiction over Defendants under the circumstances of this case.
In their response brief, Plaintiffs also state that “a defendant’s active
avoidance of service of process is insufficient to establish that service was
improper.” ECF No. 20 at 5. In support, they cite a Northern District of Illinois case
that was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit—Relational, LLC v. Hodges, No. 07-CV415, 2009 WL 3188012 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2009), aff’d, 627 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2010).
Relational does not stand for the proposition that Plaintiffs argue, however. The
district court there found, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, only that the
testimony supporting that the defendant was properly served was more credible
than the defendant’s testimony that he was never served such that the defendant
failed to provide “clear and convincing” evidence to overcome the prima facie
presumption of service. Id. at *5. In making that finding, the district court
acknowledged that the defendant seemed to have made service of process
“unusually challenging” through his “active avoidance of contact.” Id. This case
6

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And, while troubling, the fact that Defendants had actual notice of
the ongoing proceedings is not enough to establish the Court’s personal
jurisdiction. To the contrary, even when a party has actual notice of the
proceedings, including of the summons and the complaint, service is still
required to confer personal jurisdiction. Welty, 369 N.W.2d at 766 (“[W]hen
a statute prescribes how service is to be made, compliance with the statute
is required for personal jurisdiction even where the defendant has actual
notice of the summons and complaint.” (quoting Horrigan v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 317 N.W.3d 474, 477 (Wis. 1982))).
Further, while a party may “submit to the jurisdiction of the court by
appearance,” Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 703–04 (1982), nothing in the record suggests that Defendants
submitted themselves to the Court’s jurisdiction despite the lack of proper
service. While Newgard mailed a letter to the Court in February 2024, this
letter cannot be construed as submitting himself to the Court’s jurisdiction.
First, as to Advanced Wholesale, an LLC may only appear by counsel,
therefore Newgard’s pro se letter could not be construed as an appearance
on its behalf. Philos Techs., Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc., 645 F.3d 851, 858 (7th Cir.
2011) (declining to find that a pro se letter from certain defendants could be
deemed an appearance by a corporation defendant (citing Scandia Down
Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1985) and United States
v. Hagerman, 549 F.3d 536, 537 (7th Cir. 2008)). As for Newgard personally,
while his pro se letter does request “an appropriate and reasonable amount
of time to seek counsel and properly defend . . . [against] this case,” the

does not support that a court has personal jurisdiction when clear and convincing
evidence shows that the defendant was not properly served merely because of a
defendant’s one-time evasion of service.

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same letter can also be construed as contesting jurisdiction because it
specifically states that neither Newgard “nor any other representative for
Advanced Wholesale has been served.” ECF No. 10 at 1. Following the
Seventh Circuit’s lead, the Court will not construe this as an appearance
that would deny Newgard the opportunity to present a jurisdictional
defense. See Philos Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d at 858–59 (collecting cases).
Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs never effectuated service of
process on Defendants, it is constrained to vacate the default judgment in
this case, as it never had jurisdiction to enter it in the first instance.
Relational, 627 F.3d at 671 (“[A] judgment is void as to any party who was
not adequately served.” (citing Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,
484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); Homer, 415 F.3d at 752; and Robinson Eng’g Co.
Pension Plan and Tr. v. George, 223 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2003))); Homer, 415
F.3d at 753 (“If the district court had no jurisdiction over the movant, its
judgment is void and it is an abuse of discretion to deny the movant's
request to set aside the judgment under Rule 60(b).” (citing George, 223 F.3d
at 448 and United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip. from High Tech Indoor
Garden Supply, 55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995))); see also Haselow, 569
N.W.2d at 99–100 (affirming an order vacating default judgment due to
finding that the defendant was not properly served under Wisconsin law).
While the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable
diligence in attempting to serve Defendants, it also finds that Newgard’s
blatant evasion gives them good cause for seeking to extend their time to
properly effectuate service of process on Defendants. The fact that
Defendants have actual notice of the action by now does not rid Plaintiffs
of their obligation to properly serve them. See Homer, 415 F.3d at 758
(“[A]ctual notice does not by itself constitute valid service of process.”
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(citing George, 223 F.3d at 453; Swaim, 73 F.3d at 719; and Mid-Continent
Wood Prods, Inc., 936 F.2d at 301)). The Court will accordingly, sua sponte,
grant Plaintiffs additional time to serve Defendants. Cardenas v. City of
Chicago, 646 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2011) (a district court may, upon a
finding that there was no effective service, either dismiss the case or
“specify a time within which the plaintiff must serve the defendant,” a
decision which is “inherently discretionary” (first citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)
then citing United States v. Ligas, 549 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2008))); Huber v.
Beth, 654 F. Supp. 3d 777, 805 (E.D. Wis. 2023) (“When a defendant is
evading service, there is good cause for extending the time to complete
service.” (citing Coleman v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 290 F.3d 932, 934 (7th
Cir. 2002)); Sullivan, 151 F.R.D. at 333 (“Evasion of service . . . constitutes
good cause for a delay in service” to support excusing a party from the
deadline for service set by Rule 4). Plaintiffs shall properly serve
Defendants within sixty (60) days of the judgment being vacated.
4.2

Rule 60(b)(1): Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable
Neglect

Rule 60(b)(1) provides that “[o]n motion and just terms, the court
may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” upon
a showing of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
As the Rule 60(b)(1) standard has developed, a specialized three-part
standard has evolved which squarely places the burden on the moving
party to show: (1) “good cause” for the default; (2) quick action to correct
the default; and (3) the existence of a meritorious defense to the original
complaint. Pretzel & Stouffer, 28 F.3d at 45 (citing DiMucci, 879 F.2d at 1495).
This standard was originally formulated with motions to vacate an entry of

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default under Rule 55(c) in mind, Breuer Elec. Mfg. v. Toronado Sys. of Am.,
687 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1982), but it was eventually applied to structure
decisions involving motions to set aside default judgments under Rule
60(b), id. at 187. See also Merrill Lynch Mortg. Corp. v. Narayan, 908 F.2d 246,
250 (7th Cir. 1990).
While the tests are identical under either Rule 55(c) or Rule 60(b),
respect for the finality of judgments results in the application of the test
under Rule 60(b) circumstances—where a default judgment has been
entered—to be much more limited and stringent. Breuer, 687 F.2d at 187
(citing United States v. Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 944, 951
(N.D. Ind. 1975) and Ben Sager Chems. Int’l v. E. Targosz & Co. 560 F.2d 805,
809 (7th Cir. 1977)). This narrowness is achieved by interpreting the threepart standard in light of the language of Rule 60(b)(1) which, by its very
terms, establishes a high hurdle for parties seeking to avoid default
judgments and requires something more compelling than ordinary lapses
of diligence or simple neglect to justify disturbing a default judgment. N.
Cent. Ill. Laborer's Dist. Council v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 842 F.2d 164, 167
(7th Cir. 1988); Ben Sager Chems. Int'l, 560 F.2d at 809.
Given the Court’s credibility determinations based on Newgard and
Maghakian’s depositions, see supra Section 3, Defendants do not make it
past the first prong of the test—“good cause” for the default—which is fatal
to their argument based in Rule 60(b)(1). Pretzel & Stouffer, 28 F.3d at 45, 46
(defendants must meet all three prongs of the test to support vacating a
judgment). The Court finds Defendants’ assertions that they “at no point
. . . intend[ed] to avoid the current litigation” and “did not even become
aware of this case until February 13, 2024” to be without merit. ECF No. 17
at 7. The Court earlier determined that Maghakian’s testimony was more
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credible than Newgard’s and therefore adopted her testimony that
Newgard lied about his identity while Maghakian was attempting to serve
him. The Court also credits Maghakian’s testimony that, if Newgard had
been honest about who he was, both Newgard and Advanced Wholesale
would have been properly served. See supra Section 3. The Court further
credited Plaintiffs’ assertions that Newgard spoke with Graves about this
case in December 2023, meaning that he had actual notice of its existence at
that time. See id.
Accordingly, Defendants may not argue “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) because they—
Newgard personally and Advanced Wholesale via Newgard, its
representative—willfully evaded service, contributing to the default.
Arnold v. Boatman’s Nat. Bank of Belleville, 89 F.3d 838, 1996 WL 359778
(Table), at *1 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A review of such cases shows that relief under
the excusable neglect standard may be granted only ‘where the actions
leading to the default were not willful, careless, or negligent.’” (quoting
Johnson v. Gudmundsson, 35 F.3d 1104, 1117 (7th Cir. 1994) (cleaned up))); see
also Iconic Energy LLC v. Solar Permit Servs., Inc., 18 CV 50020, 2018 WL
4520220, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No.
18 CV 50020, 2018 WL 5290099 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2018) (“[I]n the absence of
a showing of wilfulness [sic], courts in the Seventh Circuit are more likely than
not . . . to vacate a default judgment.” (quoting Christensen v. Adams, 251
F.R.D. 358, 360 (S.D. Ill. 2008) (emphasis added)).
Because failure on even one prong is fatal, and, independently,
because the Court has found that it must vacate the default judgment due
to lack of personal jurisdiction, it declines to analyze prongs (2) and (3) of
the test. Pretzel & Stouffer, 28 F.3d at 45. It further declines to analyze
Page 25 of 28

Defendants’ argument that, even if Defendants provided no good “excuse”
for the default, good cause still exists because of the allegedly
disproportionate damages award. See ECF No. 17 at 9–10.
5.

ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Defendants have very narrowly escaped default judgment in this

case. The Court will not allow Newgard’s willful evasion of process and
disregard for these proceedings to go without penalty. The Court was
constrained to grant Defendants’ motion to vacate, but it is not without
recourse to sanction Defendants for their evasive and dilatory behavior,
which required both Plaintiffs and the Court to expend valuable resources.
In their motion to vacate, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs “will not
be harmed or prejudiced in any way if [they are] forced to litigate now.”
ECF No. 17 at 10. That argument conveniently forgets that Plaintiffs have
expended resources in requesting entry of default, moving for default
judgment and other relief, responding to Defendants’ motion to vacate
default judgment, and deposing Newgard and Maghakian. See Iconic
Energy, 2018 WL 4520220, at *3 (noting that defendant’s conduct caused
actual prejudice to plaintiff by way of motion practice and noting that “[t]he
Seventh Circuit has recognized that even where the drastic sanction of . . .
default is not warranted, an award of sanctions such as attorneys’ fees may
be” (citing C.K.S. Eng’rs, Inc., 726 F.2d at 1206)). Had Newgard been honest
about his identity when Maghakian asked him on December 27, 2023, or
had he acted upon his actual notice of these proceedings and appeared
earlier, all these steps could have been avoided. Accordingly, the Court will
make setting aside the default judgment and permanent injunction
contingent on Defendants paying Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and
costs incurred in seeking entry of default; moving for default judgment,
Page 26 of 28

damages, and injunctive relief; opposing the motion to vacate; and
deposing Newgard and Maghakian. E.g., id. By thirty (30) days from this
Order, Plaintiffs’ counsel shall file a statement of the reasonable fees and
costs incurred, supported by affidavits and exhibits as necessary.
6.

CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth herein, the Court grants Defendants’

motion to vacate the April 12, 2024 default judgment and permanent
injunction, ECF No. 16, contingent upon their payment of Plaintiffs’
reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in requesting entry of default; moving
for default judgment, damages, and injunctive relief; responding to
Defendants’ motion to vacate; and deposing Newgard and Maghakian.
Plaintiffs’ counsel is ordered to file a statement of reasonable attorneys’ fees
corresponding to the same, accompanied by sufficient evidentiary support
and justification, within thirty (30) days of this Order. Plaintiffs are granted
additional time to properly serve Defendants and shall do so within sixty
(60) days of the judgment in this case being vacated.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Advanced Wholesale LLC and
Nikolas Newgard’s motion to vacate the April 12, 2024 default judgment
and permanent injunction, ECF No. 16, be and the same is hereby
GRANTED, contingent upon their payment of Plaintiffs The Goat LLC,
Daniel Webster, and Gary Graves’ reasonable attorneys’ fees as specified
herein;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs The Goat LLC, Daniel
Webster, and Gary Graves’ counsel shall, within thirty (30) days of this
Order, FILE a statement of reasonable attorneys’ fees as discussed herein;
and
Page 27 of 28

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the deadline for Plaintiffs The Goat
LLC, Daniel Webster, and Gary Graves to serve Defendants Advanced
Wholesale LLC and Nikolas Newgard be and the same is hereby RESET to
sixty (60) days from the date the judgment is vacated.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 7th day of March, 2025.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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