Walker v. Eplett

Filing 26

ORDER signed by Judge Brett H Ludwig on 1/27/25 that Walker's petition for writ of habeas corpus 1 is DENIED, and the case is DISMISSED with prejudice. Walker's motion for release on bond pending appeal 24 is DENIED. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. (cc: all counsel and mailed to pro se party)(jad)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
JEFFREY K. WALKER,
v.

Petitioner,

Case No. 23-cv-1743-bhl

BRIAN CAHAK, Warden, 1
Respondent.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING § 2254 HABEAS PETITION
______________________________________________________________________________
In 2017, a Brown County jury found Petitioner Jeffrey K. Walker guilty on nine felony
counts arising from the sexual assaults of two young boys. Following his convictions, the state
court sentenced Walker to twenty years of initial confinement. Walker then challenged his
conviction and sentence in postconviction proceedings and on direct appeal, arguing, among other
things, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and the evidence against him was
insufficient to support his conviction. After the state courts affirmed Walker’s conviction, he filed
a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See ECF No. 1.) Walker
has also filed a motion for release on bond pending appeal. (See ECF No. 24.) Because Walker
has not established that he is entitled to habeas relief, both his petition and motion will be denied.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2
In August 2015, Walker was charged with two counts of sexual assault of a child and one
count of child enticement. (ECF No. 8-5 at 2.) The original criminal complaint describes reports
by two young boys, Victim 1 and Victim 2, who separately told police that they had slept at
Walker’s home on different occasions and were awakened to find Walker sexually assaulting them.
Walker is incarcerated at Oshkosh Correctional Institution, where Brian Cahak is now Warden. Accordingly, Cahak
is the appropriate Respondent for Walker’s habeas petition. See Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

1

2
In deciding a habeas petition, the Court must presume the facts set forth by the state courts are correct. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1). The petitioner has the burden of rebutting that presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id.
The background facts are based on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision affirming Walker’s conviction. (See
ECF No. 8-5 at 1–28); see also State v. Walker, No. 2020AP2115-CR, 2023 WL 3589959 (Wis. Ct. App. May 23,
2023).

(Id.) The State ultimately filed a nine-count amended information charging Walker with eight
counts of sexual assault and one count of child enticement. (Id. at 2–3.) The first five counts
involved illegal sexual conduct with Victim 1 during the spring of 2011. (Id. at 3.) The next three
counts involved illegal sexual conduct with Victim 2 during the summer of 2013. (Id.) The child
enticement count related to an incident involving Walker and Victim 2 on August 1, 2015. (Id.)
At trial, Victim 1 testified that Walker and his father had been friends, and that Walker
assaulted him when he was in middle school. (Id.) Victim 1 related how, during the spring of
2011, when he was either eleven or twelve years old, Walker had invited him to go bowling and
then spend the night with Walker. (Id.) Victim 1 accepted the invitation and the two went bowling
and later watched movies at Walker’s mother’s apartment, where Victim 1 drank two “tall cans”
of beer that Walker offered him. (Id.) Later that evening, Victim 1 woke up to Walker sexually
assaulting him. (Id.) During his direct examination, Victim 1 provided specific and graphic details
regarding multiple incidents of illegal sexual conduct inflicted upon him by Walker. (Id.; ECF
No. 8-7 at 149–160.) Victim 1 testified that he did not immediately report the assaults because he
feared he would not be believed. (ECF No. 8-5 at 3.) Victim 1, however, finally reported the
assaults to his mother in 2014 after she confronted him about changes in his behavior. (Id.) Victim
1 testified that he did know or recognize Victim 2, the other victim. (Id.)
Victim 2 testified after Victim 1. (Id. at 4.) He testified that Walker was a family friend
and during the summer of 2013, when Victim 2 was in middle school, Victim 2 slept at Walker’s
mother’s home where he watched television and drank a Mike’s Hard Lemonade that Walker had
offered to him. (Id.) After Victim 2 fell asleep, “he woke up to Walker unbuttoning and
unzipping” his pants. (Id.) Victim 2 then testified that Walker performed sex acts on him. (Id.;
ECF No. 8-7 at 199–204.) Victim 2 also described another separate incident that occurred several
months later where Walker took Victim 2 and a friend on a fishing trip. (ECF No. 8-5 at 4.) The
three stayed together in a motel in Kewaunee, Wisconsin, where Walker gave Victim 2 a beer and
told him to “chug it.” (Id.) That evening, Victim 2 awoke to Walker picking him up and carrying
him over Walker’s bed. (Id.) Victim 2 testified that Walker then sexually assaulted him. (Id.)
Victim 2 next described an incident in 2015 where Walker arrived at Victim 2’s home,
took him out for dinner, and later stopped at a gas station to purchase alcohol. (Id.) Victim 2
testified that he was concerned “[b]ecause all the other times [Walker] bought alcohol he raped
[Victim 2].” (Id. at 4–5.) Walker attempted to check into two motels with Victim 2 but while at

the second motel, Victim 2 fled from Walker’s vehicle and ran to a friend’s house because he
“didn’t want the same thing to repeat over again.” (Id. at 5.) When Victim 2 returned home, he
reported the sexual assaults to his mother. (Id.) Victim 2 testified that he did not know Victim 1.
(Id.)
The prosecutor also introduced testimony from Victim 1’s mother, Victim 2’s mother and
sister, and a detective, after which Walker testified in his own defense. (Id. at 5–6.) Walker flatly
denied ever having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with Victim 1 or Victim 2. (Id. at 6.) He
insisted he had tried “to be a positive role model” for the boys. (Id.) On cross-examination, the
prosecutor asked Walker a series of questions about whether he was being a “role model” when
he performed sex acts on each child. (ECF No. 8-8 at 140–58.)
The case went to the jury and, after about forty-five minutes of deliberation, the jury found
Walker guilty on all nine felony counts. (ECF No 12 at 36; ECF No. 8-1.) The trial judge
sentenced Walker to 20 years of initial confinement and 15 years of extended supervision. (ECF
No. 8-1 at 2–3.)
Walker, proceeding pro se, filed a motion for postconviction relief arguing, among other
things, that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, that he had received ineffective assistance
from his counsel, and that the jury had engaged in misconduct. (ECF No. 8-2.) The state circuit
court held an extensive evidentiary hearing (called Machner hearings under Wisconsin law)
concerning Walker’s ineffective assistance allegations. After hearing testimony from both Walker
and his trial counsel, the court rejected Walker’s claims and denied the motion. (ECF No. 8-3.)
Walker then filed a direct appeal and raised multiple issues including the issues raised in his
postconviction proceedings. (ECF No. 8-4 at 1–41.) The Wisconsin Court of Appeals denied his
claims and affirmed his conviction on May 23, 2023. (ECF No. 8-5.) Walker filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the court of appeals denied. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1–2.) Walker then petitioned
for review in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, but that court denied his petition on September 26,
2023. (Id. at 3–4.) Walker did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) On December 29, 2023, Walker timely filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus with this Court. (ECF No. 1.)
LEGAL STANDARD
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) limits a federal
court’s ability to grant habeas corpus relief. To obtain relief under AEDPA, a petitioner must

show that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1040 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). With
respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, a habeas petition can be granted only if
the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180–81 (2011). This
standard is “highly deferential” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (citations omitted). It is intentionally very
difficult to meet. See Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351, 357–58 (2013).
A state court decision is “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law” within the
meaning of § 2254(d)(1) if the state court “applie[d] a rule different from the governing law set
forth” by Supreme Court precedent or when the state court “decides a case differently than [the
Supreme Court] on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693–
94 (2002). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable” application of established precedent
within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2) when the “state court identifies the correct governing legal
principle . . . but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). Under either
prong, it is not enough that “a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect”
or erroneous. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). Rather, the state court’s application
of clearly established law must be “objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error
will not suffice.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015). The Supreme Court has repeatedly
explained that “a federal habeas court may overturn a state court’s application of federal law only
if it is so erroneous that ‘there is no possibility that fairminded jurists could disagree that the state
court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court’s precedents.’” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S.
505, 508–09 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)).
ANALYSIS
On habeas, Walker raises five grounds for relief. (ECF No. 1 at 6–9.) In ground one,
Walker contends the evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict on the child enticement
charge. (Id. at 6–7.) In grounds two, three, and four, Walker contends his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective when she failed to object to the prosecutor’s “golden rule” argument

in closing and to the government’s “role model” line of questioning during cross examination. (Id.
at 7–8.) He also complains that counsel should have impeached the victims by pointing out their
inconsistent statements. (Id. at 9.) In ground five, Walker argues juror misconduct. (Id.) Under
AEDPA, Walker is required to show that no fair-minded jurist would conclude that the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals’ decision rejecting his claims was inconsistent with the applicable United States
Supreme Court precedent. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. Because Walker has failed to make
this showing on any of his grounds, his petition will be denied.
I.

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals Reasonably Applied Federal Law in Concluding
That the Evidence Was Sufficient to Sustain Walker’s Child Enticement Conviction.
Walker argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the child enticement conviction

because the prosecutor failed to show that Walker enticed Victim 2 and intended to have sexual
contact with him. (ECF No. 12 at 7–12.) The Wisconsin Court of Appeals addressed the merits
of this claim by stating the relevant standard for sufficiency of the evidence: “We must consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and the jury’s verdict.” (ECF No. 8-5 at 22–
23 (citing State v. Smith, 817 N.W.2d 410 (Wis. 2012).) This standard is identical to the controlling
United States Supreme Court precedent, Jackson v. Virginia, in which the Court held that federal
habeas courts must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and
determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have [reached a guilty verdict] beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979) (emphasis removed).
The court of appeals noted that the 2013 incident involved Walker taking Victim 2 to a
motel in Kewaunee, Wisconsin, providing him with alcohol, and later sexually assaulting him
during the night. (ECF No. 8-5 at 22.) It also cited Victim 2’s testimony that on August 1, 2015,
when Victim 2 was fourteen years old, Walker gave him alcohol and attempted to check into two
different motels with Victim 2. (Id.) While at the second motel, Victim 2 ran away because he
did not want Walker to again sexually assault him. (Id.) As the court of appeals stated, “Given
the similarities between Walker’s conduct on August 1 and the prior sexual assault in Kewaunee,
the jury could reasonably infer that Walker was attempting to take [Victim 2] into the motel room
with the intent of having sexual contact with [him].” (Id. at 22.) Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, the appellate court concluded that “the circumstantial evidence . . .
was sufficient to support reasonable inferences of [Walker’s] intent” and noted that “[a] conviction
may be supported solely by circumstantial evidence.” (Id. at 23 (citation omitted).)

Walker argues that the prosecutor “never show[ed]” that Walker took Victim 2 to the motel
“with the intent to have sexual contact with him.” (ECF No. 12 at 8.) Walker misunderstands the
proof necessary for a conviction. Criminal intent may be found and inferred based on a person’s
acts. See Wisconsin Jury Instruction – Criminal 2134A (2018) (“You cannot look into a person’s
mind to find intent. Intent must be found, if found at all, from the defendant’s acts, words, and
statements, if any, and from all the facts and circumstances in this case bearing upon intent.”). The
court of appeals reasonably concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Walker’s child
enticement conviction and Walker’s arguments to the contrary fail to show otherwise.
Accordingly, ground one of his petition is without merit.
II.

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals Did Not Unreasonably Apply Controlling Supreme
Court Precedent in Concluding that Trial Counsel Was Not Constitutionally
Ineffective.
The controlling Supreme Court precedent for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To establish a violation of Strickland, a petitioner
must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Thus, the Strickland test requires the petitioner
to establish both (1) deficient performance by counsel and (2) prejudice. Regarding the deficientperformance prong, great deference is given to counsel’s performance, and the petitioner has a
heavy burden to overcome the strong presumption of effective performance. Id. at 689–90;
Coleman v. United States, 318 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2003). This burden requires Walker to
“establish specific acts or omissions of his counsel which constitute ineffective assistance,” to
which this Court then “determine[s] whether these acts or omissions were made outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance.” Coleman, 318 F.3d at 758 (citing Menzer v. United
States, 200 F.3d 1000, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000)). To show prejudice, Walker must demonstrate “that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “The likelihood of a different
result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112 (citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 693). A court need not address both components; if the defendant makes an insufficient
showing on one, the inquiry ends. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
In grounds two through four, Walker alleges trial counsel was ineffective in three separate
ways. In ground two, he alleges that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object during the
closing arguments to an improper “golden rule” argument. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) In ground three,

Walker maintains that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the State’s “role model”
line of questioning. (Id. at 8.) Finally, in ground four, he alleges that trial counsel was deficient
in failing to effectively impeach the alleged victims. (Id. at 9.)
In this case, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied Wisconsin law incorporating the
Strickland two-part test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (ECF No. 8-5
at 7.) The appellate court correctly identified both parts of the test, noting that it required Walker
to “prove: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” (Id. (citing State v. Sholar, 912 N.W. 89, 101 (Wis. 2018).) The appellate
court also correctly explained that Strickland’s prejudice prong required him to show that there is
a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” (Id. (quoting State v. Savage 951 N.W.2d 838, 849 (Wis. 2020).) It
also explained that a reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence
in the outcome.” (Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).) The appellate court then discussed
Walker’s arguments and the relevant evidence and concluded that even if trial counsel’s errors
constituted deficient performance, Walker had “failed to show prejudice as a result of his trial
counsel’s failure.” (Id. at 10–17.)
Because the state court applied the appropriate rule from Strickland, this Court applies an
even higher standard of habeas deference. As the United States Supreme Court emphasized:
The pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the
Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking
whether defense counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s
standard. Were that the inquiry, the analysis would be no different
than if, for example, this Court were adjudicating a Strickland claim
on direct review of a criminal conviction in the United States district
court. Under AEDPA, though, it is a necessary premise that the two
questions are different. For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), “an
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an
incorrect application of federal law.” A state court must be granted
a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case
involves review under the Strickland standard itself.
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (emphases in original) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court
acknowledged that “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task,” and “[e]stablishing
that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more
difficult.” Id. at 105 (citations omitted) (“The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are

both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.”); see also
Woods, 575 U.S. at 316–17 (“[F]or claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, [] AEDPA review
must be doubly deferential in order to afford both the state court and the defense attorney the
benefit of the doubt.”(cleaned up)).
In ground two, Walker argues that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object
to the prosecutor’s closing argument in which he asked the jurors “at least three times” to “place
themselves in the shoe[]s of the alleged victims.” (ECF No. 1 at 7; ECF No. 12 at 12–21.) As the
court of appeals noted, in a criminal case, asking the jurors to consider themselves in the victim’s
shoes is a prohibited “golden rule” argument because it appeals to the jurors’ sympathy for the
victim of the crime. (ECF No. 8-5 at 16 (citing State v. DeLain, 679 N.W.2d 562, 569 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2004).) The court of appeals concluded that trial counsel’s performance in failing to object
to such statements during closing arguments was deficient. (Id.) The court of appeals also
concluded, however, that Walker had failed to show prejudice, noting that “two different victims
who did not know each other testified to almost identical stories about being singled out in middle
school and subjected to specific grooming behavior by Walker and then plied with alcohol and
brutally assaulted.” (Id. at 17 (cleaned up).) Therefore, the appellate court held that there was not
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s improper golden
rule argument, the result of the proceedings would have been different. (Id.)
The issue on habeas review is whether the court of appeals unreasonably applied federal
law when it concluded that any error was not prejudicial. To establish prejudice on habeas, the
defendant must show that no “fairminded jurists could disagree” that the state court’s decision
conflicts with Strickland. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. Walker has not met this high bar. His
suggestion that, but for counsel’s errors, there is a chance the jury might have reached a different
verdict, is not the standard. Because the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply
clearly established Supreme Court precedent in rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, this ground for habeas relief fails.
With respect to ground three, the appellate court concluded that the prosecutor’s “role
model” questions were not improper. After Walker testified on direct examination that his
relationship with Victim 1 and Victim 2 had been one of a “role model” and “father figure,” (ECF
No. 8-8 at 110), the prosecutor asked Walker whether he was being a role model when he
performed sex acts on his victims. (Id. at 141–51.) The prosecutor also asked Walker whether he

was trying to be a role model to two other young boys (not Victim 1 and Victim 2) and he answered
that he was. (Id. at 157–58.) Walker contends such questions were argumentative, misleading,
and accusatory. (ECF No. 12 at 22.) But, as Walker acknowledges, he does not “cite any legal
authority showing the prosecutor’s comments [were] improper.” (Id. at 23.) Walker asserts that
he does not need to come forward with authority supporting his position, but this misunderstands
the habeas standard. If Walker has no legal authority that shows the unreasonableness of the state
court’s decision that the comments were proper, his habeas clam fails. See Stone v. Farley, 86
F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Failure to raise a losing argument, whether at trial or on appeal,
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
Walker also argues that the prosecutor “weaponized the role model line of questions to
insinuate [he] was sexually assaulting” two other boys and this was improper. (ECF No. 12 at 25.)
The court of appeals noted that Walker had specifically testified to being a role model for these
other boys during his direction examination and the prosecutor never implied that Walker had any
sexual contact with these other boys. (ECF No. 8-5 at 16.) The court of appeals’ conclusion that
counsel was not deficient for failing to make a meritless objection was not unreasonable. Walker
speculates that, “Since the jury could have concluded that Walker sexually assaulted [the other
boys] the jury was allowed to use this false insinuation in its deliberations to convict [him].” (ECF
No. 12 at 25.) As noted by Respondent, Walker’s speculation falls far short of his burden to show
that the court of appeals unreasonably applied federal law. (See ECF No. 20 at 18.)
In ground four, Walker argues that his trial counsel failed to effectively impeach Victim 1
and Victim 2. (ECF No. 12 at 26–34.) The trial transcript corroborates that Walker’s attorney
cross-examined Victim 1 extensively, asking why he first told police that the assault occurred in
2012 and then changed it to 2011. (ECF No. 8-7 at 167, 170–71.) She also elicited testimony
from Victim 1 that the detective assigned to the case had reached out to him shortly before trial to
offer to help Victim 1 deal with outstanding citations. (Id. at 174–80.) Walker’s attorney crossexamined Victim 2 as to why his statement to police about which assault happened first differed
from his trial testimony. (Id. at 248–51.) She also asked why he testified that he had slept on a
pull-out couch at the motel, when he had told police he slept on the floor. (Id. at 250.) And she
elicited from Victim 2 that he had never seen Walker with a gun, even though he’d testified he
thought Walker had a gun. (Id. at 251.)

Walker argues that it was deficient performance for counsel to fail to use additional
purported inconsistencies to impeach both witnesses. (ECF No. 12 at 28–34.) The court of appeals
concluded that, “[a]lthough counsel could have cross-examined [Victim 2] with other alleged
inconsistencies, her failure to do so did not render her performance constitutionally inadequate.”
(ECF 8-5 at 13.) Reviewing the transcripts of the trial and of trial counsel’s testimony at the
evidentiary hearing, it explained that counsel “focused on the implausibility of [Victim 1]’s
allegations” and “emphasized [Victim 1]’s possible motive to lie.” (Id. at 14.) It therefore
concluded that counsel’s performance in this regard was not deficient because she “could very
reasonably choose to pursue these arguments instead of summarizing each possible conflict in the
trial testimony.” (Id.)
The court of appeals reasonably concluded that Walker had not established that he was
prejudiced. Counsel inevitably make strategic decisions on the areas for cross examination and
such strategic decisions cannot be second guessed on habeas. The state court’s conclusion that
counsel’s cross examination decisions were reasonable has ample support in the record. This
ground therefore also fails.
In sum, Walker cannot establish that the state appellate court’s decisions on his ineffective
assistance claims were contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Strickland’s
prejudice standards. Nor can Walker demonstrate that the state court’s decision involved an
unreasonable determination of the facts. Walker’s habeas challenges to his counsel’s effectiveness
therefore fails.
III.

Walker’s Claim of Juror Misconduct is Meritless.
Walker’s final argument is that the jury engaged in misconduct and was biased against him

by “deliberat[ing] for only 45 minutes” before finding him guilty on all nine charges, including
child enticement. (ECF No. 12 at 34.) The United States Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant the right to an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI.; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149 (1968) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases
which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee.”). Although Walker cites case law confirming that a jury must be impartial, (ECF No.
12 at 34–37), he offers no factual support that the jurors who convicted him were not impartial or
any argument that the court of appeals unreasonably applied federal law. Walker’s allegations that
the jury “did not weigh the evidence” and was “influenced by impermissible factors” are mere

conclusory assertions. (See ECF No. 12 at 35–36.) As noted by the court of appeals, Walker
simply “infers from the [short] duration of the jury’s deliberations and from the jury finding him
guilty of child enticement that the jury failed to weigh the evidence.” (ECF No. 8-5 at 23.) As the
court of appeals ruled, Walker’s argument “has no basis in law or fact.” (Id.) And, Walker cannot
reasonably infer from the duration of the jury’s deliberations that the jury failed to weigh the
evidence. As the state court noted, “one could also reasonably infer that the evidence supporting
Walker’s convictions was overwhelming.” (Id.) As previously explained, the evidence was
sufficient to support Walker’s child enticement conviction. Walker’s fifth ground for relief is
meritless.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Under Rule 11(a) of the rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court must consider
whether to issue a certificate of appealability. A court may issue a certificate of appealability only
if the applicant makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitution right. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). The standard for making a “substantial showing” is if “reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
declines to issue a certificate of appealability because reasonable jurists could not debate the
Court’s decision to deny the petition on the merits.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Walker’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF
No. 1, is DENIED, and the case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed
to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Walker’s motion for release on bond pending appeal,
ECF No. 24, is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED because the

Court does not find that a reasonable jurist could conclude that the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner, Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin on January 27, 2025.
s/ Brett H. Ludwig
BRETT H. LUDWIG
United States District Judge